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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the procedural democratic legitimacy of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. The Court of Justice has been instrumental 
in the construction of the European Union. Through its interpretation of the Treaty of 
Rome since the 1960s, it has constituted a legal system distinctive in kind. In contrast 
to orthodox instances of the political community – international organisations and 
the nation-state – the EU exemplifies no general type. Its legal, constitutional, 
political, economic and social infrastructures are part of a complex and pervasive 
web of overlapping jurisdictions that goes some way beyond the ordinary 
international organisation (by virtue of constitutional principles such as direct effect 
and citizenship), but not quite as far as the nation-state (e.g. sovereignty 
contestation). This being the case, its interlocutors have long since understood that 
the EU is in a state of transformation – it is itself a project and a process, the end 
result of which (finalité) is unknown. As such, many questions have been asked 
about the legitimacy of this process; and, given the Court of Justice’s (in)famous 
generative role within this process, the Court also finds itself the subject of such 
scrutiny. The legitimacy of the Court of Justice has been the focus of attention from 
both academics and practitioners. Most of that attention has been on the Court’s 
jurisprudence and jurisdiction – scrutinising the legal reasoning of cases; or 
questioning the limits of its constitutional functions according to axiomatic 
conceptions of, for example, the separation of powers doctrine. By contrast, less 
attention has been paid to the democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice, and 
much less in relation to the Court’s institutional design. 
 
The subject-matter of the analysis in this thesis is the Court’s structures and 
processes, such as: the composition and appointments processes for members of the 
Court; the mechanisms that give access to various kinds of participants (such as 
locus standi and third-party intervention); and the use of judicial chambers. 
Procedural democratic legitimacy, moreover, has two dimensions: intrinsic and 
instrumental. The intrinsic is a measure of the democratic credentials of the Court as 
a discrete decision-making authority (such as representativeness and democratic 
participation); whereas the instrumental is concerned with the ways in which the 
Court contributes to the overall democratic legitimacy of the EU. In this thesis, the 
structures and processes of the Court of Justice are examined in light of both of those 
criteria. In contrast to prevailing approaches of constitutional theorists – who tend to 
treat these criteria as functions that are quite discrete, and their performance as 
mutually exclusive – an important theoretical contribution of this thesis is to develop 
an analytical framework that allows for the inherent synergies and tensions that exist 
between intrinsic and instrumental criteria to be factored into analyses of the 
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I think it is not unreasonable to assert that the role of courts has, or should have, 
something to do with the realities of democracy. Properly organized, it is through 
them that the individual can play a larger and more significant part of government 
while gaining a greater sense of security.1 
 
    
The Court of Justice of the European Union2 is an exceptional institution within an 
exceptional political community. This is not somehow to convey a sense of 
endorsement of the Court of Justice and its contribution to the EU. Rather, it is to 
highlight the sheer distinctiveness of both the Court and the EU – as distinct from 
more familiar instances of constitutional-type courts functioning within equally 
familiar types of political communities, especially nation-states. The Court of Justice 
and the EU – as profound exceptions to these orthodoxies – thus present compelling 
subject-matter for inter-disciplinary research, such as the research of this thesis. And 
it is this sense of distinctiveness that runs as a guiding motif throughout the various 
arguments and analyses presented here. 
 
As alluded to by the above quotation, this research focuses on the democratic role of 
the Court of Justice within the EU. The primary research question is: is the Court of 
Justice democratically legitimate? This is itself a complex analytical question, and, 
again, as the above quotation indicates, the democratic legitimacy of courts is, in a 
large part, guided by a notion of their role within the political community for which 
they function. There are thus two aspects to the analysis here: democratic legitimacy 
as exemplified by the Court of Justice assessed on its own terms (what I term 
standards of intrinsic democratic legitimacy); and democratic legitimacy with respect 
to the various ways in which the Court responds and contributes to the broader 
democratic ordering of the EU as a political community (instrumental democratic 
legitimacy). These two aspects do not, moreover, represent unrelated or alternative 
methodological approaches i.e. they do not present two different sets of answers in 
relation to the primary research question. Rather, each perspective – the intrinsic and 
the instrumental – is informed by the other. And it is precisely this inherent 
methodological interaction between (intrinsic) democratic notions of the Court and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Mitchell, “Why European Institutions?” (Nov, 1968) University of Edinburgh Inaugural 
Lecture No. 39 (hereinafter Mitchell, 1968): 11. 
2 Hereinafter the Court of Justice, the Court, or the CJEU.  





(instrumental) democratic conditions of the EU that gives such emphasis and 
analytical relevance to the distinctiveness of both the Court and the EU.    
 
Why are these questions interesting and to whom are they of interest? At one level, 
this research fits within the very densely packed analytical terrain associated with the 
study of the European integration project. Within that area of enquiry – naturally 
prone to multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary research – there are two sub-
branches in particular to which this research makes a contribution. First, there is an 
historically rich literature that has devoted its attention to the more general concern 
of the legitimacy of the Court of Justice – focussing, more specifically, on its 
jurisprudential output; its putatively “activist” decisions and legal reasoning. This 
analytical terrain is dominated by constitutional and legal scholars and jurists, whose 
analytical attention tends to focus on canons of legal reasoning and axiomatic notions 
of constitutional propriety, such as the separation of powers doctrine. Within those 
debates, there has been very little attention paid to democratic legitimacy as a 
yardstick against which the Court’s role and contributions can be measured.  
 
An important second branch is located within the political science and political 
theory realms of European integration research – in particular, the controversies 
surrounding the EU’s putative “democratic deficit”. Within that literature, there are 
two important, and related, contributions to be made by this thesis. The first arises 
out of that literature’s demonstrable neglect of the Court of Justice as a relevant 
institution for its analyses. Invariably, proponents and opponents of the deficit-thesis 
employ empirical observations in relation to the EU’s overtly political institutions 
(namely, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament) in 
support of their claims. The second contribution to be made to that literature relates 
to prevailing methodological problems associated with analysing the sui generic 
political community that is the EU. Such problems manifest themselves in diagnoses 
of the EU’s democratic credentials, such that empirical appraisals of the EU’s 
institutions tend to be founded on shaky analytical premises. The approach in this 
research is to make explicit the salient and distinctive polity-conditions of the EU 
towards establishing a coherent analytical framework with which to undertake a 





methodologically sound empirical analysis of the democratic legitimacy of the Court 
of Justice. 
 
Beyond European integration studies, this research contributes to similarly densely 
packed debates at a theoretical level – in particular, to the theoretical debates on the 
democratic legitimacy and roles of constitutional courts; or, more broadly, theories 
of judicial governance. Methodologically, these debates tend to frame their analyses 
according to theories of legal reasoning and theories of constitutionalism. On the 
former, there are those who propose or oppose the idea that there are democratic 
ways for judges in constitutional courts to interpret constitutional law: counter-
majoritarian arguments; protecting inviolable socio-political conditions of 
democracy; and sociological responsiveness to public interests, inter alia. There are 
also those that propose or oppose the idea that a constitutional court has the mandate 
to do any of the above on the basis of constitutional orthodoxies such as the 
separation of powers. These latter debates take shape most prominently within the 
opposition between the so-called political constitutionalists and legal 
constitutionalists. The former, in general terms, oppose the degree of interpretative 
discretion that constitutional judges ought to have in the first place, regardless of any 
“face-saving” methods of interpretation. Their arguments are premised on the idea 
that constitutional courts are simply not structured and designed according to basic 
and salient precepts of democratic institutional configuration. A typical, though 
somewhat trite, example of such an argument is that “judges are not elected by the 
people”.  
 
In relation to these theoretical debates, there are two primary contributions – again, 
related – being made here. The first is that, by contrast to the two prevalent analytical 
approaches, this thesis assesses the democratic legitimacy of constitutional courts 
(e.g. the Court of Justice) at the structural and procedural levels, via a substantive 
examination of (EU) law. It is not an empirical examination of the constitutional 
court’s juridical output i.e. what it can, or has, contributed to the democratic ordering 





of the political community for which it functions.3 Nor is it a theory of legal 
reasoning, which argues how a constitutional court’s judges ought to interpret law 
democratically.4 Further still, it is not an examination of how a constitutional court 
safeguards the democratic structures and processes of overtly political institutions of 
the broader political community.5 This thesis looks directly at the Court of Justice’s 
structures, procedures and processes, and assesses how they are democratic in both 
intrinsic and instrumental terms. The structural aspects being examined include, inter 
alia: the composition, appointment and performance of incumbent members of the 
Court (primarily the Judges and the Advocates-General); the mechanisms that give 
access to various kinds of participants; the formation of judicial chambers; and the 
division of judicial labour between the EU courts (i.e. the General Court and the 
Civil Service Tribunal; but also the national courts and tribunals of the Member 
States). The procedural aspects being examined include: the jurisdiction of the Court; 
the actions that the Court is competent to hear (such as annulment proceedings and 
preliminary rulings); enforcement mechanisms; and generic procedural mechanisms 
(such as the provision of legal aid and translation services). In other words, this 
thesis explores the procedural democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice. 
 
The second theoretical contribution responds to the prevalent and pervasive 
methodological approach of the debates in relying on particular constitutional 
orthodoxies, and, related to that, neglecting to appraise normatively the democratic 
structuring of political institutions with the necessary sensitivity to distinctive-polity 
conditions. Again, this is where the exceptionality motif shines through. The 
constitutional orthodoxies referred to above relate to the familiar analytical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Consider, for example, the Court’s contribution in Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [1990] ECR 
I-2041 (hereinafter Chernobyl), in which the Court interpreted Article 173 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community (1957), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm 
(hereinafter TEEC) (now Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2010) 
OJ C 83/47 (hereinafter TFEU)) in such a way as to grant standing to the European Parliament 
(hereinafter the EP) in actions of judicial review of (what is now) Union Acts (insofar as the EP was 
to be able to protect its legislative prerogatives).  
4 See, for example, Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution: 
Judges and Law Beyond Constitutive Power, London and New York: Routledge, 2009 (hereinafter 
Everson and Eisner, 2009): Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  
5 Consider, for example, the Court of Justice’s decision in Case C-294/83 Parti Ecologiste “Les 
Verts” v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 (hereinafter Les Verts), in which the Court safeguarded the 
procedural and substantive rights of political parties participating in elections to the EP.  





frameworks that guide the democratic ordering of contemporary western states: the 
separation of powers doctrine; the rule of law; partisan representative politics, etc. 
These conceptual tools, though applicable, have been constructed against the 
backdrop of the modern manifestation of the political community i.e. the 
Westphalian nation-state. The tendency to use these concepts as analytical premises 
robs appraisals of the democratic legitimacy of political institutions, more generally, 
and constitutional courts, more specifically, of theoretically coherent and robust 
precepts with which to evaluate those institutions; and all the more so in the sui 
generic context of the EU. The solution offered here is to incorporate into the 
analytical framework a conceptual way of understanding the democratic legitimacy 
of institutions – in particular, judicial institutions – with the necessary sensitivity to 
the distinctiveness of each polity-context in mind.  
 
How do these methodological approaches help, ultimately, to answer the principal 
question on the procedural democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice? There is no 
real quantifiable sense in which we can say institutions are, or are not, democratic – 
there is no objective standard or measurement whereby we can say, for example, “the 
Court of Justice is 72% democratic.” Instead, the argument here will be to point out 
the various ways in which the Court’s structures and processes meet, and fall short of 
meeting, the precepts of democratic legitimacy. Moreover, this analysis examines the 
Court’s structures and processes in light of both intrinsic criteria (self-standing 
standards and exemplification of democratic legitimacy) and instrumental criteria 
(the functional role of the Court within the EU) of democratic legitimacy.  
 
The argument begins by outlining its intellectual contribution to existing scholarship. 
In Chapter One, the “activism literature” is reviewed. The activism literature 
examines the legitimacy of the Court of Justice from what I refer to as an intrinsic 
perspective – assessing the legitimacy of the Court as a discrete decision-making 
authority – as opposed to assessing its instrumental legitimacy (assessing the 
legitimacy of the Court in terms of how it legitimises the EU). Given that one of the 
main aims of this thesis is to analyse the democratic legitimacy of the Court from an 
intrinsic perspective, the activism literature is one to which this thesis contributes. 





We see that the activism literature has two principal analytical approaches to intrinsic 
questions: evaluation of the Court according to theories of legal reasoning; and 
examination according to theories of EU constitutionalism. The former approach 
examines the different methods the Court’s Judges use, or should use, when 
interpreting indeterminate Union law. The latter approach examines, or makes 
normative claims on, the functions of the Court depending on a theory of EU 
constitutionalism – a theory on what the EU is, or should be, as a polity; and, 
consequently, a theory on which institutions constitutional supremacy is, or should 
be, held by (national or EU institutions). Within this literature, there are only very 
minor and tangential arguments or analyses made relating to the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court. We see a few examples of theories of democratic legal 
reasoning – the Court as a responsive institution; and the Court that adjudicates 
according a citizen-oriented paradigm of constitutional justice. Yet there is much less 
in relation to the structures and processes of the Court, which is the subject-matter of 
this thesis.  
 
Chapter Two has two objectives. The first, like Chapter One, is to clarify the 
intellectual contribution of this thesis by reviewing one of the key literatures to 
which it contributes. Whereas in Chapter One the analyses which review the Court’s 
structures and processes from an intrinsic democratic perspective are addressed, in 
Chapter Two I look at the literature in which contributions on the instrumental 
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice are made. In this regard, the debates 
over the EU’s putative “democratic deficit” are particularly relevant to discussions 
on the instrumental roles of the EU’s institutions: how do the Union’s institutions 
contribute to the democratic legitimacy of the EU as a polity? We see that there is a 
variety of analytical approaches and schools of thought, but that there is a 
demonstrable neglect of the Court of Justice within that literature. The second 
objective of this Chapter is to identify the salient characteristics of the EU that are 
relevant for the analysis of the procedural democratic legitimacy of the Court of 
Justice. This is because, as is explained in Chapter Three, analysing the procedural 
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice (or, indeed, any Union institution) is 
sensitive to the underlying polity-conditions of the EU. In this regard, I argue that 





there are three salient conditions of EU constitutionalism: the complexity of the EU 
as a polity; the contestation over the nature of the EU; and the ever-changing nature 
of the EU (the three C’s of EU constitutionalism).  
 
In Chapter Three, an analytical framework is presented within which the procedural 
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice can be examined. As we have seen, 
procedural democratic legitimacy is understood in two ways: intrinsic (the 
democratic credentials of the Court as a discrete decision-making authority) and 
instrumental (the ways in which the Court contributes to the democratic functioning 
of the EU). One of the key contributions of this thesis is to argue that, at a theoretical 
level, constitutional courts ought to be designed according to the intrinsic virtues of 
democratic legitimacy in a way that is balanced against their instrumental 
requirements. The purpose of this Chapter is to clarify precisely how these analytical 
perspectives will be used to examine the Court’s structures and processes. This 
clarification is necessary given the demonstrable complexity involved in analysing 
courts in this way, and because of the distinctive complexity involved in doing so for 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. To that end, the notion of trusteeship is 
adopted to provide an important conceptual grounding. The idea of the trustee-
institution explains – in terms of constitutional and political theory – the legitimate 
administration of delegated regulatory decision-making in non-majoritarian 
institutions, such as constitutional courts. Owing to the virtuous fiduciary 
relationship between trustee-institutions and their beneficiaries (the public) – as laid 
down through agreed upon rules by the settlors of the trust – trustee-institutions are 
endowed with significant discretion with which to exercise regulatory decision-
making in a responsive (and so, democratic) way. Given this foundational 
framework, and in order to avoid methodological pitfalls associated with democratic 
specification, democracy is defined as an inclusive process of governance of the 
people, for the people and by the people. I then consider precisely how the intrinsic 
and instrumental criteria of democratic legitimacy fit into that framework – 
addressing the inherent conceptual complexities; and the complexities associated 
with specifying this analytical framework given the sui generic characteristics of the 
EU. In doing so, I provide an outline of how the argument of this thesis unfolds in 





the remaining chapters, which empirically examine the Court’s structures and 
processes in light of the analytical framework presented in Chapter Three.  
 
Chapter Four considers how the Court is supported by various structures and 
processes in meeting its core instrumental objectives: specifically, how the structures 
and processes of the Court bolster its institutional independence and insulation from 
interference by extraneous political forces, such that it can adjudicate sufficiently 
impartially. We see that the deeply contested nature of the EU justifies the Court of 
Justice, in comparison to other constitutional courts (national and transnational), 
being strongly insulated from ex ante and ex post political influences, because of the 
demonstrable threat to judicial independence posed by the EU’s politically 
heterogeneous and multiple constituencies e.g. its 27 Member States, inter alia. 
  
Chapter Five and Chapter Six move on to consider the intrinsic virtues of democratic 
legitimacy: representativeness (Chapter Five) and participation (Chapter Six). The 
underlying normative rationale of intrinsic virtues is institutional responsiveness to 
public interests, and what we are concerned with here are the structural and 
procedural mechanisms by which salient affected public interests are identified by 
the Court of Justice, which is the province of representativeness and participation. 
 
In Chapter Five, I address the intrinsic virtue of representativeness in the Court of 
Justice – assessing the extent to which, and the precise manner in which, its 
structures and processes exemplify that virtue. The underlying rationale of 
representativeness is that it is a mechanism by which public interests can be 
identified in an holistic or aggregated sense. What are the primary political cleavages 
that emerge from within the polity, generally; and, more specifically, how do those 
contests manifest themselves within constitutional disputes? The structures and 
processes of the Court are argued to be aligned with the holistic, aggregated public 
interests of the EU. Moreover, we see that, given the strength of 
intergovernmentalism within the complex mélange of ordering principles of 
constitutional design in the EU, representation in the Court of Justice is achieved by 
balancing structures and processes that are representative of national legal traditions 





(such as common law, inquisitorial, and federal systems) with those that represent an 
emerging, autonomous Union legal culture. 
 
Chapter Six then moves on to the issue of disaggregated or special interests. In other 
words, beyond the salient holistic matters of political contestation that are 
represented in the Court of Justice, how are the more particular, disaggregated or 
special interests that are manifested disparately among the many categories of public 
actors (e.g. from within civil society) identified by the Court of Justice? This Chapter 
considers structural and procedural mechanisms that give access to different actors in 
order that they may express their arguments and viewpoints on how their affected-
interests should be dealt with by the Court of Justice in its constitutional 
adjudication. We see that democratic participation in the Court is achieved through 
various mechanisms of access to judicial review (such as rules of standing, and third 
party intervention). The discussion then turns to examine the degree to which civil 
society actors, and national and Union actors, can gain access to the Court of Justice 
by virtue of the Court’s procedural rules, concluding that access for civil society 
actors is significantly more restricted than for national and Union actors (the 
“privileged” actors). The discussion then normatively appraises the relative degrees 
of access afforded to these actors, emphasising how our (contested) understanding of 
the EU polity and finalité informs that analysis. It is argued, first, that the Union’s 
commitment to an intergovernmental organisational logic, and its countervailing 
supranationalist posturing, justifies the privileged degree of institutional access 
apportioned to the governments of the Member States and the Union’s institutions. I 
then go on to consider the weaker position of civil society actors, and consider 
whether or not this is justified. It is argued, first, from a comparative perspective, that 
civil society actors (natural and legal persons) have an unusually high degree of 
access to the Court of Justice when compared to national supreme or constitutional 
courts, as well as other transnational courts. Furthermore, under the rubric of “civil 
society”, the problematic group is not individuals, but interest groups. It is thus 
argued that these actors are entitled to greater access because of the Union’s 
democratic deficits that exist within its legislative and administrative infrastructure; 
and also because, in the Union, as a sui generic polity, the domains of “politics” and 





“law” are functionally intertwined in such a way that requires its legal institutions to 
be more democratic and, thus, participatory. 
 
The thesis concludes by summarising the overall findings of the research. I argue that 
the overall picture is a positive one – that the Court fulfils the functions of a trustee-
court respectably by meeting the criteria of procedural democratic legitimacy. This is 
to suggest neither that the Court – or courts in general – should be the focus of 
democratic ordering in polities, nor that there is no room for improvement. Rather, 
the extent to which Court’s structures and processes satisfy the criteria of procedural 
democratic legitimacy tend to outweigh the ways they do not. 
        Chapter One 









The purpose of this Chapter is to review the literature which assesses the legitimacy 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This literature – referred to here as the 
activist literature – is one of the key fields to which this thesis contributes. The aim 
in this Chapter is to categorise the arguments and viewpoints into schools of thought 
that account for this discursive terrain (Section 2). It is demonstrated that there are 
two principal analytical approaches in this literature: evaluation of the legal 
reasoning of the Court of Justice; and evaluation of the Court’s constitutional role 
within the EU. The boundaries of the discourse will then be critically assessed in 
order to determine the shortfalls and gaps that exist in the literature, with a view to 
placing this thesis into its discursive context and clarifying its intellectual 
contribution (Section 3). It is demonstrated that within these analytical approaches, 
and their schools of thought, insufficient attention has been paid to questions on the 
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice.  
 
 
2. The Activism Literature: Analytical Approaches and Schools of Thought 
 
This Section examines the literature which assesses the legitimacy of the Court of 
Justice.6 This body of literature is referred to as the “activism literature”, since its 
core question is the extent to which the Court is legitimately performing its role 
(however defined). Since the purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court of Justice, the activism debate is an important literature to 
which it contributes.7 The term “activism” is a loaded term, since it suggests right 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The literature reviewed here does not include institutional commentary from governmental, quasi-
governmental or judicial bodies, writing in their institutional capacity. That literature is referenced in 
later Chapters of this thesis – as it informs particular structural or procedural arguments. Instead, this 
review focuses only on academic literature.  
7 The other important contribution of this thesis is the subject-matter of the analysis: the structures and 
processes of the Court of Justice. As will be seen in Chapters Four, Five and Six, the existing 
literature on the structures and processes of the Court is fragmented – tending to analyse only one or a 
few structures or processes at a time from a range of analytical perspectives. See, for example, 
Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 
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away that the Court is adjudicating illegitimately. Nevertheless, I shall use it here 
given its definitional function and general cognisability. 
 
There are, broadly, two principal analytical approaches to the legitimacy question. 
First, there are analyses that focus on theories of interpretation, which seek to assess 
the legitimacy of the Court’s legal reasoning according to varying criteria of judicial 
interpretive methods. Second, there are analyses that focus on the constitutional role 
of the Court, which seek to identify the appropriate function(s) of the Court 
according to varying conceptions of EU constitutionalism – is it, for example, a 
constitutional court in the orthodox sense?  The two analytical approaches are not, 
moreover, mutually exclusive. It is quite common, for example, for arguments 
explicitly pertaining to a theory of interpretation to be implicitly informed by a 
particular theory of EU constitutionalism. In this Section, the various schools of 
thought which fall into these analytical approaches will be outlined. In Section 3, 
they will be critically assessed in light of their shortcomings with respect to 
arguments from the perspective of democratic legitimacy.  
 
 
2.1. Theories of Interpretation  
 
There are four schools of thought which assess the legitimacy of the Court of Justice 
in terms of legal reasoning. The schools are presented in the following order: the 
school of literal interpretation; the teleological school; the Razian school; and the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(hereinafter Arnull, 2006); and Paul Craig, “The Jurisdiction of the Community Courts 
Reconsidered”, in de Búrca and Weiler (Eds), The European Court of Justice, Oxford University 
Press, 2001 (hereinafter Craig, 2001). The focus in this literature review is, by contrast, on the 
conceptual perspectives adopted (such as democracy or legal reasoning) when systematically 
evaluating the legitimacy of the Court.  
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2.1.1. The School of Literal Interpretation 
 
The first school of thought holds that the Court must adhere strictly to a literal 
interpretation of EU law. Proponents of this idea do not believe that the Court has, or 
should have, any creative leeway in interpreting the EU’s legal texts. Their argument 
is that the Court is bound to give effect to, and only to, precise and unambiguous 
legal language. Further to this, where the wording is ambiguous or unclear in some 
way, the Court is, or should be, prohibited from imputing any meaning. Two key 
advocates of this school of thought are Neill and Hartley. In his 1995 “Case Study in 
Judicial Activism”,8 Neill indicts the Court for having flagrantly interpreted the 
Treaty establishing the European Community9 (now, the TFEU) with a missionary 
zeal:   
 
The ECJ has indulged in ‘creative jurisprudence’ on many occasions. The Treaty 
texts and directives agreed between the Member States may at any time be given by 
the Court a meaning and impetus that may not have been contemplated by the 
negotiators …10  
 
This is a view that Hartley shares and has expanded.11 Hartley categorised two forms 
of “extra-textual interpretations”: “rulings outside the text” and “rulings contrary to 
the text”, both of which are deemed “activist” and, thus, illegitimate.12 Both Hartley 
and Neill examined the Court’s most influential early constitutional jurisprudence – 
the seminal Vand Gend en Loos13 and Costa v ENEL14 jurisprudence – to support 
their claims. They held that the judicially-created doctrines of direct effect and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Patrick Neill, “The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism”, published in the 
Minutes of Evidence, House of Lords Sub-Committee on the IGC (Session 1994-95, 18th Report, HL 
Paper 88: 218-52); and published in London: European Policy Forum Frankfurt: Frankfurter Institut, 
1995 (hereinafter Neill, 1995). 
9 Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community (1992) OJ C 224/06 
(hereinafter TEC (pre-Nice)). 
10 Neill, 1995: 1, 2. 
11 Trevor Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European 
Union” (1996) Law Quarterly Review Vol. 112 95 (hereinafter Hartley, 1996). 
12 Hartley, 1996: 96. 
13 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos (NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming) v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 97 (hereinafter Van Gend en Loos).  
14 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (hereinafter Costa v ENEL).  
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supremacy were clear examples of the Court imputing a meaning into the (then) 
TEEC, which had made no provision for either of those principles i.e. “outside the 
text” interpretations.  
 
There are two (related) problems with these arguments. The first is that they are 
based on a parochial theory of legal reasoning. To argue that judges must only give 
effect to clear and unambiguous legal text, and must not impute any meaning to such 
legal text, is both disingenuous and ignores a very rich literature in legal theory on 
the legal reasoning of judges.15 Much of that literature is premised on the notion that 
unclear and ambiguous legal texts, from whatever authoritative source, are 
inevitable; and that it is moreover a necessary part of the judge’s duty to give 
meaning to such legal texts. Such an analytical premiss – the inevitability of 
ambiguous legal texts (legal indeterminacy) – is a relatively uncontroversial claim, 
and a commonplace understanding for those working in legal scholarship and legal 
practice.16  
 
The second problem with their arguments builds on the first. It is that the issue of 
legal indeterminacy is amplified in the context of EU law. Tridimas makes this point 
well in his contribution to the “activism” debate.17 Here, he refers to the open-
textured nature of EU law (especially the Treaties18) i.e. that EU law is inherently 
and necessarily drafted in such a way that gives rise to greater degrees of legal 
indeterminacy.19 He elaborates on this by presenting reasons why the EU legal texts 
should not be relied on in the same way as, for example, the text of English statutes. 
This is because of the style of drafting of the former, and its inherent multi-lingual 
nature. He contrasts the Treaties’ style of drafting with that of English statutes; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This literature is discussed in greater depth in Chapter Three. An example of an important and 
pertinent contribution is Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994 (hereinafter MacCormick, 1994). 
16 See Lord Goff in Woolwich Building Society v IRC (No 2) [1992] 3 All ER 737. 
17 Takis Tridimas, “The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism” (1996) European Law Review Vol. 21 
199 (hereinafter Tridimas, 1996): 203, 204. 
18 Then, the Treaty on European Union (1992) OJ C 224/02 (hereinafter TEU (pre-Nice)); and the 
TEC (pre-Nice).  
19 This point is of analytical significance for the arguments made in this thesis, and will be addressed 
in greater depth in Chapter Three. 
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unlike the latter, they take their form from a Civilian tradition of deliberately 
imprecise, codified, broad statements of principle. In addition to this, Tridimas notes 
that the process by which the substantive content of the Treaties was decided was a 
compromise between the competing policy views of Member States, which required 
unanimity and thus broader articulations in the hope that they would be narrowed 
down by the Court of Justice.20 Moreover, the multiplicity of official languages of 
the (then) Community reduced any sense of objective authority of the wording of the 
Treaties. It should be noted that all of these considerations have even greater weight 
today in the juridically, politically, territorially and linguistically expanded EU. It is 
for these reasons that Tridimas argues that the Union’s judiciary ought not to rely so 
heavily on the wording of the Treaties when performing its interpretive duty.21 
 
It is rare, however, for scholars to defend such a disingenuous view so 
dogmatically.22 Yet the literal school represents an important point of departure from 
which scholars can argue for different methods of legitimate judicial interpretation of 
indeterminate legal text. The remainder of Section 2.1 will outline three schools of 
thought which all share, to varying degrees, the “inevitability” postulate; and share 




2.1.2. The Teleological School of Thought 
 
The teleological school of thought (as with the following schools) seeks to fill the 
void of open-textured EU law according to a method of judicial interpretation.23 A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Tridimas, 1996: 204.  
21 See also Anthony Arnull, “The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A Reply to Professor 
Hartley” (1996) Law Quarterly Review Vol. 112 411 (hereinafter Arnull, 1996). See also Pierre 
Pescatore, “The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of Community Law” (1983) European 
Law Review Vol. 8 155 (hereinafter Pescatore, 1983).  
22 Hartley does propose “justifications” for the Court’s interpretive behaviour (pp. 102-109). These 
only account, however, for counter-arguments to his thesis rather than suggest a workable alternative 
thesis. He ultimately rejects them in any event.  
23 Article 19 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (2010) OJ C 83/13 (hereinafter TEU) provides that 
the Court is to “ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.” 
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teleological method of interpretation is an interpretive method by which the Judges 
of the Court of Justice fill in the blanks of indeterminate Union law according to a 
particular vision of what the EU is, or what the EU is to become – a telos.24 Tridimas 
puts it in the following way: 
 
Where issues are raised before the Court on which the text of the Treaty provides 
little or no guidance, the Court takes into consideration … the objectives of the 
Treaty and it is a specific application of the teleological method of interpretation…25 
 
A familiar example is the Court’s instrumental use of the preamble to the Treaties. 
Most notably and recognisable is the drafters’ resolve “to continue the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (emphasis added) – a 
commitment that has survived since the inaugural Treaty of Rome. 26  So, in 
Pescatore’s (a former ECJ judge) view, this part of the preamble is an important 
“structural element” that permits the Judges to interpret indeterminate Union law in 
such a way as to further European integration.27  
 
As alluded to above, however, European integration is itself a broad church, and can 
be broken down into a variety of teleologies.28 In this part of the Chapter, I will 
demonstrate two examples: variations of a federal EU; and variations of an 
intergovernmental EU.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 What the EU is or what it is to become is itself a complex issue (addressed in Chapter Two). 
25 Tridimas, 1996: 208.  
26  The Treaty of Rome, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf. See, now, 
Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on Establishing the 
European Community (2007) OJ C 306/01 (hereinafter the Lisbon Treaty); and the preamble to the 
TEU. 
27 See generally Pescatore, 1983. Indeed, in a critical reply to Hartley (Hartley, 1996), Arnull argues 
that “[t]he Court can hardly be criticised for striving to construe the Treaty in a way which gives 
effect to its authors’ overall design” (Arnull, 1996: 413). See also Hans Kutscher, “Methods of 
Interpretation: As Seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice” (September, 1976) Judicial Academic and 
Conference; Luxembourg; Court of Justice of the European Communities Vol. I 1 (hereinafter 
Kutscher, 1976). 
28 It is by virtue of the frequency with which the preamble’s “ever closer union” leitmotif is used, 
judicially and academically, that such a variety of, and often competing, visions of European 
integration have taken shape in the Court’s legitimacy discourse. 
29 For an alternative telos, see Renaud Dehousse, The European Court of Justice: the Politics of 
Judicial Integration, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998. Dehousse argues for a teleological approach of 
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Visions of the EU as a federal or quasi-federal polity date back to its inception. For 
Koopmans, this political paradigm pertains to the inaugural Jean Monnet philosophy 
of a federal Europe: complete with an integrated economy; common political 
institutions; and peaceful international relations.30 Indeed, this is the teleological 
basis for Mancini and Keeling’s theory of interpretation. 31  Based also on the 
preamble to the Treaty, they envisage a European polity that is based on the rule of 
law and parliamentary democracy, which has been transmitted to the constitutional 
structuring of the EU by the objectives set out in the Treaty as if it were a “genetic 
code”.32 Following this logic, they consider that an important role of the Court is to 
protect and preserve the institutional balance of the EU (in terms of an orthodox 
conception of the separation of powers doctrine i.e. executive, legislative and judicial 
organs of state). In their view, then, the Court’s interpretation of Article 173 TEEC 
(now Article 263 TFEU) in Chernobyl was legitimate. In that case, the Court decided 
that the European Parliament should be granted locus standi in the Treaty’s 
annulment procedure, in spite of the Treaty’s silence on the issue, and a prior ruling 
by the Court to the contrary.33 Methodologically, their argument is premised on the 
Court’s duty to interpret “the law” (qua Article 19 (1) TEU) in line with a 
teleological view of the EU as a federal polity.34 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
judicial interpretation towards the ends of “market integration” i.e. the single market. See also 
Stephen Weatherill, “Law and the Economic Objectives of the Union” (Chapter Nine) in Cases & 
Materials on EU Law (9th Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 (hereinafter Weatherill, 
2010); and Niamh Nic Shuibhne, “The Free Movement of Goods and Article 28 EC: An Evolving 
Framework” (2002) European Law Review  Vol. 27 No. 4 408 (hereinafter Nic Shuibhne, 2002). Nic 
Shuibhne argues that the Court has continued to rigourously develop the jurisprudence on Article 28 
TEC (now Article 34 TFEU) so as to further the process of market integration by giving pride of place 
to the notion of “market access” in justifying its decisions. 
30 Thijmen Koopmans, “The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integration” (1986) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 35 925 (hereinafter Koopmans, 1986): 925. 
31 Federico Mancini and David Keeling, “Democracy and the European Court of Justice”, (1994) 
Modern Law Review Vol. 57 No. 2 175 (hereinafter Mancini and Keeling, 1994). 
32 Mancini and Keeling, 1994: 186. 
33 Case 302/87 Parliament v Council [1988] ECR 5615 (hereinafter Comitology). In the aftermath of 
these jurisprudential developments, the EP was formally granted this privilege by subsequent Treaty 
amendments. See, most recently, Article 263 (2) TFEU.  
34 A similar analysis is presented by Komarek in relation to the Treaty’s Preliminary Rulings 
procedure (Article 267 TFEU). See Jan Komarek, “In the Court(s) we Trust? On the Need for 
Hierarchy and Differentiation in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure” (2007) European Law Review 
Vol. 32 No. 4 467 (hereinafter Komarek, 2007). 
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As we shall see in Section 2.2 of this Chapter, and in Chapter Two especially, there 
is a divisive controversy over whether or not a federal telos is legitimate. Standing in 
direct contention with that vision is the view that the EU is, and should remain, an 
intergovernmental association. Likewise, variations of the intergovernmental vision 
influence the views taken on legitimate judicial interpretation. An example of a 
debate in which this controversy arose was on the (now, since Lisbon, largely 
resolved) “depillarisation” of Union law.35 Given that the division between the three 
pillars had a natural inclination to overlap, the Court of Justice’s incidental 
involvement in adjudicating on matters that did not squarely fall into its jurisdiction 
became a contested matter. Those that hold an intergovernmental view of the EU 
argue that the Judges should avoid interpreting the Treaty36 in such a way that allows 
the Court to adjudicate on matters falling outwith its jurisdiction. Nicol forecasted 
the suitability of the Court extending supremacy (qua Costa v ENEL) to the EU’s 
(former) 2nd and 3rd pillar jurisdictions. He rejected the claims that the Court ought to 
extend this principle, because of an underlying intergovernmental teleological 
rationale.37 Contrary to this view, analysing a case of a similar nature,38 Tridimas 
approves of the Court’s reasoning in that it accords with teleological “policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Prior to the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the jurisdiction of the EU 
was structured under three “pillars”: the first pillar was the largely supranational European 
Community, under which the Court of Justice was endowed with significant powers of judicial 
review; the second and third pillars related to matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(hereinafter the CFSP), and the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (hereinafter the AFSJ), 
respectively. The second and third pillars were intergovernmental in nature, and the Court of Justice 
had limited powers with respect to the third pillar (see Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union 
(2006) OJ C 321 E/5 (hereinafter TEU (pre-Lisbon)); and even fewer with respect to the second pillar. 
Whilst the Lisbon Treaty formally abolished the Union’s pillar structure (symbolically at least), the 
divisions of jurisdiction and the Court’s powers remain functionally similar in some respects. For a 
detailed overview of this evolution, see Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials (5th Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2011 (hereinafter Craig and de Búrca, 2011): 
Chapter One. For the jurisdiction of the Court now, see Appendix One. 
36 Specifically, Article 40 TEU (ex Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon)), which provides that the Union’s 
putatively intergovernmental competences (i.e. the former second and third pillars) “shall not affect 
the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the 
Treaties for the exercise of” the Union’s supranational competences (i.e. the former first or 
Community pillar), over which the Court of Justice has significant supervisory powers. 
37 Danny Nicol, “Democracy, Supremacy and the ‘Intergovernmental’ Pillars of the European Union”, 
(2009) Public Law Apr 218 (hereinafter Nicol, 2009): 219. Nicol justifies this view on the basis that 
the Member States of the EU specifically wished to avoid the supremacy and supranationality of these 
competences – as can be elicited, in Nicol’s view, from legislative deliberations. 
38 Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities Case, [2005] ECR 
II-3649 (hereinafter Kadi). 
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perspectives”.39 One of the issues under consideration was the extent to which the 
open texture of Article 308 TEC40 could allow for counter-terrorist sanctions to be 
applicable to individuals vis-à-vis Community regulations. Whilst disagreeing with 
some of the Court’s arguments, he concurs with the decision that the Community had 
such a competence given that “[t]he making of counter-terrorist policy, its 
implementation via binding legal measures, and its actual enforcement stand a much 
higher chance of being successful if they are coordinated at supra-national level.”41  
 
 
2.1.3. The Razian School of Thought 
 
As its name suggests, the analytical approach of proponents of this school of thought 
resonates with an important contribution to legal theory by Joseph Raz: specifically, 
Raz’s theory of the conceptual nature of the rule of law, which aptly describes the 
sorts of arguments that are often presented when defending a position on the 
legitimacy of the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice. Raz’s theory of the rule of 
law has been described as “formal”42 and “legalistic”.43 It is a theory that eschews 
political philosophies as underpinning the true nature of the rule of law,44 and instead 
postulates that the rule of law is systemic – intrinsic to a legal system – and 
composed of four inter-connected virtues: non-retroactive law-making; clear rules of 
law; a judiciary that is independent from the political branches of governance (and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Takis Tridimas, “Terrorism and the ECJ: Empowerment and Democracy in the EC Legal Order”, 
(2009) European Law Review Vol. 34 No. 1 103 (hereinafter Tridimas, 2009).   
40 Article 308 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (2006) OJ C 321 E/37 (hereinafter 
TEC (pre-Lisbon)), now Article 352 TFEU. 
41 Tridimas, 2009: 108. Tridimas’ argument here overlaps with the Razian school of thought. This is 
returned to in Section 2.1.3. For similar views, see Koen Lenaerts and Tim Corthaut, “Of Birds and 
Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law” (2006) European Law Review Vol. 31 
287 (hereinafter Lenaerts and Corthaut, 2006); and Maria Fletcher, “Extending ‘Indirect Effect’ to the 
Third Pillar: The Significance of Pupino?” (2005) European Law Review Vol. 30 862 (hereinafter 
Fletcher, 2005). 
42 Paul Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework” 
(1997) Public Law Aut 467 (hereinafter Craig, 1997). 
43 Nicholas Barber, “Must Legalistic Conceptions of the Rule of Law Have a Social Dimension?” 
(2004) Ratio Juris Vol. 17 No. 4 474 (hereinafter Barber, 2004). 
44 Though this is challenged by Barber (Barber, 2004: 476-478).  
        Chapter One 






indeed, any other authoritative institutions); and that the system be accessible.45 
These virtues are all necessary components of a legal system, which not only 
overlap, but are mutually dependent on each other i.e. systemic. The implication 
here, then, is that any one virtue not only cannot credibly be attained without the 
others, but also that the invocation of one or more of these virtues within a system of 
“law” necessitates the discovery and implementation of the others.  
 
The link to the work of the Court of Justice should thus be obvious to those familiar 
with its evolutionary jurisprudence – especially its putatively “constitutional” 
jurisprudence. Some of the most (in)famous and influential cases of the Court of 
Justice have been justified on the basis of “general legal principles” (some of which 
are not, or were not at the pertinent time,46 present in the Treaties): 
 
The general principles have been largely fashioned by the Union Courts. They have 
read principles such as proportionality, fundamental rights, legal certainty, legitimate 
expectations, equality, the precautionary principle, and procedural justice into the 
Treaty, and used them as the foundation for judicial review …47 
 
These principles all resonate, in one way or another, with Raz’s four virtues. 
Furthermore, they are mutually dependant in order for their justification i.e. they are 
systemic.48 Proponents within this school of thought regard these general principles, 
and juridical developments, as a legitimate means by which the Judges of the Court 
of Justice can interpret indeterminate Union law. Leczykiewicz argues that all judges 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Joseph Raz “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979: 210–29 (hereinafter Raz, 1979). 
46 See the now largely justiciable Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010) OJ C 
83/389 (hereinafter the Charter of Fundamental Rights) 
47 Craig and de Búrca, 2011: 109.  
48 Consider, for example, that the Court of Justice justified the invocation of direct effect (Van Gend 
en Loos) and supremacy (Costa v ENEL) on the basis that the Treaty of Rome had established a “new 
legal order”. Consider, then, how further general principles of law – recognised as authoritative by the 
Court of Justice – that have been discovered by the Court have been justified on that foundation and 
its progeny: Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419 (fundamental rights); Les Verts 
(procedural fairness and the constitutional basis of the new legal order); Case C-341/05 Laval un 
Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Eyggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, 
Byggettan, Svenska Elekrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I11767 (hereinafter Laval); and Case C-438/05 
International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and 
OÜ Viking Line Eesti ECR I-10779 (hereinafter Viking Line) on social rights. 
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need to use such “legal concepts” in order to justify their legal reasoning.49 But she 
also argues that there is an even greater need for the Court of Justice’s Judges.  Legal 
concepts, she argues, are necessary in the EU for “system-building” by the Court – 
especially because of the inchoate and contested nature of the EU polity:  
 
In light of those difficulties, the authority of Community law and therefore the proof 
that the Community has a legal system has to be deduced from other sources, for 
example from the fact of observance of the rule of law or from the coherence of the 
system. The role of legal concepts is especially important in those theories that relate 
the authority of law to its coherent, systematic character.50 
A variant of this logic is – instead of “system building” – systemic effectiveness i.e. 
without the invocation or use of the legal concept, the legal system would be 
functionally ineffective. Dehousse captures this point well: 
 
Supremacy of Community law is in many respects the logical corollary of the 
doctrine of direct effect developed by the Court; similarly the ECJ developed a 
closer interest in the protection of human rights in reaction to the dangers facing the 
doctrine of supremacy.51 
 
The commentary on the Court’s putative “depillarisation” jurisprudence is indicative 
of this trend. Fletcher’s observations of the Court’s decision Pupino52 are a good 
example of this.53 In Pupino, the Court extended the principle of “indirect effect” 
from the first pillar’s legal framework into the third pillar – holding particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Dorota Leczykiewicz, “Why Do the European Court of Justice Judges Need Legal Concepts?” 
(2008) European Law Journal Vol. 14 No. 6 773 (hereinafter Leczykiewicz, 2008). 
50 Leczykiewicz, 2008: 784 (emphasis added). “Coherence” – again, which resonates with the Razian 
virtues – is meant in the MacCormick sense of the concept (MacCormick, 1994). See also Joxerramon 
Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
51 Dehousse, 1998: 95 (emphasis added).  
52 Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 (hereinafter Pupino).  
53 Fletcher, 2005. For a similar analysis, see Simone White, “Harmonisation of Criminal Law Under 
the First Pillar” (2006) European Law Review Vol. 31 No. 1 81 (hereinafter White, 2006): 90. 
Commentary on Kadi has reignited some of these arguments. Cardwell et al, for example, argue that 
the contention that UN legal norms should have primacy over Community law “seemed incompatible 
with the whole tenor of the ECJ’s jurisprudence on fundamental rights.” See Paul Cardwell, Duncan 
French and Nigel White, “Case Comment Kadi v Council of the European Union (C-402/05 P)” 
(2009) International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 58 No. 1 229: 234. 
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significance for national courts, individuals and the EU’s AFSJ – raising the question 
of how the Court justified this development in its reasoning. Fletcher observes that 
the duties of “harmonious interpretation” and “loyal co-operation” were the principal 
justifications for this development. These principles do not appear explicitly in the 
Treaties, but have been adopted as general legal principles which guide the Court’s 
legal reasoning. Approving of this approach, Fletcher reinforces the argument by 
observing the Court’s consideration of other general principles of law extraneous to 
the Treaties: non-retroactivity and legal certainty. She argues that the duty of loyal 
co-operation should not operate contra legem with respect to the precise meaning of 
national law (albeit with a very rigid application).54  Without the cross-fertilisation of 
legal principles between the Union’s jurisdictions, Union law would be ineffective. 
 
 
2.1.4. The School of Socio-Political Responsiveness 
 
The conceptual distinctiveness of this school of thought – compared to the distinction 
between the former two – is much clearer, and more radical. According to this school 
of thought, when the Judges are to interpret indeterminate Union law, they ought to 
do so by inferring observable preferences from the social and/or political 
environment within which they adjudicate. It is a theory of legal reasoning which 
eschews axiomatic conceptions of constitutional interpretation – what Hjalte 
Rasmussen referred to as the “legal purity approach”55 – and, instead, places an 
emphasis on looking towards so-called “real world” sources. Rasmussen, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Notably, these principles mirror those pronounced by the Court in relation to the indirect 
“horizontal” effect of first pillar directives in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891 
(hereinafter Von Colson).  
55 Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study on 
Judicial Policymaking, Dordrecht; Lancaster: Nijhoff, 1986 (hereinafter Rasmussen, 1986): 180. 
Rasmussen adopted this methodological approach in relation to the Court of Justice following the 
work of inter alia Bredimas (see Anna Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law, 
Amsterdam; New York; Oxford: North-Holland, 1978 (hereinafter Bredimas, 1978)). Rasmussen’s 
thesis (and a priori many aspects of the analytical approach of the socio-political school) has received 
much (often mis-guided) criticism. See Mauro Cappelletti, “Is the European Court of Justice ‘running 
wild’?” (1987) 12 European Law Review Vol. 12 3 (hereinafter Cappelletti, 1987); and Joseph Weiler, 
“The Court of Justice on Trial” (1987) Common Market Law Review Vol. 24 555 (hereinafter Weiler, 
1987).  
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example, asks “how liberally may the Community judge… give preference to 
teleology over text; to some nebulous effet necessaire over Treaty-provisions which 
do not ordain such an effect?”56 Similarly, and with an eye to the Razian school of 
thought, Everson and Eisner argue: 
 
‘General principles of law’ may very well constitute a necessary formalist glue of 
law-internal self-illusion. In a real-world, however, ‘general’ legal principles are 
meaningless: no more than a theoretic mantra of judicial self-justification. The 
principled mechanics of constitutional morphogenesis must instead be proximate to 
a real-world … in light of experience.57 
 
How, then, can the Judges interpret indeterminate Union law in this responsive way? 
For Rasmussen, the judiciary is “responsible for taking the body politic’s pulse in 
order to verify whether an actual activism is acceptable or not.”58 This is to be 
measured, empirically, as an assessment of the views of the “countervailing 
powers”59 which can be inferred from the “welcoming [of] judicial involvement in 
the political affairs of government to launching court-curbing or even court-
destroying initiatives.”60 Thus, the appropriate yardstick by which unwarranted 
activism – i.e. illegitimate interpretations of indeterminate Union law – can be 
determined is the existence of expressions of disapproval from the political 
institutions of the EU.61 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Hjalte Rasmussen, “Between Self-restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European Court” 
(1988) 13 European Law Review Vol. 13 28 (hereinafter Rasmussen, 1988): 33. 
57 Everson and Eisner, 2009: 174. Throughout their thesis, they refer to “formalist” legal reasoning as 
“transcendental nonsense”.  
58 Rasmussen, 1986: 17. 
59 These are the political institutions of the polity, such as (in the EU) the European Commission, the 
EP, national parliaments, etc.  
60 Rasmussen, 1986: 17. Rasmussen borrowed this empirical method from Joutsamo (Karl Joutsamo, 
The role of Preliminary Rulings in the European Communities, Turku: Suomalainen tiedeakatemia, 
1979). For Joutsamo, it is necessary for there to be “rationality” in the Court’s judgments because it is 
a supreme court, and hence the judgments must reflect and adapt to changing social conditions.  
61 Weiler is critical of this method. Whilst he believes that this method should have a role to play in 
constitutional adjudication, he does not believe that the existence of negative political inputs 
“becomes a sign of judicial impropriety” (Weiler, 1987: 578).  In the first place, along with 
Cappelletti, Weiler argues that there is a constitutional need for there to be judicial resistance to 
political powers i.e. judicial independence (Weiler, 1987; and Cappelletti, 1987). Weiler also observes 
that it would not be of much practical use for individual cases anyway. This would be problematic not 
        Chapter One 







Another variant of this school of thought is the idea of constitutional dialoguing. 
“Dialoguing” is used broadly here to mean the exchange of ideas (relevant to 
constitutional interpretation of indeterminate law) between the Court and other 
institutions of (social, legal and/or political) authority – ex ante responsiveness, as 
opposed to the former variant’s ex post responsiveness. Whereas in Section 2.2.3, we 
will see theories on how the Court of Justice ought to dialogue with other courts 
(national and transnational), the school of socio-political responsiveness is not 
limited to judicial dialoguing. 62  Everson and Eisner argue for an interpretive 
methodology for neutrally responding to the EU’s social and political environment. 
Following a Habermasian proceduralist logic, 63  this neutral responsiveness is 
achieved through the Judges’ deference to deliberative politics that are on-going 
between social and political institutions.64 The responsiveness of the Court to its 
social and political real-world environment is a mechanism that allows, as much as 
possible, social, political and, importantly, yet-to-be social and political actors to 
play out their political deliberations inter se. In this way, the Court plays a 
facilitative role in ensuring “that the only appropriate conduit between legal and 
extra-legal environments, ‘politics’, functions in an open, honest and transparent 
manner”.65 The Court achieves this by channelling these extra-legal deliberations 
through its politically-neutral procedural criteria of rationality, subsidiarity and 
proportionality.66  They eschew teleological explanations – such as the Court’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
least because the empirical methods proposed by Rasmussen (and others) do not avail themselves of a 
clear analytical process for reaching clear and precise solutions – much less by judges.  
62  On judicial dialoguing in the Court of Justice, see Charles Sabel and Oliver Gerstenberg, 
“Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: the ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate 
Constitutional Order” (2010) European Law Journal Vol. 16 511 (hereinafter Sabel and Gerstenberg, 
2010). 
63 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995 (hereinafter Habermas, 1995); and Jürgen Habermas, 
“Paradigms of Law” in Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges, edited by Michel 
Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato, Berkeley, California; London: University of California Press, 1998: 
Chapter One (hereinafter Habermas, 1998). 
64 Everson and Eisner, 2009: Chapter Six and Chapter Seven.  
65 Everson and Eisner, 2009: 222.  
66 For some criticisms of this argument, see Ross Carrick, Review of The Making of a European 
Constitution: Judges and Law Beyond Constitutive Power by Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2009), (2011) European Law Journal Vol. 17 No.1 138: 139 – 
140. 
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propensity towards increasing majoritarianism in the EU – which necessarily 
implicate the Judges in matters of political contestation.67 
 
This rationale has links to a final variant within this school of thought: that the 
Judges ought to interpret indeterminate Union law according to what they perceive to 
be the shortcomings of the legislature i.e. how the legislature – by way of Treaty 
amendments (especially), ordinary, and delegated legislative procedures – would 
have framed the law given the foresight.68 In this regard, Dehousse considers the 
decision in Reyners.69 In this case a Dutch national sought the right to practise at the 
Belgian bar. In the absence of legislative measures, the Court decided that the 
general provisions of law70 were sufficient to impose the negative obligation on the 
Belgian State – prohibiting it from making a nationality discrimination that would 
prevent the Dutch individual from practising at the bar. This was largely justified 
because, as Dehousse puts it, “the shortcomings of the Community legislature could 
not be allowed to imperil the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.”71 
 
 
2.2. Theories of EU Constitutionalism 
 
The other main analytical approach in the activism literature is evaluating the 
legitimacy of the Court of Justice according to theories of EU constitutionalism, 
which determine the nature of the Court of Justice: what type of court is the Court of 
Justice? As was alluded to in Section 2.1.2, theories of EU constitutionalism are 
abundant, complex and contested. A theory of EU constitutionalism informs an 
analysis of legitimate institutional functioning by, first, asking “what sort of polity is 
the EU?”; and then, “what sort of institutional configuration should support this 
polity?” What is distinctive in the EU about the relationship between these analytical 
questions is the complex, contested and ever-changing nature of the polity itself, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Everson and Eisner, 2009: Chapter Six.  
68 This point is also argued by Everson and Eisner, using Les Verts as an example.  
69 Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 631 (hereinafter Reyners). 
70 In this case, the freedom of establishment under Article 52 TEEC (now Article 49 TFEU).  
71 Dehousse, 1998: 75. 
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the corollary questions in EU constitutional theory.72  The former “what polity-type” 
question can be characterised in terms of the sort of political form the EU takes. Is it 
an intergovernmental international agreement; a federal or quasi-federal polity; or 
something in-between? I refer to this line of enquiry as the “spectrum of polity-type”. 
The second question runs in parallel to the first, and considers the question of 
constitutional supremacy: in which institutions – in particular, here, judicial 
institutions – does constitutional supremacy lie? Is it with the Member States’ courts; 
is it with the EU’s courts; or does it lie somewhere in-between? A view on the 
former set of questions will naturally inform a view on the latter, which I refer to as 
the “spectrum of vertical73  constitutional supremacy”. Both of these analytical 
queries serve to identify a normative basis on which the legitimacy of the Court’s 
functions can be gauged – in particular, the second question on vertical constitutional 
supremacy. In this sub-section, we consider three schools of thought on these 




2.2.1. The School of Intergovernmental Arbitration 
 
This school exists at the intergovernmental end of “the spectrum of polity-type”. Its 
proponents advocate, primarily, that the EU is, and should be nothing more than, an 
international agreement between its Member States, for which the EU’s institutions 
(like the Court of Justice) merely implement its political ends.74 As such, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 In  Section 4 of Chapter Two, we take a closer look at these theories. Here, we are concerned only 
with the ways in which these perspectives inform the activist literature. 
73 To be distinguished from “horizontal” questions of constitutional functioning. Given the different 
ways constitutional power can be divided between political institutions (according to one perspective 
or another on a theory of “separation of powers”), how can “law-making” and “law applying” 
functions be divided between the EU’s institutions (as opposed to a division between EU and national 
judicial institutions)? The former is addressed in greater depth in Chapter Two. On horizontal 
divisions of power, see Nicholas Barber, “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) Cambridge 
Law Journal Vol. 60 No. 1 59 (hereinafter Barber, 2001). On these issues, as they pertain to the EU, 
see Eoin Carolan, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009 (Carolan, 2009).  
74 Dehousse, for example, (critically) explains the intergovernmentalist view of the instrumental role 
that the Court of Justice plays in achieving the political ends of market integration. Dehousse, 1998: 
70, 78-93. 
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question of legitimate authority lies squarely in the domain of Member State 
sovereignty. On the parallel “spectrum of vertical constitutional supremacy”, 
constitutional supremacy rests with the Member States’ institutions. The 
constitutional authority of the EU’s institutions is thus either non-existent, or there is 
a minimal degree of authority based on the vicarious monist or dualist notions of 
(Member) state sovereignty. These arguments emphasise that the authority of the 
EU’s institutions is derived from the requisite “permission” – in one shape or form – 
from the retained constitutional authority of the Member States’ institutions.  For 
example, Dyèvre takes the view that the EU not only does not have a constitution, 
but also that it is a political structure incapable of constitutionalisation.75 He based 
this view in an observation of the political structure of the EU: that, without political 
autonomy, it is inappropriate to consider the EU in constitutional terms (unlike the 
sovereign state). The constitutional authority of the Court of Justice is thus fictional, 
which ultimately derives from the sovereign powers of the Member States, and 
particularly their national courts which afford the Court legal validity.76 Indeed, this 
is the paradigmatic basis of Hartley’s and Neill’s indictments of the Court’s 
“activist” decisions. They argue that the Court’s interpretive duty is determined by 
an intergovernmentalist paradigm, and not by federalism. 77  This is a difficult 
argument to sustain in that it does not convincingly address the significant 
“supranational” aspects of the EU and its Court of Justice – particularly given what 
the Court has contributed to the development of the single market (and, more 
broadly, the jurisdiction formerly referred to as the “Community pillar”).78  
 
Nevertheless, there was much greater scope and support for this school of thought 
with respect to the CFSP and the AFSJ (the pre-Lisbon TEU’s second and third 
pillars).  There are those who argue that, because those competences are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Arthur Dyèvre, “The Constitutionalisation of the European Union: Discourse, Present, Future and 
Facts” (2005) European Law Review Vol. 30 165 (hereinafter Dyèvre, 2005).  
76 Dyèvre, 2005: 178, 179. 
77 Hartley, 1996; and Neill, 1995: 2. 
78 The supranational aspects will be addressed in the Section 2.2.3, and in Section 4 of Chapter Two. 
For an overview, see Joseph Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” (1991) The Yale Law Journal 
Vol. 100 2403 (hereinafter Weiler, 1991). See also Joseph Weiler, “The Community System: The 
Dual Character of Supranationalism” (1981) Yearbook of European Law Vol 1 267.  
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intergovernmental by design, the Court must respect that arrangement in its 
judgments.79 In his commentary on Kadi, Tomuschat argues that these areas of law 
should retain a commitment to general principles of international law – being part of 
the over-arching international community – and that the EU should be subject to the 
rules of the UN Security Council. He thus rejects the notion of an autonomous (i.e. 
supranational) EU fundamental rights jurisprudence (qua Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft80 ). 81  Bernd Meyring, by emphasising the intergovernmental 
nature of the (then) third pillar, observes the legal limitations on the application of 
the norms therein: 
 
[The first pillar] establishing a Community based on the rule of law, relies upon the 
principles of supremacy and direct effect. In the framework of the two 
‘intergovernmental’ pillars we are no longer in this legal order. Therefore, measures 
under the third pillar do not have the same effect as Community Law does.82 
 
The most generous admission of EU constitutional authority for this school is one 
that grants the EU’s institutions a vicarious or derivative authority from the Member 
States’ sovereign cores – along the lines of das Bundesverfassungsgericht’s famous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 This is so in relation to the “depillarisation” cases (See Section 2.1.3).   
80 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125 (hereinafter Internationale). A 
case in which (following Stauder) the autonomy of the (then) EC’s competence in fundamental rights 
was affirmed.  
81 Christian Tomuschat, “Note on Kadi v Council and Commission (CFI)” (2006) Common Market 
Law Review Vol. 43 537. 
82 Bernd Meyring, “Intergovernmentalism and Supranationality: Two Stereotypes for a Complex 
Reality” (1997) European Law Review Vol. 22 No. 3 221 (hereinafter Meyring, 1997): 231. Nicol, 
however, forecasts the extension of the principle of supremacy to the (then) third pillar, and notes that 
“in stark contrast to art.234 EC [now Article 267 TFEU], it is optional for Member States whether to 
accept the ECJ’s jurisdiction under the Art.35 regime [see, now, Article 10 of Title VII, Protocol (No 
36) TEU On Transitional Provisions (2010) OJ C 83/322 (hereinafter Protocol 36)]. They are free to 
choose not to accept the ECJ’s jurisdiction at all … The limited jurisdiction of the ECJ lends a strong 
intergovernmental flavour to the third pillar, and differentiates EU framework decisions sharply from 
EC directives” (Nicol, 2009: 220). There are normative arguments and empirical indications to the 
contrary. Commenting on the Court’s extension of criminal sanctions into the Community (first) pillar 
in Council v Commission (and the “depillarisation” jurisprudence more generally), White observes 
that it has reignited the discussion of “communitarian vs intergovernmental” schools of thought., and 
delivers quite a blow to the intergovernmentalist way of thinking (White, 2006: 86). See also Fletcher, 
2005; and Lenaerts and Corthaut, 2006. 
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Brunner rationale. 83  It retains its conceptual premiss of national constitutional 
supremacy, whilst offering an explanation for how the Court has successfully 
functioned beyond that limit. Nicol notes that, in the UK, the supremacy of EU law is 
ultimately derived from the UK’s European Communities Act 1972, and not from 
any source of Union law i.e. the Court’s jurisprudence.84  
 
A variant of this argument is that the Court of Justice’s institutional authority is 
derived (also) from the compliance of national courts in applying its interpretations 
under Article 267 TFEU, and its jurisprudence more generally, in cases before 
national courts.85 Arnull argues, for example, that national court discretion (as to 
whether or not to use an Article 267 TFEU preliminary ruling) encourages national 
courts to decide points of Union law for themselves, which can jeopardise its 
uniform application across the Member States.86 In a similar vein, Nyikos argues 
that, given their discretion, national judiciaries use the preliminary rulings procedure 
as a means of directing the meaning and application of Union law according to their 
own juridical preferences, as opposed to treating the Court of Justice as a 
constitutional court that has constitutional supremacy.87  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See Case 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92 Manfred Brunner and Others vs. The European Union Treaty 
(1994) CMLR 57 (hereinafter Brunner); and was more recently rearticulated in the wake of the Lisbon 
Treaty ratification judgment; available at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html 
(hereinafter the Lisbon Judgment). See especially Paras 99-114, 136-165, and 298-350. See also 
Daniel Thym, “In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment 
of the German Constitutional Court” (2009) Common Market Law Review Vol. 46 1795. 
84 Nicol, 2009: 226. Yet he does not reflect the nuance of the the House of Lords’ judgment in R v 
Secretary of State for Transport ex. p. Factortame (No.2) [1991] AC 603 (hereinafter Factortame II): 
658 onwards, which, it should be noted, followed a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice in C-
213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex. p. Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433 (hereinafter 
Factortame). 
85 See Florence Giorgi and Nicolas Triart, “National Judges, Community Judges: Invitation to a 
Journey through the Looking-Glass – On the Need for Jurisdictions to Rethink the Inter-Systemic 
Relations beyond the Hierarchical Principle” (2008) European Law Journal Vol. 14 No. 6 693 
(hereinafter Giorgi and Triart, 2008): 695-709. See also Craig and de Búrca, 2011: 268-296. 
86 Anthony Arnull, “The Past and Future of the Preliminary Rulings Procedure” (2002) European 
Business Law Review Vol. 13 No. 3 183. 
87 Stacy Nyikos, “Strategic Interaction Among Courts Within the Preliminary Reference Process – 
Stage 1: National Court Preemptive Opinions” (2006) European Journal of Political Research Vol. 45 
527–550 (hereinafter Nyikos, 2006). In particular, she demonstrates how national courts have used the 
provision of  “pre-emptive opinions” (in their summary of the legal and factual circumstances) as 
effective “rhetorical weapons” designed to secure their desired interpretation of Union law (Nyikos, 
2006: 527 – 530). 
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The most damaging indictment, however, of the Court of Justice’s constitutional 
supremacy (in favour of national judicial compliance) is the Solange jurisprudence 
and its progeny.88 That case-law – emanating from das Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(but observed in other jurisdictions also89) – takes a strong stance against the 
supremacy of EU law by making it conditional on the compliance of EU law with 
national constitutional norms. In other words, where EU law (particularly EU 
legislation), or national implementing measures, do not comply with national 
constitutional principles, the national constitutional court reserves the right to be the 
ultimate arbiter of legal validity – not the Court of Justice.90 In this regard, Meyring 
indicts the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence with respect to the authority of 
das Bundesverfassungsgericht: 
 
Since Community law requires its supremacy to be uniformly applicable and the 
ECJ has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether it is applicable, this jurisprudence 
is a clear violation of Germany’s obligations under Community law as interpreted by 
the ECJ.91 
 
So, even with the admission of a degree of constitutional authority, the Court is 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1974] 2 CMLR 540 (hereinafter Solange I); and Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 
225 (hereinafter Solange II).  
89 See Massimo Fichera, “The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of 
Convenience?” (2009) European Law Journal Vol.15 No.1 70 (hereinafter Fichera, 2009).  
90 For recent examples of this, in relation to the European Arrest Warrant, see Fichera, 2009: 81-96.  
91 Meyring, 1997: 226. 
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2.2.2. The Federal Court 
 
Mancini and Keeling famously stated that the Treaties are endowed with a “genetic 
code”, which configures the institutions of the EU into a federal-type polity.92 On the 
spectrum of polity-type, this school exists at the opposite end to the 
intergovernmentalist school. Proponents of this school believe either that the EU is a 
federal or quasi-federal polity; or that its institutions should behave as such for the 
purposes of integration towards that end.93 The end result is the same: a normative 
appraisal that the Court of Justice’s functions accord with those normally attributed 
to supreme or constitutional courts of federal states. 94  In terms of vertical 
constitutional supremacy, then, the Court of Justice is the ultimate arbiter of legal 
validity with respect to matters pertaining to the Treaties. It is (or is to behave as) a 
constitutional court in the orthodox sense.  
 
Due provides an empirical analysis of how the Court has acquitted itself in 
performing the function of  a constitutional court: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Mancini and Keeling, 1994: 186. 
93 This distinction will be addressed further in Chapter Two. There is a distinct literature that explores 
the Court’s role in shaping the EU into a federal (or otherwise) polity – referred to under the rubric of 
“integration through law”. In Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler’s “Integration through Law” series, 
Cappelletti and Golay examine the dichotomy between national regulatory diversity and the 
uniformity of EU law (Mauro Cappelletti and David Golay, “The Judicial Branch in the Federal and 
Transnational Union: Its Impact on Integration” in Cappelletti, M., Seccombe, M. and Weiler J. (gen. 
eds.), Integration Through Law: Vol. I: Methods Tools and Institutions Book 2, Berlin and New York, 
de Gruyterm, 1986 (hereinafter Cappelletti and Golay, 1986): 260).  
94 There is a particularly strong comparative trend with the US Supreme Court and das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht of Germany. Much of the early work on the legitimacy of the Court of 
Justice was carried out by North American scholars in comparative law. Hay, for example, regarded 
the Court of Justice as a constitutional court within his paradigm of federal politics (Peter Hay, 
Federalism and International Organization, University of Illinois Press, 1966). See also AW Green, 
Political Integration by Jurisprudence, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1969. More recently, Shapiro observes that 
the Court, by comparison with the US Supreme Court, has the same functions with only superficial 
terminological or procedural differences; rather than constitutional, functional or systemic differences. 
He thus sees that, like the US supreme court, judicial review of legislation, human rights review, 
separation of powers review, and administrative review are necessary functions of the Court of Justice 
(see Martin Shapiro, “The US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice Compared” in Anand 
Menon, Martin Schai eds., Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in 
Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2006: 216). Whilst the trend of comparative 
scholarship is significant in itself, it shall not be examined any further in this review.  
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It is possible to conclude from this short examination of the case law that the Court 
of Justice has found ways and means for filling the gaps in the judicial system of the 
Treaty text so as to provide full judicial protection of Member States, Community 
institutions and individuals against encroachment upon their rights and to offer 
opportunities for the Court to decide on practically any issue of a constitutional 
character which may arise in a Community context. Without any doubt, the Court 
exercises the functions of a Constitutional Court for the Communities. 95 
 
As part of the same project, Jacobs considers the specific functions of the Court that 
are of a “constitutional character” to be inter-institutional review and legislative 
review.96 Cappelletti argues that another quintessentially federalist function that the 
Court does, and should, perform, in the context of judicial review, is mediating a 
plurality of sources of law. 97 A good example of this is the Court’s fundamental 
rights jurisprudence, which explicitly incorporates the “constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States”.98 Indeed, the judicial protection of fundamental 
rights of the individual is a common reference point in this school of thought.99     
 
An important aspect of the Court’s competence within this school of thought is, of 
course, that it is the supreme constitutional arbiter of Union law (as opposed to 
national courts). Naturally, this sits in a tension with the intergovernmentalist school 
of thought and, in particular, the Solange jurisprudence. In terms of the Court’s 
relationship to national courts, Komarek argues that:  
 
The Court of Justice is not merely a “supranational” court … it has become part of 
national judicial structures. It is not like an international court acting outside 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Ole Due, “A Constitutional Court for the European Communities?” in D. Curtin and D. O’keeffe, 
Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law, Essays for the Hon. Mr 
Justice TF O’Higgins, Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd., 1992: 8.  
96 Francis Jacobs, “Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitutional Court?” in D. 
Curtin and D. O’keeffe, Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law, 
Essays for the Hon. Mr Justice TF O’Higgins, Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd., 1992: 22-35. 
97 Cappelletti, 1987: 4-8.  
98 See Internationale: Para. 4.  
99 Van Gerven considers the protection of fundamental rights of the individual to be an important 
constitutional function of the Court (Walter van Gerven, “The Role and Structure of the European 
Judiciary Now and in the Future” (1996) European Law Review Vol. 21 211 (hereinafter van Gerven, 
1996): 212).  
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national judicial systems, but rather a supreme court, whose task is to guide lower 
courts in their application of EU law… it acts as the EU Constitutional Court – 
deciding disputes concerning the division of powers, systemic principles of EU law 
or fundamental rights of those who are bound by it.100 
 
Komarek’s normative basis for this argument (like other proponents of this school) is 
the federal political paradigm. He goes on to argue that the preliminary rulings 
procedure should be reformed according to a “hierarchical system”, which would 
transform the procedure into a system akin to an appeals process in a federal 
polity.101 This rests on an assumption of unfettered constitutional supremacy of the 
Court, such that national courts should be hierarchically ranked. In a similar vein, 
Weatherill argues that, given the importance within federal states of the vertical 
relationship between federal and state institutions, the development of the principle 
of supremacy in the Court’s jurisprudence was instrumental and necessary for 
legitimising its federal constitutional functions.102  Indeed – in the context of 
fundamental rights adjudication, and with an eye to the Solange threshold from the 
national courts – the Court’s jurisprudence not only emphasises its autonomy and 
supremacy, but also that the Court has its own “version” of the Solange 
jurisprudence (hereinafter referred to as the reverse-Solange jurisprudence). In cases 
like Schmidberger 103  and Omega Spielhallen, 104  the Court has deferred to the 
standards of fundamental rights protection set by national authorities so long as they 
do not fall below the minimum standard provided by EU fundamental rights at the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Komarek, 2007: 484. 
101 See also Pescatore, 1983.  
102  Stephen Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union, Clarendon Press, 1995 
(hereinafter Weatherill, 1995): 187-189. He goes on to highlight that the Court’s powers of judicial 
review, for the institutions (notably the European Parliament) and individuals, are necessary and 
exemplary constitutional functions (Weatherill, 1995: 189-205). 
103 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659 (hereinafter Schmidberger). 
104 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609 (hereinafter Omega). 
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2.2.3. The Sui Generic Court 
 
This school of thought proposes that the Court and its political environment hold 
distinctive qualities that demand a unique type of judicial function. In terms of the 
spectrum of polity-type, this school exists in a murky tension between the 
intergovernmental school and the federal school. Many accounts of the EU here are 
based on the idea of the EU as a “supranational” political and legal order that does 
not conform to the orthodoxies of international law and legal systems.105 There are 
also accounts of the EU which deliberately eschew axiomatic taxonomies, instead 
simply emphasising that it is a polity sui generis.106 There is a quintessentially 
postmodern approach to this school of thought, which has a very diverse and rich 
literature (see Chapter Two).  
 
In terms of the “spectrum of vertical constitutional supremacy”, this school of 
thought tends to reject the notion of constitutional supremacy as a zero-sum game; or 
to reject the premiss that it is a necessary condition for effective institutional 
functioning. Instead, the Court of Justice – on account of the distinctive social, legal 
and political environment within which it functions – is a Court sui generis, and 
functions legitimately according to varying criteria. Petersmann, for example, 
compares the Court of Justice with the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 
the ECtHR) and the European Free Trade Area court, and argues that the EU is a sui 
generic political organisation that functions according to the precepts of “multi-level 
judicial governance”.107 Underpinning this political organisation is a bottom-up, 
citizen-oriented notion of constitutional justice – with the analytical premiss that the 
citizen is the political subject and political institutions their agents. As such, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See, famously, Weiler, 1991.  
106 See Deirdre Curtin, Postnational Democracy: the European Union in Search of a Political 
Philosophy, The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 1997 (hereinafter Curtin, 1997). 
107 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Judging Judges: from ‘Principal-agent Theory’ to ‘Constitutional 
Justice’ in Multilevel ‘Judicial Governance’ of Economic Cooperation Among Citizens” (2008) 
Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 11 No. 4 827 (hereinafter Petersmann, 2008): 827, 828. 
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structures “transcend the intergovernmental structures of European law by focussing 
on … [individuals] rather than on state interests in intergovernmental relations.”108  
 
The distinctiveness of this type of political structure in terms of vertical 
constitutional legitimacy is two-fold. First, as Petersmann has attested to, the focus 
of constitutional supremacy becomes instrumental towards the ends of citizens and 
not those of the Member States or the EU. Secondly, constitutional legitimacy is 
borne out of a tension between Member States and the EU (the actors) in terms of 
constitutional supremacy.  
 
One solution to this tension in this school of thought is found in the notion of 
constitutional pluralism, in which both national and EU institutions enjoy a degree of 
constitutional autonomy simultaneously and in a non-hierarchical way. So, instead of 
the imposition of authority on one institution by another, constitutional pluralism 
operates by way of inter-institutional co-operation, or, in the words of Weiler: 
 
[When Member States] are told: in the name of the peoples of Europe, you are 
invited to obey … When acceptance and subordination is voluntary, it constitutes an 
act of true liberty and emancipation from collective self-arrogance and constitutional 
fetishism: a high expression of Constitutional Tolerance.109 
 
A delicate balance has to be struck in order for constitutional pluralism to be a 
sustainable and legitimising force. It is in preserving this balance that proponents of 
this school find their normative criteria to determine the Court’s legitimate 
institutional functions.  This is argued by many to be found in what Maduro refers to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Petersmann, 2008: 850. For a similar argument, see Daniel Halberstam, “The Bride of Messina: 
Constitutionalism and Democracy in Europe” (2005) European Law Review Vol. 30 No. 6 775 
(hereinafter Halberstam, 2005): 798. 
109 Joseph Weiler, “Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg” (2000) Harvard Jean 
Monnet Paper 10/2000, available at http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/001001.html. Emphasis 
added. Martinico and Pollicino argue that this pluralist approach provides a unique kind of authority 
to the Court’s decisions by virtue of its “moral and intellectual prestige”, which results in voluntary 
obedience by national courts. See Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino, “Between Constitutional 
Tolerance and Judicial Activism: the ‘Specificity’ of European Judicial Law” (2008) European 
Journal of Law Reform Vol. 10 No. 1 125 (hereinafter Martinico and Pollicino, 2008): 128. 
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as “contrapunctual law”.110 This refers to a “reflexive dialogue” between the Court of 
Justice and the Member States’ constitutional courts within which rules and 
principles of law shared between the jurisdictions are developed in “universal” terms 
so as to be accommodating to the juridical preferences of all affected overlapping 
legal orders. This way, the issue of constitutional supremacy between the courts, and 
the tensions that emerge (as we have seen in the Solange and reverse-Solange 
jurisprudence), are reconciled.111   
 
A subtly different pluralist account is provided by Giorgi and Triart. They provide a 
pluralistic framework that steps outside the prevailing orthodoxies of constitutional 
pluralism, and, instead, emphasises legal pluralism, which they refer to as “network 
pluralism”.112 The idea here is that sites of judicial governance (such as, but not 
limited to, the Court of Justice and national constitutional courts) operate within a 
plurality of sites of judicial governance, domestically and internationally, and do not 
enjoy constitutional supremacy inter se: 
 
One possibility would be to no longer consider the hierarchical nature of the system 
as a determining element of its identity. An interesting idea was provided by the 
concept of the site of governance developed by Francis Snyder to describe the 
interactions between the actors of a globalised legal pluralism … there is not one but 
many sites of governance. Furthermore, this voluntarily broad definition allows us to 
appreciate ... the relationships between sites such as the WTO as much as the EU or 
its Member States, but the possibilities are almost endless.113 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Miguel Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action” in Neil 
Walker (Ed.), Sovereignty in Transition, Hart Publishing, 2003: 501-537. See also Miguel Maduro, 
“Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as Good as it Gets?” (2000) Constitutionalism Web-
Papers ConWEB No. 5/2000, available at:  http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb/. 
111 See also Jan Komarek, “European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In Search 
of the Limits of Contrapunctual Principles” (2007) Vol. 44 Common Market Law Review 9 
(hereinafter Komarek, 2007a); Damien Chalmers, “Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Treaty” 
(2005) International Journal of Constitutional Law Vol. 3 No.2/3 448 (hereinafter Chalmers, 2005); 
and Petersmann, 2008: 850. 
112 Giorgi and Triart, 2008: 712. Sabel and Gertenberg present a similar argument, and provide useful 
case-studies to support their claims (see Sabel and Gerstenberg, 2010).  
113 Giorgi and Triart, 2008: 711. 
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Notably, at the time of writing, Kadi had not been decided by the Court of Justice, 
the implications of which conflict with this idea of network pluralism. Indeed, given 
the Court’s and national constitutional courts’ preoccupation with constitutional 
supremacy, this account must be taken to be normative, rather than descriptive of 
legitimate judicial governance in the EU.114  
 
 
2.3. Interim Conclusion 
 
The foregoing literature review was presented to demonstrate the primary scholarly 
contributions that have been made in evaluating the legitimacy of the Court of 
Justice. The first approach focuses on canons of legal reasoning; and the second on 
constitutionalism. Within these debates, there is little, if any, attention paid to the 
concept of democracy as an analytical lens. The point to note is that analysing the 
Court from the perspective of democracy is a relatively neglected part of the activism 
debate, thus presenting a gap in which the contribution of this thesis can fill. In the 
next Section, I consider the (limited) ways that the concept of democracy has been 
used to evaluate the Court, with a view to clarifying more precisely the contribution 
of this thesis.  
 
 
3. Arguments from Democracy: Framing the Contribution of this Thesis 
 
Having reviewed the main literature that assesses the legitimacy of the Court of 
Justice in Section 2, here we consider the ways in which the Court is assessed to be 
democratically legitimate. An important preliminary point to emphasise is that 
arguments on the democratic legitimacy of the Court can be understood in the two 
ways discussed in the introduction to this thesis: in intrinsic terms and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Note here the legal reasoning of the national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice adverted 
to above i.e. the Solange and reverse-Solange jurisprudence. 
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instrumental terms.115 Intrinsically, the Court can be examined as a discrete decision-
making authority, whereby its democratic credentials are determined solely with 
respect to the form and functioning of the Court itself. Instrumentally, the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court can be examined with respect to the ways in which it 
contributes to the democratic legitimacy of the EU. In this Chapter, we have been 
concerned with literature that assesses the Court of Justice from an intrinsic 
perspective – the legal reasoning of the Court’s judges (Section 2.1), and the nature 
of the Court (Section 2.2) being matters of form and function with respect to the 
Court’s decision-making authority.116 The next Chapter deals with the literature that 
examines the democratic legitimacy of the Court from an instrumental perspective 
inter alia. The literature that assesses the democratic legitimacy of the Court from an 
intrinsic perspective is very limited. What follows is a walk-through of the various 
ad hoc arguments from democratic theory that are presented, somewhat tangentially, 
within the activism literature.  
 
The starting point returns to Rasmussen’s thesis. He postulated that the Court’s 
judicial law-making is an affront to the virtues of democracy, and this so because the 
Court’s decision-makers – the judiciary – are unelected by the people and thus do not 
hold the capacity to represent the popular will (a prerequisite, for Rasmussen, of a 
democratically legitimate norm-producing institution): 
 
Since the laws which a litigant may request the Court to set aside are adopted by 
duly democratically elected legislatures, a democratically less accountable court 
should always show some measure of caution before following his invitation unless 
the democratic political will was not formulated under due observance of all 
requirements of form.117   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 The intrinsic-instrumental taxonomy is explained in greater depth in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 
Three.  
116  The inherent connection between intrinsic and instrumental perspectives comes out in the 
discussion in Section 2.2. Nevertheless, the analyses in that literature are primarily concerned with the 
constitutional nature of the Court – an intrinsic category. 
117 Rasmussen, 1986: 181. 
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This was most emphatically asserted by Rasmussen in his stark warning that should 
the Court’s activity remain unchecked then this will “inevitably lead to a totalitarian 
state”. 118  
 
It is surprising that Rasmussen has limited the connection between democratic theory 
and his socially and politically responsive method of interpretation to merely 
observing that courts “should always show some measure of caution”. By this I mean 
that his consideration of democratic theory is itself limited, in that it could have 
provided a more persuasive and illuminating account of his responsiveness 
premiss.119 It is also surprising because he has considered Gulmann’s theory of 
interpretation.120 Gulmann emphasised the need for democratic values to be factored 
into the legal reasoning of supreme courts. This method of interpretation requires 
supreme courts to conform to “democratic” values, which are defined as the same 
kind of “real world” values advocated by Rasmussen. The (surprising) difference is 
that Rasmussen has not framed this premiss as pertaining to democratic values, with 
which they would more than comfortably fit. Indeed, this is an advantage of Everson 
and Eisner’s more sophisticated theory of responsive adjudication. They make this 
link explicit, and present a theoretically robust argument.121 Their argument is that 
the Court acts as a conduit through which political deliberations – seen as a 
necessary democratic good in polities – can take place, following Habermas’ 
proceduralist paradigm of law.122 Yet this argument does not relate to the structures 
and processes of the Court, and are germane to theories of instrumental democratic 
legitimacy (Chapter Two). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Rasmussen, 1986: 46. This is the same argument presented in Peter Blok’s analysis of the Court’s 
legitimacy: “this objection against judicial law-making is decisive, it must be firmly maintained that 
important political decisions should not be taken by the Court … To the extent this principle is not 
observed the democratic nature of the decision-making process is squashed.” (emphasis added). See 
Peter Blok, Patentrettens Konsumtionsprincip, Kobenhaven, 1974: 621. 
119 As will be demonstrated in Chapter Three, the notion of “institutional responsiveness” is a 
foundational virtue for intrinsic democratic ordering.  
120 Claus Gulmann, “Methods of Interpretation of the Court of Justice” (1980) Stockholm Institute for 
Scandianvian Law 1957-2009, available at http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/24-8.pdf. 
121 See Everson and Eisner, 2009: Chapter Six and Chapter Seven.  
122 Habermas, 1995; and Habermas, 1998. 
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The proposition of participatory self-governance via a judicial institution is an idea 
that Cappelletti considers as having democratic virtues, and makes reference to in his 
analysis of the Court of Justice. 123  This is particularly so given the judicial 
predisposition to observe and arbitrate pluralities of normative ordering – another 
important democratic virtue. Petersmann presents a much more comprehensive 
analysis of this argument, and does so with reference to the broader literature. His 
premiss of a bottom-up constitutional justice – with the citizen as principal 
democratic subject and political/judicial organs as their agents – fits well with a 
postmodern theory of democracy:  
 
International economic courts, notably in Europe, have played a crucial role in 
adjusting state-centered economic and human rights agreements to the democratic 
demand by citizens… Similar to human rights courts, also national constitutional 
judges increasingly argue that constitutional democracies are premised on ‘active 
liberty’; the exercise of individual rights to participate in democratic self-
government.124 
 
For Petersmann, the democratic legitimacy of the Court’s law-making function is 
based on a different quality of democratic theory that revives the democratic virtues 
of participatory and deliberative democracy – via judicial dialogues. Like Everson 
and Eisner, he goes on to make the crucial link to Habermas’ judicial model of 
deliberative democracy. Yet he does so without much explanation of the applicability 
of this theory, and seemingly based more on the idea of the “just” decision, but not 
on the issue of the procedural means by which they should achieve this. Yet 
MacCormick articulates a deliberative role for the Court in procedural terms: 
 
[T]he European Court of Justice … does not present an image or an actuality of 
arbitrary decision making by the will of those in authority. Decisions that bind by 
virtue of the Court’s authority are reasoned out and justified publicly in the light of 
publicly deployed arguments on themes to which all can contribute, either by way of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Cappelletti, 1987: 6. 
124 Petersmann, 2008: 877-878. 
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the general or specialised legal discussion of problems about law and legal policy 
and principles, or more restrictedly by directly arguing a case before the Court, 
which only specially appointed advocates for parties can do … The institutional 
arrangements are set up in such a way as to facilitate the careful presentation of 
every relevant argument on legal points on issue, and to consider them in an 
atmosphere of cool and rational deliberation.125 
 
There are other, more familiar, arguments that have been made on the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court of Justice: a counter-majoritarian “check” on the legislature; 
the protection of core democratic rights, such as freedom of speech; and the building 
of a democratically robust polity.126 Yet these arguments are instrumental arguments 
i.e. they are more about the ways in which the Court of Justice can help bolster the 
democratic credentials of the EU, rather than how the Court of Justice is itself 
democratic. This literature will be examined in Section 2 of Chapter Two, where I 
demonstrate how this thesis contributes to the literature on the instrumental 
arguments from democracy. It is clear, however, that there is very little in the way of 
analyses which explore the democratic legitimacy of the Court from an intrinsic 
perspective. Those that do tend to do so somewhat tangentially to their principal 
arguments, much less in a systematic way (see Chapter Three), and do not focus on 
the Court’s structures and processes. This is one aspect of the intellectual 
contribution of this thesis: to present a systematic analysis of the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court of Justice from an intrinsic perspective, which focuses on the 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Neil MacCormick, “Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the ‘European Commonwealth’” 
(1997) Law and Philosophy Vol. 16 No. 4 331 (hereinafter MacCormick, 1997): 352-353.  
126 See, for example, Quoc Loc Hong, “Constitutional Review in the Mega-Leviathan: A Democratic 
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In this Chapter, the activism literature was reviewed. The activism literature is one 
that examines the legitimacy of the Court of Justice from what I refer to as an 
intrinsic perspective (assessing the legitimacy of the Court as a discrete decision-
making authority). We saw that the activism literature has two principal analytical 
approaches to intrinsic questions: examination of the Court according to a theory of 
legal reasoning; and arguments on the constitutional function(s) of the Court 
according to a theory of EU constitutionalism. Within this literature, there were only 
very minor and tangential arguments or analyses made relating to the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court. We saw a few examples of theories of “democratic” legal 
reasoning: the Court as a responsive institution; and the Court that adjudicates 
according a citizen-oriented paradigm of constitutional justice. There was much less 
in relation to the structures and processes of the Court – with a few ad hoc comments 
made on the unelected (and so a priori undemocratic) judiciary as law-makers; and 
on the deliberativeness of the Court. Given that one of the main aims of this thesis is 
to analyse the democratic legitimacy of the Court’s structures and processes from an 
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This Chapter has two objectives. The first, like Chapter One, is to clarify the 
intellectual contribution of the thesis by reviewing one of the key literatures to which 
it contributes – the democratic deficit debate. As we see in Chapter Three in more 
detail, my criteria of procedural democratic legitimacy – the analytical lens through 
which I evaluate the Court’s structures and processes – are intrinsic and instrumental 
democratic legitimacy. In Chapter One, we saw that there is very little in the way of 
analyses which review the Court’s structures and processes from an intrinsic 
democratic perspective. In this Chapter, I look at the literature in which contributions 
on the instrumental democratic legitimacy of the EU’s institutions are made (Section 
2). We see that there are some contributions relating to the Court of Justice, but, 
ultimately, there are significant shortcomings and gaps (Section 3).  
 
The second objective of this Chapter is to identify, drawing from the literature 
review in Section 2, the salient characteristics of the EU in constitutional terms – 
hereinafter the EU’s polity-conditions (Section 4). This objective is necessary 
because, as we see in Chapter Three, analysing the procedural democratic legitimacy 
of the Court of Justice (or, indeed, any EU institution) is sensitive to the underlying 
polity-conditions of the EU. Whilst this is more intuitively significant for the 
analysis of instrumental democratic legitimacy (because that type of analysis looks 
directly at how institutions contribute to the democratic ordering of polities), it is 
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2. The “DemDefLit”128 
 
In this Section, the literature on the European Union’s putative democratic deficit is 
reviewed. This field of enquiry is expansive and draws the attention of various 
disciplines and analytical approaches – most prominently, of public lawyers and 
political scientists. With such an abundance of scholarly attention, the following 
review will be a synoptic overview of the main analytical approaches to questions on 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU.  
 
Broadly speaking, there are two levels of enquiry: there are theories of the polity; 
and theories of the system. The former analytical approach considers the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU from philosophical and theoretical perspectives. It postulates 
what the EU is, or what it should be, according to concepts of the political 
community in political theory – questioning the EU’s capacity to conform to 
underlying pre-institutional precepts of democracy (Section 2.1). The latter approach 
focuses on the institutional architecture of the EU – considering the extent to which it 
conforms to democratic standards; or arguing for institutional reform in the same 
vein (Section 2.2). These two approaches are, moreover, analytically connected. 
Advocates of institutional reform, for example, will base their arguments, either 
explicitly or implicitly, in a theory of the polity.  
 
 
2.1. Theories of the Polity 
 
Here we are concerned with analyses that approach the issue of the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy by considering, from a theoretical point of view, what sort of polity the 
EU is or should be. There are two principal debates that follow this approach: the 
existential debate, which considers the nature of the EU from a functional point of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Weiler referred to this literature as the “DemDefLit”, adopted hereinafter by way of shorthand. See 
Joseph Weiler, “European Democracy and its Critics: Polity and System” in The Constitution of 
Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 (hereinafter Weiler, 1999).  
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view; and the “no demos” debate, which examines the underlying socio-political 
conditions within which the EU exists, and because of which the EU can (not) be, or 
should (not) be, understood in democratic terms. These two debates will be 
considered in turn.  
 
 
2.1.1. The Existential Debate 
 
Arguments about Europe’s democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature 
and ultimate goals of the integration process.129 
 
At its most fundamental level, questioning the democratic legitimacy of the EU is 
really about determining the location of the institutional capacity to solve problems 
and implement solutions in relation to the provision of certain public goods – public 
goods being anything that members of a community would expect to be provided by 
the community, such as health-care, education, legal enforcement, etc. In this way, 
the EU is defined by what public goods it is competent to administer. In other words, 
what is the EU for? Bearing in mind that our Member States – as Westphalian states 
in form (see Section 2.1.2 below) – were once competent to administer all public 
goods, to what extent is the existence of the EU necessary or desirable?  
 
The empirical frame of reference for the EU’s democratic deficit is by way of 
comparison with the position as it would be if matters were still dealt with at 
national level. This requires us to assess the reality of decision-making within 
national polities, and postulate what the locus of decision-making would be if there 
were no EU.130 
 
A common premiss within this debate is the idea that there are some public goods 
that states cannot provide to their citizenry without the transnational assistance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Giandomenico Majone, “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards” (1998) 
European Law Journal Vol. 4 No. 1 5 (hereinafter Majone, 1998): 5.   
130 Craig and de Búrca, 2011: 151.  
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other states.131 Menon and Weatherill argue that EU integration, as a transnational 
“process”: 
 
… provides a cure for the democratic failings of Member states by embedding 
within national political and administrative systems legally enforceable obligations 
to respect the interests of actors whose voice is excluded or muffled (de jure or de 
facto) within purely national political processes.132 
 
Their analysis is confined, however, to the functional benefits of the single market, 
and notably does not address the somewhat more controversial aspects of political 
union inaugurated by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993,133 and developed in subsequent 
Treaty reforms.134 Yet it is precisely this sort of issue that forms the subject-matter of 
the existential debate – should the EU have jurisdiction on matters of, for example, 
internal and external security? Furthermore, the debate not only considers what 
functions the EU should have; it also considers, more qualitatively, the extent of 
discretion each level of actor (Member State and EU) should have with respect to 
those functions – to what extent should the EU share its jurisdiction on security with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 It is uncommon for scholarly analyses to refute this premiss. Such claims tend to be manifested in 
party-political “Eurosceptic” rhetoric. Menon and Weatherill note: “French President General Charles 
de Gaulle described the European Commission in typically withering terms as a ‘mostly foreign 
technocracy, intended to encroach upon French democracy’ (cited in P. Magnette, What is the 
European Union? Nature and Prospects (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005) 171); in 2006 Wolfgang 
Schüssel, Chancellor of Austria, was reported to have urged the European Court to ‘pay more heed to 
public opinion and to refrain from handing down heavy-handed judgments’ (Financial Times, April 
19 2006)” (see Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill, “Democratic Politics in a Globalising World: 
Supranationalism and Legitimacy in the European Union” (2007) LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers No. 13/2007 (hereinafter Menon and Weatherill, 2007), available at 
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm: footnote 6). In 2005, the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) published their party manifesto for the general election. The introduction entitled “Why 
the UK must leave the EU” states that a UKIP government would “restore … confidence in the 
democratic process and reconnect with people … [by] [f]ormal withdrawal from the EU by repealing 
the 1972 European Communities Act. This will release [the UK] from obligations under EU treaties 
and re-establish the precedence of UK law over EU law.” Available at 
http://www.stuartagnewmep.co.uk/stuartagnew/pdf/UKIPa4manifesto2005.pdf. 
132 Menon and Weatherill, 2007: 3. See also Weatherill, 2010: Chapter Nine. Both contributions make 
reference to a Commission study on the impact of the single market, which provides evidence of the 
economic benefits of the EU. See European Commission (2002) The Internal Market: Ten Years 
Without Frontiers, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/10years/docs/workingdoc/workingdoc_en.pdf. 
133 The Maastricht Treaty (1992) OJ C 191.  
134  For an analysis that does address this point, see Jukka Snell, “‘European Constitutional 
Settlement’, an Ever Closer Union, and the Treaty of Lisbon: Democracy or Relevance?” (2008) 
European Law Review Vol. 33 No. 5 619. 
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the Member States? There is thus a natural connection in the existential debate to the 
relationship between sovereignty and democratic legitimacy. Many of the 
contributions to this debate centre on this core issue.135  
 
In this regard, there are two categories of EU existentialism: reductionist; and 
experimentalist. Reductionist analyses try to square the circle by understanding the 
EU according to orthodox conceptions of the polity – tending to frame the analysis 
against the backdrop of the (Westphalian) nation-state and/or the orthodox 
conception of international regimes in public international law.136 Experimentalists 
will treat the EU as a sui generic phenomenon, and take exploratory and sometimes 
quite radical approaches to (re)understanding concepts of the polity and democracy 
in this context.  
 
A typical reductionist approach is, for example,  intergovernmentalism. 
Intergovernmentalists advocate – empirically and/or normatively – that regulatory 
authority is provisionally transferred by the Member States to the EU’s 
institutions.137 Among other things, they emphasise that the EU does not need to be 
measured in democratic terms since its competences are foreseeable, retractable and 
have been authorised by democratic processes of the Member States.138 These 
competences are, moreover, of a kind that do not create “winners” and “losers”, but, 
instead, achieve politically neutral “pareto-optimal” policy objectives – analogous to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See Neil Walker, “Surface and Depth: The EU’s Resilient Sovereignty Question” in J. Neyer and 
A. Wiener (Eds.), Political Theory of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 
also available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585852 (hereinafter Walker, 2010). Walker 
argues that the problem of locating sovereignty causes pervasive “diagnostic controversies” over the 
democratic nature of the EU, which he frames under six headings: denial, delegation, demarcation, 
disaggregation, displacement and dualism (Walker, 2010: 15-20). 
136 On the latter, see Ole Spiermann, “The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the 
Making of the European Community Legal Order” (1999) European Journal of International Law 
Vol. 10 No. 4 763 (hereinafter Spiermann, 1999). 
137 On “provisional supranationalism”, see Sverker Gustavsson, “Defending the Democratic Deficit” 
in A. Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, 
Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, London: Routledge, 1998 (hereinafter Gustavsson, 1998). 
138 This rationale has been defended by various national constitutional courts in Treaty ratification 
processes over the years (see Section 2.2 of Chapter One). See Andrew Moravscik, “In Defence of the 
‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union” (2002) Journal of Common 
Market Studies Vol. 40 No. 4 603 (hereinafter Moravscik, 2002). 
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national regulatory agencies.139 Another typical reductionist approach is a statist 
orientation. Observing the same empirical phenomena as the intergovernmentalists, 
those with a statist orientation take the converse view that the EU should become 
more state-like (i.e. greater sovereignty) if it is to be democratic. Habermas – in an 
altogether more conspicuous indication of his modernity – argues that the hitherto 
deregulatory, market-freeing forces of EU integration give rise to “increasing 
inequalities in the distribution of the gross national product”.140 Such problems – 
associated with globalisation – are themselves democratic deficits, requiring the EU 
to be transformed into a federal, state-like entity to be redressed.141   
 
There is a variety of experimentalist approaches. The common theme here, however, 
is exploratory (re)conceptualisation given the sui generic nature of the EU. Curtin 
argues that reconceptualisation is necessary for “survival in the modern world in 
which the whole concept of geographical borders is rapidly becoming irrelevant.”142 
It is thus the intellectual movement towards post-Westphalian forms (and, in some 
respects, Curtin argues, pre-Westphalian forms) of the polity which is virtuous, 
especially given the ubiquity of new boundary-less communicative structures (such 
as the Internet). Humanity, in other words, needs to make this “transcendental” 
journey.143 The approaches here do not reject, but invariably accept, the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 See Majone, 1998: 14; and Moravscik, 2002: 607. See also Michael Greven, “Can the European 
Union Finally Become a Democracy?” in Greven and Pauly (Eds.), Democracy Beyond the State?: 
The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000 
(hereinafter Greven, 2000): 49. He argues that in the minds of EU citizens, the EU is merely an 
“international appendage” to the state, given the relatively unimportant areas in which it is competent 
to regulate.  
140 Jürgen Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution” (2001) New Left Review Vol. 11 5 
(hereinafter Habermas, 2001): 11. 
141 Zürn refers to the problems associated with the globalisation of markets as “input and output 
incongruities”, which give rise to “pre-political” and, hence, democratic deficits. See Michael Zürn, 
“Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State” in Greven and Pauly (Eds.), Democracy Beyond 
the State?: The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2000 (hereinafer Zürn, 2000). See also Federico Mancini, “Europe: The Case for Statehood” 
(1998) European Law Journal Vol. 4 No. 1 29 (hereinafter, Mancini, 1998): 40; and Richard Kuper, 
“The Many Democratic Deficits of the European Union” in A. Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) 
Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, 
London: Routledge, 1998 (hereinafter Kuper, 1998). Such conditions of globalisation, however, do 
not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that a European state is needed (Menon and Weatherill, 2007).  
142 Curtin, 1997: 4. 
143 Curtin, 1997: 4. This is the leitmotif of Mitchell’s inaugural lecture “Why European Institutions?” 
(see Mitchell, 1968).  
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“regulatory efficacy in the globalised world” premiss. Yet their distinctiveness shines 
through in other, varied, ways. For example, Weiler et al. suggest a distinctively 
post-nationalist purpose for the EU: 
 
Maybe in the realm of the political, the special virtue of contemporaneous 
membership in a national ethno-cultural demos, and in a supranational civic, value-
driven demos, is in the effect which such double membership may have on taming 
the great appeal, even craving, for belonging in this world which nationalism 
continues to offer but which can so easily degenerate into intolerance and 
xenophobia.144 
 
The issue of sovereignty is also treated in exploratory ways. Indeed, we saw in the 
last Chapter how notions of “constitutional pluralism” inform the functioning of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. There are likewise many theories of 
constitutional pluralism that seek to understand the nature of the EU and the 
constitutional relationships that exist therein. There is the post-sovereign idea of the 
“mixed system”, within which there is a plurality of political and legal systems that 
overlap: intergovernmental, supranational, infranational, postnational and state 
systems.145 Walker, on the other hand, argues that sovereignty in the EU: 
 
… is not best conceived as merely redistributed in a mixed or multi-layered federal 
‘system’ for the states in combination, for that would still imply a single ‘superstate-
like’ final authority for the system in question and an overarching principle or rule 
for deciding the hierarchy of norms within that system.146 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Joseph Weiler, Ulrich Haltern, and Franz Mayer, “European Democracy and its Critique” (1995) 
West European Politics 18 (hereinafter Weiler et al., 1995): 23-24. Indeed, MacCormick notes that the 
era of post-sovereign Europe is “a very welcome development in diminishing the probability of 
recurrence to the barbarism of time recently past.” See MacCormick, 1997: 338. 
145 Weiler et al., 1995: 24-28. See also MacCormick, 1997: 338-339; Richard Bellamy and Dario 
Castiglione, “The Uses of Democracy: Reflection on the European Democratic Deficit” in Eriksen 
and Fossum (Eds.), Democracy in the European Union: Integration Through Deliberation?, London; 
New York: Routledge, 2000 (hereinafter Bellamy and Castiglione, 2000): 69; and Heidrun Abromeit, 
“How to Democratise a Multi-Level, Multi-Dimensional Polity” in A. Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) 
Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, 
London: Routledge, 1998 (hereinafter Abromeit, 1998): 112. 
146 Walker, 2010: 13. 
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Nor can sovereignty, as an analytical tool, be dispensed with altogether in this task, 
as post-sovereigntists would claim (e.g. MacCormick). Instead, it is: 
 
… discretely located in each of these various overlapping polity sites, none of whom 
will defer to the other and so concede the absoluteness and exclusivity of the claim 
of the other, and whose relations inter se are for that reason finally heterarchical 
rather than hierarchical … [the EU is a] multi-sovereign, territorially and 
jurisdictionally overlapping configuration … which does not subserve to a single 
discipline of internal hierarchy and system-integrity, and where identities and 
loyalties are not nested within one overall system supplying both the ordering 
mechanism and inter-cultural traditions.147 
  
There is also, finally, a strong school of thought that seeks to rescue the idea of 
“democratic deliberation” as a way of explaining – and, normatively, guiding the 
evolution of – the EU as a sui generic polity. In this view, the special virtue of the 
EU is in its capacity to disaggregate and optimally coordinate special interest 
representation via its multi-faceted institutional framework.148 
 
 
2.1.2. The “No Demos” Debate 
 
There are considerable doubts expressed as to whether the EU can be understood as a 
democratic polity given broader social and political phenomena. These concerns 
manifest themselves within the so-called “no demos” thesis, which is another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Walker, 2010: 13-14, 22. For a similar pluralist account, see Sabel and Gerstenberg, 2010.  
148 Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political 
Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology” (1997) European Law Journal Vol. 3 No. 3 273 
(hereinafter Joerges and Neyer, 1997); Christian Joerges, “‘Deliberative Political Processes’ 
Revisited: What Have we Learnt about the Legitimacy of Supranational Decision-Making” (2006) 
Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 44 779 (hereinafter Joerges, 2006); Joshua Cohen and 
Charles Sabel, “Directly Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) European Law Journal Vol. 3 No. 4 313 
(hereinafter Cohen and Sabel, 1997); Oliver Gerstenberg, “Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen 
and Sabel” (1997) European Law Journal Vol. 3 No. 4 343 (hereinafter Gerstenberg, 1997); and 
Everson and Eisner, 2009.  
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contested aspect of the DemDefLit.149 The argument can be summarised simply that 
because there is no “European People” per se, the EU cannot and should not be 
understood in democratic terms.  
 
The idea of a people or demos, as such, has been described as a sense of 
“togetherness”,150 or “a minimum sense of ‘we feeling’”.151 This, it is argued, is 
lacking in the ever-enlarging, expanding and deepening EU. The principal claim is 
that the EU lacks of a distinctively European “collective self-identity” – a 
community identity by which the citizenry can understand itself.152 In particular, it is 
argued that there is no comparable national identity of the EU.153 This rationale is 
backed up by empiricists, like Moravscik, who observe the disinterested and ignorant 
attitudes towards the EU exhibited by its de jure members.154 Examples of these 
attitudes are: low voter turnout at elections to the EP; non-competitive party-politics 
in the EU; EU politics and policies of low salience in the minds of voters; and EU 
elections being of “second order” to national elections.155 They argue that these 
attitudes signify the absence of a European, “we-feeling” sense of collective identity. 
 
Weiler et al further argue that “the kind of homogeneity of the ethno-national 
conditions on which peoplehood depend [does not] exist.”156 In order for there to be a 
democratic community there needs to be a “modicum of cultural homogeneity”.157 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 For an overview of the “no demos” thesis, see Weiler et al’s “standard version” in Weiler et al, 
1995: 9-14. 
150 Zürn, 2000. 
151 Walker, 2010. 
152 See Abromeit, 1998; and Zürn, 2000.   
153 An important factor in the Lisbon Judgment ratio was the discussion of das volk (the people), and 
the lack thereof in relation to the EU: para. 105.  
154 Moravscik, 2002: 615-617. See also Andrew Moravscik, “The Myth of Europe’s Democratic 
Deficit” (2008) Intereconomics: Journal of European Public Policy 331 (hereinafter Moravscik, 
2008).  
155 Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, People and Parliament in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998 (hereinafter Blondel et al., 1998).  
156 Weiler et al, 1995: 13 (emphasis added). 
157 Abromeit, 1998. See also Albert Weale, “Between Representation and Constitutionalism in the 
European Union” in A. Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: 
Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, London: Routledge, 1998, on pre-political bonds; 
Andreas Føllesdal, “Democracy, Legitimacy and Majority Rule in the European Union” in A. Weale 
and M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice 
and Citizenship, London: Routledge, 1998: 36, on the need for avoidance of “standard harms”; Larry 
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Given these requirements, there is a general presumption that a socio-culturally 
diverse Europe of nation-states is incapable of the necessary degree of homogeneity. 
Grande, for example, argues that Europe’s socio-political cleavages result in 
“structural minorities” making the implementation of majoritarian decision-making 
less feasible.158 Another argument is that the EU does not have a public sphere within 
which political deliberation can take place – seen as a necessary condition for a 
democratic polity, and for the cultivation of a sense of community.159 Greven argues 
that public communication in the EU is difficult to achieve given the multiplicity of 
languages.160 Associated with this is that there is no transnational media that are 
“specifically European”.161  
 
There are three responses to the no-demos thesis: to say that it is not needed given 
the intergovernmental nature of the EU;162 that the EU should create the necessary 
conditions to foster a European demos, as above; 163  and the experimentalist 
approaches that decouples the Westphalian precepts of democracy by re-imagining 
the conceptual relationship between democracy and the polity: in particular, the 
rejection of the strictures that the notion of “nationality” imposes on understanding 
the concepts associated with demos.164 MacCormick argued that there is a de jure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Siedentop, Democracy In Europe, London: Allen Lane, 2000 (hereinafter Siedentop, 2000), on a 
“shared moral base”; Greven, 2000, on shared “political symbols”. 
158 Edgar Grande, “Post-National Democracy in Europe” in Greven and Pauly, Democracy Beyond the 
State? The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2000 (hereinafter Grande, 2000): 122. See also Loc Hong, 2010.  
159 Habermas, 2001: 18.  
160 Greven, 2000. 
161 Habermas, 2001: 18. See also Philip Schlesinger and Deirdre Kevin, “Can the European Union 
Become a Sphere of Publics?” in Eriksen and Fossum (Eds.), Democracy in the European Union: 
Integration Through Deliberation?, London; New York: Routledge, 2000. 
162 This view is not restricted to intergovernmentalists. See, for example, Loc Hong, 2010: 706.   
163 Habermas, 2001, on a “catalytic EU Constitution”. See also Simon Hix, What’s Wrong With the 
European Union and How to Fix It, Polity Press, 2008 (hereinafter Hix, 2008): 68. See also Andreas 
Føllesdal and Simon Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and 
Moravcsik” (2006) Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 44 No. 3 533 (hereinafter Føllesdal and 
Hix, 2006). They argue that this will be achieved by competitive party-political processes, the 
establishment of which would create pan-European public discourse and a collective identity. 
164 Curtin, 1997: 14, 15, 53. Habermas defines the nation as “a political community shaped by 
common descent, or at least by a common language, culture, and history” (see Jürgen Habermas, The 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (2nd Edition) The MIT Press, 1999: 107). It is worth 
noting, however, that Habermas adopts a postnational approach – with his idea of “constitutional 
patriotism” in the EU – as a necessary stepping stone towards European statehood (see Jürgen 
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European citizenship on which a demos can develop. He notes that this is a notably 
“thin” sense of citizenship and demos, and that it presently co-exists with national 
identities derived from the traditions of the Member States.165 Associated with the 
idea of postnational identity is the blockage caused by socio-cultural heterogeneity. 
To this, Habermas optimistically argues: 
 
Europe has developed institutional arrangements for the productive resolution of 
intellectual, social and political conflicts. In the course of painful, if not fatal 
struggles, it has learnt how to cope with deep cleavages, schisms and rivalries 
between secular and ecclesiastical powers … Europe has thus learnt a sensitive 
attitude and a balanced response … to the promise of future benefits from the 
‘creative destruction’ of present productivity.166 
 
 
2.2. Theories of the System 
 
Thus far we have considered the more philosophical aspects of the DemDefLit – 
looking at the literature which examines the nature and form of the EU, and the 
taxonomies therein that invariably borrow the conceptual language of political 
theories of the polity. In this sub-section, we consider literature focusing on the 
institutional system of the EU, and which questions the overarching system’s 
democratic legitimacy. This literature looks at the institutional system of the EU 
holistically and postulates how it is to be legitimate or accountable in a general 
sense,167 and ties that into a theory of democratic legitimacy i.e. because such 
mechanisms are regarded as being instrumental towards holding the institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe” (1992) 
Praxis International Vol. 12 1.  
165 MacCormick, 1997: 342.  On formative notions of EU citizenship, see Grande, 2000: 122; Weiler 
et al. 1995: 19, 23; Abromeit, 1998; Zürn, 2000; Habermas, 2001; and Greven, 2000; and Curtin, 
1997: 18.  
166 Habermas, 2001: 20. 
167 For Bovens, “[a]ccountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences. This is generic because the actor and forum may be 
anyone or any institution. See Mark Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual 
Framework” (2007) European Law Journal Vol. 13 No. 4 447 (hereinafter Bovins, 2007): 450.  
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system of the EU to standards of democratic legitimacy e.g. institutional checks and 
balances.168 
 
There is a necessary relationship in the DemDefLit between reductionist and 
experimentalist philosophies with approaches to systemic accountability. The 
intergovernmental point of view, for example, is that democratic control remains 
with the Member States – their publics being the ultimate accountability forum qua 
Bovens.169 The preoccupation here is with ensuring as much as possible that Member 
States ultimately remain in control.170 The supranational, or infranational, variant of 
this logic is a particular strand of delegation theory called trusteeship.171 Whereas the 
intergovernmental approach depicts the relationship between the Member States and 
the EU as “principal-agent”, trusteeship depicts the relationship as analogous to the 
common law trust; whereby EU’s institutions are the trustees, acting for, and on 
behalf of, the European public(s) (the beneficiaries of the trust).172 The crucial 
difference between trusteeship and the principal-agent model is that the EU’s 
institutions – as trustee-institutions – are, as much as possible independent from the 
Member States in exercising this discretion –preventing the Member States from 
reneging on their previously agreed policy-commitments. In this view, the insulation 
of supranational institutions, like the Commission, from Member State control is 
seen as (democratically) legitimate.173 The statist approach seeks to replicate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168  The theoretical relationship between the separation of powers doctrine and democracy is 
considered in greater detail in Section 3.2 of Chapter Three. See also Eric Barendt, “Separation of 
Powers and Constitutional Government” (1995) Public Law Winter 599 (hereinafter Barendt, 1995); 
Barber, 2001; and Richard White, “Separation of Powers and Legislative Supremacy” (2011) Law 
Quarterly Review Vol. 127 July 456 (hereinafter White, 2011). 
169 For intergovernmentalists, the aspects of the Union’s legislative processes that require “unanimity” 
are important democratic safeguards. See Moravscik, 2008: 334; Grande, 2000: 124; and Abromeit, 
1998: 115. 
170 Such a system is open to normative and empirical objections. Empirically, it does not explain the 
supranational elements of the EU. Conceptually, unanimity may create de facto minorities through 
“pork barrelling” (see Abromeit, 1998; and Grande, 2000); and “disabling” legislative impasses 
(Walker, 2010: 24). 
171 As we shall see in Section 2 of Chapter Three, the notion of trusteeship is central to the analytical 
framework of this thesis. 
172 See Giandomenico Majone, “Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU 
Governance” (2001) European Union Politics Vol. 2 103 (hereinafter Majone, 2001). 
173 Indeed, this is why advocates of this approach, such as Majone, Weatherill and Menon, focus on 
matters of institutional output (Majone, 1998; Menon and Weatherill, 2007; and Weatherill, 2010). 
Such a system is also descriptively attractive since it explains the demonstrable supranational 
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institutional arrangements that inhere in the modern democratic state. Føllesdal and 
Hix present the paradigm case: a Westminster style, majoritarian,174 competitive 
system of party politics.175 Hix argues:  
[C]ompetition for political power is the essential element of virtually all modern 
theories of democratic government. Even if a polity is procedurally democratic, in 
terms of having representative institutions and checks-and-balances on the exercise 
of power, it is not substantively democratic unless there is open competition for 
executive office and over the direction of the policy agenda.176 
 
A variant in the statist school is the case for a federal Europe – complete with a 
written and justiciable constitution, which would provide a set of basic unassailable 
social and/or political rights that are to be protected by the supervisory jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice.177   
 
The experimental analyses tend to be less normative. They are more concerned with 
finding ways of explaining the prevailing institutional set-up by reframing standards 
of accountability and legitimacy. So, rather than adopt a single paradigmatic 
organising principle (such as intergovernmentalism or federalism) with which to 
explain what can be seen, and criticise what cannot, experimental approaches will 
first determine what can be seen, and then postulate new paradigms. Two examples 
of new paradigms are pluralism in a “mixed system” 178  and “deliberative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
elements of the EU system. See, however, Deirdre Curtin, “Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU 
Administrative Actors to Public Account” (2007) European Law Journal Vol. 13 No. 4 523 
(hereinafter Curtin, 2007); Joerges and Neyer, 1997; and Joerges, 2006 for contrary views on the 
accountability of the Commission.  
174 Føllesdal argues that majoritarianism gives greater control for all affected parties, thus protecting 
political equality, whereby the “losers” (i.e. the minorities) have consented to the overall system in the 
knowledge that they have the opportunity to “win” at some opportunity in the future; as well as the 
advantage that it allows for more effective problem-solving (Føllesdal, 1998). 
175  See Føllesdal and Hix, 2006. See also Føllesdal, 1998; Hix, 2008; and Richard Bellamy 
“Democracy Without Democracy? Can the EU’s Democratic ‘Outputs’ be Separated from the 
Democratic ‘Inputs’ Provided by Competitive Parties and Majority Rule?” (2010) Journal of 
European Public Policy Vol. 17 No.1 2 (hereinafter Bellamy, 2010). 
176 Hix, 2008: 68 (emphasis added). 
177 See Kuper, 1998; Siedentop, 2000: Chapter One; Greven, 2000; Zürn, 2000; Habermas, 2001; and 
Loc Hong, 2010. 
178 MacCormick, 1997. 
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supranationalism”.179 We have already seen how the different notions of pluralism 
(constitutional, legal, post-sovereign, and heterarchical) reconfigure institutional 
legitimacy in a mixed system of political and legal orders. In that view, issues such 
as the insufficiency of legislative power in the EP, or the executive dominance of the 
unelected Commission, 180  are not per se unaccountable or undemocratic.  
Accountability in the multi-level EU does not “subserve to a single discipline of 
internal hierarchy and system-integrity”,181 but instead is disaggregated, leading to 
multiple, discrete, but effective, forums of accountability qua Bovens. Curtin, for 
example, in rejecting delegation theory, uses Bovens’ generic model of 
accountability to demonstrate the various public forums through which the 
committees of the Commission, and the EU’s regulatory agencies, are held to 
account.182 
 
In the theory of “deliberative supranationalism”, the legitimacy of the EU system is 
derived from on-going inter-institutional deliberations and the effectiveness of the 
EU’s institutions in both problem-solving and grass-roots interest representation. 
Moreover, the special virtue of this theory is its resolution of the tension between 
intergovernmental and supranational forces, which pervade institutional structuring 
and decision-making in and around the EU: 
 
Comitology has provided a forum for the development of novel and mediating forms 
of interest formation and decision making. Any attempt to provide for its analytical 
conceptualisation and normative evaluation, may therefore be confronted with 
institutional innovations which fit neither into the analytical models of functionalism 
and intergovernmentalism ...183 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Joeges and Neyer, 1997.  
180 Both issues are part of the “standard version” of the DemDefLit (Weiler et al, 1995). These are 
also concerns most acutely felt by those of a statist or majoritarian persuasion (see Føllesdal and Hix, 
2006).  
181 Walker, 2010: 22. 
182 Curtin, 2007.  
183 Joerges and Neyer, 1997: 279. For a similar paradigm, see Cohen and Sabel, 1997; and 
Gerstenberg, 1997.  
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As well as opening up political deliberation to otherwise marginalised interest 
groups, the democratic legitimacy of deliberative supranationalism is rooted in its 
extraordinary inclusivity and its capacity to embrace “revolutionary politics”.184 
 
 
2.3. Intrinsic Democratic Virtues and Institutional Claims 
 
This Section is particularly relevant for understanding and clarifying the contribution 
of this thesis. As we shall see in Chapter Three, intrinsic virtues of democratic 
legitimacy are central to the argument of this thesis. The democratic virtues are 
representation, participation, accountability, and transparency. In the DemDefLit, 
these virtues form the analytical bases in various accounts. Sometimes they are used 
in relation to the EU’s institutional framework holistically, and sometimes they are 
used to analyse the democratic legitimacy of particular institutions. Unlike the 
systemic accounts in Section 2.2, these virtues are self-standing democratic criteria 
(intrinsic), and, as such, their claim to democratic legitimacy is not a priori 
(instrumental). In the following sub-sections, the various systemic and institutional 
claims that are made in the DemDefLit in terms of these four democratic virtues will 
be outlined.185  
 
What is important to observe in the following presentation is the manner in which the 
intrinsic virtue is being analysed: in particular, whether the institution that is under 
examination is being assessed in light of its capacity to foster an intrinsic virtue of 
the system, or another institution (an instrumental point of view); whether the 
institution is itself being examined in light of an intrinsic virtue; and, crucially for the 
argument of this thesis, whether or not, and to what extent, an underlying philosophy 
of the EU (as discussed in Section 2.1 supra) guides the assessment. In Section 3, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Everson and Eisner argue that political processes in the EU should not exclude non-nationals, and 
should not “smother” the possibility of political revolution (Everson and Eisner, 2009: Chapter 
Seven). 
185 Often they are not understood discretely. This is because there is a natural ontological overlap 
between these otherwise discrete concepts, and there are therefore variations in the ways in which 
they have been used analytically. 
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look at the literature that examines the Court of Justice from an instrumental 
perspective; and in Section 4, I explain, first, that an underlying philosophy 
necessarily informs these sorts of analyses, and go on to specify my own philosophy 





Democratic representation is portrayed in two ways in the DemDefLit: representation 
by election; and the representation of salient public interests – the former approach 
emphasising the notion of those in political office acting as (elected) 
“representatives”; and the latter emphasising institutional responsiveness to public 
interests more generally. On the former, there have been a variety of claims made by 
those engaged in evaluating the democratic credentials of the institutional framework 
of the EU. In the standard version of the democratic deficit, the EU’s institutions are 
overrun by unelected bureaucrats or technocrats.186 In particular, it is a common 
objection that the unelected Commission and the merely indirectly elected Council of 
Ministers – both of which are regarded as the de facto executive of EU governance – 
suffer this democratic deficit. There have thus been many proposals for reform 
presented along the lines of electing – directly or indirectly – the incumbents of these 
institutions.187 Another, latterly more successful, argument has been for the election 
of the President of the Commission.188 Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See Weiler et al, 1995: 6-9. For more recent accounts of the prevailing arguments, see Føllesdal 
and Hix, 2006: 534-537; Menon and Weatherill, 2007: 3-6; and Craig and de Búrca, 2011: 150-155. 
These accounts do not merely present a “straw man”. Indeed, Føllesdal and Hix have systematically 
and normatively rehearsed these arguments in their contributions to the DemDefLit (Føllesdal and 
Hix, 2006; and Hix, 2008).  
187 On direct elections to the Council, see Blondel et al, 1998; and Føllesdal, 1998. Moravscik argues, 
on the contrary, that the incumbent representatives of Member States in the Council suffice given that 
they have been elected by their electorates and are a priori accountable to their national parliaments 
(See Moravscik, 2002; and Moravscik, 2008). On direct and indirect elections to the Commission, see 
Christophe Crombez, “The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing?” 
(2003) European Union Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 101. 
188 On direct election of a Commission president, see Vernon Bogdanor, “The Future of the European 
Community: Two Models of Democracy” (1986) Government and Opposition Vol. 21 No. 2 161; and 
Frank Decker, “Governance Beyond the Nation-State. Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the 
European Union” (2002) 9(2) Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 9 No. 2 256. On elections via 
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European Parliament now has a de jure role in electing a Commission President.189 It 
has also been argued that the Commission should be stripped of its executive 
powers,190 or, as we have seen, that it is simply unnecessary for such technocratic 
organisations to be democratic and thus elected anyway, given the nature of the 
EU.191 
 
In the school of electoral representation, even the directly elected European 
Parliament does not escape criticism. From the point of view of representation by 
election, the key claims are that there is low voter turn-out at European elections, and 
that, for those who do vote, the elections are more about national politics than they 
are about distinctively EU policy and politics. 192  This is another reason why 
Føllesdal and Hix argue for a competitive system of party politics – so that real 
debates emerge in the eyes of voters, and there is thus something at stake to vote for 
or against in European elections.193  
 
Beyond electoral representation, there are analyses that conceive of democratic 
representation in terms of politically-salient public interests that ought to be factored 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an electoral college, see Simon Hix, “Elections, Parties and Institutional Design. A Comparative 
Perspective on European Union Democracy” (1998) 2(3) West European Politics  Vol. 2 No. 3 19. On 
the involvement of the European Parliament specifically, see Walter Van Gerven, The European 
Union: A Polity of States and Peoples, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005; and Brenden Donnelly and 
Markus Wagner “Voting for Europe: Citizens, Elections and Referendums” Federal Trust, Policy 
Brief Number 27, 2006.  
189 Article 14 (1) TEU. This is, however, a vote on a proposal from the European Council (Article 17 
(7) TEU), on the basis of consultations between the European Council and the European Parliament 
(Declaration 11 of the Lisbon Treaty). But the EP does not enjoy similar powers with respect to the 
Council (Article 16 (6) TEU, and Article 236 TFEU); the Court of Justice of the European Union (for 
the processes of elections of Presidents of the Union Courts, see Section 3.3.4 of Chapter Four); the 
Court of Auditors (Article 283 TFEU); and the Executive Board of the European Central Bank 
(Article 286 TFEU). 
190 Roland Vaubel, The Centralisation of Western Europe: The Common Market, Political Integration 
and Democracy, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1995. 
191 See especially Majone, 1998; Majone, 2001; Moravscik, 2002; and Moravscik, 2008.  
192 For a detailed empirical study of these claims, see Moravscik, 2002: 615-617. See also Blondel et 
al, 1998. These and other criticisms of the EP have been made in relation to the broader issue of 
democratic accountability of the EU, discussed below. 
193 See Føllesdal and Hix, 2006: 551-553; and Hix, 2008: 98-107. It is interesting to note here that 
Føllesdal and Hix share the same empirical observations as Moravscik, yet their normative arguments 
strongly diverge. This issue will be explored in Section 4.  
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into institutional decision-making and structuring. 194  In the DemDefLit, these 
interests are typically understood along the paradigmatic fault-lines of EU 
governance: intergovernmental, supranational, and infranational.195  Naturally, the 
intergovernmental approach emphasises the importance of distinctively national 
interests within the EU’s regulatory framework.196 The standard version here is that 
by transferring competences to supranational (procedurally and/or substantively 
undemocratic) EU institutions, such as the Council and the Commission, national 
interests are marginalised or bypassed altogether. This argument manifests itself in 
debates on the conceptual and practical issues of subsidiarity in the EU. 197 
Subsidiarity – best understood here in its political (as opposed to legal) form198 – 
provides a rationale by which scholars have argued in favour of protecting national 
regulatory diversity and interests, in opposition to a dis-interested European 
technocracy.199 As such, much of the focus here has been on the role of national 
parliaments within the ordinary legislative process, which has latterly resulted in 
significant reforms via the Lisbon Treaty.200 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 As we shall see in Chapter Five, it is this perspective that forms the basis of the analysis of the 
representativeness of the Court of Justice’s structures and processes.   
195 See especially Weiler et al, 1995: 24-28.  
196 See, for example, Vivien Schmidt, Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Polities, Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
197 For an overview of the different conceptual understandings of subsidiarity, and its practical 
application, see Nicholas Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity” (2005) European Law 
Journal Vol. 11 308 (hereinafter Barber, 2005). For a critical view of its application and 
understanding within the EU, prior to the reforms in the Lisbon Treaty, see Gareth Davies, 
“Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’ (2006) Common Market Law 
Review Vol. 43 63 (hereinafter Davies, 2006). 
198 See Davies, 2006.  
199 See Robert Schütze, “Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism” (2009) 
Cambridge Law Journal  Vol. 68 525; and Philipp Kiiver, “The Early-Warning System for the 
Principle of Subsidiarity: the National Parliament as a Conseil d’Etat for Europe” (2011) European 
Law Review Vol. 36 98. 
200 The major innovation of the Lisbon Treaty in this regard was to provide national parliaments with 
formal powers in the ordinary legislative procedure (under Article 289 TFEU and Article 294 TFEU) 
within which national parliaments may participate and negotiate in the process. See Protocol (No 2) 
TEU On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (2010) OJ C 83/206 
(hereinafter Protocol 2). National parliaments must be consulted, and have (limited) powers of 
negotiation that can result in the redrafting of legislative proposals (see Article 6 and Article 7 of 
Protocol 2). They cannot, however, veto proposed legislative acts. Recently, the first instance of a 
“yellow card” raised by a sufficient number of national parliaments under this procedure connection 
with the so-called “Monti II” legislative proposal of the Commission, clarifying the consequences of 
the rulings on labour law and free movement of companies in light of the judgments in Viking and 
Laval.  National Parliament objections can be tracked via IPEX, http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/search.do. The Commission has since withdrawn the proposal (12 September, 2012), yet it did 
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The supranational variant places a premium on the notion of representation in the 
liberal tradition of substantive democracy i.e. democratic output. Habermas, for 
example, as we have seen, bases his claim of a democratic deficit in the asymmetry 
between market deregulation and welfare protection of citizens. The solution is, 
therefore, to codify a set of socio-political rights that redress the under-represented 
class of citizens who have been marginalised by the market-freeing forces of EU 
integration. 201  This is a more ambitious version of Menon and Weatherill’s 
supranationalist claims, in which they emphasise the virtue of representation as 
“respect[ing] the interests of actors whose voice is excluded or muffled (de jure or de 
facto) within purely national political processes.”202 An important point to note here, 
which is of great significance to the claims in this thesis, is that there is a prima facie 
zero-sum tension between the intergovernmental and supranational variants of 
interest representation. We shall return to this point in Section 4.  
 
Finally, the “infranational” variant of interest representation extols the virtue of civil 
society as a relevant and important actor in the constitutional structuring of EU 
governance.203 Civil society here refers to a range of actors that do not qualify as a 
public authority, at whatever level: private organisations; NGOs; regions of the 
Member States; sectoral or epistemic interest groups, and individuals, inter alia. 
Grande observes that “in [a] multi-level system of governance like the EU, some of 
the premises of political representation no longer hold.”204 He argues that there are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not admit to violation of the subsidiarity principle. Instead it simply cited absence of adequate 
political support. 
201 Habermas, 2001.  
202 Menon and Weatherill, 2007: 3. See also Weatherill, 2010: Chapter Nine. 
203 This is sometimes referred to in political theory as associative democracy. Weiler refers to this 
system as “infranationalism” and holds that it is apolitical and “technocratic” (Weiler, 1999: 283-
285). It gives rise to efficacious problem-solving, whilst at the same time circumventing the zero-sum, 
or negative sum, tensions that exist between the intergovernmental and supranational structures of 
representation (see also Joseph Weiler, “Epilogue: Comitology as Revolution Infranationalism, 
Constitutionalism and Democracy” in C. Joerges and E. Vos (Eds.) EU Committees. Social 
Regulation, Law and Politics, Hart Publishing, 1999: 347). An interesting addition here is in the way 
that Joerges and Neyer conceive of this. Unlike Weiler, they hold that its virtue lies in its capacity to 
foster public discourse and deliberation around the policy-making process – a view against which 
Weiler strongly protests. This will be examined below under the heading of deliberation. 
204 Grande, 2000: 124-125. 
      Chapter Two  






many actors that have de facto influence on the policy-making process (like those 






In two important respects, there is a conceptual overlap between the democratic 
virtues of representation and participation.205 First, both virtues can, and should, be 
understood as mechanisms of institutional responsiveness to politically-salient 
matters of public interest. 206  Second, both representation and participation are 
capable of measuring the (often marginalised) interests of civil society. Yet the 
crucial difference between these two virtues is the manner in which each is disposed 
to such measurement.207 The representation of civil society – infranationalism or 
associative democracy – is primarily a substantive conception of democratic 
ordering. On the basis that there are institutional structures and incumbents in place 
to represent interests, it tends to measure those interests in terms of what is perceived 
to be of interest (government for the people), whereas participation in institutional 
decision-making is a procedural conception of democratic ordering and institutional 
responsiveness (government by the people). Of course, the two approaches can be 
synergistic, but it is often the case, and demonstrably the case in the EU, that 
democratic representation is dominated by intergovernmental and supranational 
interests.208 
 
A point of departure here, then, towards the virtue of participation, is that there is too 
much emphasis within the political institutions of the EU on representation, to the 
extent that the interests of civil society are displaced. Opportunities for citizens and 
interest groups to participate directly in the policy-making process are more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 See Section 2.1 of Chapter Six for further discussion. 
206 See Section 3.2.1 in Chapter Three. 
207 See the theoretical discussions in Chapters Five and Six for a more detailed account of this 
distinction.  
208 This is an important premiss in Joerges and Neyer’s theory of “deliberative suprantionalism” 
(Joerges and Neyer, 1997; and Joerges, 2006).  
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attractive from a civil society point of view. Abromeit thus argues that in the design 
of EU institutional structures: 
 
The task is … depicting the structure of the existing mixture of decision-making 
institutions and policy networks, of ‘statist’ elements and intergovernmental as well 
as intersocietal cooperation, in this way clarifying it and indicating the places – the 
crucial ‘intervention points’ – where participatory elements can and should be 
introduced.209 
 
She proposes a combination of representation and direct participation under a system 
of sectoral and regional veto referendums as part of the policy-making process. 
Under this system, members of regional or sectoral (i.e. epistemic) groups would be 
given the opportunity to vote at referendums on policy decisions that directly affect 
their interests, the consequence of which could be the capacity to veto any potential 
development.  
 
Similarly, Nentwich observes that the current array of opportunity structures for 
citizens’ participation is too heavily dominated by representative structures.210 He 
presents various, empirically identifiable, “opportunity structures for citizens’ 
participation” in the EU policy process: the Internet could be used to provide 
interactive media; deliberative opinion polls; a forum for citizens to comment on 
green and white papers (with enhanced transparency211) and input on EP hearings (of 
which there should be more); expanding the range and depth of Eurobarometer 
research; less restrictive locus standi rules for the Court of Justice’s judicial review 
procedure under (what is now) Article 263 TFEU; trans-European political parties 
that allow citizens to become members; referenda for all constitutional issues; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Abromeit, 1998: 113. 
210 See generally Michael Nentwich, “Opportunity Structures For Citizens’ Participation: The Case of 
the European Union” in A. Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: 
Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, London: Routledge, 1998 (hereinafter Nentwich, 
1998).  
211 On transparency and the reforms that have been made in that regard since 1998, see Section 2.3.4, 
below.  
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controlling petition referenda to block legislation (similar to Abromeit’s point); and 
for commissioners to be accountable via public opinion.212 
 
There is a significant deliberative variant in the participation school. In Curtin’s 
outline of an “alternative vision of democracy for the EU”, she explains that her 
postnational conception is a resolutely thicker notion of democracy than that of the 
national conception. By this she means that it encapsulates a broader range of 
theoretical influences including, most significantly, a deliberative notion of 
democracy. This view emphasises processes of dialogic will-formation within non-
governmental civil spheres and networks of communication and, importantly, does 
not “hinge on the assumptions of macro-subjects, like the ‘people’ of a particular 
community”.213 Furthermore, it emphasises a republican conception of political 
participation: 
 
Whereas a liberal vision of democracy stresses the importance of giving due weight 
to each individual’s distinct preferences, the deliberative view relies upon a person’s 
capacity to be swayed by rationale arguments and to lay aside particular interests 
and opinions in deference to overall fairness and the common interest of the 
collectivity.214  
 
This conception, finally, does not oppose the idea of political representation per se 
and, in fact, Curtin proposes that this republican model be used in combination with 
sites of representation within the EU’s institutional framework. Indeed, some of the 
advocates of representative structures, such as Grande, envisage a system in which 
the kinds of “associative” elements of representation (i.e. the involvement of private 
organisations and NGOs, for example, in policy-making) are exposed to deliberative 
opportunities for the direct participation of citizens.215 This reflects the theoretical 
premiss of Joerges and Neyer’s “deliberative supranationalism”. Through their 
examination of the practice of Comitology in the Commission – whereby experts and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 On the democratic accountability of the Commission, see Section 2.3.3.  
213 Curtin, 1997: 54. 
214 Curtin, 1997: 54.  
215 Grande, 2000: 130.  
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leaders of epistemic communities are consulted during policy-making – they 
discover a deliberative practice contained within “non-hierarchical transnational 
governance structures”. This practice, they argue, depends upon “persuasion, 




2.3.3. Democratic Accountability 
 
In contrast to systemic or generic accountability, democratic accountability relates 
specifically to the manner in which the public holds particular institutions of the EU 
to account. Bovens’ conception still captures this relationship, yet it is more specific 
inasmuch as the “forum” is the public, or institutions representative of the public 
(e.g. the EP), and the “actor” is any one of the EU’s regulatory institutions.217 This 
does not mean that democratic accountability cannot be understood systemically (as 
an aggregation of the entire institutional framework of the EU’s institutions). On the 
contrary, the first and most pervasive perspective on democratic accountability in the 
EU that we consider here relates to the deficiencies of the EP to provide the central 
forum by which institutional accountability is guaranteed holistically in the EU (what 
Bovens refers to as broad, public and democratic accountability). Following a 
Westminster model of parliamentary accountability, the standard version of the 
democratic deficit holds that the EP does not have enough legislative power, and that 
it does not have sufficient supervisory powers under which the executive branches of 
the EU (namely the Council and the Commission) are answerable to it. In spite of 
these claims, over the years during successive Treaty reforms and inter-institutional 
agreements, the powers of the EP have gradually and incrementally increased. We 
saw above that the EP now has a de jure role in electing the President of the 
Commission. Likewise, it has gained considerable power in the ordinary legislative 
procedure (both procedurally and substantively), and greater powers of oversight and 
veto with respect to the secondary legislative acts of the Commission during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Joerges and Neyer, 1997: 298. 
217 See Bovens, 2007: 455, 463. 
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committee stage.218  It may also censure and dismiss the Commission,219 and has 
(limited) oversight powers with respect to the budget of the Commission.220 It also 
has the power to supervise and call to account the institutions of the EU by 
petition, 221  or via its Ombudsman. 222  Nevertheless, these reforms have not 
completely addressed the concerns of advocates of Westminster-style parliamentary 
accountability. We have already seen the claims of Føllesdal and Hix, whereby 
democratic accountability via the EP can only be achieved with a competitive system 
of party-politics in place.  This perspective is, however, notably ambitious and 
feasible only in the event of a state-like transformation of the EU. Papadopoulos, by 
contrast, considers the role of the EP in light of the multi-level nature of the EU and 
argues that each institution should be formally answerable and punishable by the EP 
following Bovens’ generic model of accountability.223 Ultimately, these criticisms 
stem from the fact that the EP is still a comparatively weaker accountability forum 
than its national counterparts – largely down to the sui generic system of separation 
of powers in the EU’s institutional framework.224 
 
Moving away from the parliamentary notion of democratic accountability, there are 
more optimistic and ambitious renditions of democratic accountability in the EU. In 
these views, accountability must be understood in a disaggregated sense, whereby 
particular institutions and/or areas of regulatory competence are answerable to a 
multiplicity of public forums. Curtin adopts this approach in her assessment of the 
accountability of “(quasi-) autonomous” institutions – namely, Comitology and EU 
agencies.225 For Curtin – in addition to the aforementioned (limited) mechanisms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 See Articles 288 to 299 TFEU; and Article 36 TEU; Council Decision 1999/468/EC (2000) OJ L 
256/19; and Council Decision 2006/512/EC (2006) OJ L200/11 (consolidated version at (2006) OJ C-
225/4). For an overview of the historical evolution of institutional reform, see Craig and de Búrca, 
2011: Chapter One; and for comments on the powers of the EP in particular, see Craig and de Búrca, 
2011: 51-58.  
219 Article 234 TFEU.  
220 Article 314 TFEU. For commentary, see Carl Bergstrom, Comitology. Delegation of Powers in the 
European Union and the Committee System, Open University Press, 2005. 
221 Article 226 TFEU and Article 227 TFEU.  
222 Article 228 TFEU.  
223  Yannis Papadopoulos, “Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and Multilevel 
Governance” (2007) European Law Journal Vol. 13 No. 4 469 (hereinafter Papadopoulos, 2007). 
224 Barber, 2001.  
225 Curtin, 2007: 531-539.  
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accountability to the EP – the Commission, its committees and EU agencies are 
accountable to other public forums such as the Court of Justice,226 the Court of 
Auditors and the European Ombudsman, 227  which represent alternative 
accountability forums that do not fall foul of the mis-guided and mythical democratic 
legitimacy postulate that delegation theory offers. In other words, the former 
institutions are directly accountable to the latter – a more efficacious and 
contextually appropriate system of accountability. 228  The same sort of inter-
institutional accountability is observed in other contexts. For example, it is argued 
that different actors are accountable to the Commission under the complaints and 
infringement procedures.229 Article 17 TEU states that “[the Commission] shall 
oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.” Its role is thus analogous to that of a public prosecutor – charged 
with the responsibility of enforcing the law unilaterally with sanctions; or by 





Institutional transparency, especially in terms of decision-making, is seen as a core 
democratic virtue. If we understand transparency (as I argue that we should) as part 
of a process by which the public can audit institutional processes, then it goes 
together with the democratic virtue of accountability. In other words, transparency is 
an adjunct to democratic accountability in the name of public supervision.231 What is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 This role of the Court of Justice will be considered in greater depth in Section 3. See also Loc 
Hong, 2010. He argues that the Court fulfills this function as part of a broader democratic network of 
counter-majoritarian institutions.  
227 On the European Ombudsman, see Peter Bonnor, “Institutional Attitudes in Context: A Comment 
on Rawlings’ Engaged Elites” (2001) European Law Journal  Vol. 7 No. 1 114: 115. 
228 Following Bovens’ generic conception of accountability, Curtin points out that the Court of 
Auditors and the Ombudsman are deficient in some respects i.e. a lack of coercive power (Curtin, 
2007: 537-538).  
229 See Richard Rawlings, “Engaged Elites: Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in Commission 
Enforcement” (2000) European Law Journal Vol. 6 4; Melanie Smith, “Enforcement, Monitoring, 
Verification, Outsourcing: The Decline and Decline of the Infringement Process” (2008) European 
Law Review Vol. 33 No. 6  777; and Arnull, 2006: 34. 
230 For an overview of this process, see Appendix One at note 2. 
231 This is a point made by Bovens, amonst others (Bovens, 2007: 453). 
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important here is the idea of access to institutional documents, which record the 
input, the reasoning, and the output of the decision-making in political (and legal) 
institutions.232  
 
In the standard version of the democratic deficit, the Council and the Commission 
are subject to the greatest criticism. Not only are their decision-making processes 
concealed from the public eye (especially in the Council), but the severity of this is 
compounded by the strong political and, in particular, legislative power they yield. 
Yet transparency in the EU is both conceptually nuanced and, like many of the other 
democratic virtues, gaining greater force through successive Treaty reforms and 
inter-institutional agreements. 233  There are nonetheless still calls for greater 
transparency in the EU. Føllesdal and Hix criticise the Council in particular for its 
enduring lack of transparency, and make this central to their claims of a democratic 
deficit in the EU in spite of the aforementioned reforms.234 Brandsma et al take a 
socio-legal approach to their study of the transparency of Comitology. In their view, 
the formal legal obligations of transparency belie the day-to-day practice of 
institutional decision-making. In an empirical study of the Comitology process – 
examining the “input”, “throughput” and “output” of decision-making in 
Commission committees – they discovered that there are serious shortcomings with 
respect to the information that is being published; shortcomings in both quantitative 
and, especially, qualitative terms.235  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 See Gijs Jan Brandsma, Deirdre Curtin and Albert Meijer, “How Transparent are EU ‘Comitology’ 
Committees in Practice?” (2008) European Law Journal Vol. 14 No. 6 819 (hereinafter Brandsma et 
al, 2008): 824-829. 
233 On transparency in the EU, see Deirdre Curtin and Albert Meijer, “Does Transparency Strengthen 
Legitimacy?” (2006) Information Polity Vol. 11 No. 2 109; and Brandsma et al, 2008: 827-829. For 
an overview of the progress that has been made, see Brandsma et al, 2008: 819-822. For a broader 
overview of institutional reform, see Craig and de Búrca, 2011: Chapter One. Important examples 
include Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents (2001) OJ L 145/43. See also European Commission, Green Paper, Public 
Access to Documents held by the Institutions of the European Community A Review, COM (2007) 
185 Final (18 May 2007); and inter-institutional agreement between Commission and Parliament on 
procedures for implementing Council Decision 1999/468/EC (2000) OJ L 256/19. 
234 These are claims that are made by Føllesdal and Hix, 2006: 553-554. See also Hix, 2008.  
235 For their data, see Brandsma et al, 2008: 831-836. A highly significant observation they made was 
that, whilst input and output documentation was relatively well published, this information was much 
more quantitative in nature, simply recording the final decision of meetings or the results of votes, 
whereas the arguably more democratically pertinent qualitative information (at least from a 
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Yet there are also more nuanced accounts of transparency in the EU context. As 
Craig and de Búrca (correctly) observed,236 it is important to make such assessments 
from a comparative perspective. Moravscik, for example, argues that there is even 
greater transparency in the EU than we would legitimately expect from our national 
institutions:  
 
Yet even in promulgating regulation, the EU acts under the procedural straightjacket 
of extreme transparency ... Successively, it must secure: (a) consensual support from 
national leaders in the European Council to be placed on the agenda, (b) a formal 
proposal from a majority of the technocratic Commission, (c) a formal 2/3 majority 
(but in practice, a consensus) of weighted member state votes in the Council of 
Ministers, (d) a series of absolute majorities of the directly elected European 
parliament, and (e) transposition into national law by national bureaucrats or 
parliaments … Such a set of barriers would be unimaginably high in a national 
context, where elected unitary parliamentary governments can often legislate 
effectively by a single majority vote and bureaucratic mandate … In addition, the EU 
has imposed state-of-the- art formal rules guaranteeing public information and input; 
studies show these protections are stronger than those of the USA or Switzerland.
237 
It’s all in the Financial Times, or any one of the many publications and websites – 
including the EU’s own – that track legislation.238 
 
Another more nuanced analysis is Curtin’s theory of institutional “secrecy” in the 
context of both internal and external security policy and practice in the EU.239 She 
argues that, in the context of information relating to security, institutional secrecy is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
deliberative democracy perspective) was seriously deficient. From their data-set, they recorded that in 
45.2% of the publications of committee deliberations the details were “poor”; 40% were “fair”; 11.9% 
were “good”; and only 2.9% were “excellent”. For more detail on these results, see Brandsma et al, 
2008: 832.  
236 See supra at note 130. 
237  Thomas Zweifel, Democratic Deficit? Institutions and Regulation in the European Union, 
Switzerland and the United States in Comparative Perspective, Lanham MD, 2002; and Thomas 
Zweifel, International Organizations and Democracy, Boulder 2005. 
238 Moravscik, 2008: 334. 
239 Deirdre Curtin, “Top Secret Europe” Inaugural Lecture 415 (delivered upon appointment to the 
chair of Professor of European Law at the University of Amsterdam on 20 October 2011), Universiteit 
vvan Amsterdam, 2011. 
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a necessary public good, which also exists at the transnational level. Whilst 
nevertheless generally arguing for less secrecy (especially in the Council and the 
European Council), she conceives of different levels of secrecy: “deep” and 
“shallow” secrets. The former are secrets that are so secret that their very existence is 
unknown and unknowable to the general public (as well as other institutional actors). 
Her principal argument is then to say that the EU should become more transparent by 
avoiding such deep secrets, but allowing for institutional secrecy in the shallow 
sense, whereby other political institutions and their actors, and/or the general public 
can in limited ways hold the holders of shallow secrets to account, whilst ultimately 
recognising the demonstrable need for this information to be kept away from the 
broader public domain.  
 
 
2.4. Interim Conclusion 
 
The literature review in this Section was presented, first, to outline an area of 
scholarly enquiry to which this thesis contributes; and, second, to tease out relevant 
analytical criteria for my argument. On the former, we saw that much of the literature 
focused on how the political institutions of the EU are, or are not, instrumental in 
making the EU a democratic polity. In Section 3, I consider the (limited) 
contributions within the DemDefLit that analyse the Court in this way. On the latter, 
a few observations need to be emphasised. First is that underlying political 
philosophies of the EU (Section 2.1) pervade all levels of analysis in the DemDefLit. 
It is rare, and, as I argue in Chapter Three, improvident, to evaluate the instrumental 
democratic legitimacy of institutions without a clear analytical grounding of the 
polity-context within which they function. To that end, in Section 4, I clarify the 
salient polity conditions of the EU for my argument. Another important observation 
was the conceptual overlap between the intrinsic virtues and instrumental democratic 
legitimacy. Indeed, Hix’s argument that the EP should hold competitive 
Westminster-style party-political elections entails elements of participation, 
representation, and accountability, which ultimately (according to his guiding 
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philosophy) generate the “essential” institutional dynamics for a democratic EU i.e. 
instrumental democratic legitimacy. It is central to the argument of this thesis to 
carefully address the boundaries and balance between intrinsic virtues and 




3. The Court of Justice, the DemDefLit and Instrumental Democratic 
Legitimacy 
 
In this Section, we look at the limited contributions to the DemDefLit with respect to 
the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Recalling the different 
perspectives and analyses of the Union’s other institutions in Section 2, here we are 
interested in the extent to which the Court of Justice has been analysed in these ways. 
These approaches are outlined in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, I move on to highlight 
the analytical shortfalls and intellectual gaps that persist, and demonstrate the 




3.1. The Court of Justice and the DemDefLit 
 
Mitchell’s point was that courts and, by implication at least, the Court of Justice have 
“something to do with the realities of democracy”.240 For him, courts were not 
simply a service that people may use to resolve their disputes, but part of the very 
fabric of democracy. Moreover, he argued that in the context of the EU, we should 
be prepared to adopt new paradigms in political theory in order to understand the 
democratic legitimacy of courts.241 What, then, has been made of this legacy?   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 See supra at note 1. 
241 Mitchell, 1968: 11-12.  
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The most common, and not altogether surprising, claim is that the Court safeguards 
the basic tenets of a democratic polity through its exercise of judicial review. 
Moravscik, for example, in his emphatic rejection of the need for democracy at the 
EU level, argues that the Court of Justice protects national democracies from 
unwarranted legislative and executive trespass by the EU given its powers of 
legislative and administrative review.242 Operating under non-intergovernmentalist 
paradigms, there is a variety of instrumental arguments. There is the equivalent of 
Moravscik’s approach, whereby the Court of Justice is regarded as a democratically 
essential “counter-majoritarian” institution under an orthodox separation of powers 
paradigm. Lenaerts proposes that an important democratic end for constitutional 
courts to observe is an inter-institutional check – specifically, to guard against the 
failure of political institutions to fulfil their legislative duties: 
 
[T]he Court of Justice is still seen as the guardian of the rule of law and of 
democratic values when the actors in the political process seem to need protection 
against each other’s majoritarian rule.243 
 
Loc Hong adopts the approach of Ely,244 by which constitutional courts, like the 
Court of Justice, are necessary in a democracy to protect “discrete and insular 
minorities” from being marginalised by majoritarianism; and to unblock the political 
channels through which political actors may participate and deliberate 
communicatively: 
  
[A] politically powerful ECJ is, in fact, indispensable for the democratic legitimacy 
of qualified majority voting in the long run. Without such a counter-majoritarian 
mechanism for liberation, minorities in general, and minorities composed of small 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Moravscik, 2002: 610, 611-614; and Moravscik, 2008: 334. For an outline of the Court’s powers of 
review, see Appendix One of this thesis. Others have argued that mere judicial oversight is not enough 
to protect the democratic deficits that putatively exist at the national level (see Meyring, 1997; Weiler 
et al, 1995: 9). 
243 Koen Lenaerts, “Some Thoughts about the Interactions between Judges and Politicians in the 
European Community” (1992) Yearbook of European Law Vol 12 1: 34. 
244  See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980 
(hereinafter Ely, 1980). Ely borrows the terminology of “discrete and insular minorities” from the 
famous case heard by the US Supreme Court: United States v. Caroline Products Co. 1938 304 US 
144 (hereinafter Caroline Products). 
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Member States in particular, would soon have reasons to perceive the governance of 
the Union on the basis thereof as nothing more than a regime under which, to quote 
Thucydides, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.245 
The contributions of Weiler, and Mancini and Keeling, span two different kinds of 
instrumental democratic legitimacy. They argue, in a similar vein to Loc Hong, that 
the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence contributes towards democratic ends in its 
capacity to protect and preserve the juridical conditions necessary in a democratic 
polity e.g. the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence.246 In other words, without 
freedom of expression, for example, to whom could the Union’s regulatory 
authorities credibly be responsive?  
 
This also overlaps with a particular strand of theory in which the Court’s famous 
constitutional jurisprudence has been instrumental towards building a democratic 
polity. Mancini and Keeling make the point that the progenitors of the EU (the 
European Coal and Steel Community; the European Atomic Energy Community; and 
the European Economic Community)247 were not, nor intended to be, “democratic” 
organisations. Similarly, Weiler provides a genealogy of the Court’s polity-
constitutive developments.248 The same logic has been applied in relation to specific 
categories of putatively necessary conditions for a democratic polity. Halberstam 
argues that an important democratic aspect of judicial polity-building is a bottom-up 
form of constitutional legitimacy associated with citizenship. He proposes that the 
Court’s rejection of intergovernmentalism might “further democratic equality among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Loc Hong, 2010: 715. Rosenfeld rejects the separation of powers paradigm in the context of the 
EU, and, thus, the counter-majoritarian argument with respect to the Court of Justice (see Michel 
Rosenfeld, “Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme 
Court” (2006) International Journal of Constitutional Law Vol. 4 No. 4 618 (hereinafter Rosenfeld, 
2006): 632. See also Snell, 2008: 621-623.  
246 See Weiler, 1991: 2417-2419; and Mancini and Keeling, 1994.  
247 These are: the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding (hereinafter ECSC); the Treaty establishing 
the European Atomic Energy Community (1957), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding (hereinafter Euratom); and the Treaty of Rome (1957), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf. 
For an overview of this evolution, see Weatherill, 2010: 3-26. 
248 See generally Weiler, 1991.  
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citizens, not the long-term policy preferences of constituent state governments.”249 
The role of law, and the Court of Justice, is central to Joerges and Neyer’s 
conception of a democratic EU – following their paradigm of “deliberative 
supranationalism”250 – especially with regard to ensuring that regulatory decision-
making in and around the EU is deliberative, transparent and effective: 
 
It would be the task of the law to further this kind of orientation, for example 
through: clear commitments represented primarily by the Commission to arrive at a 
common solution; the establishment of forums where the views of all concerned 
societies can be included; legal principles and rules civilising the decision-making 
process and providing an institutional context for practical reasoning; to ensure the 
potential of the system to manage tensions between output rationality (high 
standards), procedural transparency 251  and fairness; to control the regulatory 




3.2. The Court of Justice and Instrumental Democratic Legitimacy 
 
As a general observation, there is much more room for contributions on Court of 
Justice in the DemDefLit. The contributions made tend to be tangential to broader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Halberstam, 2005: 798. 
250 See supra at Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1.  
251 Curtin examines how the Court is instrumental in safeguarding transparency in the Union’s 
administrative processes. See Curtin, 2007: 535. 
252 Joerges and Neyer, 1997: 299. These observations very much follow a Habermasian proceduralist 
logic (see Habermas, 1995; and Habermas, 1998). There are a variety of contributions along these 
lines in the DemDefLit. Everson and Eisner’s central claim in their contribution is that the Court of 
Justice has been instrumental in facilitating the construction of, through its legal reasoning, a self-
reflexive, inclusive, socio-politically responsive polity (Everson and Eisner, 2009). Similarly, Eriksen 
and Fossum note the manner in which the Court reasons via an inter-institutional dialogue; and that its 
development and protection of rights within the Union legal order is, and will continue to be, a 
valuable source of deliberative potential, particularly with respect to citizens’ participation (see Erik 
Eriksen and John Fossum, “Conclusion: Legitimation Through Deliberation” in Eriksen and Fossum 
(Eds.), Democracy in the European Union: Integration Through Deliberation?, London; New York: 
Routledge, 2000). On the Court’s role in making regulatory decision-making in the EU more 
transparent, see Joni Helliskoski and Päivi Leino, “Darkness at the Break of Noon: The Case Law on 
Regulation No. 1049/2001 on Access to Documents” (2006) Common Market Law Review Vol. 43 
735; and Pedro Cabral, “Access to Member State Documents in EC Law” (2006) European Law 
Review Vol. 31 No. 3 378. 
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arguments, and do not reflect the rich literature on the instrumental democratic 
legitimacy of constitutional courts in constitutional theory (outlined in Chapter 
Three). The Court is the neglected institution in the DemDefLit. Even 
interdisciplinary approaches suffer from a somewhat parochial understanding of the 
role of courts in a democratic system. This is why the limited arguments that are 
made on the Court of Justice tend to resort to the safe-ground of the counter-
majoritarian postulate. And the examples given above that go beyond that claim 
invariably focus on the Court’s output i.e. its judgments.  
 
In this thesis, an important objective is to contribute to this debate by going beyond 
these orthodoxies. In terms of the instrumental democratic legitimacy of the Court, 
the focus of the analysis here is the Court’s structures and processes – what we might 
refer to as institutional input or through-put. As we saw in Section 2, many of the 
claims made in relation to the Union’s other institutions are concerned with matters 
of institutional input e.g. election processes of incumbents (vis-à-vis democratic 
representation) and decision-making procedures (vis-à-vis democratic participation 
and institutional transparency). In those arguments, institutional structures and 
processes are ipso facto instrumental in bolstering the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU, largely because those institutions (namely the Council, the Commission, and the 
European Parliament) wield significant regulatory power (and probably because they 
are more recognisable to the public). But, as will be explained in Chapter Three, 
courts, especially constitutional courts like the Court of Justice, have regulatory 
powers too. The contributions that we saw in Section 3.1 on the Court’s instrumental 
role were not about the Court’s structures and processes, but how the Court – 
primarily via its judgments – helps to make the structures and processes of the 
Union’s political institutions more democratic. They were not claims on how the 
Court’s structures and processes themselves are instrumental in bolstering the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union. Contributions will either make claims on the 
structures and processes of the Court with limited emphasis on their democratic 
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credentials; 253 or they will make purely instrumental arguments, that have little to do 
with the structures and processes of the Court (Section 3.1).  
 
The objective here is to redress this – to challenge the assumptions that give courts a 
limited role in contributing to the democratic ordering of polities; and to change the 
focus from judicial output to input/through-put i.e. the Court’s structures and 
processes. To that end, there are three (related) ways in which to understand 
democratic contribution (instrumental democratic legitimacy) made by the Court of 
Justice. The first is simply that the Court, via its structures and processes, applies the 
democratically established rules of law in a faithful manner – it is part of the 
transmission belt from which European citizens enjoy and can vindicate the 
democratically established rules of law of the EU. The second is that the Court 
compensates for democratic or systemic “deficits” that exist in the Union’s decision-
making and law-making processes. The third is that the Court complements the 
Union’s decision-making and law-making processes. The difference between the 
latter two perspectives is dependent on the particular vision of what the EU is (i.e. 
the existential debate, above) – what I will hereinafter refer to as finalité. Given the 
analytical force of finalité in the DemDefLit, I defend a vision of finalité that roughly 
accords with the idea of “deliberative supranationalism” (qua Joerges and Neyer), 
and explain how this vision guides my own analysis of the procedural democratic 
legitimacy of the Court of Justice.  
 
 
4. Understanding Finalité: The Three C’s of EU Constitutionalism 
 
This thesis began with a statement about the distinctiveness of the EU as a polity, 
and that distinctiveness forms an important premiss in my argument. This is unfolded 
in the following Chapters, but in this Section I will state briefly the core features of 
the EU that make it distinctive, with an emphasis on the features that have a 
particular resonance with understanding the procedural democratic legitimacy of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 See Section 3 of Chapter One. In particular, see Rasmussen, 1986: 46, 181.  
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Court of Justice. There are two levels underpinning my vision of finalité: abstract 
and empirical. The former denotes an underlying philosophy that guides my 
understanding of what the EU should be; and the latter empirically observes three 
related conditions of EU constitutionalism, which complement the abstract notion of 
finalité, but which also provide an important grounding on which to gauge 
democratic institutional configuration within the EU.  
 
At the abstract level, my vision of finalité roughly accords with Joerges and Neyer’s 
“deliberative supranationalism”, and Everson and Eisner’s notion of 
Rechtsverfassungsrechts.254 The kernel of this the idea is that “we don’t know what it 
is yet”.255 The contestation we observed in Section 2.1.1, in relation to the existential 
debate, exemplifies this. The EU is a sui generic category of polity. Not simply 
because the prevailing reductionist categories do not so neatly fit, but because it is a 
polity in a state of flux – responding to different pressures of constitutional and 
political design from its socio-political environment. It might be the case that the 
final result is something more recognisable and modernistic.256 But at this stage we 
can only say, first, that it does not fit within the reductionist categories; and, second, 
that there is something to be said for treating the EU as the historical emergence of 
something quite new, which provides an opportunity for new paradigms of 
constitutional and political design to be cast as a response to the prevailing 
insufficiencies of the modern democratic state. This is what Mitchell urged in his 
inaugural lecture at the University of Edinburgh in 1968; and what Curtin meant by a 
“transcendental journey”.257  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Joerges and Neyer, 1997; and Everson and Eisner, 2009. See Section 2 generally for an overview 
of their arguments.  
255  David Fincher and Aaron Sorkin, The Social Network, Columbia Pictures, 2010. In this 
biographical film, the leitmotif was that facebook – as an emerging online “social network” – could 
not be categorised according to orthodox notions of business entities, such that its founders refused to 
conform to market pressures by treating it as a profitable service; because they “don’t know what it is 
yet”. There is a variety of interesting parallels that can be made between online social media and the 
EU, from ontological, epistemological and historical perspectives. Here it is only relevant to note that 
a similar argument is made in relation to the EU.  
256 See, for example, Habermas, 2001.  
257 See Mitchell, 1968; and Curtin, 1997: 4. 
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Complementing this abstract and normative vision of finalité are three empirical 
observations of constitutionalism in the EU – the three C’s of EU constitutionalism – 
the appreciation of which is vital to the task of democratic institutional configuration 
in the EU; these are: complexity, contestation, and change. The first is that the 
constitutional architecture of the EU, such as it is in its present form, is distinctively 
complex. As observed in the DemDefLit, the EU is typically understood to embody a 
constitutional tension between intergovernmental and supranational forces – 
particularly so as a tension between Member State interests and autonomous Union 
interests, respectively. Indeed, these forces represent the central constitutional feature 
of EU constitutionalism. Yet even this seemingly simple bifurcation is grounded in a 
complex web of jurisdictional division, and multi-level inter-institutional relations.  
This is so on two levels. First, the political objectives, or ends, of the Union are 
functionally divided into intergovernmental and supranational jurisdictions e.g. the 
CFSP, and the Common Market, respectively. Second, the Union’s institutional 
infrastructure – within its supranational jurisdiction – is organised in such a way that 
involves both intergovernmental and supranational decision-making structures and 
processes.258 Within the intergovernmental parts of the Union, Member States (acting 
through the representatives of their governments) are the key players in the decision-
making process. In this view, the ultimate goals of the Union, and the measures by 
which they are achieved, lie in the hands of the governments of the Member States 
acting in concert. By contrast, the supranational parts of the Union see the transfer of 
competences from the Member States to the Union’s central independent institutions, 
especially the Commission. According to this logic, the delivery of the ends 
transferred over to those institutions is administered without the interference of the 
Member States, and can be implemented by institutions that represent the Union as 
an autonomous polity. In addition to these complexities, we must also appreciate that 
there are other categories of constitutional actors – beyond intergovernmental (qua 
Member State), and supranational (qua autonomous Union) – that have their place in, 
and exert pressure on, the governance of the EU. There are, for example, other 
international jurisdictions that are either part of the EU, but which are limited to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Consider the accounts of the Comitology procedure in Section 2.3.  
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sub-set of Member State signatories (e.g. the Eurozone); or which can overlap with 
the jurisdiction of the EU (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the ECHR) and the United 
Nations (hereinafter the UN)).259 There is also, importantly, what we might broadly 
term civil society. Under the rubric of civil society, we can include categories such as 
the individual (as economic or political citizen), and specialist or sectoral interest 
groups. We saw in the DemDefLit that the civil society component plays an 
important role in guiding the constitutional structures of the EU – from Majone’s 
neo-functionalism to Joerges and Neyer’s deliberative supranationalism.260 In that 
respect, the role of civil society in the EU is intertwined and insinuates itself within 
the primary constitutional tension between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism; and is marginalised somewhat given the dominance of the latter 
two forces. Finally, and in line with the foregoing guiding philosophy of the 
incomplete and unknown destination of finalité adopted here, there is the 
constitutional space within which yet-to-form categories of actors can emerge i.e. 
Everson and Eisner’s normative and empirical argument that the EU is governed in 
such a way that allows for “revolutionary politics” to take shape. 261  
 
The second C of EU constitutionalism is polity contestation. If we consider the sheer 
breadth of perspectives in the DemDefLit, it is immediately apparent that the 
democratic nature of the EU and its institutions is deeply contested. In that regard, it 
is important to remember that underpinning many, if not all, of these debates is one 
theory or another on the nature of the EU i.e. the existential debate. In Section 2.1.1, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 See, for example, Deirdre Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and 
Pieces” (1993) Common Market Law Review Vol. 30 17; and Sabel and Gerstenberg, 2010.  
260 Majone, 2001; Joerges and Neyer, 1997. See also Eric Stein, “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of 
a Transnational Constitution” (1981) American Journal of International Law Vol. 75 1 (hereinafter 
Stein, 1981); and Everson and Eisner, 2009. 
261 Everson and Eisner, 2009: Chapter Seven. We might look to the emergence of socio-political rights 
of non-EU nationals (as Everson and Eisner do) as consistent with this premiss. The Court of Justice 
has been instrumental towards this end in a series of cases. See, for example, Case C-127/08 Metock 
and Others [2008] ECR I-6241 (hereinafter Metock). In this case, the Court of Justice was referred 
questions from the Irish High Court on the extent to which third country nationals could enjoy Union 
law rights. The Court of Justice, controversially (against the submissions of ten intervening Member 
States), ruled that Irish law (that excluded third country national family members of Union citizens 
from enjoying Union rules on free movement) was incompatible with Union law.  
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we saw that the EU is understood in a variety of, often competing, ways: reductionist 
views of the EU include intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and (super)statism; 
and the more experimental views regard the EU as a sui generic polity that 
exemplifies a “mixed system” of reductionist categories, pluralism, heterarchy, 
and/or deliberative polyarchy. Such a diversity of visions of finalité invariably 
permeates analyses at the institutional and meta-institutional levels, and does so in a 
decisive way.262 What is important to note here is that such contestation should not 
simply be regarded as a mere symptom of the EU project, or as an interesting 
academic sideshow, but is itself part of the mélange of finalité. Polity contestation in 
the EU is an important guiding hand with which to configure the EU’s institutions 
democratically. If we take the national political context as an analogy, we see in the 
US, for example, how important the ideological cleavage between the Republican 
and Democrat parties is in guiding the configuration of the US’s Federal and State 
institutions. In the EU context, competition over finalité is the essential element in a 
theory of EU democracy. In other words, it is the equivalent of the US’s ideological 
divide as represented by Republicans and Democrats. Yet we do not need to go as far 
as Hix by suggesting that the only way for the EU to be responsive to this 
contestation is by institutionalising a competitive system of party-political elections. 
As will be made clear in the following Chapters, not only would such a system be ill-
suited to the EU as a sui generic polity, but there is a variety of structural and 
procedural mechanisms by which the EU’s institutions can be configured so as to be 
responsive to polity-contestation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 The debate between Moravscik and Hix exemplifies this (see Moravscik, 2002; Moravscik, 2008; 
Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; and Hix, 2008). Their dispute centres on their differing approaches to 
finalité. They agree, and base their arguments, on the same set of empirical observations of the EU’s 
governance structures e.g. that there are no competitive party-political elections to an EU executive; 
that there is voter apathy with respect to European policies; and that the EU is regulated by a top-
heavy executive. Yet intergovernmentalists, such as Moravscik, view the EU as nothing more than a 
“fourth branch of government”, that serves a similar function to quasi-governmental domestic 
institutions such as central banks and constitutional courts. They adopt the same vision of finalité that 
has famously been propounded by das Bundesverfassungsgericht: that the Member States are the 
masters of the Treaty and that the EU and its institutions derive their legitimacy from them (Brunner; 
and The Lisbon Treaty Judgment). As such, democratic legitimacy is still a matter of national politics 
and does not have a place in the EU. Hix, on the other hand, takes a more ambitious approach by 
adopting a view of finalité that sees the EU becoming more state-like in form. For Hix, the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU and its institutions does not emanate from the authority of the Member States, 
but must come from the institutional reconfiguration of the EU’s central institutions towards a state-
like system of parliamentary democracy. 
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The final C of EU constitutionalism is polity change. In no period in the history of 
the EU, much less in recent decades, can we say that the EU has been a settled polity. 
In terms of its membership and its jurisdiction, the EU has constantly been in a state 
of flux – in particular, by-and-large, a state of growth. The first Chapter in most 
textbooks on EU law will suffice to demonstrate this point.263 Even a cursory glance 
will show that the EU, as it is now, has transformed significantly since its inception 
by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This growth is also complex. It is not simply 
territorial,264 but also jurisdictional. The jurisdictional expansion, moreover, is not 
simply that the EU has gained greater regulatory competence,265 but also the degree 
of autonomy with which it can administer those competences.266  
 
What is important to note about polity change is how this state of flux affects 
democratic institutional configuration in the EU. As the EU expands and deepens, 
the institutions of the EU are subject to enlargement (in terms of their incumbents), 
and broader administrative discretion. The same is true with respect to the citizenry 
affected by autonomous EU norms, and the extent of their affected-interests. This is 
precisely the reason why Majone’s pareto-optimism, and Moravscik’s fourth branch 
of government, become ever-more tenuous; and why the EU gradually accrues 
responsibility for responsive decision-making. Moreover, given the incomplete state 
of change, it is important for the EU’s structures and decision-making processes to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 See, for example, Weatherill, 2010; and Craig and de Búrca, 2011. For a detailed overview of the 
recent forms of the Lisbon Treaty, see Michael Dougan, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, 
Not Hearts” (2008) Common Market Law Review Vol. 45 617 (hereinafter Dougan, 2008). 
264 The number of Member States that have joined the EU has risen gradually from six in 1957, to 27 
today. Croatia will be the 28th Member State in July, 2013. See Treaty of Accession of Croatia (2012) 
OJ L 112. 
265 The TEEC was primarily concerned with economic deregulation within its territory. Increasingly, 
(what is now) the EU has become competent in other regulatory areas, such as defence (see now Title 
V TEU) and the administration of justice (see now Article 4 (2) (j) TFEU; and Title V TFEU). For a 
full list of competences see Article 4 (2) TFEU. Alongside Treaty reform, the EU has also expanded 
its constitutional scope through, primarily, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (see Weiler, 1991; 
Christiaan Timmermans, “The Constitutionalization of the European Union” (2002) 21 Yearbook of 
European Law Vol. 21 1 (hereinafter Timmermans, 2002); and Dyèvre, 2005).  
266 See Weiler, 1991. Consider also the aforementioned “depillarisation” jurisprudence in cases such 
as Pupino; and the reforms in the Lisbon Treaty that, for example, extend to the Union’s legislature 
the power to enact laws in the AFSJ (Title V TFEU) using the ordinary legislative procedure in 
Article 289 TFEU (for an overview of these reforms, see Dougan, 2008 : 680-687). 
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be able to accommodate newly emerging actors and categories of actors whose 
interests are, or are likely to be, affected. We must therefore be careful to understand 
debates on institutional reform in light of this historical trend. To what extent are 





This Chapter had two objectives. The first was to identify the DemDefLit as a 
literature to which this thesis contributes, and to explain how the arguments herein 
contribute to that literature. The second objective was to specify the salient polity-
conditions of the EU that are relevant for analysing the procedural democratic 
legitimacy of the Court of Justice.  
 
On the former, the DemDefLit was shown to be particularly relevant to discussions 
on the instrumental roles of the EU’s institutions: how do the Union’s institutions 
contribute to the democratic legitimacy of the EU as a polity? We saw in Section 2 
that there are broadly two analytical approaches in the DemDefLit: political theories 
of the EU polity; and empirical analyses of the EU’s institutional system and 
institutions. We saw that the former approach largely informs the analytical premises 
of the latter. Within these analyses there are reductionist and experimentalist 
perspectives on understanding the EU and its institutions. The demonstrable 
conclusion was that insufficient attention has been paid to the Court of Justice within 
the DemDefLit. There were only very limited, tangential, and somewhat parochial 
arguments on the instrumental role of the Court e.g. the counter-majoritarian 
postulate, and the Court’s democracy-generative juridical output. In this regard, the 
contribution of this thesis is to look at the Court’s structures and processes (what we 
might term institutional input or through-put), and to determine how they are 
democratic in instrumental terms. 
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On the second objective of this Chapter, it was argued that there are three salient 
conditions of EU constitutionalism – the three C’s of EU constitutionalism: 
complexity, contestation, and change. In particular, polity-contestation – as observed 
within the DemDefLit – is necessarily pervasive in empirical institutional analyses. It 
refers to the deeply contested nature of the EU in existential terms, such that the 
conflict itself must be factored into the structures and processes of the Union’s 
institutions – including, of course, the Court of Justice – so that they are 
democratically responsive.  
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The purpose of this thesis is to assess the procedural democratic legitimacy of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, at the structural and procedural levels. How 
can we answer that principal research question? There is no real quantifiable sense in 
which we can say that institutions are, or are not, democratic – as observed in the 
Introduction to this thesis, there is no objective standard or measurement whereby we 
can say, for example, “the Court of Justice is 72% democratic.” Instead, the 
argument here will be to point out the various ways in which the Court’s structures 
and processes meet, or fall short of meeting, the precepts of procedural democratic 
legitimacy – intrinsic (self-standing standards and exemplification of democratic 
legitimacy) and instrumental (the functional role of the Court within the EU) 
standards of democratic legitimacy. The purpose of this Chapter is to outline the key 
analytical framework within which the Court of Justice can be examined in this way. 
In Section 2, the foundations of the analytical framework are constructed under the 
guiding and instructive notion of institutional “trusteeship”. In Section 3, we address 
the messy task of formulating an analytically coherent methodology for 
understanding the concept of democracy, and how that concept can be specified for 
normative appraisals of institutions. Finally, in Section 4, the  analytical framework 
is specified in relation to the Court of Justice and the EU – identifying the core 
argumentative thread of this thesis with a view to setting up the specific substantive 
analyses in the following Chapters.  
 
 
2. The Foundations of the Analytical Framework: Institutional Trusteeship 
 
In theoretical terms, a central concern of this thesis is institutional legitimacy – how, 
in the abstract, can institutions that are endowed with political powers (broadly 
speaking) legitimately hold and administer those powers? An examination of the 
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice of the European Union is 
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fundamentally addressing this question, albeit from a particular perspective. In this 
Section, we consider how the notion of institutional trusteeship provides an 
analytical starting point for an examination of institutional legitimacy, in both the 
abstract sense and, for the present analysis, of the democratic legitimacy of the Court 
of Justice.  
 
 
2.1. Institutional Trusteeship 
 
What is institutional trusteeship? In general terms, the notion of trusteeship explains 
the nature of the relationship between non-majoritarian political institutions (e.g. 
central banks) and the broader polities within which, and for which, they function, in 
such a way that justifies the former’s possession and exercise of “regulatory” 
powers.267 It depicts this relationship as analogous to the common law trust, whereby 
non-majoritarian institutions (the “trustees”) have been delegated regulatory powers 
by the polity’s central political institutions (i.e. executive and legislative institutions 
– the “settlors” of the trust) for, and on behalf of, the public (the “beneficiaries” of 
the trust). As with the common law trust, institutional trusteeship involves a transfer 
of property rights: 
 
This situation may be expressed in the language of property rights. The right to 
exercise public authority in a given policy area may be thought of as a species of 
property rights: political property rights.268  
 
In this view, central political institutions hand over political property rights (i.e. 
delegate regulatory powers) to non-majoritarian institutions. Those political property 
rights become the exclusive competence of the receiving institution (the trustee), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Majone, 2001. 
268 Majone, 2001: 108 (emphasis added). Majone develops the idea of political property rights from 
Terry Moe, “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story” (1990) Journal of Law and 
Economic Organization Vol. 6 213.  
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which must then hold and administer them in a responsible and faithful manner: for, 
and on behalf of, the public, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the trust. 
 
There is an important normative logic that underpins this sort of institutional 
relationship. A democratic polity269 has to provide its people with certain types of 
political goods and services that are most effectively administered when they are 
immune, or independent, from the control and influence of majoritarian political 
forces or the realpolitik. This can be understood under two headings: the problem of 
commitment and the problem of contractual incompleteness. The problem of 
commitment relates to the ways in which majoritarian political forces would 
significantly disrupt or undermine the delivery of political goods and services. It 
might be the case, for example, that certain types of political goods and services need 
to be delivered over the long-term and thus not be subject to the regular interference 
of incoming and outgoing administrations. Alternatively, their delivery might require 
the delicate and insulated treatment of specialists. Handing over the administration of 
such goods and services to an independent institution (i.e. a transfer of political 
property rights) allows for a greater commitment to administering them effectively 
by avoiding the impulsive and unpredictable ephemeral forces of the realpolitik.270 
The problem of contractual incompleteness, on the other hand, refers to the inability 
of political institutions – subject to majoritarian political forces – to agree on the 
precise manner in which political goods and services are to be administered, whilst 
fundamentally agreeing on the basic necessity of those goods and services. In such a 
situation, in order to circumvent an impasse, political principals reach an agreement 
on how the delivery of those goods and services is to be administered in very general 
terms only, handing over the responsibility of deciding on the specifics to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 The term “democratic polity” must hereinafter be understood only in its most abstract sense, which 
is discussed in Section 3.1.1 of this Chapter. 
270 See Majone, 2001: 107-108. See also Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, “Theory and Practice 
of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions” (2002) West European Politics Vol. 25 1 (hereinafter 
Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002). It is according to this logic that modern democratic polities set up 
independent central banks, for example, so that complex issues pertaining to the economy – such as 
the setting of national interest rates – are administered by specialists who can do so without their 
decisions being subverted by majoritarian political forces. 
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independent institution that has sole discretion with respect to the implementation of 
those goods and services.271 
 
Institutional independence is thus a key element in trusteeship. It fosters the 
conditions necessary for the trustee-institution to function effectively i.e. for a 
trustee-institution to resolve the problems of commitment and contractual 
incompleteness. Independence distinguishes trusteeship from other, weaker, forms of 
delegation, such as agency:  
 
An agent bound to follow the directions of the delegating politicians could not 
possibly enhance the credibility of their commitment. Independence means not only 
that the principal’s and the delegate’s preferences may be different but also, and this 
is the key point, that in general it is not in the principal’s interest to minimize such 
difference.272 
 
For Majone, trusteeship more accurately explains delegation as a commitment and 
contractual-completion device than the principal-agent relationship.273 The virtue of 
trusteeship is its capacity to facilitate the fulfilment of long-term policy objectives by 
political principals who, being subject to the realpolitik, would subsequently renege 
on those commitments. The principal-agent relationship, by contrast, is less suitable 
for that task because agents have only very limited discretion – they do not “own” 
any political property – and would ultimately be subject to the whims of their 
principals. Instead, trusteeship, offers a greater degree of delegation – a transfer of 
ownership – giving rise to a much higher degree of institutional independence. 
Furthermore, the trusteeship-agency distinction is not binary – it is not an either/or 
situation – but, instead, a sliding scale, or spectrum, with the key variable being the 
level of institutional independence the delegate-institution enjoys. Delegate-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271  This is what Stone Sweet refers to as “relational contracting”. See Alec Stone Sweet, 
“Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy” (2002) West European Politics Vol. 25 77 
(hereinafter Stone Sweet, 2002): 86. 
272 Majone, 2001: 110.  
273 See also Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 7.  
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institutions with high levels of independence tend towards the trustee end of the 
spectrum and vice versa.  
 
What is the test, then, for levels of independence? Following Majone’s conceptual 
framework, Stone Sweet frames this sort of analysis in terms of the “zone of 
discretion” the delegate-institution enjoys, whereby the greater the discretion the 
delegate institution enjoys, the greater its independence.274 The zone of discretion is 
determined by two factors: first, establishing the degree of decision-making powers 
that have been formally delegated to the delegate-institution; and, second, then to 
subtract from the former whatever “mechanisms of control” are available to political 
principals. Political principals will delegate greater and lesser degrees of 
administrative powers to institutions i.e. what the delegate-institution is empowered 
to do in order to meet its objectives (whatever they may be). In some instances, the 
purview and administrative powers of delegate-institutions will be narrowly 
constrained by explicit terms set out in the delegation-settlement or “contract”. On 
the other hand, political principals may, for the reasons set out above (the problems 
of commitment and contractual incompleteness), endow delegate-institutions with a 
broad range of administrative powers by virtue of a combination of terms that are 
explicitly set out and terms that are left open for the delegate-institution to interpret 
itself. In that case, the delegate institution will tend to have a higher “zone of 
discretion” and thus be more independent.   
 
This conjecture is contingent, however, on the “mechanisms of control” that are 
available to political principals. Notwithstanding the powers that are formally 
transferred to delegate-institutions, there may remain various constitutional or 
political powers on the part of political principals that, if activated, would undermine 
any administrative action taken by the delegate-institution. Stone Sweet argues that 
there are four types of mechanisms of control: direct, indirect, ex post and ex ante. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 See Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004 (hereinafter Stone Sweet, 2004): Chapter One. See also Stone Sweet, 2002: 92-93. Stone Sweet 
examines the notion of trusteeship in relation to constitutional courts. This is addressed in greater 
depth in Section 2.2.  
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With some degree of overlap, direct controls are those that arise by virtue of superior 
constitutional norms that can, by design, invalidate or reverse the administrative 
discretion of delegate-institutions e.g. especially legislative supremacy; indirect 
controls can arise by virtue of rules of law or customary institutional practices and 
place, to greater and lesser extents, incentives and disincentives – as opposed to 
invalidation – on delegate-institutions to favour particular administrative outcomes; 
ex post mechanisms of control relate to the ways in which political principals can 
respond to the output of delegate-institutions (these also tend to be direct 
mechanisms of control); and ex ante mechanisms of control are the ways in which 
political principals can influence the decision-making of delegate-institutions (these 
tend to be indirect mechanisms of control).  
 
The “zone of discretion”, then, is determined by balancing all the types of 
mechanisms of control available to political principals against the administrative 
powers delegated to the delegate-institution. Less of the former and more of the latter 
result in stronger institutional independence of the delegate-institution, which is thus 
situated towards the trusteeship end of the spectrum. This is because, as with the 
common law trust, once the (political) property has been transferred to the trustee(-
institution), and the terms have been set, the settlors (the political principals) cease to 
be able to control or exercise administrative discretion with respect to that 
competence (the delegated areas of public authority). Moreover, the settlors (political 
principals) are then subject to the “supremacy” of the trustee(-institution). Unlike the 
agent, the trustee-institution has a large zone of discretion and is not bound to follow 
the instructions, post-settlement, of a principal (ex ante control); nor can the principal 
reverse the decisions of the trustee-institution. In the example of the independent 
central bank, a government that would benefit politically from, for example, 
introducing a higher rate of inflation, could neither implement this of its own accord, 
nor could it compel the central bank to do so – that competence remaining within the 
sole discretion of the bank.   
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Thus far, we have determined the normative and conceptual underpinnings of 
trusteeship – considering why trusteeship is a desirable institutional arrangement; and 
what the necessary constitutional and institutional conditions are for that 
arrangement. So what does this mean for institutional legitimacy? How does the 
trustee-institution legitimately exercise those powers for which it has administrative 
“supremacy”?  
 
Once it has been established that an institution is of the trustee type, then its 
legitimate exercise of this exclusive competence is subject primarily to the terms and 
objectives that have been set by the settlors of the trust, and, more specifically, the 
fiduciary duties that inhere in that arrangement. In general terms, fiduciary duties are 
about ensuring that the trustee administers the trust in good faith i.e. in the interests 
of the beneficiaries. In particular, this means that the trustee dutifully observes the 
settled terms of the trust (what we can refer to as primary fiduciary duties), but it 
also means that the interests of the beneficiaries are not undermined by any 
unforeseen contingencies. The latter relates to the problem of contractual 
incompleteness and how the trustee responds to that indeterminacy i.e. the 
inevitability that the terms of the trust are not exhaustive, and do not, therefore, 
explicitly set out how the trustee is to administer the trust in all situations.275 It is in 
this sense that the trustee’s fiduciary relationship to the beneficiaries involves “filling 
the gaps” of contractual incompleteness – what we can refer to as secondary 
fiduciary duties. In other words, when a situation arises whereby a trustee cannot 
look to the terms explicitly laid down in the trust for direction, the trustee must 
decide how to administer the trust according to standards that are implicit in the 
settled terms – either by inferring what the broader objectives of the trust are, or by 
reference to some other more general standard that corresponds to the interests of the 
beneficiaries.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Majone, 2001: 116-119. 
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It is easy to see how this conceptual scheme is descriptive of institutional 
relationships between independent non-majoritarian institutions and their political 
principals. Typically, the former are set up by virtue of constitutionally entrenched 
rules of law, in such a way that guarantees their institutional independence from their 
political principals, including their administrative supremacy. These rules of law will 
typically set out the institution’s primary responsibilities i.e. the terms of the trust; or, 
at the very least, they will incorporate the trustee-institution’s responsibilities – from 
whatever source – into that legal and, more pertinently, constitutional framework. 
And so, observing these constitutionally entrenched terms forms a core part of the 
trustee-institution’s fiduciary duties i.e. their primary fiduciary duties. Yet, given the 
(intentionally) open-textured nature of constitutional provisions, the trustee-
institution will inevitably be subject to contractual incompleteness. Consequently, 
they will have to “fill in the blanks” according to the terms and objectives implicit 
within those constitutional provisions and/or according to more general standards of 
good faith vis-à-vis the beneficiaries (in this case, the public) i.e. the secondary 
fiduciary duties of trustee-institutions. 
 
As an analytical starting point for this thesis, we are interested in the relationship 
between the EU and one of its non-majoritarian institutions (the Court of Justice) and 
the extent to which this relationship exemplifies institutional trusteeship. Confirming 
the hypothesis that the Court of Justice is an institution of the trustee kind provides a 
firm grounding on which to frame an analysis of democratic legitimacy. Before we 
move on to that analysis, however, we need to address two questions. First, to what 
extent is the notion of trusteeship applicable to courts? Second, given a confirmation 
of that hypothesis, where and how does a concept like democratic legitimacy fit in? 
These questions are addressed in the remainder of this Section, and Section 3, 
respectively, after which I specify this analytical framework in the context of the 
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2.2. Institutional Trusteeship and Courts 
 
In this sub-section, we consider the extent to which the notion of institutional 
trusteeship is applicable in the context of courts – both in normative terms (should 
courts be configured in this way?) and in conceptual terms (can courts be regarded as 
trustee-institutions?). These questions are very much related: there are certain types 
of courts that are trustee-institutions because of the particular role they are expected 
to play within a polity’s institutional architecture; whilst other types of courts 
function more like agents. They are also important questions because, as we shall see 
in Section 2.3, establishing whether or not a court (like the Court of Justice) can 
credibly be regarded as functioning as a trustee institution – as distinct from acting as 
an institutional agent – opens up the analysis of institutional legitimacy to measures 
of democratic legitimacy. Put simply, if the Court is a trustee-institution, and 
because of the high degree of institutional independence that configuration 
exemplifies, then it ought to be structured and to function more democratically. 
 
The normative justification for having trustee-courts can be expressed in the same 
terms as in Section 2.1 i.e. problems of commitment and contractual incompleteness. 
Yet their relevance to the work of courts is not altogether straightforward and has to 
be treated with care. To begin with, the people of a democratic polity expect that the 
law they make is reasonably applied and enforced: a task that is delegated to courts 
(as well as other enforcement institutions, like the police). In the event that there is a 
disagreement between people – whether it is a public or private dispute – over their 
legal responsibilities and rights inter se, courts provide a forum within which not 
only can these disputes be settled, but the meaning and application of the people’s 
law can be clarified and communicated to the public.276 Breaking this down, the 
primary responsibilities that have been delegated to courts (generally) are:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 This is the same as Rawls’ idea of courts as “exemplars” of public reason. See John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1996 (hereinafter Rawls, 
1996): 215-218. 
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1. to resolve legal disputes; 
2. to resolve legal disputes according to a faithful interpretation of the 
meaning of established rules of law; 
3. to make reasonable interpretations and clarifications of indeterminate law; 
and 
4. to ensure that no-one is above the law i.e. that the law is observed by all.  
 
These functions are what we might view as the particular form of “political good” or 
“political service” that courts provide for, and on behalf of, the public.  
 
In certain types of courts, or for certain types of dispute resolution, these functions 
are most effectively administered by a court that is fully independent from 
majoritarian political institutions (i.e. trusteeship) due to particularly acute problems 
of commitment and contractual incompleteness. Stone Sweet argues that the 
problems of commitment and contractual incompleteness are of greatest relevance to 
the work of constitutional courts, as distinct from ordinary courts.277 This is because 
the sorts of legal disputes constitutional courts are charged with settling are disputes 
over the rights and obligations of parties inter se with respect to the higher order 
legal norms that are explicitly set out, or implicit in, constitutional settlements – 
significantly, making political principals, and in some cases legislative processes, 
subject to their superior normativity. Given the formation, the functions and the 
superior status of constitutional legal norms – compared with ordinary sources of 
law, such as legislation and case-law – the problems of commitment and contractual 
incompleteness are somewhat foundational to the work of constitutional courts. The 
orthodoxy is that constitutional settlements (the source of constitutional norms, in 
abstract terms) are reached and implemented by the people of a polity – via their 
political representatives, typically – in order to bind the polity to protecting particular 
inviolable rights that are to be guaranteed to the people. Such rights – which, 
depending on the polity, can include social, political, substantive and procedural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Stone Sweet, 2002: 77-82. 
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rights – are deemed to be so necessary that their place within the polity’s legal and 
political infrastructure cannot be undermined by the day-to-day world of majoritarian 
politics or the realpolitik. In other words, they are deemed to be so important as to 
bind future democratically elected governments and administrations from unilaterally 
or whimsically altering their superior normativity.278 
 
The role of constitutional courts thus arises out of problems of commitment and 
contractual incompleteness inherent in constitutional settlements. On the former, 
given that constitutional settlements provide people with a set of rights to be 
vindicated, in particular, against political institutions, it is necessary for there to be 
an administrative institution that is immune to the ex ante control of political 
institutions and, in particular, majoritarian decision-making forces; and which has 
supreme discretion over that administrative function, such that its decision-making 
cannot be undermined or even invalidated by the ex post control of political 
institutions i.e. institutional independence. In this regard, a typical function of a 
constitutional court is the judicial review of legislation, whereby the court decides on 
the legal validity of the legislation produced by the political branches of government 
(legislatures) in accordance with the higher order legal norms as expressed, or 
implicit, in the constitutional settlement. This sometimes involves constitutional 
courts invalidating legislation that does not conform to constitutional standards.279 
Given this function, and given that legislatures will inevitably resist a legislative 
annulment, it is important that constitutional courts are sufficiently independent from 
the executive and legislative political institutions and, thus, have sole discretion in 
determining the validity of legislation.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 In his thesis, Ely frequently characterises this as placing the protection of values and processes 
“beyond the reach of the political process” (Ely, 1980: Chapter Four). 
279 Of course, there are many theories of constitutionalism that reject the notion of judicial review as 
the legitimate means by which political institutions and actors are to be subject to constitutional 
norms. See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999 (hereinafter Waldron, 1999); Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, Oxford: Hart, 2005 
(hereinafter Tomkins 2005); and Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007 (hereinafter Bellamy, 2007). 
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On the latter problem (contractual incompleteness), establishing the content of 
constitutional settlements is something that is prone to disagreement between the 
political principals (the representatives of the people) who set their terms.280 Some 
might hold the view, for example, that constitutional settlements should protect 
social or moral values e.g. the provision of social welfare for the economically 
disenfranchised.281 On the other hand, some would argue that there is little or no 
place for social or moral values in constitutional settlements, instead holding the 
view that they should guarantee rights of fair and equal access to political, 
democratic processes only. 282  Furthermore, there will inevitably be significant 
disagreement over how each of the rights – regardless of their nature – contained in 
constitutional settlements is to be applied in specific contexts that arise in the social 
world. Indeed, many contexts will be either unforeseen or unforeseeable. 
Notwithstanding these formative disputes, political principals will often be in 
agreement over the need for the basic constitutional protection of rights, even if only 
in very general terms. This is the problem of contractual incompleteness most 
pertinent to the work of constitutional courts. Constitutional courts are delegated the 
task of “filling in the blanks” in the course of their development of constitutional 
jurisprudence, as it emerges within particular constitutional disputes. Constitutional 
courts, like all courts, have been delegated the political property rights to bring 
meaning to the law through interpretation i.e. judicial law-making. 283  Yet, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Following Rawls’ idea of “the circumstances of justice”, Bellamy argues that the underlying 
contestation over the content of constitutional settlements is derived from “reasonable disagreement” 
over particular conceptions of justice – what he refers to as “the circumstances of politics” (Bellamy, 
2007: Chapter One). Indeed, we saw in Chapter Two that there is a considerable degree of controversy 
over the nature and scope of the EU’s constitutional project.  
281 This is precisely Habermas’ core argument on the democratic deficit in the EU. He argues that, in 
order for there to be a (democratically) legitimate EU constitutional settlement, EU citizens would 
have to be guaranteed basic social welfare rights as part of a codified, and justiciable, “constitution” 
(Habermas, 2001).   
282 This is Ely’s central normative claim. He argues that – in the context of American judicial review, 
at least – the virtue of the Constitution is its commitment to protecting the basic structures of 
representative democracy, which is achieved “by a quite extensive set of procedural protections, and 
by a still more elaborate scheme designed to ensure that in the making of substantive choices the 
decision process will be open to all on something approaching an equal basis, with the decision-
makers held to a duty to take into account the interests of all those their decisions affect.” Ely, 1980: 
100.  
283 Indeed, Bengoetxea argues that judicial law-making, in this fashion, is a political property right 
tacitly delegated to courts by political organs. See Joxe Bengoetxea, “The Scope For Discretion, 
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Kavanagh notes, there are important differences between judicial law-making and 
legislative procedures: 
 
[I]t seems plausible to suggest that many of the considerations in judicial decisions 
are exactly those which a legislator must consider when enacting new legislation. 
However, one crucial difference between legislation and judicial law-making ...  is 
that when judges make law, they must do so by way of interpretive reasoning. This 
means that they cannot approach a legal question in a purely forward-looking way. 
They are also obliged to look back at and take account of the pre-existing legal 
frameworks and standards set out by Parliament and previous judges.284  
 
Yet there is a special significance in the context of the interpretation of constitutional 
rules of law. Constitutional interpretation functions as a way of resolving the 
inevitable impasse associated with establishing the content of constitutional 
settlements. In the words of the ECtHR: “[where there is] no consensus within the 
Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the 
interest at stake or as to how best to protect it, the margin [of appreciation] will be 
wider.”285 In this regard, constitutional courts need to be able to give authoritative 
interpretations on the general terms of constitutional settlements in such a way that 
provides the public with definitive constitutional norms that are derived from the 
constitutional court’s duty to provide definitive solutions to constitutional disputes. 
Stone Sweet thus argues that it is important for constitutional courts’ “rulemaking [to 
be] effectively insulated from ex post controls”.286 In other words, legislatures should 
not be able to reverse or invalidate constitutional interpretations; or, at least, they 
should be subject to cumbersome legislative processes in order to do so. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Coherence and Citizenship”, in O. Wiklund (ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective, 
Stockhom: Kluwer Law International, 2003.  
284 Aileen Kavanagh, “The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation Under the Human 
Rights Act 1998” (2004) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 24 No. 2 259: 271. See also 
MacCormick, 1994.  
285 ECtHR Application No. 44362/04 Dickson v United Kingdom Government, judgment, (Grand 
Chamber) of 4 December 2007: para. 78. 
286 Stone Sweet, 2004: 28, emphasis added. 
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The position of constitutional courts can be contrasted with other courts, and, in 
particular, what Stone Sweet refers to as “ordinary courts”.287 They key difference 
between the two is that, whereas constitutional courts can (and should) be regarded 
as trustee-institutions (as explained above), ordinary courts are best described as the 
institutional agents of the political branches of government. This is essentially 
because ordinary courts are subject to the legislative supremacy of their political 
principals (legislatures), and the role that has been delegated to them is not prima 
facie to hold political institutions to account, but, rather, to apply and bring 
determinacy (albeit tentative) to the legislature’s law. As Ely puts it:   
 
There is obviously a critical difference: in non-constitutional contexts, the court’s 
decisions are subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary statute. The court is 
standing in for the legislature, and if it has done so in a way the legislature does not 
approve, it can soon be corrected. When a court invalidates an act of the political 
branches on constitutional grounds, however, it is overruling their judgment, and 
normally doing so in a way that is not subject to “correction” by the ordinary 
lawmaking process.288 
 
To the extent that we can empirically determine whether or not a court is a trustee or 
an agent, we have to be aware of a few factors. First, more generally, the distinction 
is a matter of degree – courts are not necessarily either trustees or agents. Indeed, 
many so-called supreme courts do not easily fall into either category. The UK 
Supreme Court, for example, is competent to exercise constitutional review, but is 
significantly limited by both ex ante and ex post mechanisms of control derived from 
the legislative supremacy of the UK Parliament.289 The extent to which a court tends, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 On the distinction between the different types of courts, and how they can be differentiated in 
constitutional terms, see Stone Sweet, 2002: 77-82. Stone Sweet derives his conception of the 
constitutional court from Hans Kelsen’s model of constitutional review, and argues that 
“constitutional courts have links with, but are formally detached from, the judiciary and legislature. 
They occupy their own ‘constitutional’ space, which is neither clearly ‘judicial’ nor ‘political’” (Stone 
Sweet, 2002: 80). He also argues that they do not take part in the resolution of ordinary legal disputes 
or litigation, which is the jurisdiction of “ordinary courts”. 
288 Ely, 1980: 4, emphasis added.  
289 See Section 4.1.2 of Chapter. See also Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK 
Human Rights Act, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
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then, towards trusteeship or agency depends on the factors described in Section 2.2 
under the rubric of “the zone of discretion”, which is broken down into: (1) 
establishing the degree of decision-making powers that have been formally delegated 
to the court (does it have powers of constitutional review?); and (2) to balance this 
against whatever “mechanisms of control” are available to political principals.  
 
As we saw in Section 2.2, there are four ways of categorising mechanisms of control: 
direct, indirect, ex post and ex ante. In the context of courts, mechanisms of control 
relate to the remaining legislative and administrative powers (post-delegation) of 
political principals that allow them to control or influence judicial decision-making, 
or the effects thereof. The most significant of these, as can already have been 
inferred, is the capacity for legislatures to overturn a judicial decision, or invalidate a 
judicial interpretation, through enacting corrective (normatively superior) legislation 
(i.e. a direct, ex post mechanism of control). Political principals may also be able 
directly to control and alter the powers of courts. Indeed, it is for both of these 
reasons that the UK Supreme Court does not easily fit the description of a trustee-
institution, in spite of having been delegated powers of constitutional review. This is 
because, as we saw, the UK Parliament is always able to “correct” decisions of the 
UK Supreme Court by way of legislation; in addition to which, the UK Parliament 
can repeal or amend the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereinafter the HRA) – which 
defines the powers of judicial review that are available – in such a way that either 
mitigates further the UK Supreme Court’s powers, or removes those powers of 
constitutional review altogether. Short of being able directly to control the discretion 
of courts, political principals may also be able indirectly to influence judicial 
decision-making ex ante. This depends on, as we shall see in greater detail in Chapter 
Four, the level of institutional insulation of the court from political majoritarian 
forces or the realpolitik. Are the judges elected into office by the public? If so, their 
decision-making may be significantly affected by popular opinion – especially if 
judicial opinions are published and the judges do not have indefinite tenure. Are the 
judges appointed by heads of state or executive governments? If so, they may be 
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2.3. Assessing the (Democratic) Legitimacy of Trustee-Courts 
 
The foregoing criteria can be used as a way of empirically assessing the level of 
independence of courts with a view to determining where on the spectrum a court 
can be placed between agency and trusteeship. In the next Chapter, it is demonstrated 
how the Court of Justice of the European Union can be regarded as an independent 
trustee-institution. Before moving on to that analysis, it is important to clarify what 
trusteeship means for institutional legitimacy in the context of constitutional 
courts.291 How does a constitutional court legitimately administer its delegated 
powers (constitutional adjudication) for which it has supreme discretion? And how 
does this set up an analysis of democratic legitimacy?  
 
Earlier we saw that trustee institutions administer their “political property” 
legitimately when they do so according to the standards set by a fiduciary 
relationship between the trustee-institution and the public-beneficiaries. The 
fiduciary relationship is defined by primary and secondary fiduciary duties on the 
part of the trustee-institution, designed to ensure that the interests of the beneficiaries 
are respected in all matters relating to the administration of the trust. In the context of 
trustee-courts, their fiduciary relationships are with the publics of the polities within 
which, and for which, they function. Their primary fiduciary duty is dutifully to 
observe the terms of the trust. In other words, to give a faithful interpretation and 
application of constitutional norms in settling constitutional disputes. Re-articulating 
the four criteria listed in Section 2.2 above, the primary duties of constitutional 
courts are: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 The legitimacy of electing judges into office is considered in Section 4 of Chapter Five. 
291 The terms trustee-court and constitutional court will hereinafter be used interchangeably.  
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1. to resolve constitutional disputes (e.g. judicial review); 
2. to resolve constitutional disputes according to a faithful interpretation of 
the meaning of the norms set out (explicitly and implicitly) in constitutional 
settlements i.e. constitutional law; 
3. to make reasonable interpretations and clarifications of indeterminate 
constitutional law; and 
4. to ensure that no-one is above the law i.e. that the law is observed by all, 
especially political institutions.  
 
Adhering to these duties is the first, and most important, way for constitutional 
courts to exercise their administrative supremacy legitimately.  
 
Secondary fiduciary duties relate to the ways in which trustee-institutions are to 
administer the trust given the inevitability that the terms of the trust are not 
exhaustive, and do not, therefore, explicitly set out how the trustee is to administer 
the trust in all situations. This is very much the flip-side of the problem of 
contractual incompleteness. For constitutional courts, secondary fiduciary duties 
relate to the processes by which courts discover “implicit constitutional norms” 
(Point 2, above) and how they “make reasonable interpretations and clarifications of 
indeterminate constitutional law” (Point 3) i.e. “filling in the blanks”. In very general 
terms, this is achieved legitimately when constitutional courts do so in ways that are 
responsive to the interests of the public i.e. the beneficiaries of the trust.  
 
It is at this analytical juncture that we can place many, if not all, of the debates on the 
legitimacy of constitutional adjudication. There is always a sense in which these 
debates start from a shared assumption: that constitutional courts, like all courts, 
fulfil a necessary law-applying function, since “statutes do not interpret, apply, or 
enforce themselves”.292 In other words, there is a shared assumption of a very narrow 
appreciation of primary fiduciary duties – because polities need their laws to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Stone Sweet, 2002: 78.  
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applied, polities need courts. Where the contention tends to arise is in questioning the 
legitimacy and the processes by which courts: (1) “fill in the blanks” (secondary 
fiduciary duties); and 2. annul democratically enacted rules of law (the judicial 
review of legislation).293 How can or how do courts legitimately perform these tasks? 
There is a wide variety of objections and solutions that form the core theoretical 
literature in this area of enquiry, and, indeed, we saw these analytical perspectives 
take shape in the context of the Court of Justice in Chapter One. There, we saw that 
there are broadly two epistemological approaches within this area of enquiry: there 
are various theories of legal reasoning that seek to establish normative frameworks 
of judicial interpretation i.e. establishing the canons of legal interpretation by which 
judges ought to “fill in the blanks” or, more broadly, justify their decisions;294 and 
there are also many theories of constitutionalism that critically assess the roles of 
courts – especially constitutional and supreme courts – in light of particular 
(somewhat axiomatic) conceptions of the legitimate ordering of polities. 295  Of 
course, these approaches are not mutually exclusive, and it is often the case that they 
overlap in scholarly analyses.296 Furthermore, within these approaches, there are 
many different schools of thought and sub-branches or approaches e.g. the different 
schools of thought on canons of judicial interpretation, such as the teleological, 
positivist, and natural law approaches.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 These two questions are often taken together as part of the same analysis. See, for example, Ronald 
Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996 (hereinafter Dworkin, 1996). Yet they essentially relate to two separate, if 
related, aspects of adjudication.  
294 Notable examples include: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1970; Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994; Joseph Raz, 
Practical Reason and Norms, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990; and MacCormick, 
1994. 
295 See, for example, Waldron, 1999; Tomkins, 2005; and Bellamy, 2007. 
296 See, for example, Ely, 1980; Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Mass.; London: 
Harvard University Press, 1985 (hereinafter Dworkin, 1985); Habermas, 1995; and Wilfred 
Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.	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It is in this analytical terrain that an analysis of democratic legitimacy fits.297 More 
specifically, it is at the analytical juncture between primary and secondary fiduciary 
duties of trustee-courts that an analysis of the procedural democratic legitimacy of 
constitutional courts can take place. How is this so? In Section 3, we go on to 
consider this in more detail. In quite basic terms, however, the concept of 
democracy, first, neatly explains and fits with many of the conceptual foundations of 
trusteeship. In particular, it emphasises the importance of trustee-courts adhering to 
primary fiduciary duties, because (1) applying the law gives expression to and 
application of the people’s law, who have set its terms through democratic political 
processes; and (2) because it is the people who have – via their political 
representatives – set the terms of the trust. In other words, fulfilling the terms of the 
trust is itself a democratic duty. 
 
Democracy is also relevant as an analytical yardstick with which to gauge how 
courts and judges are to “fill in the blanks”. This is especially relevant in the context 
of trustee-institutions and constitutional courts, where there are greater degrees of 
contractual incompleteness and commensurate degrees of institutional discretion. In 
this regard, democratic legitimacy is a good way to guide courts seeking to determine 
their secondary fiduciary duties. As Majone puts it: 
 
The central issue in these cases is how to make the delegate independent and at the 
same time accountable. The fiduciary principle and fiduciary duties are essential 
instruments for reconciling independence and accountability.298  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Indeed, many of the theoretical discussions on the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication frame 
their analyses according to a view on democratic legitimacy. Waldron and Bellamy – as “political 
constitutionalists” – take the view that the judicial review of legislation is illegitimate on the grounds 
that it offends a (proceduralist) conception of democratic legitimacy (Waldron, 1999; Bellamy, 2007), 
whereas Ely and Dworkin would argue that judicial review is necessary in order to protect important 
democratic rights from being undermined by improvident legislative processes (Ely, 1980; Dworkin, 
1985). There are analytical positions that go beyond the issue of judicial review. Habermas, for 
example, argues that courts play an important instrumental role in bolstering the deliberativeness of 
the broader polities within which they function in his “proceduralist paradigm of law” (Habermas, 
1995; and Habermas, 1998). 
298 Majone, 2001: 119, emphasis added.  
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In other words, because majoritarian political institutions become powerless in those 
areas of public policy and administration that they have delegated to trustee-
institutions, the people prima facie lose their capacity to self-govern, as those tasks 
of government have been transferred to an autonomous and independent institution 
that is, by design, insulated from majoritarian forces. Fiduciary duties are therefore 
one way of ensuring that democratic accountability (understood in very broad terms) 
is not sacrificed. Furthermore, it is not simply the case that democratic legitimacy is 
just one other thing for courts to be aware of when determining their secondary 
fiduciary duties. As we shall see in the next Section, one of the key objectives of 
democratic ordering is the virtue of institutional responsiveness – that is, 
responsiveness to the interests of the people. In that regard, democratic ordering 
significantly overlaps with the underlying premiss of fiduciary duties, which is to 
ensure that the interests of the beneficiaries are not undermined and given due 
appreciation throughout the administration of the trust. In the context of 
constitutional courts, this means precisely the same thing as being responsive to the 
public, who are the constitution’s beneficiaries.  
 
These basic propositions are elaborated in the remainder of this Chapter, specifying 
their relevance to the analysis of the procedural democratic legitimacy of the Court 
of Justice. In Section 3, we consider the applicability and application of the concept 
of democracy, by, first, outlining a workable concept of democracy; then by 
specifying an analytical framework that explains how institutions can be understood 
in democratic terms; and, lastly, explaining how trustee-courts can be understood in 
those terms. In Section 4, we then go on to consider how this analytical framework is 
specified for assessing the procedural democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice 
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3. Democratic Legitimacy: An Analytical Framework 
 
Democracy is one of those elephants: hard to define, but you know it when you see it. 
Pinning down a settled notion of what it means, how it is to function and its 
underlying values have always been dependent on historical and geo-political 
circumstances. Over time and across varied manifestations of political power, there 
have been many “democratic experiments”. Records begin with the classical (and 
inaugural) manifestations in Greece, BC; 299  then, after a prolonged period of 
inactivity, finding a resurgence in the early modern era with the establishment of the 
Westphalian nation-state;300 followed by a respecification in the post-industrialist era 
(and very much setting the standards of modern democratic thought); 301  and, 
laterally, with the advent of globalisation and international political regimes – 
bringing with them associated concepts of socio-cultural pluralism and the gradual 
erosion of the strictures of the modern nation-state – a series of quintessentially post-
modern instances of democratic experimentalism.302 Of course, it is not the case that 
these experiments were conducted merely out of philosophical or academic curiosity. 
Each stage and each data-set have arisen by virtue of changes and challenges from 
within the social world: the Enlightenment; the spread of capitalism; the industrial 
revolution; global warfare; the emergence of the welfare state; secularisation; 
globalisation; human rights regimes; international political and economic regimes; 
and technological advances have all given rise to significant challenges to how 
people envisage their political relations inter se, and, thus, to a perpetual rediscovery 
and respecification, by iteration, of the values and objectives that underpin 
democracy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Plato, Republic (Translation by Robin Waterfield), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
300	  John	  Locke,	  Two Treatises of Government,	  Cambridge:	  University	  Press,	  1960.	  
301 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan: London; 
New York, 1897. In a contemporary context, consider Habermas’ account of the role of civil society 
in constituting the public sphere. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989 (hereinafter 
Habermas, 1989). See also Ely’s account of representative democracy (Ely, 1980: Chapter Four). 
302 See especially Cohen and Sabel, 1997; and Curtin, 1997. On the notion of “constitutional 
patriotism” as a transitional phase in the establishment of a European demos, see Habermas, 1992; and 
MacCormick, 1997. 
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It is not within the remit of this thesis to engage in a comprehensive genealogy of 
democratic experimentalism. It is, however, relevant to at least be firmly aware of 
the context-dependant nature of democratic thought, and furthermore, to be aware 
that it is by virtue of such a rich history of data that there are so many definitions and 
analytical “models” of democracy. 303  Familiar examples include: classical 
democracy; 304  participatory democracy; protective democracy; representative 
democracy; parliamentary democracy;305 associational democracy;306 democracy as a 
set of formative political procedures;307 democracy as a set of substantive socio-
political or moral values;308 and experimental democracy.309 These perspectives are 
not mutually exclusive, and each emphasises one or other core virtue of democratic 
legitimacy that has been given priority at any given time or place.  
 
What we are left with, then, is a plethora of terminology and concepts of democracy, 
which, if we are not careful, might lead us into diagnostic problems when assessing 
the democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice.310 In this Section, an analytical 
framework is presented in such a way as to avoid becoming trapped by such 
diagnostic problems. The framework clarifies a very general set of fundamental or 
“threshold” standards of democracy, and demonstrates how they may be of analytical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Indeed, contemporary political science textbooks will invariably recast the basic historical precepts 
of democracy as “models of democracy”. See, for example, David Held, Models of Democracy (2nd 
Edition), Oxford: Polity Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996; and Andrew Heywood, 
“Models of Democracy” in Politics (2nd Edition), Palgrave, 2002. 
304 Melissa Schwartzberg, “Athenian Democracy and Legal Change” (2004) The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 98 (2) 312 (hereinafter Schwarzberg, 2004). 
305 This is where the putative political constitutionalists fit in i.e. Waldron, Tomkins and Bellamy 
(discussed above). 
306 The idea of civil society as a disaggregated set of specialist interest groups forming a core 
democratic constituency e.g. Habermas, 1989. 
307 See Ely, 1980; or Bellamy, 2007. 
308 Dworkin, 1996.  
309 Cohen and Sabal, 1997.  
310 Indeed, this is a problem that was identified in much of the DemDefLit. For example, consider 
Hix’s proposition that “competition for political power is the essential element of virtually all modern 
theories of democratic government” (Hix, 2008: 68). Hix, like so many others, has relied too heavily 
on the notion of parliamentary democracy when addressing the issue of the democratic deficit in the 
EU. This is problematic because we can only really accept that claim in the nation-state context. Yet 
this is too much to assume for an analysis of a sui generic polity like the EU. 
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use when determining the configuration of democratically legitimate political 
institutions and, in particular, trustee-courts. This allows for a coherent analysis 
which systematically connects particular institutional claims (especially, of course, 
the claims made in this thesis about the Court of Justice) to the core values and 
virtues of democracy (in their most basic sense); yet avoids an analysis where 
everything and anything counts as democratic. 
 
 
3.1. Threshold Criteria of Democracy 
 
Given the account above, how can we arrive at a workable, coherent and applicable 
set of concepts by which we can credibly analyse political institutions from a 
democratic perspective? In this Section, we consider a threshold theory of democracy 
that aims to capture its essence, and which outlines how such a basic set of criteria 
can be specified for its analysis.  
 
There are three elements of a threshold theory of democracy of which we have to be 
aware. These are: the subject-matter of democracy; the content of a theory of 
democracy; and the context-dependency of the specification of a theory of 
democracy. Each of these ideas will be developed below with a view to providing 
solid grounding for the present analysis of the procedural democratic legitimacy of 
the Court of Justice. 
 
 
3.1.1. The Subject-Matter of Democracy 
 
When we speak about democracy and democratic ordering, to which sorts of social 
phenomena are we relating? In general terms, democracy is a form of governance, 
and, as such, seeks to provide the subjects of an authority with a way of organising 
the administrative powers of that authority – in particular, establishing a rationale by 
which administrative power is divided between the subjects of an authority; and 
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determining how administrative discretion should be implemented. The term 
“authority” is thus key, and there are many different types of authority for which 
democracy can serve. Elaborating on this is important for the analysis in this thesis.  
 
It is often said that a golf club can be democratic. In the same vein, so too can a 
business entity, a charity, a university, and, of course, a nation-state. These examples 
are not exhaustive and are presented to illustrate the types of social phenomena that 
we can regard as being “authorities”. They are authorities because they are each 
responsible for regulating how their members are to conduct themselves in relation to 
a particular goal or function. Using the golf club example, its primary remit is to 
provide people with the facility of playing the game of golf. In order to do so, it will 
necessarily require various tasks to be coordinated among people: cutting the grass; 
providing refreshments; establishing rules of play, etc. A system of governance is 
required in order to ensure that these tasks are optimally performed i.e. a means of 
directing and coordinating the activities of the persons involved in providing the 
facility to play golf. Someone needs to cut the grass; someone needs to lay down the 
rules of play; someone needs to decide on who does what, etc. A system of 
governance puts these elements into place, and a democratic system of governance 
does so according to a particular logic (discussed in Section 3.1.2). Naturally, we can 
make similar observations in relation to the business entity or the charity – both of 
which engender particular functional objectives in the fulfilment of which the 
activities of persons have to be governed. Yet, in this thesis, we are concerned with a 
particular type of authority: the polity. What sort of authority does the term polity 
denote? 
 
In an abstract sense, a polity is what Rawls refers to as “the basic structure” of 
society, by which he means “a society’s main political, social, and economic 
institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation 
from one generation to the next.”311 The polity is thus an authority that seeks to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 Rawls, 1996: 11.  
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govern the relations between persons who are engaged in political, social and 
economic matters, and, significantly, disagreements inter se. The polity seeks to 
regulate such spheres of the social world so as to bring about a “unified system of 
social cooperation”. Yet even this definition is too narrowly conceived. Rawls 
confines himself, for the purposes of his analysis, to the strictures of modernity i.e. 
the Westphalian state. But it is important for the present analysis not to be so self-
limiting. A polity can exist independently of the strictures of the modern nation-state. 
There are increasing instances of transnational, postnational, supranational, 
international and global governance structures whose remits are to regulate specific 
spheres of social, political or economic matters.312 Indeed, as we have seen in 
Chapter Two, the EU is a comparatively powerful, or authoritative, example of such 
a non-state polity.  
 
In this respect, when we consider what types of authorities are to be regarded as 
polities, it is the concept of the political that provides the necessary qualification: 
polities, in the most abstract sense, are authorities that are concerned with regulating 
and coordinating the activities of their subjects in relation to political matters, and, 
more particularly, political contestation between subjects. The concept of the 
political, here, being itself broadly conceived so as to encompass a range of 
substantive issues (economic, social, moral, etc.) that take on a political character. In 
line with Schmitt’s analytical framework, what makes an issue “political” is 
determined by the capacity with which any given issue can give rise to a 
confrontation between “collectivities” of peoples seeking to defend their way of life 
with respect to a given issue.313 The political does not presuppose, therefore, nor is it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 The key elements that prevent polities from being regarded as nation-states are: their political 
institutions do not possess comprehensive powers in all substantive areas; connected to that, they are 
generally not regarded as “sovereign” authorities – with their administrative powers often contingent 
on their constituent nation-states’ approval; they are not pre-defined by a territory; nor do they enjoy a 
sense of nationhood, underpinned by a common culture or ethnicity. For a breakdown of the key 
elements of the nation-state, see Curtin, 1997: 13-16. 
313 Schmitt uses the distinction between “friend” and “enemy” to represent the political (as opposed to 
the moral or aesthetic) antithesis. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996 (hereinafter Schmitt, 1996): Chapter One. 
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defined by, particular types of public dispute, but is instead manifested by the 
existence of the dispute itself: 
 
The political can derive its energy from the most varied human endeavours, from the 
religious, economic, moral, and other antitheses. It does not describe its own 
substance, but only the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings 
whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, 
or of another kind and can effect at different times different coalitions and 
separations.314 
 
To this we must add that the political is also about identifying the interests and ways 
of life of individuals, not merely collectivities. Moreover, it does not need to be 
conceived as a process of identifying a dominant collectivity, but, rather, a process of 
negotiation between collectivities and individuals such that polities, as authorities, 
can regulate and mediate political contestation insofar as they bring about what 
Rawls refers to as “a unified system of social cooperation”. These qualifications are, 
as we saw in Chapter Two, especially pertinent to the EU given the multiplicity of 
constitutional actors that bring their political interests to bear on the EU’s 
governance structures. Moreover, being so broadly conceived, polities can manifest 
themselves in different forms – such as international political and economic regimes 
– and are not restricted to the modern configuration of the nation-state. In this thesis, 
we are only concerned with polities, broadly so conceived, as the subject-matter of 
an analysis of democratic legitimacy, and we leave behind golf clubs and business 
entities. The democratic relevance and roles of institutions (e.g. the Court of Justice) 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Schmitt, 1996: 38. The “economic” dimension mentioned here resonates strongly with the EU.  
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3.1.2. The Content of a Theory of Democracy 
 
How should polities be governed? In what manner should the administrative powers 
of the polity be divided between its subjects? And how should those powers be 
exercised? These are the questions that are relevant to arriving at a threshold 
definition of democracy, since democracy itself is one of a set of archetypes of 
governance which seek to explain these very questions. These archetypes include: 
monarchies; tyrannies; aristocracies; oligarchies; and democracies.315 Consider the 
order in which these archetypes have been presented as occupying relative positions 
of a spectrum, whereby the former archetypes answer the questions above by placing 
as much, or all, of the administrative power of a polity in the hands of the few; with 
less, or no, capacity for the remaining subjects of the polity to exert their influence 
on the exercise of that power.  
 
Democracy exists at the furthest extreme away from the former archetypes, whereby 
governance of the polity is administered by the collective self-government of the 
people, by the people and for the people of the polity.316 It is the subjects (the people) 
of the polity themselves, in their collectivity, who are endowed with the power to 
govern i.e. government of the people, by the people. Furthermore, in line with this 
logic, their discretion has to be measured against what is fairly and justly regarded to 
be in the interests of the people in their collectivity i.e. government for the people. 
Democracy is thus an inclusive ordering mechanism by which the people of a polity 
are collectively in control of administering, in Rawlsian terms, their political, social 
and economic institutions i.e. the basic structure of society; and, importantly, 
according to their own interests that they themselves are responsible for identifying. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 MacCormick reviews these archetypes of governance. Furthermore, he argues that each of them is 
present – to greater or lesser extents – in any polity. For example, in a so-called (modern) democracy, 
the head of state (e.g. a president or prime minister) exhibits the characteristics of a monarch; the 
elected government – a benevolent oligarchy; and the electoral process – the democratic expression of 
the people. He refers to this as a “mixed system”. See MacCormick, 1997: 338-339. 
316 This definition is paraphrasing the well-known axiom, famously delivered by Abraham Lincoln in 
his Gettysburg address, that democracy is “government of the people, by the people, for the people”. 
Whilst somewhat dated, its pithy truisms serve to articulate the general precepts of democracy very 
well.  
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3.1.3. The Context-Dependency of Democratic Specification 
 
The final element of a threshold theory of democracy is its context-dependent nature.  
This is the quite natural consequence of there being such a wide variety of authorities 
for which democracy can serve as an organisational logic – from golf clubs to 
polities. Indeed, even if we limit an analysis to polities as the particular subject-
matter – as is the case in this thesis – there is still great variety. As we saw, beyond 
(and including) the Westphalian nation-state, a polity can take shape in different 
ways – the necessary criterion being that it is an authority that regulates and mediates 
political contestation between groups of people and individuals. There are, 
accordingly, many variables that will determine the particular form that a polity will 
take – variables of which we must be aware when specifying the open-textured 
content of a theory of democracy i.e. specifying how to implement a system of 
collective self-government for any given polity. These variables will include, inter 
alia: the number of members of the polity e.g. population size; the polity’s remit – 
which may be expressed in some form of “constitutional charter”; the scope of that 
remit – what are the substantive limitations of the polity’s powers?; the degree of the 
polity’s powers i.e. sovereignty; the socio-cultural background(s), and the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity thereof, of the polity’s members; and the territorial 
nature of the polity – is the polity self-contained by a geographical boundary, and if 
so, is that for posterity?  
 
It should be pointed out that these variables are not exhaustive, nor are they mutually 
exclusive, but they serve to highlight the fact that polities can come in all shapes and 
sizes. Moreover, they are pre-institutional conditions. As we shall see in the Section 
3.2, given the size of most polities, their administration has to be disaggregated into 
institutions that perform particular democratic functions. Specifying how those 
institutions are to exemplify the moral content of a theory of democracy – the 
collective self-government of the people, by the people and for the people – is not a 
straight-forward or self-evident formula and must, it is argued here, be calibrated to 
the distinctive pre-institutional variables (as described above) of any given polity. 
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This is why, in Chapter Two, it was argued that democratic specification in the EU – 
as a polity sui generis – cannot and should not be expected to form along the same 
lines as a nation-state. As we saw, the sheer complexity of the EU – with its multi-
level and multi-jurisdictional features – makes it irreducible to the precepts of 
axiomatic constitutional theory and political theory. The orthodoxy of “left wing” 
and “right wing” party politics, for example, is misplaced in the EU given its 
constitutional structures and preferences i.e. the three Cs of EU constitutionalism. 
Democratic specification must be calibrated according to the type of polity and, in 
particular, according to the sorts of pre-institutional variables identified above. In 
Section 3.2, we consider the role of institutions within democratic polities, and how 
it is their roles and functions are to be understood in democratic terms; and in 
Section 4.3, we consider how the polity-conditions of the EU are to be factored into 
the analysis of the Court of Justice.  
 
 
3.2. The Democratic Role of Political Institutions 
 
Given the foregoing criteria – which represent very general standards only – we now 
address the role of the polity’s political institutions. Here, we understand political 
institutions to be the manifestation of a polity’s democratic governance structures: 
they are the governance structures. What forms can they take and how can they be 
democratic? These questions are addressed in the following two sub-sections. 
 
 
3.2.1. Addressing the Paradox of Exclusive Democratic Political Institutions 
 
One of the great paradoxes of modern democratic theory is borne out of the necessity 
for polities to be governed through institutions – institutions being inexorably 
exclusive forums of political power. In an arguably ideal democratic polity, the 
political powers of the polity would be at the disposal of all the people in the polity. 
Democratic political processes would be directly accessible and available for 
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participation by all. Indeed, in its classical and inaugural form, democracy was 
designed as such, and it is perhaps the most intuitive form of democratic ordering i.e. 
collective self-government by the people.317 Yet even the Athenian models were 
fundamentally challenged by unavoidable practical problems associated with 
granting the public universal participation, 318  thus promulgating alternative 
democratic ordering mechanisms – most notably, the idea of representative 
democracy.319 As Ely puts it: 
 
Representative democracy is perhaps most obviously a system of government suited 
to situations in which it is for one reason or another impractical for the citizenry 
actually to show up and personally participate in the legislative process.320 
 
The paradox arises because, in attempting to formulate an inclusive system of 
government (by the people), it is necessary – due to pragmatic concerns – for 
political power to be handed over to institutions that are exclusive. What this means 
is that the democratic idea of government by the people is at best an ideal; but, more 
realistically, it is mythological – albeit virtuous. Democracy, then, has to be 
understood not as government by the people, but, instead, government by political 
institutions.321 
 
How can this problem be reconciled with our threshold criteria, and, in particular, the 
content of a theory of democracy i.e. the collective self-government of the people, by 
the people and for the people? Answering this question is important for the present 
analysis, as there is a range of possible solutions available that can help to reconcile 
this apparent paradox; and identifying the optimal solution is very much a part of the 
context-dependant nature of democratic specification. So, in purely theoretical terms, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 See Schwartzberg, 2004. 
318 In addition to which was the exclusion of women and slaves.  
319 For a genealogical exposition of this principle, albeit in an American context, see Ely, 1980: 77 – 
88. 
320 Ely, 1980: 77.  
321 The more commonly used taxonomy is “governors” for, and on behalf of, the “governed”. These 
have unfortunate connotations, however, of political power being ascribed to individuals as opposed 
to the preferred view here, which is that it is the institutions that are endowed with political power.	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what solutions are available that make otherwise exclusive political institutions 
nonetheless democratic institutions? There are, broadly speaking, two ways that this 
problem can be resolved: institutional responsiveness; and the disaggregation and 
division of political powers between a multiplicity of mutually cooperating political 
institutions.  
 
Institutional responsiveness is a basic standard to which all democratic political 
institutions within a polity ought to conform. The idea itself is relatively 
straightforward: political institutions, in their political decision-making and political 
action, ought to act according to the identifiable interests of the people over which 
they govern i.e. they ought to respond to those interests. Institutional responsiveness 
is, moreover, broad enough to cover the “by the people” and “for the people” 
qualifications. On the former, institutional responsiveness can involve direct 
participation in the administration of political powers by the political institution, in 
several ways. First, the officials of political institutions will be appointed from the 
citizenry, whereby the capacity to be appointed is, in Rawls’ terms, “open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”.322  Second, political institutions 
may offer what Nentwich refers to as “opportunity structures for citizens’ 
participation”. 323  These are channels through which non-officials of political 
institutions can directly engage in their decision-making processes. Obvious 
examples include voting in general elections; lobbying; and the consultation of 
experts in the committee stages of the legislative process.324  
 
Institutional responsiveness also plays an important role in exemplifying the 
democratic qualification of “government for the people”. Given their exclusivity, it is 
essential for democratic political institutions to be responsive to the interests of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Rawls, 1996: 6. Here, Rawls is referring to the second of his two principles of justice, which seeks 
to justify “social and economic inequalities” in society. In addition to the fair terms of appointment 
point (noted above), he adds that such inequalities must also be justified such that “they are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 1996: 6). 
323 Nentwich, 1998. 
324 For a more nuanced view and “experimental” forms of direct political participation by the 
citizenry, see Cohen and Sabel, 1997.  
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people over which they govern; and for them to use whatever available means there 
are to determine those interests. There are several ways that these interests can be 
measured and/or protected. First, many of the mechanisms of direct participation 
(just outlined) can be useful indicators of public interest, and, as such, straddle the by 
the people-for the people divide. Indeed, a common example of this is the idea of 
“representative democracy” i.e. the appointment of officials of political institutions 
that are deemed, in some way or another, to represent the interests of either the 
public as a whole, or a particular constituency thereof. The most obvious example of 
this is the public voting-in of officials during general elections, inter alia. 
Democratic representation is a much broader notion than this particular example, 
however, and is given greater attention in Chapter Five. In addition to measuring 
public interest and representation, there are also important mechanisms designed to 
ensure that incumbent officials faithfully act in the interests of the public. These 
mechanisms can be broadly conceived as “supervisory” i.e. mechanisms by which 
the public can supervise and, where necessary, disempower the officials of political 
institutions. These are more commonly understood under the headings of 
accountability and institutional transparency. In general terms, accountability 
protects the public’s interests from being subverted by improvident political 
decision-making and political action by officials by providing some mechanism or 
other by which those officials can be “punished” for such action; or, alternatively, 
“rewarded” for performing their duties in good faith.325 Institutional transparency, on 
the other hand, provides a means of public audit of the decision-making and actions 
of political institutions. Institutional transparency might involve, for example, the 
publication of institutional records that relate to political decision-making e.g. the 
publication of parliamentary debates. Transparency thus guards the interests of the 
public – by providing the public with the means to hold officials to account – as well 
as fostering the conditions by which the public can react and respond to political 
action. In other words, institutional transparency also generates public participation 
in political processes by virtue of an iterative process by which the public can reflect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Indeed, this is precisely Hix’s rationale in arguing for a competitive system of elected party 
politics, through which the public can “get rid of the scoundrels”. Hix, 2008: 68.  
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and refine their interests on any given political issue and, consequently, for those 
interests to be rearticulated by responsive political institutions.  
 
The second way in which the apparent paradox of exclusive democratic political 
institutions can be resolved is the disaggregation and division of political powers 
between a multiplicity of mutually cooperating political institutions. In its modern 
guise, this is referred to as the separation of powers doctrine, with the paradigm case 
being the division of political power between executive, legislative and judicial 
political institutions.326 The idea here is that, taken holistically, any given polity is 
endowed with political powers – to greater and lesser extents – and, rather than to 
administer those powers within one political institution, those powers are 
disaggregated and functionally divided between a multiplicity of political 
institutions, which, acting in concert, achieve the desired administrative goals or ends 
of the polity. Such an inter-institutional configuration has many benefits – not least 
of which is optimal administrative efficacy – but it also provides two important 
democracy-enhancing qualities that help to resolve the exclusivity paradox. First, by 
dividing political power in this way, it reduces the capacity with which incumbent 
officials of political institutions may subvert the democratic process by abusing their 
powers. This is simply because officials of particular political institutions will have 
more narrowly constrained purviews i.e. fewer political powers. This logic could 
perhaps also be understood as an alternative method of accountability. Second, by 
virtue of there being multiple political institutions, each of which having a pre-
defined set of administrative functions, it presents a more nuanced and effective 
system of institutional responsiveness.327  In some respects, this provides more 
opportunity structures for citizens’ participation; and, in other respects, it allows for 
democratic representation within each political institution to be calibrated according 
to whatever particular set of substantive issues is expected to arise by virtue of that 
institution’s given functions. Using the paradigmatic case as an example, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 See Barber, 2001; and White, 2011.  
327 This is the rationale of Cohen and Sabel’s multi-faceted deliberative polyarchy (Cohen and Sabel, 
1997).  
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judicial institutions – as opposed to the legislative or executive institutions – 
democratic representation will take on a more legal form – judges and legal actors, 
for example, representing particular strands of public interest that are germane to the 
world of law and legal administration, as opposed to the somewhat broader matters 
of public interest to which executives and legislatures must be responsive.328 
 
As was alluded to above, furthermore, the paradigmatic tripartite division of power 
between executive, legislative and judicial power represents only one, albeit popular, 
incarnation of the separation of powers doctrine – bringing with it an association of 
normative values that underpin such a system (majoritarianism, accountability, 
formalism, etc.). But political power does not need to be narrowly conceived under 
such a formalist paradigm. It can be functionally divided in a variety of ways. For 
example, it can be decentralised – dividing administrative responsibilities between 
local and central political institutions. Consider the possible types of 
decentralisation: federalism, devolution – which can also be asymmetrical329 – and 
unitary divisions of administrative jurisdiction (e.g. France). Taking a more 
constructivist view, political power can be seen to emanate within politically 
autonomous institutions, such as economic institutions or associations within civil 
society.330 The complexities here are further compounded when we go, as we do in 
this thesis, beyond modernity and its nation-state template, whereby the separation of 
powers doctrine takes on new forms: intergovernmentalism, “inverted regionalism”, 
supranationalism, transnationalism, constitutional and legal pluralism, and 
“heterarchical” divisions of sovereignty, inter alia. 
 
An important point to be aware of here is that the variety of alternative formulations 
of this doctrine go hand in hand with the variety of possible manifestations of polity-
type (considered in Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.3, above), and that an appreciation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328  These ideas are given greater clarification in Section 4.3 below – on contrapunctual 
constitutionalism and the Court of Justice.  
329 For an analysis of asymmetrical devolution in the UK context, see Chris Himsworth, “Devolution 
and its Jurisdictional Asymmetries” (2007) Modern Law Review Vol. 70 No. 1 31 (hereinafter 
Himsworth, 2007).  
330 See especially Cohen and Sabel, 1997.  
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of these factors is crucial for an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of political 
institutions, like the Court of Justice. Not only must we assess each institution in 
isolation with respect to its responsiveness, but we must also balance that assessment 
against the given political role an institution is expected to perform for, and on behalf 
of, the polity within which it functions, by virtue of the separation of powers 
doctrine, which must necessarily be calibrated according to distinctive polity-
conditions. In the following sub-sections, then, we consider an analytical framework 
that encapsulates these analytical complexities and provides a rationale by which 
these different criteria can be prioritised inter se, such that we can make a coherent 
and methodologically sound assessment of the democratic legitimacy of political 




3.2.2. An Analytical Framework for Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of 
Political Institutions: Intrinsic and Instrumental Democratic Legitimacy 
 
The foregoing criteria have been presented to establish the basic structures and 
precepts that underpin a democratic order in the abstract – almost as if to set-up a 
blueprint for the construction of a democratic polity with democratic institutions. 
Naturally, such a project is fanciful. Instead, we must take notice of these criteria for 
the more modest task of measuring the democratic legitimacy of pre-existing 
political institutions within pre-existing polities (which may or may not have been 
designed according to those precepts). In order to make such an assessment, we must 
identify an analytical framework that coherently and comprehensively incorporates 
the foregoing criteria – general as they intentionally and necessarily are. To that end, 
there are two ways of understanding the democratic legitimacy of political 
institutions: intrinsic democratic legitimacy and instrumental democratic 
legitimacy.331  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 For a particularly cogent explanation of the intrinsic-instrumental taxonomy, see MacCormick, 
1997. 
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Intrinsic democratic legitimacy relates to the requirement of institutional 
responsiveness. As we saw in Section 3.2.1, institutional responsiveness denotes a 
set of standards by which (what are necessarily and inexorably) exclusive political 
institutions can (nonetheless) exemplify the core democratic ideal of collective self-
government – specifically, rescuing the associated ideals of government by and for 
the people. Meeting this requirement can be achieved by political institutions 
following four key virtues, which will hereinafter be referred to as the intrinsic 
virtues. These are: participation (making institutional decision-making accessible to 
the public for their involvement); representativeness (ensuring that the public’s 
interests are, in various ways, part of institutional decision-making); accountability 
(ensuring that the officials of political institutions are supervised by the public, 
whereby the public can punish improvident political action and reward political 
officials for acting in good faith); and institutional transparency (providing the means 
for public audit of the political institution’s exercise of political power).332  
 
There are two important qualifications to note in relation to the intrinsic virtues. 
First, in order for political institutions to exemplify them, they must do so at the 
structural and procedural levels. The extent to which a political institution is 
participatory or representative is dependant on there being either processes that, for 
example, make institutional decision-making accessible for public participation, or 
general structures – such as the composition of incumbent officials – that 
symbolically and/or substantively reflect salient matters of public interest. Given the 
focus on the Court of Justice’s structures and processes in this thesis, the intrinsic 
virtues are central to the analysis herein. Second, exemplifying these virtues is not to 
be understood in absolutist terms. There are natural tensions that exist between the 
intrinsic virtues (elaborated on in Section 3.3.1, and Section 4). Moreover, the extent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 As will be explained in Section 4, the focus in this thesis, in relation to the intrinsic virtues, is on 
representativeness and participation. These concepts are explained in greater depth in Chapter Five 
and Chapter Six, respectively. For an analysis of the democratic legitimacy of judicial review in 
purely intrinsic terms, see Annabelle Lever, “Democracy and Judicial Review: Are They Really 
Incompatible?” (2009) Perspectives on Politics Vol. 7 No. 4 805 (hereinafter Lever, 2009). 
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to which any given political institution is participatory, representative, accountable or 
transparent is dependent on the polity-conditions within which that institution 
functions. This is so in two senses. First, there is a necessary sensitivity to, what we 
termed in Section 3.1.3, the pre-institutional variables of the polity. In other words, 
given the distinctiveness of each polity (its jurisdiction, its scope of powers, its 
socio-cultural values, etc.), the precise manner in which an intrinsic virtue like 
representativeness is implemented will be sensitive to those polity-conditions. The 
second way that institutional exemplification of intrinsic virtues is context-dependant 
is because, as we saw in the previous sub-section, democratic polities typically 
divide up political power into a multiplicity of political institutions, each of which 
have a given function to fulfil commensurate with that power. In constitutional 
courts, for example, given their trustee-duties (discussed in Section 2, above), it is 
important that they are sufficiently insulated from the whims of majoritarian politics. 
In this case, then, the virtues of institutional accountability and transparency are 
somewhat limited.333 This leads on to the explanation of instrumental democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
Instrumental democratic legitimacy is a way of understanding the functional 
relationship between the political institution and the democratic polity within which, 
and for which, it functions. The reason we examine a political institution in this way 
is because each political institution within a democratic polity has been allocated 
certain functions in order to enhance the democratic qualities of the polity, taken 
holistically. In order to understand the democratic legitimacy of a political 
institution, then, we must also pay attention to how it functions – paying close 
attention to the scope of its political powers and the limits that places on institutional 
functioning.  
 
There are two aspects of the polity-institution connexion to be aware of here. First, 
there are the formally established institutional roles and objectives that have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 The impact of the associated issues of institutional independence and insulation is given greater 
attention in Chapter Four.  
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handed over (or delegated) to the institution by virtue of the separation of powers 
doctrine – thus enabling one to deduce the expected output of and appropriate limits 
to institutional functioning. Legislative assemblies are, for example, endowed with 
the responsibility inter alia to make law for the polity. Courts, on the other hand, are 
(primarily) responsible for resolving disputes between parties in accordance with 
established rules of law. By fulfilling these functions, institutions are contributing to 
the broader democratic governance structures of the polity and, as such, enhance the 
democratic quality of the broader polity. Second, because political institutions will 
have, to varying degrees, a certain amount of discretion (a “zone of discretion”) with 
which to administer their formally established roles and objectives, they will 
inevitably and iteratively function in such a way as to help (re)define and 
(re)constitute the polities within which they function. This arises by virtue of 
administrative indeterminacy (i.e. contractual incompleteness) and, as a (secondary) 
form of institutional output, can be understood as polity-constitutive output. 
Legislative assemblies, for example, might bolster the polity’s social legitimacy by 
introducing “progressive” taxation laws. Courts, on the other hand, may, for 
example, via judicial interpretation, bolster the polity’s protection of the citizen by 
granting individuals greater procedural rights e.g. Ely’s discrete and insular 
minorities. These constitutive contributions by institutions may well be bolstering the 
democratic legitimacy of the polity in two ways. They may be simply contributing 
social, political and/or juridical conditions necessary for a democratic polity, as per 
the institution’s formally established role; but this contribution may also be 
compensating for broader (democratic) structural defects and deficiencies elsewhere 
in the polity, which may legitimate the institution exercising its discretion in this 
way. In addition, given the incompleteness of finalité, the Union institutions’ 
contributions can be regarded as generative of the very conditions of democracy e.g. 
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3.3. The Intrinsic and Instrumental Democratic Legitimacy of Trustee-Courts 
 
Given the foregoing, and looking forward to our analysis of the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court of Justice, we are left with two sets of questions. First, if we 
are to analyse the democratic legitimacy of a political institution in the terms 
outlined above (intrinsic and instrumental), how can we determine the optimal 
configuration of intrinsic virtues and instrumental output? In other words, if we were 
to assess empirically a particular political institution – surveying its intrinsic and 
instrumental credentials – how could we determine whether or not that institution is 
sufficiently participatory, representative, accountable, or transparent; and whether or 
not that institution’s instrumental functions and output are also sufficient, 
democratically speaking? The complexity of such a diagnosis is further compounded 
by what was alluded to above, the fact that, sometimes, instrumental functions are in 
a tension with intrinsic virtues e.g. the independent constitutional court and 
transparency. How do we reconcile such tensions; or, more accurately, how do we 
factor-in the inter-dependency of intrinsic virtues and instrumental functions to that 
analysis? The second set of questions relates to the position of courts – as a particular 
type of political institution. How can courts, and, in particular, constitutional 
(trustee-)courts, fit into this analytical framework? Furthermore, why should we 
analyse courts in this way? In particular, why should we analyse the Court of Justice 




3.3.1. Resolving the Diagnostic Problems of the Intrinsic-Instrumental Taxonomy: 
Back to the Notion of Trusteeship 
 
Briefly restated, there are two problems that need to be addressed here: finding a 
rationale by which we can determine the optimal configuration of intrinsic virtues; 
and finding a rationale by which we can make that assessment in light of the inter-
dependency of intrinsic virtues and instrumental functions and output. Resolving 
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these problems brings us back to the notion of trusteeship. Trusteeship provides a 
rationale by which these conceptual complexities can be coherently ordered. This is 
because, first, trusteeship – with its bipartite division of primary and secondary 
fiduciary duties – provides a normative logic which prioritises the relationship 
between, and applicability of, instrumental functions and intrinsic virtues; and, 
second, because the notion of trusteeship itself significantly overlaps with the 
concept of democratic legitimacy. These two premises are explained presently. 
 
To begin with, trusteeship is a useful way to understand instrumental democratic 
legitimacy. The terms and objectives of the trust determine the trustee-institution’s 
functional relationship to the democratic polity. They determine what it is the 
trustee-institution is expected to provide for, and on behalf of, the polity within 
which it functions. The trustee-institution has been handed over these tasks by the 
people of a polity (settlors), for the people of a polity (beneficiaries). Thus, meeting 
the terms and objectives of the trust is a democratically mandated task. This also 
naturally resonates with the aforementioned separation of powers doctrine, whereby 
the political power of a democratic polity, in order to enhance the polity’s self-
governing credentials, is functionally divided between a multiplicity of political 
institutions. In other words, the polity delegates political powers to political 
institutions, and so, fulfilling the terms and objectives that have been set by virtue of 
that delegation, represents, for the delegate political institution, the primary 
democratic remit. The overall design of the polity – with its disaggregated power 
structures – has to be assumed to have a democratic logic of its own, in the service of 
which a particular political institution must conform to its delegated functions. Given 
this logic, from a democratic legitimacy perspective, trustee-institutions must give 
priority to measures of instrumental democratic legitimacy. They must faithfully 
observe the terms and objectives of the trust in order to bolster and enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of the broader polities within which, and for which, they 
function. In this way, when measuring the extent to which a political institution 
exemplifies the intrinsic virtues of democratic legitimacy, the applicability or 
suitability of those virtues has to give way to measures of instrumental legitimacy, as 
       Chapter Three 







a matter of priority – in the language of trusteeship, this is the same as fulfilling 
primary fiduciary duties. This is why, for example, it is easy to accept that 
institutional transparency (an intrinsic virtue) must be somewhat limited in the 
context of constitutional adjudication, because, as we shall see in greater detail in the 
next Chapter, institutional transparency often conflicts with constitutional courts’ 
impartial and independent adjudication i.e. part of their primary fiduciary duties, 
which is also their primary instrumental remit.  
 
There are a few qualifications to make here, however. First, it is not necessarily the 
case that intrinsic virtues will conflict with instrumental functions. Indeed, in certain 
political institutions – legislative assemblies for example – their primary instrumental 
functions are to exemplify the intrinsic virtues. The extent to which intrinsic virtues 
will conflict with instrumental functions is very much dependant on the type of 
political institution under examination. In Section 3.3.2, we will consider these issues 
in the context of constitutional courts.  
 
Second, as we saw in Section 2, trusteeship is, by its nature, not simply a matter of 
following the rules as laid down by political principals. The problem of contractual 
incompleteness gives rise to significant zones of discretion within which any trustee-
institution must “fill in the blanks”, because the terms and objectives of the trust 
(their instrumental functions or primary fiduciary duties) are indeterminate. In this 
regard, as we have seen, trustee-institutions are expected to “fill in the blanks” 
according to what we termed secondary fiduciary duties. In other words, when a 
situation arises whereby a trustee cannot look to the terms explicitly laid down in the 
trust for direction, the trustee must decide how to administer the trust according to 
standards that are implicit in the settled terms – either by inferring what the broader 
objectives of the trust are, or by reference to some other more general standards of 
good faith vis-à-vis the beneficiaries (in this case, the public). In this regard, there is 
a significant relationship between secondary fiduciary duties and intrinsic virtues of 
democratic legitimacy. At one level, we may say that intrinsic virtues – being 
exemplary of the democratic ideal of collective self-government – are simply good 
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examples of, or one way of understanding, the sorts of general standards of good 
faith required by secondary fiduciary duties. But the relationship between intrinsic 
virtues and secondary fiduciary duties has a more compelling significance. As we 
saw above, democratic political institutions are paradoxically exclusive, which 
makes it necessary for them to become responsive to the interests of the public over 
which they govern. This is the rationale that underpins the intrinsic virtues: 
institutional responsiveness. What is important to note here is that this rationale 
significantly overlaps with the core objectives of secondary fiduciary duties in 
trustee-institutions, which are, again, for the trustee-institution to administer the trust 
according to standards that are implicit in the settled terms by acting in good faith 
vis-à-vis the beneficiaries. Acting in good faith is, moreover, precisely about 
ensuring that the public’s interests are taken into account, acted upon and not 
subverted by the exercise of the trustee-institution’s administrative discretion.  
 
The relationship between secondary fiduciary duties and intrinsic virtues is one in 
which their core objectives significantly overlap i.e. institutional responsiveness to 
the interests of the public-beneficiaries. Yet the domain of secondary fiduciary duties 
is the exercise of discretion – an interpretative function – whereas the domain of 
intrinsic virtues is the structural and procedural design of political institutions. The 
structures and processes of a political institution will, moreover, typically be set by 
the settlors of the trust and so are not subject to alteration by the trustee-institution.334 
What we have to be aware of, then, is that secondary fiduciary duties relate to the 
exercise of administrative discretion, and intrinsic virtues, strictly speaking, do not – 
yet their core rationales (institutional responsiveness) significantly overlap. In this 
respect, we can understand the implementation of intrinsic virtues – through the 
design of a political trustee-institution’s structures and processes – as facilitating the 
trustee-institution’s fulfilment of their secondary fiduciary duties. In other words, the 
design of political trustee-institutions according to intrinsic virtues, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Indeed, the Court of Justice’s structures and processes are laid down and pre-determined by 
legislative and statutory instruments, and their capacity to be altered is not solely within the purview 
of the Court of Justice’s administrative discretion. See Article 281(2) TFEU.  
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participation and representativeness, facilitates that institution’s capacity to be 
responsive to the interests of their beneficiaries – the public.  
 
There are two important final points to note here: first, there is a subtle, yet 
consequential, difference between the nature of “public interests” vis-à-vis the 
trustee-institution, and the nature of “public interests” with respect to the broader 
polity; and, second, the explanatory power of trusteeship, vis-à-vis the diagnostic 
problems associated with the intrinsic-instrumental taxonomy, is that trusteeship 
incorporates the (democratically) necessary sensitivity to polity-conditions into its 
analytical framework. On the former, identifying the salient maters of public interest 
to which the trustee-institution ought to be responsive is dependent on the special 
role that the trustee-institution plays within the polity. In the EU, we saw in Chapter 
Two that the contestation between intergovernmental and supranational or statist 
organising principles of constitutional design is a central political dispute to which 
the EU’s institutions must be responsive e.g. the structures and processes of 
Comitology in the Commission. But to what extent is this tension, or should this 
tension, be of concern to all of the Union’s institutions? As we shall see in Chapter 
Five, the Court of Justice is not directly concerned with this tension per se, because 
the Court is primarily concerned with resolving disputes and constitutional tensions 
as they emerge through the adjudication of law i.e. the Court’s trustee duties. In that 
respect, the salient and relevant public interests to which the Court must be 
responsive relate to a tension between respecting national legal traditions and an 
emerging autonomous Union legal culture, which, whilst there are significant 
parallels, is not the same as the tension between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. The important point to note here is that when institutional 
responsiveness in trustee-institutions is called for, then it is a more narrowly 
focussed set of public interests that are relevant. On the latter point, as we saw in 
Section 3.1.3, according to a threshold theory of democracy, democratic specification 
is a necessarily context-dependent task. That is, when considering how it is a 
democratic polity sufficiently configures itself, it must do so according to what we 
termed the “pre-institutional variables” that define any given polity e.g. the size of 
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the polity, the socio-cultural values that underpin the polity, its jurisdictional scope 
and powers, etc. The analytical ordering provided by the notion of trusteeship allows 
for these variables to be factored-in when determining the optimal configuration of 
intrinsic virtues and the limits of institutional functioning and output (instrumental 
democratic legitimacy) by virtue of the discretion provided through contractual 
incompleteness. The precise manner in which both of these points are operationalised 
in the analysis of the Court of Justice is addressed in Section 4, and in the theoretical 
Sections of the following Chapters. 
 
 
3.3.2. The Democratic Role of Constitutional Courts: Instrumental and Intrinsic 
Legitimacy? 
 
We have already seen, in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, that constitutional courts can, 
and should, be regarded as institutions of the trustee kind. And we have also just seen 
that the democratic legitimacy of political institutions can be carefully and optimally 
analysed under the organising principle of trusteeship. The questions that we are 
concerned with now, however, are: how can, and why should, constitutional trustee-
courts be analysed in terms of instrumental and intrinsic democratic legitimacy? 
Why would we want to analyse the democratic legitimacy of constitutional courts at 
all? Indeed, there are many schools of thought which eschew such an analysis – 
preferring to view courts and legal systems as mere tools of the true democratic 
political institutions, such as governments and legislative assemblies.335 
 
To answer these questions, we must begin by recalling the primary functions of 
constitutional courts, which are: 
 
1. to resolve constitutional disputes (e.g. judicial review); 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 This perspective that underpins much of the political constitutionalist tradition. See, for example, 
Waldron, 1999; Tomkins, 2005; and Bellamy, 2007. 
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2. to resolve constitutional disputes according to a faithful interpretation of 
the meaning of the norms set out (explicitly and implicitly) in constitutional 
settlements i.e. constitutional law; 
3. to make reasonable interpretations and clarifications of indeterminate 
constitutional law; and 
4. to ensure that no-one is above the law i.e. that the law is observed by all, 
especially political institutions.  
 
How can we understand these functions to be of either instrumental or intrinsic 
democratic significance? First, simply put, instrumental democratic legitimacy 
relates to a political institution’s functions and output – determining the extent to 
which it enhances the broader polity’s democratic credentials. If the political 
institution under examination is a constitutional court that performs the four 
functions listed above, then to what extent or in what ways are these functions 
credibly regarded as instrumental functions and output? There are two relatively 
straightforward answers to this, which present quite modest responses to the 
objections of political constitutionalists. First, these four functions can be regarded as 
the terms and objectives of the trustee relationship between the constitutional court 
and the (democratic) polity for which it functions. The trustee-court has been handed 
over these tasks by the people of a polity (via their political representatives), for the 
people of a polity (the public-beneficiaries). Thus, meeting the terms and objectives 
of the trust is a democratically mandated task. Second, beyond the constitutional 
court simply “doing what it’s told” by the public, the principal focus of these four 
functions is giving application and faithful meaning to the law – law that has been 
established by prior democratic political processes. In other words, applying the law 
is a democratic function in that it is fulfilling the ends demanded by the people. In 
both senses, then, the trustee-court is an instrument towards meeting the desired ends 
of the people of a polity, as set up under the terms and objectives of a trust. 
 
Such an account is naturally quite formalistic, and, as we have seen, trustee-courts 
are endowed with large “zones of discretion”. That discretion arises by virtue of the 
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indeterminacy of both the terms and objectives of the trust-settlement; as well as, 
specifically for courts, the semantic indeterminacy of law. The question here, then, 
is, can constitutional courts exercise that discretion in a democratic way? This 
question is particularly significant because, when judges interpret indeterminate law, 
they are effectively law-making. This problem relates to the instrumental democratic 
legitimacy of the constitutional court’s output. Indeed, this is where the real 
contestation lies between political constitutionalists and legal constitutionalists. 
Political constitutionalists – such as Waldron, Tomkins and Bellamy – would argue 
that a court has no legitimate mandate with which to take on the role of legislature, 
particularly in the context of the judicial review of legislation.  
 
There are, however, very credible and compelling reasons to reject the objections of 
political constitutionalists. To begin with, at a methodological level, their objections 
are somewhat misplaced. They tend to ignore, first, that there is not really such a 
thing as a determinate law that can be simply and robotically applied in courts. They 
are also misplaced because they ignore the sheer inevitability and necessity of having 
an institution like a court that can act as a neutral umpire, bringing determinacy to 
the inexorably indeterminate legislature’s law. Furthermore, as we saw in Section 2, 
the problem of contractual incompleteness – a cause of indeterminacy – actually 
provides a normative rationale for (1) legislatures purposefully making law 
indeterminate; and (2) having independent institutions like courts to bring 
determinacy thereto. That normative rationale was that formal political deliberations, 
within legislatures or wherever, cannot always agree on the particulars of legislative 
content, whilst agreeing fundamentally on broader objectives – leaving the specifics 
to be ironed out by courts that are independent from the same majoritarian political 
forces that give rise to such legislative impasses.336 
 
Beyond these methodological problems, there are also some very compelling 
counter-arguments on why courts should, from a democratic perspective, and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 We may present these objections to political constitutionalists – especially Waldron and Bellamy – 
somewhat playfully, but sincerely, as “the circumstances of constitutional adjudication”.   
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certain circumstances, take on a more legislative role. These arguments very much 
resonate with the idea of secondary fiduciary duties, thus establishing various 
rationales by which constitutional courts can exercise their discretion according to 
the values that inhere in the terms and objectives of the trust. There are those who 
argue, for example, that constitutional courts play an important role in safeguarding 
the necessary socio-political conditions of a democratic order from being subverted 
by the impulsive and whimsical forces of the realpolitik.337 There are also arguments 
which propose that an important function of constitutional courts is to foster, enable 
or enhance the deliberativeness of political processes.338 In terms of understanding 
the democratic roles and democratic legitimacy of constitutional courts, these 
approaches focus on instrumental functions and output – emphasising the various 
rationales by which judges can legitimately exercise their administrative discretion 
with respect to interpreting indeterminate law in a democratic way. But what about 
the intrinsic virtues and the structures and processes of constitutional courts? Why 
should a constitutional court be participatory, representative, accountable or 
transparent? In what sense should it use these structural and procedural virtues to 
determine public interests? Does the democratic role of courts not simply stop at 
courts performing their given (instrumental-trustee) functions? Understood 
rhetorically, these are very reasonable objections. It is not intuitive to think of courts’ 
structures and processes being designed in a democratic way. Lever argues that 
judicial review in constitutional courts is democratically legitimate in intrinsic terms, 
especially through representation and participation.339  Yet her argument is too 
narrowly focussed on the intrinsic virtues, and fails to take account of the various 
complexities involved in reconciling the tensions between the intrinsic virtues; 
tensions with instrumental democratic legitimacy; and the calibration of procedural 
democratic legitimacy to the idiosyncrasies of the polity. One of the key 
contributions of this thesis is to argue that, at a theoretical level, constitutional courts 
ought to be designed according to the intrinsic virtues of democratic legitimacy in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Ely, 1980; Dworkin, 1985; Dworkin, 1996; and Rawls, 1996.  
338 Habermas, 1995; and Everson and Eisner, 2009.   
339 Lever, 2009. 
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way that is balanced against their instrumental requirements and sensitive to polity-
conditions. 
 
Given that the intrinsic virtues (participation, representativeness, accountability and 
transparency) are concerned with responsiveness to public interests, we need to focus 
on the relationships between the constitutional court, its functions and 
responsiveness to public interests in both the broader polity and the constitutional 
court itself. In some respects, we have already considered this above. Some of the 
arguments presented by legal constitutionalists, such as Dworkin, are premised on 
the idea that it is necessary for constitutional courts to exercise their interpretive 
discretion by defending certain categories of public interests or “principles” – 
whether they be of minorities or some more general category of public interest like 
the right of peaceful protest. Yet the difference between these arguments and the 
present issue centres on the methods by which those public interests are identified. 
Legal constitutionalists tend to make these assertions in relation to canons of legal 
reasoning, and less so in relation to the structures and processes of constitutional 
adjudication, the latter, of course, being where intrinsic virtues can take shape. What 
we can say, then, as a starting point, is that the intrinsic virtues present a 
supplementary mechanism by which constitutional courts and their judges can be 
responsive to the interests of the public – they facilitate the constitutional court in 
exercising a responsive discretion. But under what circumstances would it be 
appropriate to design constitutional courts in this way? 
 
This very much depends on the levels of institutional responsiveness and interest 
representation that exist within the political institutions of the broader polity. In the 
language of trusteeship, one factor that becomes apparent here is that as political 
property is transferred to non-majoritarian institutions, such as constitutional courts, 
responsiveness to the affected interests of that “political property” has to be 
addressed.  Because majoritarian political institutions become powerless in those 
areas of public policy and administration, “the people” prima facie lose their 
capacity to self-govern, as those tasks of government have been transferred to an 
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autonomous and independent institution that is, by design, insulated from 
majoritarian forces. We need to know how those institutions can also be responsive 
to the affected interests of the people. One way of achieving this is to design trustee-
institutions, like constitutional courts, according to the intrinsic virtues of democratic 
legitimacy.  
 
Of course, one might object that the terms and objectives of the trust – including, 
importantly, the implicit terms – have already factored in the salient matters of 
affected public interests, so why provide these extra mechanisms? Are they not 
unnecessary? There are two responses to this objection. First, trustee-courts are 
subject to high zones of discretion, which is in response to the problem of contractual 
incompleteness. That logic is, furthermore, underpinned by the idea that political 
principals have not been able to pin-down sufficiently what the public’s interests are; 
or, rather, that they have not been able sufficiently to reconcile the various cleavages 
of public interest that relate to that area of public administration i.e. the settlement of 
constitutional disputes. Political principals have consequently handed over that 
administration to the trustee-court, which itself must still be able to measure salient 
matters of public interest in order for it to reach concrete solutions.  
 
A second response to this objection is that the trustee-court might be operating 
within a polity with significant systemic deficits with regard to determining salient 
matters of affected public interests. One could argue, for example, that a 
constitutional court, as a trustee-institution, might still be able to identify salient 
matters of public interest via an inter-institutional dialogue with the other 
(majoritarian) political institutions.340 This is a good argument, and in the ordinary 
polity-context – the modern, democratic nation-state – this would perhaps be a 
sufficient means by which constitutional courts could reasonably identify salient 
matters of affected public interests without having to be designed according to the 
intrinsic virtues. Yet the situation is somewhat different outwith that polity-context. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Indeed, this is one of the premises of Everson and Eisner’s sociological, deliberative theory of 
adjudication. Everson and Eisner, 2009.  
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One of the key premises of this thesis – which is examining the EU’s constitutional 
court – is that the EU is not an ordinary polity, but one that has significant systemic 
deficits with regard to the identification and protection of public interests by its other 
political institutions. Put simply, because polities like the EU and their “mainstream” 
political institutions (i.e. executive and legislative institutions) are not sufficiently 
responsive to salient matters of affected public interests, it is more appropriate to 
design their constitutional courts according to the intrinsic virtues, whereby their 
interests can be identified as they emerge within constitutional disputes.341 
 
 
4. The Court of Justice: Framing the Argument 
 
Given the foregoing, we now have a conceptual language with which, and an 
analytical framework within which, to understand and assess the procedural 
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice. Trusteeship is an umbrella concept 
that establishes the underlying rationale for this analysis. It explains how and why we 
should empirically examine the Court’s structures and processes in intrinsic and 
instrumental terms. That the Court of Justice is a trustee-institution is a central claim 
of this thesis. Moreover, trusteeship provides an ordering logic by which the tensions 
that exist between intrinsic virtues and instrumental legitimacy can be resolved; and 
by which the necessary sensitivity to the EU’s polity-conditions can be factored into 
the analysis.  
 
The argument of this thesis can be understood at three levels: (1) the ways in which 
the structures and processes of the Court of Justice satisfy intrinsic and instrumental 
criteria; (2) how the tensions therein are reconciled; and (3) the manner in which the 
former two threads of the argument are guided by the socio-political environment of 
the Court i.e. the EU’s polity-conditions. These three aspects of the argument are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 The same phenomenon may be found in other polity-contexts. In the EU context, the specifics of 
these systemic deficits were outlined in the review of the DemDefLit, and shall be rearticulated in 
Section 4 with a view to framing the argument of this thesis.  
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discrete. Indeed, they must ultimately be taken together as part of the same analysis. 
But they are presently outlined separately in order to make clear how they inform the 
overall argument of this thesis. 
 
 
4.1. Instrumental and Intrinsic Democratic Legitimacy and the Court of Justice 
 
The first level of the argument is how the Court’s structures and processes satisfy 
instrumental and intrinsic criteria. We begin this analysis in Chapter Four by 
considering how the Court’s structures and processes satisfy instrumental democratic 
legitimacy. We have seen that instrumental legitimacy can be understood in two 
ways: fulfilling primary fiduciary duties; and, through the discretion afforded by 
secondary fiduciary duties, making polity-constitutive, democracy-generative 
contributions to the broader polity. In Chapter Four, we look at the former: 
specifically, at how the structures and processes of the Court bolster the Court’s 
institutional independence and insulation from interference by majoritarian forces, 
such that it can perform the four aspects of constitutional adjudication free from 
political constraint and influence.  
 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six move on to consider the intrinsic virtues of democratic 
legitimacy. Yet we are only concerned with two of those virtues: representativeness 
(Chapter Five) and participation (Chapter Six). This is because, as we saw in Section 
3.2.2, the underlying normative rationale of intrinsic virtues is institutional 
responsiveness to public interests, and what we are concerned with here are the 
structural and procedural mechanisms by which salient affected public interests are 
identified by the Court of Justice, which is the province of representativeness and 
participation. Accountability and transparency, by contrast, are more about fostering 
the necessary means by which the public can supervise and audit political 
institutions. These virtues tend to operate most effectively with respect to 
majoritarian political institutions. Accountability, for example, understood as a 
broader systemic virtue, seeks to punish or reward incumbent political officials 
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according to their preferences. Such a mechanism transgresses quite significantly the 
primary trustee duties of constitutional courts, which is impartially and 
independently to adjudicate on constitutional rules of law. The same observation 
could be made with respect to institutional transparency, whereby, again, in the 
service of independent and impartial adjudication, it is necessary for a significant 
degree of secrecy, especially with respect to judicial deliberations.342 This is not to 
suggest that these virtues are altogether misplaced when analysing constitutional 
courts like the Court of Justice. Indeed, there are more nuanced ways that the Court 
exemplifies these virtues.343 Whilst these analyses are interesting, and worthy of 
further attention, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to venture into those aspects of 
institutional responsiveness. 
 
In Chapter Five we address the virtue of representativeness in the Court of Justice – 
assessing the extent to which, and the precise manner in which, its structures and 
processes exemplify that virtue. The underlying rationale of representativeness is that 
it is a mechanism by which public interests can be identified in a holistic or 
aggregated sense. What are the primary political cleavages that emerge from within 
the polity, generally, and, more specifically, how do those contests manifest 
themselves within constitutional disputes? The structures and processes of the Court 
are examined in line with a view arguing how it is they align themselves to the 
holistic, aggregated public interests of the EU. 
 
Chapter Six moves on to the issue of disaggregated or special interests. In other 
words, beyond the salient holistic matters of political contestation that are 
represented in the Court of Justice, how are the more particular, disaggregated or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 See Article 2 SCJ.  
343 In terms of accountability, for example, the President of the Court of Justice has the power to 
assess the suitability of the Judges to remain in office in the event that a Judge fails to act according to 
the established duties and obligations incumbent on them (see Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice (2012) L 265/1 (hereinafter RPCJ)). In terms of institutional 
transparency, the Court publishes its judgments, and increasingly so in the 23 official languages of the 
EU (see Article 36 RPCJ). Complementing this, the Court has an internal translation service, 
mitigating the inherent difficulties associated with an extraordinarily multi-lingual polity such as the 
EU (see Article 42 RPCJ). 
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special interests that are manifested disparately among the many categories of public 
actors (e.g. from within civil society) identified by the Court of Justice? This Chapter 
considers structural and procedural mechanisms that give access to different actors in 
order that they may express their arguments and viewpoints on how their affected-




4.2. Tensions and Synergies Between the Intrinsic Virtues and Instrumental 
Legitimacy 
 
The second level of analysis relates to the inexorable complexity involved in 
determining precisely the manner in which instrumental legitimacy and intrinsic 
virtues are to be operationalised in the Court of Justice. The exemplification by the 
Court of intrinsic virtues such as representativeness and participation cannot be 
understood in the abstract.344 There is no sense in saying that the Court must be as 
accessible as possible, or that representation must be achieved by electing Judges 
from each Member State. There is an art of precision and calibration involved in 
determining how intrinsic virtues are to be operationalised. There are two principal 
reasons for this: first, at a conceptual level, there are tensions and synergies between 
instrumental legitimacy and intrinsic virtues; and, second, much depends on the 
specificities of the Court of Justice and its socio-political environment i.e. the polity-
conditions of the EU. On the latter, the polity-conditions of the EU that pertain to 
that assessment are specified in Section 4.3.  
 
On the former, one of the difficulties with understanding procedural democratic 
legitimacy is that, conceptually speaking, the various criteria that we have identified 
are sometimes in conflict. We considered the example above that transparency, in the 
context of constitutional adjudication, conflicts with requirements of secret judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 This is where Lever’s analysis of the procedural democratic legitimacy of judicial review is lacking 
(Lever, 2009). 
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deliberations – the latter being necessary so as to safeguard the independence of the 
judiciary and, thus, its capacity to fulfil its fiduciary duties i.e. instrumental 
legitimacy. If the deliberations of the judiciary were not secret, then the judges 
would become vulnerable to the influence of, broadly, the body-politic and thus 
undermine their impartiality. As we shall see in Chapter Four, in the Court of Justice 
the threat most strongly emanates from the governments of the Member States. 
Likewise, certain forms of representation conflict with judicial independence e.g. 
elections to the judiciary. Indeed, addressing the tensions that are created by the 
(instrumental) requirement of judicial independence and the intrinsic virtues is a core 
motif in the following Chapters. 
 
It is also important to note here that there is no neat demarcation between the 
intrinsic virtues and instrumental legitimacy, conceptually speaking i.e. they often 
overlap in a synergetic way. For example, there is a synergetic relationship between 
representativeness and participation, on the one hand, and instrumental democratic 
legitimacy on the other. As we saw in Section 3.3.1, we must understand intrinsic 
virtues as facilitating the legitimate exercise of secondary fiduciary duties i.e. 
bringing determinacy to contractual incompleteness. There is thus an essential 
relationship with the second aspect of instrumental democratic legitimacy – the 
polity-constitutive, democracy-generative aspect. In other words, when the Court of 
Justice adjudicates in such a way that impacts on the social, political and/or juridical 
conditions of the EU, its exemplification of intrinsic credentials must be understood 
as one of the ways in which this is achieved democratically. In Chapter Five, we see 
that representativeness has a symbolic value that goes beyond the idea of institutional 
responsiveness. Representation of salient public interests is, of course, responsive 
insofar as it transmits to the decision-makers (the Judges) matters that are to be 
factored into their decision-making (adjudication). Yet in recognising these 
categories of public interest at a symbolic level, the Court is also ensuring fealty to 
the authority of the Court by the public (i.e. an instrumental quality), whether or not 
its decision-making is in fact responsive. In Chapter Six, we see that the mechanisms 
of access that allow actors to participate in the Court’s decision-making processes are 
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not only intrinsically democratic – exemplifying the core democratic virtue of 
collective self-government – but they also go some way towards fostering responsive 
polity-constitutive jurisprudence from the Court i.e. the polity-constitutive aspect of 
instrumental legitimacy.  
 
 
4.3. The Polity-Conditions of the EU: Contrapunctual Constitutionalism and the 
Court of Justice 
 
I have emphasised throughout this Chapter how important it is that the polity-
conditions of the EU be factored in to the analysis of procedural democratic 
legitimacy. Institutional specification of intrinsic and instrumental criteria is not an 
abstract exercise. We cannot say, for example, that access to judicial review should 
be granted to natural and legal persons without first knowing something about the 
relevant court and the broader socio-political structures within which it operates.345 
This is why in Section 4 of Chapter Two we considered the salient polity-conditions 
of the EU – the three C’s of EU constitutionalism: complexity, contestation, and 
change. It is these three conditions that are most pertinent to the analysis and 
argument here. This is because these conditions tell us how to balance the tensions in 
and between the intrinsic virtues and instrumental legitimacy. How independent is 
the Court of Justice, and how independent does it need to be? In Chapter Four, we 
see that the deeply contested nature of the EU justifies the Court of Justice, in 
comparison to other constitutional courts (national and transnational), being strongly 
insulated from ex ante and ex post political influences, because of the demonstrable 
threat to judicial independence posed by the EU’s politically heterogeneous and 
multiple constituencies e.g. its 27 Member States, inter alia. On representativeness 
(Chapter Five), given the strength of intergovernmentalism as part of the complex 
mélange of ordering principles of constitutional design in the EU, representation in 
the Court of Justice is achieved by balancing structures and processes that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 See Lever, 2009: 813–814 (see especially note 66).  
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representative of national legal traditions (such as common law, inquisitorial, and 
federal systems) with those that represent an emerging, autonomous Union legal 
culture. In Chapter Six, we see that democratic participation in the Court is achieved 
through various mechanisms of access to judicial review (such as rules of standing, 
and third party intervention). Yet, comparatively, it is demonstrated that these 
mechanisms of access are strong (contrary to prevailing critiques), which is justified 
given demonstrable systemic deficits within the Union’s legislative processes i.e. the 
putative “democratic deficit”. 
 
Finally, it is important to note how it is that concepts associated with the three C’s of 
EU constitutionalism are relevant to the analysis of the Court of Justice. For 
illustration, if we consider the concept of intergovernmentalism as a standard that 
guides constitutional design in the EU more generally, it is not ipso facto of concern 
to legal actors in the Court of Justice. One might believe, for example, that the 
broader political structures and processes of the EU ought to be, or to remain, guided 
by intergovernmentalism, yet at the same time believe that the Court itself be 
structured and function according the paradigm of an autonomous Union legal 
culture (a more supranational logic) – believing that the special virtue of the Court is 
to ensure that the fruits of intergovernmental agreement are realised. We need to be 
mindful, therefore, that whilst the three C’s of constitutionalism influence and have 
parallels with the structures and processes of the Court, they do not necessarily 
translate directly. In this vein, consider Maduro’s vivid metaphor of counterpoint in 
music, and how he uses that imagery to convey a means by which the judges at the 
different levels of the EU’s plural legal order ought to reconcile clashes and conflicts 
of norms.346  Because the EU’s overlapping legal systems lay claim to the sovereign 
jurisdiction with which to interpret and apply norms in common with the jurisdiction 
of the EU; and because of the EU’s commitment to a uniform system of (Union) law, 
Maduro argues that the judiciaries ought to transpose – like in counterpoint – their 
prevailing interpretations of national law into universal terms that fit with EU law: 
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national law in minor key, as it were. Here, too, we can understand the three C’s of 
EU constitutionalism, as they relate to the political system of the EU more generally, 
in contrapunctual terms with respect to the Court of Justice. Whilst 
intergovernmentalism or supranationalism do not directly attach to the sorts of legal 
matters of interest to legal actors in and around the Court of Justice, their logics and 
analytical force have their counterparts in the legal world. As we see in Chapter Five, 
for example, the forceful preoccupation of representing national legal traditions in 
the Court of Justice is guided by similar sensibilities to intergovernmentalism – 
national legal traditions as intergovernmentalism in minor key. In this vein, it is 
important to pay due regard to the three C’s of EU constitutionalism as guiding 
forces in designing the structures and processes of the Court in a democratic way, but 





In this Chapter, an analytical framework was presented within which the procedural 
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice can be examined. As we have seen in 
previous Chapters, procedural democratic legitimacy is understood in two ways: 
intrinsic and instrumental. The purpose of this Chapter was to clarify precisely how 
these analytical perspectives will be used to examine the Court’s structures and 
processes. This clarification is, moreover, necessary given the demonstrable 
complexity involved in analysing courts in this way, and because of the distinctive 
complexity involved in doing so for the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
 
To that end, the notion of trusteeship was shown to provide an important conceptual 
grounding. The idea of the trustee-institution explains – in terms of constitutional 
and political theory – the legitimate administration of delegated regulatory decision-
making in non-majoritarian institutions, such as constitutional courts. Owing to the 
virtuous fiduciary relationship between trustee-institutions and their beneficiaries 
(the public) – as laid down through agreed upon rules by the settlors of the trust – 
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trustee-institutions, such as constitutional courts, are endowed with significant 
discretion with which to exercise regulatory decision-making. The fiduciary 
relationship that inheres in this arrangement was shown to involve primary and 
secondary fiduciary duties. The former simply denotes a dutiful compliance with the 
terms of the trust e.g. judges faithfully applying rules of law. Secondary fiduciary 
duties, however, account for the inevitability that the terms of the trust are not 
exhaustive (which neatly overlaps with the idea of indeterminate law), given 
unforeseen, or unforeseeable, contingencies, and contractual incompleteness. These 
duties require the institutional decision-makers (i.e. the judges) to “fill in the blanks” 
in ways that are responsive to the interests of the public-beneficiaries. 
 
Given this foundational framework, we then considered the requirements of intrinsic 
and instrumental criteria of democratic legitimacy. First, in order to avoid 
methodological pitfalls associated with democratic specification, democracy was 
defined as an inclusive process of governance of the people, for the people and by the 
people. Yet, given the paradoxical inevitability that institutions are exclusive for 
pragmatic reasons, it was argued, first, that there ought to be a multiplicity of 
institutions; and, second, that they must ultimately exercise their discretion in a 
responsive way – thus overlapping with the fiduciary relationship which inheres in 
the trusteeship model. Instrumental democratic legitimacy was shown to be 
consistent with primary fiduciary duties, and the democratic requirement that each 
institution within a democratic polity will be delegated a particular task, the 
observance of which is instrumental towards bolstering the democratic legitimacy of 
the polity. In constitutional courts, this was shown to be fealty to democratically 
established rules of law. Intrinsic democratic legitimacy was then shown to be a way 
for the trustee-institution to administer its discretion in a democratic way. This is 
because intrinsic democratic legitimacy is ultimately about institutions – understood 
as discrete decision-making authorities – being responsive to the interests of the 
public. The intrinsic virtues (especially representativeness and participation), 
moreover, are operationalised through institutional structures and processes, whereas 
secondary fiduciary duties relate to institutional decision-making. In this regard, it 
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was shown that the implementation of intrinsic virtues in constitutional courts 
facilitates the democratic exercise of their law-making discretion.  
 
We then considered the conceptual and empirical complexities associated with 
examining the Court of Justice in this way. It was noted that there is no neat 
demarcation between the intrinsic virtues and instrumental legitimacy, conceptually 
speaking – sometimes they conflict, and sometimes they overlap in a synergetic way. 
One of the key contributions of this thesis is to argue that, at a theoretical level, 
constitutional courts ought to be designed according to the intrinsic virtues of 
democratic legitimacy in a way that is balanced against their instrumental 
requirements. We saw that this is where the notion of trusteeship is again instructive. 
Not only does it prioritise the requirements, but it does so in a way that pays due 
regard to the polity-conditions of the EU. It is in this way that the three C’s of EU 
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This Chapter considers how the Court is supported by various structures and 
processes in meeting its primary instrumental objectives. In Section 2, the theoretical 
framework of this analysis is presented. Guided under the umbrella of trusteeship, 
institutional independence is the central standard against which the Court’s structures 
and processes are to be examined, which is broken down into specific criteria. 
Section 3 then moves on to an empirical examination of the structures and processes 
that satisfy these criteria. Section 4 contextualises that analysis in light of the 
distinctive polity-conditions of the EU. It is argued that the underlying polity-
conditions of the EU – the three C’s of EU constitutionalism – justify the 
comparatively347 strong degree of institutional independence in the Court, but that 
the remaining weaknesses are justified, to an extent, by countervailing legitimacy-
factors (specifically, the need to ensure Member State representation in the 
composition of the judiciary), which is consistent with the Court’s secondary 
fiduciary duties as a trustee-institution.  
 
 
2. Theoretical Orientations: Instrumental Democratic Legitimacy, Trusteeship 
and Institutional Independence 
 
In this Chapter, we are concerned with instrumental democratic legitimacy, which 
refers to the role that an institution plays within a democratic polity, and how that 
role contributes to the proper democratic functioning of the polity. In particular, we 
are concerned with the structures and processes of the Court of Justice that support 
and foster its primary trustee/instrumental role within the EU, which is: to resolve 
legal/constitutional disputes; to resolve those disputes according to a faithful 
interpretation of the meaning of established rules of law; to bring determinacy to that 
law; and to ensure that the law is observed by all.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
347 Three other apex courts are considered: the ECtHR, the UK Supreme Court, and the US Supreme 
Court.  
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Trusteeship is a useful way to understand instrumental democratic legitimacy. A 
democratic court is, first and foremost, one that does what it is supposed to do.  The 
terms and objectives of the trust determine the trustee-institution’s functional 
relationship to the (democratic) polity. The trustee-institution has been handed over 
these tasks by the people of a polity (settlors), for the people of a polity 
(beneficiaries). Thus, meeting the terms and objectives of the trust is a 
democratically mandated task. In the context of courts, their primary objectives are 
to apply the law and to define the law – the law itself, moreover, being a democratic 
expression of the people. The people have, via their representatives, created laws that 
they demand to be applied universally, fairly and dispassionately; and which they 
demand to be reasonably interpreted and clarified in light of the, sometimes 
unforeseen, circumstances that emerge in real-world legal disputes (i.e. judicial law-
making).348  
 
In order to achieve this, it is necessary that constitutional courts are independent – 
that the effective administration of courts’ objectives is not subverted or undermined 
by external influences, especially political influences. In this regard, we saw that the 
test for independence – to the extent that we can credibly regard courts as trustees, as 
opposed to weaker forms of delegation such as agency – is establishing the “zone of 
discretion” courts enjoy.349 This test first determines the powers and discretion given 
to courts i.e. its jurisdiction; then balances these against both ex post and ex ante 
external mechanisms of control that may undermine the exercise of that discretion.350 
Ex post mechanisms of control relate to the ways in which political principals can 
respond to the discretion of delegate-institutions (these also tend to be direct 
mechanisms of control) such as to invalidate or reverse the decisions of delegate-
institutions; and ex ante mechanisms of control are the ways in which political 
principals can influence the decision-making of delegate-institutions (these tend to be 
indirect mechanisms of control) such as to make that discretion heteronomous.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
348 See Chapter Three, Section 2.3. 
349 See Section 2.1 of Chapter Three.  
350 We can also understand ex post and ex ante discretion-curbing mechanisms as being direct or 
indirect. Given that these overlap with the former two, it is not necessary here to treat them discretely. 
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In Section 3, we consider the independence of the Court of Justice in light of the 
foregoing by examining its structures and processes. We first assess the jurisdiction 
of the Court in order to determine the degree of institutional power and discretion it 
enjoys. Then, under the rubric of ex post mechanisms of control, we assess the extent 
to which the Court’s discretion – especially with respect to its interpretation of Union 
law – is subordinate to legislative processes: can the Union’s legislative processes 
invalidate or reverse judicial decisions? In terms of ex ante mechanisms of control, 
we consider the extent to which the Judges of the Court are free to exercise non-
heteronomous discretion when adjudicating. It is demonstrated that the appointments 
process of the Judges poses the most significant threat, but that there is a series of 
structures in place which insulate the judiciary from external influences. 
 
 
3. The Institutional Independence of the Court of Justice 
 
3.1. The Jurisdiction and Interpretive Discretion of the Court of Justice 
 
What powers have been formally delegated to the Court of Justice? In the language 
of trusteeship, what are the Court’s “political property rights”? The foundational 
mandate is expressed in Article 19 (1) TEU:  
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the 
General Court and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed [emphasis added]. 
 
As indicated by the first sentence, the Court of Justice of the European Union is 
functionally divided into three, formally non-hierarchical, courts: the Court of 
Justice, the General Court (formerly known as the Court of First Instance (hereinafter 
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CFI) prior to the Lisbon Treaty), and the Civil Service Tribunal (CST).351 Each of 
these courts is competent to hear a variety of actions.  The table in Appendix One 
provides a comprehensive list of the actions each of the three courts is competent to 
hear. These include, inter alia: actions for the annulment of Union Acts (legislative, 
and non-legislative); inter-institutional administrative review – both vertically 
(between Member States and the Union’s institutions), and horizontally (between the 
Union’s institutions; and between Member States); preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation and validity of EU law vis-à-vis national law; and various forms of 
public and private international dispute resolution.352 Moreover, we see that the 
Court has powers of constitutional review within specific areas of the Union’s 
intergovernmental jurisdictions.353 Historically, as the Union has expanded and 
deepened its jurisdiction, so too has the Court – contemporaneously with its own 
enlargement – gained greater powers of constitutional review. Sometimes this has 
been achieved by the Court itself in cases such as Pupino,354 but also as part of the 
Treaty amendments processes – as indicated by the provisions listed in Appendix 
One.355  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
351 The only specialised court in existence, at present, is the CST (see Annex I SCJ). The introduction 
of a specialised Intellectual Property court and a labour law court have been part of ongoing 
deliberations, but have yet to be implemented. See also Article 262 TFEU; and Opinion 1/09 of the 
full Court, pursuant to Article 218 (11) TFEU on the compatibility of the draft decision to create a 
unified European and Community Patent Court [2011] Judgment of 8 March 2011 (hereinafter 
Opinion 1/09). For reforms as part of the Nice Treaty negotiations, see Working Party for the 
European Commission, Report by the Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ 
Court System, May 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/pdf/due_en.pdf 
(hereinafter the Due Report): 32; and see also The Future of the Judicial System of the European 
Union (Proposals and Reflections), May, 1999, available at 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/2458996/THE-FUTURE-OF-THE-JUDICIAL-SYSTEM-OF-THE-
EUROPEAN-UNION (hereinafter the Courts’ Paper, 1999): 19, 26. For negotiations on the 
Constitutional Treaty, see The European Convention on the Future of Europe, “Final Report of the 
Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice” (Brussels, 2003) CONV 636/03 CERCLE I 13 (hereinafter 
Final Report of the European Convention): 4-5, available at http://european-
convention.eu.int/EN/bienvenue/bienvenue2352.html?lang=EN. The role of national courts within the 
European Union’s legal order is not addressed here. This is addressed in Chapter Five and Chapter 
Six, with respect to their roles in the preliminary rulings procedure (Article 267 TFEU), and their 
relationship to Union law more generally by virtue of the principles of direct effect (Van Gend en 
Loos) and supremacy (Costa v ENEL). 
352 See the table in Appendix One for a full break-down of these actions. 
353 See Section 4 of Chapter Two for an overview of these areas, and the table in Appendix One for 
list of the Court’s competence within these areas.  
354 See Fletcher, 2005; and White, 2006.  
355 Interestingly, the powers of review in substantive areas that fall under the intergovernmental 
jurisdictions are cases that can be designated to the Court of Justice sitting as a Grand Chamber (at the 
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Jurisdiction aside, the Court enjoys significant interpretive discretion. We know this 
empirically because of the well-documented historical role of the Court in the 
evolution of the EU.356 Yet the constitutional justification, or, indeed, cause, of this 
discretion can be found in Article 19 (1) TEU’s ironically inconspicuous statement 
that the Court shall ensure that “the law is observed”. Relying on the English 
translation of Article 19 (1) TEU can be misleading, since it may suggest that the 
Court is empowered merely to incorporate formally established rules of law (such as 
Treaty provisions, legislation, and case-law) into its interpretive canon. If we look, 
for example, to the French and the German versions of the Treaty, we see that the 
Court’s mandate is much broader. French and German, unlike English, make a 
distinction between two forms of “law”: between, on the one hand, “du droit” and 
“dem Recht”; and, on the other, “le loi” and “dem Gesetz” (respectively). The latter 
relate to the more narrowly construed notion of established rules of law; whereas the 
former are much broader notions, which are literally translated as “rights”, and can 
be read as pertaining to the protection of general rights associated with the rule of 
law. In the French version, it reads:  
 
La Cour de justice de l'Union européenne comprend la Cour de justice, le Tribunal et 
des tribunaux spécialisés. Elle assure le respect du droit dans l'interprétation et 






request of a Member State that is a party to the action) or, in cases of “exceptional importance”, the 
full Court. See Article 16 SCJ (3) and (5). See Section 3.3.4 for further details on the use of judicial 
chambers.  
356  See, for example, Stein, 1981; and Weiler, 1991. More recently, consider the Court’s 
“depillarisation” jurisprudence, and the ever expanding EU citizenship acquis in cases such as Case 
C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, and Metock. See also Niamh Nic Shuibhne, “The 
Resilience of EU Market Citizenship” (2010) Common Market Law Review Vol. 47 1597. See also 
Section 2 of Chapter One. 
357 Article 19 (1) Version Consolidée du Traité sur l’Union Européenne (2010) OJ C 83/27 (emphasis 
added).  
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Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Unionumfasstden Gerichtshof, das Gerichtund 
und die Fachgerichte. Er sichert die Wahrung des Rechts bei der Auslegung und 
Anwendung der Verträge.358 
 
We must therefore take the interpretive discretion of the Court of Justice to be 
broader than merely, and robotically, applying rules of law, but, instead, ensuring 
that “in the interpretation of the Treaties” that the rule of law (and prima facie any 
rights associated with that mandate) “is observed”.  
 
Given the foregoing, it is reasonable to say that the Court of Justice is a court with 
significant constitutional powers and discretion, which match the criteria listed in 
Chapter Three that establish the first part of the test for determining the extent to 
which a court is an institution of the trustee kind.359 Particularly important to bear in 
mind is the special significance of primary and secondary fiduciary duties that inhere 
in that arrangement; and the extraordinary degree of contractual incompleteness 
exemplified by the significantly open-textured nature of the Treaties, the 
combination of which demonstrates that the Court has particularly wide interpretive 
discretion.360 The next part of the test, then, in establishing the “zone of discretion” 
and independence of the Court, is determining the existence and extent of ex post and 







358 Artikel 19 (1) Konsolidierte Fassung des Vertrags über die Europäische Union (2010) OJ C 83/27 
(emphasis added). 
359 See Section 2.3 of Chapter Three. 
360 On primary and secondary fiduciary duties, see Section 2.1 of Chapter Three; and on the 
extraordinary degree of contractual incompleteness exemplified by the significantly open-textured 
nature of the Treaties, see Section 2.1.1 of Chapter One.  
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3.2. Ex Post Mechanisms of Control 
 
Thatcher and Stone Sweet argue that the notion of trusteeship accurately depicts the 
relationship between the Court of Justice and the EU: 
 
A trustee typically wields the power to govern those who have delegated in the first 
place. In the EU, for example, one of the Court’s tasks is to interpret authoritatively 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome; such rulings govern all legal persons in the 
[Union], including the member states. The Court, as constitutional court, is a trustee 
that is well insulated from formal controls. 361  
 
In terms of direct ex post mechanisms of control, we are interested in the extent to 
which the Court’s interpretation of Union law – in whatever form – can be 
overturned by legislative processes. First, it is very difficult for the Court’s Treaty-
interpretations to be reversed or invalidated. The only way for this to happen is via 
the somewhat infrequent intergovernmental Treaty revision and amendments 
processes. As Stone Sweet notes, moreover, the amendments process is subject to the 
cumbersome requirement of unanimity, where the status quo will remain if 
unsuccessful.362 The failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty in 2005,363 and the 
protracted ratification of the Lisbon Treaty exemplify this.364 
 
The situation is different, however, with respect to the Court’s interpretation of other 
species of Union law.365 Thatcher and Stone Sweet note that “when the Court 
interprets a regulation or directive, it acts more as the agent of the EU legislator, and 
the EU legislator monitors and corrects the Court’s rulings, through subsequent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
361 Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 7. 
362 Stone Sweet, 2002; and Stone Sweet, 2004. 
363 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) OJ C 310/01 (hereinafter the Constitutional 
Treaty). 
364 See, however, Protocol (No 33) Concerning Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (2010) OJ C 83/319. This Treaty provision was originally introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty (Protocol (No 2)) in order to limit the effects of the Court’s decision in Case 262/88 
Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889 in relation to the 
retrospective application of Article 119 TEC (pre-Nice) (now Article 157 TFEU). 
365 On the different forms of Union law, and the various processes through which they are enacted, see 
Chapter 2, Title I, Part Six TFEU. See also Article 5 TEU.  
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legislative acts, as the legislator see fit.”366 The ordinary legislative procedure under 
Article 289 TFEU, and delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU, are, moreover, not 
constrained by the requirement of unanimity, but, instead, subject to the less 
cumbersome requirement of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in their enactment.367 
This gives the Union legislator a stronger mechanism by which to “correct” the 
Court’s interpretation of Union Acts. Yet this does not prevent the Court from 
reviewing any consequent Union Acts, and re-asserting its constitutional 
interpretation thereof.368 
 
Thus far, we have seen that the zone of discretion is quite large for the Court of 
Justice – bolstering its independence and thus facilitating instrumental democratic 
legitimacy. The final aspect to consider here is the ex ante mechanisms of control 






366 Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 7. 
367 See Article 114 TFEU; and Article 352 TFEU. Yet there are areas of Union jurisdiction that cannot 
use the ordinary legislative procedure, in which case the more cumbersome requirement of unanimity 
is required. Most of those areas of substantive law fall within the Union’s intergovernmental 
jurisdictions, which, as we can see in Appendix One, the Court has limited competence in anyway. 
Yet there are a few substantive areas in which the Court does have competence, and which require 
unanimity in the adoption of Union acts. See, for example, Article 113 TFEU and Article 115 TFEU, 
which provide for legislation in the area of taxation. Moreover, since the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty, national parliaments now have a procedural role in the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 
7, Protocol 2), such as to make the legislative process more cumbersome.  
368 Indeed, this situation is illustrated by the Tobacco Advertising cases. In Case C-376/98 Germany v 
Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419 (hereinafter Tobacco Advertising I), the Court annulled, 
in its entirety, Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on 
the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products (1992) OJ L 213/9, on the basis of a 
lack of competence as per Article 95 TEC (now Article 114 TFEU). Consequently, the Union 
legislature enacted Directive 2003/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 
2003 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products (2003) OJ L 152/16, which largely 
reproduced the annulled Directive in Tobacco Advertising I. The new Directive was challenged before 
the Court in Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573 (hereinafter 
Tobacco Advertising II), and, whilst it was declared valid, it was on the basis that the concerns of 
constitutional validity in relation to the previous Directive, as observed by the Court in Tobacco 
Advertising I, had been duly respected in redrafting the new Directive. 
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3.3. Ex Ante Mechanisms of Control 
 
An independent court is also one in which its decision-makers – the judges – are free 
to exercise their discretion without interference from external forces. By its nature, 
adjudication creates “winners and losers”. Most obviously, the parties pleading 
before a court are involved in some form of dispute, for which the judges must 
decide, in light of the parties’ submissions and established rules of law, who is right 
and who is wrong i.e. which party wins the case and which loses. Beyond the 
principal decision, judges must invariably interpret the law in light of the facts of the 
case. Such an interpretation necessarily puts the judges in a position to define, and 
re-define, the meaning of the law – whether it be legislation or prior judicial 
decisions. As such, the broader public becomes an interested “party” to the decision, 
where some members of the public will prefer one interpretation of the law, and 
some will prefer an alternative interpretation. Barber refers to these complexities 
under the rubric of “polycentricity”: 
 
[T]here are certain types of issue that that cannot be satisfactorily resolved in the 
triadic model because the decision has implications that go beyond the parties 
appearing before the judge. This point is not a new one; Lon Fuller characterised 
such issues as ‘polycentric’.369 An issue is a polycentric one when it is interrelated 
with other issues ... The decision of the court consequently has an impact on parties 
who may not be represented before the judge ... Most decisions before the court have 
some elements of polycentricity about them; court action can rarely be contained 
within a neat boundary between the parties.370 
 
This is another way in which adjudication creates winners and losers, and one that is 




369 Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) Harvard Law Review Vol. 92 353. 
370 Barber, 2001: 76, 77.  
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The underlying requirement of non-heteronomous adjudication must thus be 
understood as a way to ensure that judges are not predisposed to adjudicate in favour 
of particular parties and particular public interests, and that they treat each case 
purely on the merits of the facts, the arguments presented, and the established rules 
of law.371 To that end, in analysing the Court of Justice, it is important to look for the 
structures and processes in place that affect these qualities. I begin by outlining what 
represents the greatest threat – the role of Member State governments in the judicial 
appointments process – then move on to present the various aspects of the 
appointments process and the structuring of the Court that, on the one hand, foster 
the virtue of judicial impartiality and, on the other, insulate the Court from the 
influence of Member States, as well as the influence of the Union’s political 
institutions, such as the Commission and the EP. The virtues of impartiality and 
insulation ensure that parties will be judged, and the law will be defined, in such a 
way that prevents the Judges from strategically adjudicating in favour of particular 




3.3.1. The Judicial Appointments Process 
       
The appointment and re-appointment processes for the Court’s Judges present the 
Member States with opportunities to exercise some control. The Court of Justice 
functions within a political system composed of politically and constitutionally 
powerful constituent Member States.372 This is reflected in the appointments process, 
whereby Article 19 (2) TEU states that “[t]he Court of Justice shall consist of one 
judge from each Member State”373 and that they are to be “appointed by common 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
371 Of course, this does not mean strict neutrality. The judges must favour one interpretation over 
others, and, ultimately, such interpretive preferences will be guided by higher order “principles” and 
“values”. See Dworkin, 1985; and MacCormick, 1994. 
372 In this vein, consider the discussion in Chapter Two on the EU’s powerful intergovernmental 
structures. 
373 It also states that “[t]he General Court shall include at least one judge per Member State.” For the 
General Court, see Article 254 TFEU and Article 48 SCJ. The CST does not operate on a one Judge 
per Member State basis. Instead, the CST has seven judges that are appointed on as “broad a 
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accord of the governments of the Member States for a term of six years, after 
consultation of the panel provided for in Article 255 [emphasis added].”374 As it 
stands at present, with 27 Member States, there are 27 Judges in both the Court of 
Justice and the General Court – one for each Member State.375  
 
Before going on to consider the significance of the “common accord” requirement 
and the use of the “panel” – both of which foster a degree of insulation from Member 
State control – there are a few significant points to note here about this process. First, 
it is common knowledge that the governments of the Member States simply choose 
their judge.376 Indeed, this practice is reflected in official discourse on matters 
pertaining to the appointment process. The Council’s recommendation on the 
functioning of the panel states, for example: “[a]s soon as the government of a 
Member State has lodged a proposal for appointment, the General Secretariat of the 
Council shall send it to the President of the panel.”377 
 
Second, it was not always the case that the Treaty stipulated “one judge from each 
Member State”. This was introduced by the Nice Treaty in 2001 with a view to 
ensuring that:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
geographical basis as possible from among nationals of the Member States and with respect to the 
national legal systems represented”. See Article 2 and Article 3 of Annex I SCJ. See also, below, the 
discussion of the use of specialised courts. 
374 Article 253 TFEU for the Court of Justice; and Article 254 TFEU for the General Court. See also 
Article 19 TEU. The judges at the CST, by contrast, are “appointed by the Council, acting 
unanimously.” Article 257 (4) TFEU. 
375 There is a list of all of the Judges for each court on the Court’s website, which, interestingly, does 
not explicitly state the Member State they are from. This omission can be construed as consistent with 
the Court’s trend towards independence (discussed further in Section 4). See, for the Court of Justice, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/; for the General Court, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7035/; and for the CST, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/T5_5240/.   
376 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (2nd ed.), Palgrave, 2005: 117. 
377 Note from the President of the Court of Justice (Mr. Vassilios Skouris) on “Recommendation 
Relating to the Operating Rules of the Panel Provided for in Article 255 TFEU” to Mr. Miguel Angel 
Moratinos, President of the Council of the European Union and of the Conference of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, (Brussels, 2010) sse/SE/ms 5195/10 
(hereinafter Skouris, 2010): 3 (emphasis added).  
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... each national legal order [is] represented by a Judge at the Court, to ensure that 
each national legal tradition makes its contribution to [Union] law and that the 
national courts abide more closely by the Court’s case-law.378 
 
In principle, this means that, before the Nice Treaty, the Judges could all have been 
Russian.379 Yet, even before Nice, there was always a strong political pressure to 
structure the Court’s judiciary according to the logic of one Judge per Member State 
– it was “always tacitly agreed” that each Member State would have its own Judge at 
the Court.380 With such a strong bargaining position for the Member States, other 
proposals for structural composition have been rejected in favour of the Member 
States’ political interests.381 
 
Third, the Member States may also be able to take advantage of the short term and 
renewable tenure of the Judges i.e. the re-appointment process. The tenure of the 
judges, in both the Court of Justice and the General Court, is six years.382 There is to 
be a partial replacement of the judges every three years, alternating between 13 
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378 The Due Report: 46. See also the Court’s Paper, 1999. The notion of “national legal traditions” is 
particularly relevant for the discussion in Chapter Five.  
379 See Tom Kennedy, “Thirteen Russians! The Composition of the European Court of Justice”, in 
AIL Campbell and M. Voyatzee, Legal Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of European Law: 
Essays in Honour of Lord Mackenzie Stuart, London: Trenton Publishing, 1996. 
380 See the Court’s Paper, 1999: 18. See also Federico Mancini, “The Practice, Procedure and 
Working Methods of the European Court of Justice”, (last updated, 2006) Lecture to the Law and 
Justice Foundation of New South Wales, available at 
http://ljf.itechne.com/ljf/app/&id=/EB1B6BA8391FA0C1CA2571960024FC2B (hereinafter Mancini, 
Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales); and Arnull, 2006: 7-8. 
381 It is questionable whether this conviction – historically endorsed by the judiciary – will last for 
posterity given the rapid process of enlargement in the last decade. In the deliberations on the 
Constitutional Treaty, the Discussion Circle considered the number of Judges and the appointments 
process and “felt that the provisions should remain unchanged in this regard”, but added that “thought 
must be given to the question whether to maintain the current number of judges (11) sitting in the 
Grand Chamber ... after enlargement.” See Final Report of the European Convention: 2. There have 
yet to be any significant proposals for change in this regard, with the current size of the Grand 
Chamber at 15 Judges (see Section 3.3.4). For earlier proposals, see, for example, Francis Jacobs’ 
proposal to appoint judges on a one judge per legal system basis (i.e. Scottish, Northern Irish, and 
English or Welsh judges instead of one UK judge). See Institut D’Eudes Europénnes, La Cour de 
Justice des Communautés Européennes et les États Membres, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 25 
January 1980 (hereinafter IEE, 1980): 15-16.  
382 See Article 19 (2) TEU. For the Court of Justice see also Article 253 TFEU; and for the General 
Court see Article 254 TFEU.   
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Judges of the Court being replaced, followed by a replacement of 14.383 Additionally, 
retiring Judges may be reappointed, meaning that there are no prima facie limitations 
that prevent them from keeping their tenure indefinitely. Yet, what this potentially 
represents is a mechanism by which the incumbent Judges, in order to retain their 
tenure, have to meet the satisfaction of the governments of their Member States. 
Indeed, one of the recurring issues in the area of judicial reform of the Court of 
Justice has been the call, by the Judges themselves, for the their tenure to be 
increased (to twelve years) and made non-renewable on the basis that the prevailing 
system significantly undermines judicial independence – a proposal that has not, thus 
far, been taken up.384  
 
The foregoing thus represents a threat to the Court’s independence. The governments 
of Member States can take advantage of the appointment process, by virtue of which 
they can potentially exert their influence over the Court of Justice in its decision-
making ex ante. The remainder of Section 3 will consider the ways in which the 
Court’s independence is preserved, however, emphasising insulation from external 
influences, and the impartiality of the Judges. 
 
 
3.3.1.1. The “Common Accord” Requirement 
 
Within the appointments process itself, the Judges are to be “appointed by common 
accord of the governments of the Member States”. This suggests that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
383 Article 253 TFEU and Article 9 SCJ for the Court of Justice; and Article 254 TFEU and Article 47 
SCJ for the General Court. Recently: “[b]y decisions of 25 April 2012, 20 June 2012 and 20 
September 2012, the representatives of the Governments of the Member States have renewed, for the 
period from 7 October 2012 to 6 October 2018, the mandates as Judges at the Court of Justice of 
Messrs Alexander Arabadjiev and George Arestis, Ms Maria Berger, Messrs Jean-Claude Bonichot, 
Anthony Borg Barthet, Carl Gustav Fernlund, Egidijus Jarašiūnas, Egils Levits and Jiří Malenovský, 
Ms Alexandra Prechal, Messrs Antonio Tizzano and Thomas von Danwitz. For the period from 7 
October 2012 to 6 October 2018, Mr José Luís da Cruz Vilaça, replacing Mr José Narciso da Cunha 
Rodrigues, and Mr Christopher Vajda, replacing Sir Konrad Schiemann, have been nominated Judges 
at the Court of Justice, by decisions of 25 April 2012 and 20 June 2012.” See CJEU, “Partial 
replacement of the Court of Justice and entry into office of a new Member of the General Court” 
((8/10/2012) Press Release 126/12. 
384 See, for example, Francis Jacobs’ submissions in IEE, 1980: 16-17. See also the Due report: 51. 
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appointments process is subject to the agreement, of some sort, of all the Member 
States. The “common accord” requirement is not, however, defined in the Treaties, 
nor any other legal material, nor does it seem to have any bearing on the well-
established practice of Member States simply choosing their candidate. Nevertheless, 
the requirement is symbolic of a process that eschews exclusive Member State 
influence in favour of a centralised Union (albeit intergovernmental) appointments 
process. Furthermore, the “common accord” provision may have a latent 
functionality. As Mancini noted, this provision underpins “an unwritten rule, which 
to date has been scrupulously observed, [which] dictates that the other Member 
States acquiesce”.385 This system of acquiescence may serve to influence how 
governments of Member States select their Judges, arguably conforming to unwritten 
standards that they feel will be accepted, or with which they feel the other 
governments will be comfortable.386 The “common accord” provision may also take 
on greater practical significance in the future, if and when the EU evolves and its 
central institutions take on greater control of the appointments process.387 
 
 
3.3.1.2. The Advisory Role of the Appointments Panel 
 
Article 255 TFEU provides: 
 
A panel shall be set up in order to give an opinion on candidates’ suitability to 
perform the duties of Judge and Advocate-General of the Court of Justice and the 
General Court before the governments of the Member States make the appointments 
referred to in Articles 253 and 254.388 
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385 Mancini, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales: at Point 2, para. 2 (emphasis added).  
386 In this respect, see Section 3.3.2 on Judicial Competence. 
387 However, at this stage, this has not been proposed, or considered, in any of the literature or reform 
debates.  
388 Emphasis added. The CST’s appointment process is not subject to the consultation of a panel. 
Instead, a committee has been set up to ensure that “candidates [have] the most suitable high-level 
experience”. See Article 3 (4) Annex I SCJ. Indeed, the Judicial Panel, created by the Lisbon Treaty, 
was modeled on this committee; see Skouris, 2010: 1.  
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There are a few points to note here. First, in spite of the appointments system 
whereby governments of the Member States can choose their Judge, the involvement 
of the panel ostensibly provides a degree of impartiality and objectivity. The focus of 
the panel is on the candidates’ “suitability to perform the duties of Judge” and, thus, 
is instrumental towards fostering the qualities necessary for judicial competence. Its 
deliberations are to be, where desired, evidence based, where “[t]he panel may ask 
the government making the proposal for appointment to send additional information 
or other material which the panel considers necessary for its deliberations,”389 and it 
“shall hear the candidate”.390 However, it may only give an “opinion”, which, as we 
saw in Article 19 TEU, the governments of the Member States only use for 
“consultation”.391 Moreover, the operating rules of the panel prevent the panel from 
conducting a hearing for reappointments.392 Yet what is unclear is the extent to 
which the panel is involved in the reappointments process.  
 
This relates to the second point. The introduction of the panel was discussed in the 
Constitutional Treaty reforms and finally introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, on the 
basis of increasing judicial independence and democratic accountability in the 
European Union.393 Yet there is a lack of transparency of its proceedings and, in 
particular, the opinions on the candidates.394 Mance reveals that the panel maintains 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
389 Skouris, 2010: 3 (at Point 6).  
390 Council Decision relating to the operating rules of the panel provided for in Article 255 [TFEU] 
(2010) OJ L-50/18 (hereinafter Council Decision 2010/50/18): Point 7 of the Annex. 
391 See also Skouris, 2010.  
392 Council Decision 2010/50/18: Point 7 of the Annex. 
393 On increasing democratic legitimacy in the Union’s institutions in the run up to Lisbon, see 
generally Council of the European Union, “IGC 2007 Mandate” (Brussels, 2007) POLGEN 74 
11218/07, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st11/st11218.en07.pdf (hereinafter 
IGC Mandate, 2007).  During the discussions on the Constitutional Treaty – when the introduction of 
the appointments panel was proposed – it was argued that: “it was appropriate to set up an ‘advisory 
panel’, which would have the task of giving the Member States an opinion on whether a candidate’s 
profile was suited to the performance of his/her duties, particularly on the basis of objective criteria 
relating to professional qualifications.” See the Final Report of the European Convention: 2. See also 
Skouris, 2010: 3 (at Point 1).  
394 See Lord Jonathan Mance, “The Composition of the European Court of Justice” (2011) Presented 
to the United Kingdom Association for European Law, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_111019.pdf (hereinafter Mance, 2011): paras. 41-45. 
Lord Mance, one of the Justice’s of the UK Supreme Court, is one of the panel’s seven members.  
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the confidentiality of its opinions in light of Council Regulation 45/2001,395 and, in 
light of the interpretation thereof given by the Court in Commission v The Bavarian 
Lager Co Ltd, 396 “[t]he panel readily concluded both that the content of its opinions, 
whatever their purport, on individual candidates constituted personal data, and that it 
could not be disclosed in any way in its report.”397 Indeed, one researcher has 
recently noted that understanding the function of the panel is “difficult to research” 
given its lack of transparency.398 This is demonstrated in recent Council Decisions on 
the appointments and re-appointments of Judges.399 In 2010, Greece nominated a 
candidate to fill its vacant slot at the General Court, yet his candidature inexplicably 
ceased thereafter, suggesting that he had been knocked back by the panel.400 More 
conspicuously, however, was the protracted reappointment of the Hungarian Judge at 
the General Court in the same year. In a series of draft Council Decisions during a 
period of appointment his name was eventually withdrawn from the list of nominees 
– the second recital of draft Council Decision stated that the panel “has given an 
opinion on the suitability of the aforementioned eleven judges”; yet the Hungarian 
Judge’s name was not included in the list of ten Judges approved in the third 
recital.401 It thus appeared that the panel had indeed knocked back another candidate, 
but his name re-appeared in the final Council Decision and he was subsequently re-
appointed.402 Ultimately, however, we do not know the full effect of the panel’s 
opinions, even if there is some evidence to suggest that they do knock back 
candidates.403  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
395 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents, [2001] OJ L-145/43.  
396 Case C-28/08 P Commission v The Bavarian Lager Co Ltd [2010] ECR I-06055. 
397 See Mance, 2011: para. 45. 
398 Bilyana Petkova, “Structural Changes and Decision-Making at the European Court of Justice after 
the Eastern Enlargement” (2010) Dublin, ECPR Conference on EU Politics (hereinafter Petkova, 
2010): 12-13. 
399  See the well-documented findings on the EU Law Blog: 
http://eulaw.typepad.com/eulawblog/2010/07/index.html.  
400 Ibid. 
401 Council of Ministers, “Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
of the European Union Appointing Judges to the General Court” (2010) 10952/2/10 REV 2. 
402 See Council of Ministers, “Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States of the European Union Appointing Judges to the General Court” (2010) 11912/10.!
403 See Petkova, 2010: 10-13; and Mance, 2011: paras. 23-45.  
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Notwithstanding its limitations and this uncertainty, the appointments panel still 
serves to reflect a more independent appointments process. The panel is composed of 
individuals most likely to be competent to make prudent assessments: 
 
The panel shall comprise seven persons chosen from among former members of the 
Court of Justice and the General Court, members of national supreme courts and 
lawyers of recognised competence, one of whom shall be proposed by the European 
Parliament.404 
 
The panel’s current members include the head of the French Council d’Etat, three 
national supreme court judges (from Denmark, Hungary, and the UK), a retired 
CJEU Judge, a retired GC Judge, and a European Parliamentarian.405  Indeed, this is 
where the objectivity of the panel may prove to be most effective. The result here is 
an objective process of expert scrutiny of candidates, which ultimately restricts, or 
negatively influences, the discretion of the Member States, as the (expert) members 
of the Panel will provide an important check against which the Member States’ 
nominees can be assessed.406 Even if the panel has no formal de jure veto powers, the 
effect of this procedural step is likely to influence how the governments of Member 
States choose their candidates, as their selection processes are subject to independent 
scrutiny. Its composition, moreover, does not reflect the same system of symmetrical 
Member State representation and influence as can be seen in the one-Judge-per-
Member-State appointments process. With only seven members, one of which is 
proposed by the EP, it is unlikely that strategic intergovernmental interests will be 
implicated in the evidence-led deliberations.  
 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, however, the involvement of the European Parliament 
– in proposing one of the members of the appointments panel – is delegitimising. As 
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404 Article 255 (2) TFEU. Emphasis added. For the CST, Article 3 (3) of Annex I SCJ provides that 
the Committee shall be composed of “former members of the Court of Justice and the General Court 
and lawyers of recognised competence”.  
405 Council Decision, appointing the members of the panel provided for in Article 255 [TFEU] (2010) 
OJ L-50/20. See also Mance, 2011: para. 24.!
406 The same can be said in relation to the CST’s Committee. See Article 3, Annex I, SCJ.   
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a central EU institution, the European Parliament’s involvement in the appointment 
process, through having a member on the panel, undermines the independence of the 
process, where the appointments process becomes tainted by the political concerns of 
EU governance structures (as opposed to the governments of the Member States). 
This is discussed further in Section 4 of Chapter Five.  
 
 
3.3.2. Judicial Competence 
 
One way to ensure that the Court’s law-applying and law-making objectives are 
satisfactorily independent is to ensure that the Judges are sufficiently qualified and 
experienced in the art of adjudication – particularly interpretation. Accordingly, in 
order for a judge to be appointed to the Court of Justice, Article 19 TEU provides 
that they have to be “persons whose independence is beyond doubt”; and they have 
to possess “the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices 
in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence”.407 
Candidates must thus be chosen on the basis of their professional experience and 
qualifications, including the capacity to sit at their Member State’s supreme court. 
On “jurisconsults of recognised competence”, Arnull explains: 
 
The term ‘jurisconsult’, at least in the English version of the Treaty, is wide enough 
to cover lawyers in private practice and academic lawyers, even where they are not 
eligible for appointment to the Bench at home. In practice, the members of the Court 
have come from a variety of backgrounds, including the national judiciary, the civil 
service, the Bar, and the academic world.408 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
407 Article 253 TFEU. Emphasis added. It is much the same for the Judges appointed to the General 
Court, except that, Article 254 TFEU states that they must “possess the ability required for 
appointment to high judicial office” – a less restrictive requirement. In the CST, the requirements are 
even less restrictive: “[t]he members of the specialised courts shall be chosen from persons ... who 
possess the ability required for appointment to judicial office.” Article 257 TFEU. Emphasis added.  
408 Arnull, 2006: 20. 
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In conjunction with the “common accord” requirement, and the opinion of the panel, 
these criteria prima facie further limit the discretion of Member States when 
choosing their Judge.  
 
Yet the professional experience and expertise of the Court of Justice’s 35 members at 
present  (the 27 Judges, and eight Advocates-General) indicate that legal experience 
is less decisive than political or academic experience. Looking at the Court’s 
website,409 only twelve have sat as a judge at a national supreme court, eleven at a 
lower-tier national court, two at the ECtHR, and three at other international courts or 
tribunals; with 22 having never sat at a national supreme court or international court, 
and 15 not appearing to have had prior involvement in legal practice at all (albeit all 
35 members hold Bachelor of Laws degrees). By contrast, 29 have held various 
governmental or quasi-governmental positions (primarily at the national level, but 
also at the international level), whereas only six of its members have never held such 
a post. These data suggest that Member States place greater weight on those with 
political, rather than legal, experience – giving rise to a concern as to the impartiality 
of the Court’s Judges.410  
 
However, this concern is somewhat balanced by the equally strong legal-academic 
credentials of the Court’s members: 25 hold a doctorate in law; 27 have held 
academic posts  (ranging from lecturer to professor) at many prestigious universities 
around the world (including the universities of Amsterdam, Cambridge, Harvard, 
Johns Hopkins, and Oxford); with only six having neither obtained a doctorate nor 
held an academic post. This academic experience is, moreover, invariably in legal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
409 The data presented herein is taken from the presentation of the professional experience of the Court 
of Justice’s 35 members at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/.  
410 Another possible concern is that, across all 27 Member States, the extent to which national 
supreme court judges are experienced and qualified judicial actors will vary, depending on national 
rules. This may mean that, at the Court of Justice, there will be varying levels and types of judicial 
expertise; and also that Judges from newly acceded Member States may be less familiar with EU law. 
Nevertheless, these concerns are theoretical at best, and are not demonstrated by the data. 
Furthermore, at least one former member of the Court of Justice regarded such scepticism to be 
“misplaced and ill-informed” (Mancini, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales: Point 2 
Para 3).  
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areas associated with European law and governance, and is complemented by an 
impressive record of publications (writing extra-judicially) of their research.411 
 
Professional experience notwithstanding, Judges are appointed on the basis that they 
are “persons whose independence is beyond doubt”. There is a series of formal 
obligations that serve to bolster this. First, according to Article 2 SCJ:  
 
Before taking up his duties each Judge shall, before the Court of Justice sitting in 
open court, take an oath to perform his duties impartially and conscientiously and to 
preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court.412 
 
Additionally, the Judges must sign a declaration of commitment to these obligations, 
which adds that these obligations run beyond their tenure as Judges.413  Second, the 
Judges (as for public servants of the Union’s other institutions) are immune from 
certain forms of legal provisions set out under Union law. Article 3 SCJ provides that 
the “Judges shall be immune from legal proceedings”. This Article goes on to refer 
to further immunities and privileges to which the Judges are entitled, including 
certain tax and other financial privileges.414 Finally, Article 4 SCJ provides that the 
Judges will not be involved in any other political or financial engagements, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
411 Indeed, in this thesis, there are references to the work of many members and former members of 
the Court. For example: Due, 1992; O’Keeffe, 1992; Gulmann, 1980; Jacobs, 1992; Koopmans, 1986; 
Kutscher, 1976; Lenaerts, 1992; Lenaerts and Corthaut, 2006; Maduro, 2000; Maduro, 2003; Mancini, 
1998; Mancini and Keeling, 1994; Pescatore, 1983; Timmermans, 2002; Van Gerven, 1996; and Van 
Gerven, 2005. 
412 Emphasis added. The oath, set out in Article 4 RPCJ and Article 4 of the Consolidated Version of 
the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (2010) C 177/02 (consolidating: the Rules of Procedure 
of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (1991) OJ L 136/1, and (1991) OJ L 
317/34 (corrigenda), as amended, hereinafter RPGC), reads as follows: “I swear that I will perform 
my duties impartially and conscientiously; I swear that I will preserve the secrecy of the deliberations 
of the Court”. For the CST, see Article 5, Annex I, SCJ. 
413 Article 5 RPCJ; Article 4 (2) RPGC. For the CST, see Article 5, Annex I, SCJ. 
414 These privileges and immunities are set out explicitly in Articles 11-14, and Article 17 of Protocol 
(No 7) On the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union (2010) OJ C 83/266. Article 11 
provides that the Judge shall “be immune from legal proceedings in respect of acts performed by them 
in their official capacity, including their words spoken or written. They shall continue to enjoy this 
immunity after they have ceased to hold office ...”. It further provides in sub-sections b. to d. certain 
other financial and movement freedoms. Articles 12 to 14 concern the Judges’ immunity in relation to 
tax and social security matters. And Article 17 provides that these immunities shall be accorded to the 
judges “solely in the interests on the Union.” For the CST, see Article 5, Annex I, SCJ. 
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Article 18 SCJ provides that a Judge is not allowed to be involved in cases in which 
the Judge has had prior involvement: 
 
[a]s agent or adviser or has acted for one of the parties, or in which he has been 
called upon to pronounce as a member of a court or tribunal, of a commission of 
inquiry or in any other capacity. 
 
These provisions are designed to ensure that the Judges do not become predisposed 
to political, financial or personal biases that may undermine their dispassionate 
treatment of cases – specifically, their adjudication. It is easy to imagine how the 
judicial office could be exploited and subverted by judges with vested interests – 
ideological, financial, personal – in the immediate and juridical outcomes of cases. 
Doing so would not only be a severe constitutional impropriety, but also undermine 
the Court’s independence and, hence, its instrumental democratic legitimacy. Article 
6 SCJ provides an enforcement mechanism against Judges who default on these 
obligations: “[a] Judge may be deprived of his office … [if] he no longer fulfills the 
requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from his office.”415 
 
 
3.3.3. The Secrecy of Judicial Deliberations 
 
One very important legal mechanism that mitigates Member State control (and, 
indeed, the control of the Union’s institutions) is the requirement of secret judicial 
deliberations. 416  This requirement prohibits the Judges from discussing their 
deliberations on cases in public, and results in the Court producing a single collegiate 
judgment in all cases, where the Court’s reasoning appears unanimous and 
anonymous. The Judges are thus shielded from their governments’ dissatisfaction 
and reprisal (or, arguably, the Judges are prevented from improper governmental 
reward) on the basis of the individual Judge’s contribution to the case. Indeed, one 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
415 The procedures of these deliberations are outlined in Article 6 RPCJ; and Article 5 RPGC. For the 
CST, see Article 5, Annex I, SCJ. It is worth noting that, to date, the extra-judicial dissemination of 
the Judges (in publications and colloquia) has not given rise to any disciplinary action.  
416 Article 2 SCJ; Article 4 RPCJ; and Article 4 RPGC. For the CST, see Article 5, Annex I, SCJ. 
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former Court of Justice Judge supports this system, noting that “[g]iven the recent 
attitude of certain Member States, this danger may be greater than it used to be.”417 
Additionally, the Judges must sign a declaration of commitment to these obligations, 
which adds that these obligations run beyond their tenure.418 The discussions on 
reform reveal that the Judges have been in favour of this mechanism, precisely 
because their tenure is short and renewable. They have also been in favour of single 
collegiate judgments (as opposed to the introduction of individual dissenting 
opinions) on the same basis.419  
 
We have to understand the single collegiate judgment as a necessary sacrifice. If the 
Judges were not subject to frequent appointments processes, and that their parent 
Member States did not have such a strong role therein, then I would argue that 
individual opinions and dissenting judgments would be desirable from a democratic 
point of view. It is commonplace to argue that the accountability and transparency of 
courts is exemplified by this. Indeed, in Chapter Five, we look at the representation 
of national legal traditions; and since many of the Union’s Member States’ legal 
systems provide individual judgments and dissenting opinions, the collegiate 
judgment of the Court of Justice also offends the intrinsic virtue of representation. 
Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter Three, there is a strong trend in constitutional 
theory that argues that the democratic virtue of political deliberation is achieved in 
the judicial setting by such a system. Yet, as will be discussed in Section 4, the EU’s 
distinctively contested nature, and the competing political forces which converge on 
the appointments process from the Member States and the Union’s institutions, have 
generated an appointments process that is particularly vulnerable to ex ante control. 
With these factors at play, the secrecy of the Judges’ deliberations insulate the Court 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
417 David Edward, “How the Court of Justice Works” (1995) European Law Review 539 (hereinafter 
Edward, 1995): 557.  
418 Article 4 (3) SCJ; Article 3 RPCJ; and Paragraph 2 of Article 4 RPGC. For the CST, see Article 5 
Annex I SCJ.  
419 See Francis Jacobs’ submissions in IEE, 1980: 16-17; Edward, 1995: 557-558; the Due Report; the 
Court’s Paper, 1999; Petkova, 2010; and Mance, 2011.  
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3.3.4. Judicial Chambers 
 
One of the most notable features of the court system is the limited number of the 
adjudicators who sit on each case. It is rare to find a court with more than a dozen 
judges, and generally it seems that there are between one and three judges in the court. 
It follows from this that it is virtually impossible for a single judge to hear all the cases 
arising within a system. There will, almost unavoidably, be a multiplicity of judges. 
This creates a dilemma for those appearing before the courts; how can they be certain 
that the outcome of their case will not depend on the selection of the judge?421 
 
 
Another way that the Court is insulated is through limiting the number of Judges that 
hear each case by organising them into judicial chambers. This way, the extent to 
which a Member State, or another party that may have strategic intentions, can 
“select” a Judge is either impossible or improbable – thus limiting the scope 
(potential or actual) or perception of judicial bias.422 
 
There are ten chambers comprising three or five Judges in the Court of Justice.423 
The Court can also sit as a full Court (all 27 Judges), or in the Grand Chamber (15 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
420 For further reflection on this issue,  as it pertains to the intrinsic virtue of representativeness, see 
Section 3.1.1 of Chapter Five. 
421 Barber, 2001: 74-75. 
422 This issue has indeed been the subject of controversy in the media recently, where: “[a] 
controversial ruling by a Spanish judge [sic] at the European Court of Justice has triggered anger in 
Gibraltar and raised questions of impartiality. PublicServiceEurope.com questions whether the 
Luxembourg court can ever be truly independent of the interests of EU member states.” See  
http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/2371/the-case-of-gibraltar-at-the-european-court-of-
justice? utm_source=MailingList&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PSEurope290812. The 
“ruling” in question was the Opinion of the Advocate-General.  
423 See http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7029/; Article 251 TFEU; Article 16 SCJ; and Article 11 
RPCJ. The General Court has eight chambers. It can likewise use a Grand Chamber and a full Court. 
Unlike the Court of Justice, the General Court can use a chamber of one Judge. See Article 254 TFEU 
and Article 50 (2) SCJ. The CST is organised into three chambers: two chambers of three judges and 
one chamber of five judges. “The Civil Service Tribunal shall sit in chambers of three judges. It may 
... sit in full court or in a chamber of five judges or of a single judge.” Article 5 Annex I SCJ.  
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Judges).424 For any given case, a Judge-Rapporteur (chosen by the President of the 
Court, 425  or the recently established office of Vice President 426 ) makes a 
recommendation as to the formation of the chambers in the preliminary report.427 
Notwithstanding this discretion, there are rules which govern how cases are to be 
allocated to certain forms of chambers. Cases that are of “legal difficulty” or of “high 
importance” will be referred to the Grand Chamber or the full Court,428 where Article 
16 SCJ provides that cases of “exceptional importance” shall be heard by the full 
Court.429 Given the size of the full Court (now 27 Judges), the full Court very rarely 
sits. Indeed, in 2011, the full Court only sat on one case out of 668 in Opinion 
1/09;430 and the last time it heard a case before that was in 2006. That year, only two 
cases were heard by the full Court out of the 444 cases; in contrast to, for example, in 
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424 In this respect, Article 16 SCJ is incongruous with the newly adopted RPCJ, where, in Article 27 
RPCJ, it provides that the Grand Chamber for the Court of Justice will consist of 15 Judges; whereas 
Article 16 SCJ states 13, which is still applicable to the General Court (see Article 10 RPGC).  
425 According to Article 253 TFEU the Judges are to elect one of their 27 to be the official President 
of the Court, who occupies that office for three years and who may be re-elected. Indeed, the current 
President, Mr. Vassilios Skouris has recently been re-elected as the Court’s President (see CJEU, “Mr 
Vassilios Skouris is re-elected President of the Court of Justice of the European Union” (9/10/2012) 
127/12). For the General Court, see Article 254 (3) TFEU. For the CST, see Article 4 (1) Annex I SCJ 
and Article 6 Consolidated Edition of the Rules of Procedure of the European Union Civil Service 
Tribunal (2007) OJ L 225/1, with corrigendum (2008) OJ L 69/37, with amendments dated (2009) OJ 
L 24/10; (2010) OJ L 92/17; and (2011) OJ L 162/19 (hereinafter RPCST). The election takes place 
immediately after the partial replacement of the Judges. The President of the Court, under Article 9 
(2) RPCJ, “shall direct the judicial business and the administration of the Court; he shall preside at 
hearings and deliberations” and is thus endowed with significant administrative authority. Two 
examples of this role include: coordinating and presiding over the disciplinary proceedings of other 
Judges and Advocates-General (Article 6 RPCJ); and designating the Judge-Rapporteurs for each case 
(Article 15 RPCJ). For the General Court, see Article 7 RPGC. For the CST, see Article 6 RPCST and 
Article 7 RPCST.  
426 See Article 8 and Article 10 RPCJ. “The post of Vice-President was created by recent amendments 
to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The duty of the Vice-President is to assist 
the President in the performance of his duties and to take the President’s place when the latter is 
prevented from attending or when the office of President is vacant. Mr Lenaerts will be the first judge 
to carry out the duties of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice. Under Article 9a of the Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union: ‘The Judges shall elect the President and the Vice-
President of the Court of Justice from among their number for a term of three years’.” See CJEU, “Mr 
Koen Lenaerts is elected as Vice-President of the Court of Justice” (9/10/2012) Press Release 128/12. 
427 Articles 59 and 60 RPCJ. For the General Court, see Article 14 (2) RPGC and Article 52 (2) 
RPGC; and for the CST, see Article 14 (1) RPCST, and Article 45 RPCST.  
428 Article 60 RPCJ. For the General Court, see Article 14 RPGC. For the CST, see Article 13 RPCST.  
429 Additionally, the full Court shall always hear matters in relation to Article 228(2) TFEU, Article 
245(2) TFEU, Article 247 TFEU and Article 286(6) TFEU. 
430  See Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice, 2011, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-06/ra2011_statistiques_cour_en.pdf. 
      Chapter Four 






2002, when the full Court heard 31 cases out of the 361 cases heard that year.431  The 
Grand Chamber must be assigned to cases in which one of the parties or interveners 
is a Member State requesting it.432 Absent these conditions, cases will be designated 
to three or five Judge chambers.433 This depends on, again, the relative legal 
complexity or importance of the case.   
 
Each of the chambers follows a specified compositional pattern. The Grand 
Chamber:  
 
... shall be composed of the President of the Court, the Presidents of the Chambers of 
five Judges, the Judge-Rapporteur and the number of Judges necessary to reach 15. 
The last-mentioned Judges shall be designated from the lists referred to in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, following the order laid down therein.434 
 
The smaller chambers follow a similar pattern. They are each composed of their 
elected President435 and the number of Judges required to reach the required five or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
431 Compare Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice, 2009, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7032/: 88, with Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the 
Court of Justice, 2002, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_11035/rapports-annuels: 160. 
Indeed, this is symptomatic of the process of enlargement, and presents new dynamics on the debates 
on reform of the Court of Justice. It also runs in parallel to other problems on the effective functioning 
of the Court, leading to sub-optimal and, in some cases, negative sum consequences. These issues are 
addressed further in Section 4 of Chapter Five. 
432 Article 16 (3) SCJ; Article 60 (1) RPCJ. For the General Court, see Article 51 RPGC. This is not 
available in the CST.  
433 Preliminary rulings that are in relation to the substance of Title V, Part Three of the TFEU are 
assigned to a pre-specified chamber of five Judges. Additionally, cases can be re-assigned to the 
Grand Chamber or the full Court at any stage of proceedings. If a case is allocated a larger number of 
Judges, the new formation shall include the Judges that had been hearing the case in the prior 
formation. See Article 113 RPCJ. For the General Court, see Article 51 RPGC; and for the CST, see 
Article 13 (2) RPCST.  
434 Article 27 RPCJ. According Articles 27 (3) and (4) RPCJ, the Judges that are used to make up the 
15 are designated according to a pattern established by the Court for the purposes of filling up the 
other chambers, as well as for unforeseen absences. This pattern “shall follow the order laid down in 
Article 7 of these Rules, alternating with the reverse order: the first Judge on that list shall be the first 
according to the order laid down in that Article, the second Judge shall be the last according to that 
order, the third Judge shall be the second according to that order, the fourth Judge the penultimate 
according to that order, and so on.” Article 7 RPCJ determines an order of precedence of the judges, 
according to their level of seniority in office i.e. their duration in office. The judges thus rank 
according to that list. For the General Court, see (2010) OJ C 288/06; and for the CST, see (2009) OJ 
C 270/06.!!
435 There are also Presidents elected to preside over each three or five Judge chamber. Article 16 SCJ 
provides that “[t]he Judges shall elect the Presidents of the chambers from among their number. The 
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three. It is worth noting here that all of the Court’s compositions are published in the 
Official Journal and can be found on the Court’s website.436  
 
Most cases are assigned to a three or five Judge chamber, in which case, the chances 
of a particular (desired Member State) Judge sitting on the case will be very limited. 
Furthermore, Article 18 SCJ states: 
 
A party may not apply for a change in the composition of the Court or of one of its 
chambers on the grounds of either the nationality of a Judge or the absence from the 
Court or from the chamber of a Judge of the nationality of that party. 
 
The only exception to these rules is that if one of the parties or interveners is either a 
Member State or a Union institution, then they may request that the Grand Chamber 
of 15 Judges be assigned to the case, thus increasing the chances that they may “get 
their Judge”. 437 However, one former Court of Justice Judge noted that “this happens 
very rarely”.438 And even if this request is made, it does not guarantee the politically 
motivated Member State their Judge. This means that Member States’ appointees 
will not be involved in the majority of cases being heard by the Court; and, even 
more significantly, Member States cannot rely on having their appointees deciding 
cases that they might wish to exert an influence – especially cases in which the 
Member State is a party-litigant. In most cases, then, this prevents Member States 
from exerting pressure on their Judge for a favourable result (indeed, it prevents the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Presidents of the chambers of five [and three] Judges shall be elected for three years. They may be re-
elected once”, which happens immediately after the election of the President of the Court (Article 12 
RPCJ). For the recent elections, see CJEU, “Election of the Presidents of the Chambers of five Judges 
of the Court of Justice” (9/10/2012) Press Release 129/12. The Presidents of chambers fulfill the same 
administrative functions for their chambers as the President of the Court does generally (Article 11 (4) 
RPCJ). Additionally, in the event that the President of the Court is absent, the highest ranking of the 
Presidents of chambers shall perform that role (Article 13 RPCJ). For the General Court, see Article 
15 RPGC. For the CST, see Article 4 (3) Annex I SCJ and Article 11 RPCST. 
436  The specific composition of each chamber for the Court of Justice, see 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7029/; for the General Court, see 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7038/; and for the CST, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/T5_5232/. 
437 Article 16 (3) SCJ; Article 60 (1) RPCJ. For the General Court, see Article 51 RPGC. This is not 
available in the CST. 
438 Edward, 1995: 552. 
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Judges from being in the position to give a biased result); and it also thus provides a 
disincentive for Member States to nominate candidates open to their persuasion. 
 
 
3.3.5. Specialised Courts 
 
The final aspect to consider here is the use – and potential/prospective use – of 
specialised courts. The functionally divided structure exemplified by the use of 
specialised courts further insulates the Court’s judiciary from potentially politically 
powerful strategic influences. Like the use of chambers, this is partly (empirically) a 
matter of composition – limiting the extent to which a party may “get their preferred 
Judge”. As we have seen in the CST (the only example, at present, of such a 
specialised court), Member States have less control over the composition of the 
judiciary. Unlike the Court of Justice and the General Court, the CST does not have 
one Judge from each Member State: there are only seven Judges.439 In fact, there is 
no requirement for there to be any particular form of Member State representation. 
Instead, the Judges are appointed on as “broad a geographical basis as possible from 
among nationals of the Member States and with respect to the national legal systems 
represented” and they are appointed by the Council.440 In addition to this, the very 
existence of a specialised court comes about by virtue of Article 257 (1) TFEU: 
 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, may establish specialised courts attached to the General Court 
to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought 
in specific areas. The European Parliament and the Council shall act by means of 
regulations either on a proposal from the Commission after consultation of the Court 




439 Article 2 of Annex 1 SCJ.  
440 Article 257 TFEU; and Article 3 (1) Annex 1 SCJ.  
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The Member States thus have much less power to influence the internal workings 
and the establishment of specialised courts.  
 
But there is an added value with respect to specialised courts, which is that, by their 
nature, their specialist mandate is all the more so consistent with the independence-
enhancing virtues of judicial competence i.e. professional experience and 
expertise.441 Indeed, of the present seven Judges of the CST, five have significant 
legal, academic, and/or political experience in the Civil Service, labour law, industry 
and social law.442 It remains to be seen whether or not, or to what extent these 
observations will be reflected in future specialised courts should the Union 
legislature see fit to create an IP Court, or, indeed, courts within other areas of 
specialisation.  Nevertheless, in principle, by dividing judicial labour into institutions 
composed of expert and experienced legal actors, under the remit of EU law 
administration, these fields of legal and professional practice become more insulated 
from national legal and political processes. 
 
 
4. Questions of Balance: Understanding Institutional Independence in the EU 
 
[T]he Treaty of Rome effectively insulates the ECJ from Member State controls: 




441 For a commentary on the value of the CST and future specialised courts, see Nikolaos Lavranos, 
“The New Specialised Courts within the European Judicial System” (2005) European Law Review 
Vol. 30 No. 2 261 (hereinafter Lavranos, 2005).  
442 See http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/T5_5240/. 
443 Stone Sweet, 2004: 17. Indeed, this was a claim made by Hamson at a much earlier time in the 
EU’s development: “[t]he European Court, I think, regards itself as the trustee of the hopes and 
aspirations, the purposes and the objectives of the founders of the Community and is anxious not to 
fail in the performance of the trust” (Hamson, 1976: II-25). Rasmussen, however, rejected the idea 
that the Court acts as “trustee” on the basis that the Court had hitherto favoured “interpretation to 
further social, economic and political integration” despite a “declining taste for a precipitated process 
of integration” (Rasmussen, 1986: 12 and 14). Yet he does not offer much in the way of support for 
this claim. See Akos Toth, “Review of On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice by H. 
Rasmussen. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1986” (1987) Yearbook of European Law Vol. 7 
No. 1 411. 
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This is a bold claim, especially in light of some of the observations made in Section 
3. The Member States have a powerful position in the appointment (and re-
appointment) of the Court’s institutional decision-makers: the Judges. Do the 
mechanisms of insulation discussed above sufficiently insulate the Court from the 
Member States, such that we might credibly claim the Court to be an independent 
“powerful trustee court”? This is a question of balance: how independent should the 
Court of Justice be? Answering this involves both empirical and normative issues to 
be addressed. Empirically, how independent is the Court in comparison to other apex 
courts, at both the transnational and national levels? In Section 4.1, we look at the 
independence of the ECtHR, the UK Supreme Court, and the US Supreme Court, and 
confirm the hypothesis that the Court of Justice of the European Union is, as Stone 
Sweet postulates, an atypically independent court. In Section 4.2, we then go on to 
consider the normative aspect of the boundary question by considering why this 
degree of independence is justified. There, it is argued that, given the EU’s polity-
conditions (see Section 4 of Chapter Two), in order for the Court to act sufficiently 
as a trustee-institution, it carefully treads the tightrope between being insulated from 
a hostile political environment (emanating from the tide of deep polity-contestation 
in the EU), and being responsive to that environment. 
 
 
4.1. The Independence of the Court of Justice in a Comparative Context 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct comprehensive comparative analyses 
of the three apex courts (the ECtHR, the UK Supreme Court, and the US Supreme 
Court). The data presented here are limited to the salient characteristics of those 
courts and the constitutional frameworks within which they adjudicate, in order to 
demonstrate the (different) ways in which they are less independent – have smaller 
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4.1.1. The European Court of Human Rights 
 
In jurisdictional terms, the ECtHR has been delegated comparatively few and weak 
powers of constitutional review. In terms of direct actions before the ECtHR, there 
are only two types: actions alleging a breach of any of the substantive provisions of 
the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights444 by a High 
Contracting Party445, raised by a High Contracting Party (“Inter-State cases”);446 and 
“individual actions”, whereby “any person, non-governmental organisation or group 
of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto” can apply to 
the ECtHR.447 Whilst the judgments of the ECtHR are final and binding,448 they are 
merely compensatory in nature – aggrieved applicants receiving “just satisfaction”449  
– and do not ipso facto result in legal or administrative change with respect to the 
recalcitrant High Contracting Party.450 Likewise, whilst the ECtHR is regarded to be 
the decisive arbiter on the interpretation of Convention rights, its jurisprudence does 
not necessarily 451  penetrate the national (nor, indeed, the EU’s) constitutional 
framework, such that the latter’s courts can dis-apply rules of national law.452 In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
444 European Convention on Human Rights, (as amended, 2010) Council of Europe Treaty Series, No. 
194 (hereinafter ECHR). 
445 The term used to denote one of the signatory states to the ECHR – the equivalent to the EU’s 
“Member State”.  
446 Article 33 ECHR. 
447 Article 34 ECHR. 
448 The decision will be “final” under the procedural conditions set out in Article 44 ECHR; and it is 
binding on the High Contracting Party against which the action has been raised according to Article 
46 ECHR. 
449 Article 41 ECHR. 
450 Consider the (non-legal) effects of the recent judgment of the ECtHR in Hirst v the United 
Kingdom (No 2) (2006) 42 EHHR 41, whereby the ECtHR ruled that the UK’s legislation, which 
banned certain classes of prisoners from voting, was in contravention of Article 3, Protocol No 1 
ECHR. The UK was ordered to reform its law in compliance with the ECHR and the judgment, yet, 
instead, it led to protracted and fruitless deliberations which ultimately emphasised Westminster’s 
legislative supremacy. See Isobel White, “Prisoners’ voting rights” (26 September 2012) Library of 
the House of Commons SN/PC/01764. 
451 This will be dependent on the type of constitutional framework within which the national legal 
system operates. In dualist systems, such as the UK, it will not. Whereas monist systems, such as 
France, it may do so depending on how their constitutional framework has been adjusted with respect 
to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this does not preclude legislatures in monist systems 
from enacting corrective legislation. 
452 In the UK, see Section 3 and Section 4 of the HRA. See also Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 
UKHL 30 on the qualifications on how the UK’s judiciaries can legitimately apply ECtHR 
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other words, the ECtHR’s powers of constitutional review are weak; partly down to 
having limited competence, but also because it is subject to strong mechanisms of ex 
post control. This stands in stark contrast to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, 
which, as we saw in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, enjoys a variety of jurisdictional 
powers, and has the advantage of compliance of the national courts by virtue of the 
principles of direct effect and supremacy. 
 
In terms of ex ante mechanisms of control, the situation is hardly comparable. The 
ECtHR has been recognised as having a “politicised” appointments process that has 
more to do with “safeguarding state sovereignty” than it does for creating an 
effective and independent judiciary.453 Here, like with the Court of Justice, the High 
Contracting Parties (or State) are the de facto appointers of their judge in the ECtHR. 
Judges are appointed to the ECtHR on a one judge per State basis.454 When there is a 
vacancy, the State nominates three candidates 455  and submits its list to the 
Directorate General of Human Rights of the Council of Europe (hereinafter the DG), 
who reviews the list then passes it on to the Committee of Ministers, which also 
reviews the list and can reject the list if the candidates are not sufficiently qualified, 
or if the State did not follow suitable procedures to select the candidates.456 The 
Committee of Ministers then passes the list on to the Parliamentary Assembly, which 
votes on which of the three nominees should fill the vacancy.457 Furthermore, the 
requirements of office are largely the same as they are for the Court of Justice: 
judges are to be appointed if they are of “high moral character and must either 
possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be 
jurisconsults of recognised competence”;458 they are to take an oath, which holds 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
jurisprudence; and, generally, Kavanagh, 2009. In the EU, on the autonomy of the EU’s fundamental 
rights jurisprudence, see Internationale Handelsgesellschaft; Schmidberger; and Kadi.  
453 For a detailed empirical analysis of the appointments process in the ECtHR, see INTERIGHTS, 
Report on “Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights”, May 2003, 
available at http://www.interights.org/jud-ind-en/index.html (hereinafter INTERIGHTS, 2003). See 
also IEE, 1980: 15, 17.  
454 Article 20 ECHR. 
455 Article 22 ECHR. 
456 This aspect of the appointments process is not detailed in the ECHR. See INTERIGHTS, 2003: 20-
23. 
457 Article 22 ECHR.  
458 Article 21 (1) ECHR. 
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them to impartiality, independence and preserving the secrecy of the ECtHR’s 
deliberations;459 they are prevented from engaging in activities that would undermine 
their impartiality, such as participation in political or financial offices;460 and they 
are subject to the internal supervision by the ECtHR should they fail to satisfy these 
requirements, such that they may be dismissed from office.461 
 
In spite of these formalities, there are a few weaknesses that favour the discretion of 
the appointing States, such that they may not only “get their judge”, but also exert 
strategic political influence on them, and, thus, the ECtHR’s adjudication. First, in 
practice, the roles of the DG, the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly are somewhat superficial, and tend simply to accede to the wishes of the 
appointing State.462 There is no comparable “common accord” requirement, or 
independent appointments panel as observed for the Court of Justice. The States can 
effectively choose who they want to be their judge at the ECtHR, regardless of any 
formalities in place. Judges may also write their own separate judgments in cases on 
which they sit.463 This has added significance because, unlike the Court of Justice, 
judges appointed by a State are required to sit on any case to which that State is a 
party.464 This strength of this requirement is such that, if, for whatever reason, that 
judge is unable to sit on such a case, the State is empowered to appoint an “ad hoc” 
judge of their choosing for that case; or to choose another elected judge of the 
ECtHR.465 The implications of this system significantly undermine the capacity for 
elected or ad hoc judges to adjudicate without the potential or actual strategic 




459 Rule 3 of Rules of Court, Registry of the Court, Strasbourg, 1 September 2012 (hereinafter 
RPECtHR). 
460 Rule 4 RPECtHR. See also Article 21 (3) ECHR.  
461 Rule 7 RPECtHR. See also Article 21 (3) ECHR.  
462 INTERIGHTS, 2003: 17-24.  This report notes that “[i]n practice [the Committee of Ministers] are 
reluctant to look behind the ‘sovereign veil’ and the Committee of Ministers as a whole sends the lists 
unchanged to the Parliamentary Assembly” (INTERIGHTS, 2003: 8).  
463 Rule 74 (2) RPECtHR. Though, since their tenure is non-renewable, the effects of this may be 
limited (see Article 23 (1) ECHR).  
464 Article 26 (4) ECHR; Rule 24 (2) (b) RPECtHR.  
465 Rule 29 RPECtHR. 
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4.1.2. The UK Supreme Court 
 
As we have already seen, the UK’s constitutional framework gives pride of place to 
the legislative supremacy of its Parliament. As such, the UK Supreme Court – like 
the lower-tier courts – can have its law-making, including its constitutional law-
making, decisions overturned by the ordinary legislative process i.e. an Act of 
Parliament. The judiciaries of the UK have consistently affirmed that the courts 
cannot look beyond the statute book in determining the validity of rules of law.466 
This position is, of course, subject to the requirements of EU law, and, to an extent, 
the ECHR. 467  Nevertheless, the UK Supreme Court is subject to very strong 
mechanisms of ex post control. 
 
In terms of ex ante control, the UK Supreme Court is relatively independent. For 
example, neither the Head of State, nor government ministers, have a strong role in 
the appointment process. Under Section 26 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, 
the Lord Chancellor (a Government Minister) sets up a “selection commission” – 
composed of the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court and the senior 
members of the regional judicial appointments boards across the UK468 – for the 
purposes of filling any vacancies in the Supreme Court. In reaching its choice, the 
selection commission must carry out consultations with senior judicial and political 
actors and their selection must be made “on merit”.469 The Lord Chancellor is the 
only member of the British Government who has a say in the selection, and may only 
veto the selection in the event that there is not enough evidence to suggest that the 
proposed candidate meets the official statutory criteria. After the Lord Chancellor 
has ratified the choice made by the selection commission, the Prime Minister is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
466 See Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 591; Pickin v British Railways Board 
[1974] A.C. 745; and Jackson v HM Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56. This position has even been 
regarded by the UK Supreme Court to be applicable in the context of Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
(conventionally regarded to be constitutionally inferior secondary legislative acts that are reviewable 
by the courts, and may prima facie be annulled), see AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate [2011] 
UKSC 46, per Lord Hope at paras 42-52. 
467 On the implications of EU law on the doctrine of legislative supremacy, see The European 
Communities Act 1972; R v Secretary of State for Transport ex. p. Factortame [1990] 2 A.C. 85 
(hereinafter Factortame I); and Factortame II.  
468 Schedule 8, Section 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (hereinafter CRA 2005).  
469 Section 27 CRA 2005.  
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bound to accept the candidate.470 The Government thus has very little room to make 
any arbitrary or politically motivated interventions in the selection and appointment 
of the Supreme Court Justices. Yet there are two weaknesses to be considered here. 
First, according to Section 33 of the CRA 2005, a Justice of the UK Supreme Court 
“may be removed from it on the address of both Houses of Parliament.” 471 
Furthermore, it is common practice for the judges in British courts individually to 
publish their judgments, which may subject them to public and political scrutiny – 
the latter being especially problematic in light of Section 33.472  
 
 
4.1.3 The US Supreme Court 
 
By contrast with the ECtHR and the UK Supreme Court, the US Supreme Court, like 
the Court of Justice, is not subject to strong ex post mechanisms of control. This is 
for three reasons. First, US law is structured according to the legal supremacy of the 
US Constitution. Legislation, common law, and other sources of law are always 
hierarchically inferior to the various Articles and Amendments of the formally 
recognised written Constitution – something that is famously absent in the UK 
context. Second, in order to alter the Constitution – by way of legislative amendment 
– there are notably difficult and practically cumbersome legislative processes to be 
overcome e.g. a national referendum on the proposed change, which requires a 
super-majority to have the change ratified. Finally, the US Supreme Court, as 
Richard Posner argues, is thus in the position of being able to make new 
constitutional law by way of interpreting legally indeterminate provisions of the 
Constitution.473 Given these three factors, the Supreme Court potentially wields a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
470 Section 26 (3) CRA 2005.  
471 For further discussion, see Anthony Bradley and Keith Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (15th Ed) Pearson, 2010 (hereinafter Bradley and Ewing, 2010): 371. 
472 It is worth noting that a Justice has never been removed under this procedure; and that, according 
to the sub judice constitutional norm, parliament is prohibited from discussing impending or occurring 
cases, in spite of parliamentary privilege. See http://www.parliament.uk/site-
information/glossary/sub-judice/. 
473 Richard Posner, “The Supreme Court 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political Court” (2005) Harvard 
Law Review Vol. 119 31 (hereinafter Posner, 2005): 39-54.  
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significant law-making power, to the extent that such a constitutional interpretation 
would be very difficult to “overturn” legislatively. 
 
Yet the composition and appointments process tells a different story, and one that 
reveals weaknesses with respect to ex ante mechanisms of control. Principally, 
Justices are seemingly appointed on an ideological basis. Formally, Supreme Court 
Justices are appointed by the US President, with congressional oversight and 
ratification i.e. the “advice and consent” of the House of Senate.474 Yet, since the 
highly publicised controversy surrounding the (failed) appointment of Robert Bork to 
the Supreme Court by the Reagan administration in 1987, the US appointments 
process has become yet another “hot potato” in American politics, leading the 
Supreme Court’s academic interlocutors and the media towards greater attention to 
the ideological nature of the process. The legacy of the “Borking debacle” is now the 
common understanding that, as Barry Friedman notes, “judges appointed by 
Republican Presidents will be more conservative than judges appointed by 
Democrats” and vice versa. 475  If this is correct, then it may undermine the 
impartiality of the Supreme Court’s adjudication. This situation is compounded by 
the practice of publishing individual opinions, and dissenting opinions, by the 
Justices; and the heightened awareness of the decisions (and constitutional power) of 







474 See Article 2 of the United States Constitution, Section 2.2.2.  
475 Barry Friedman, “The Politics of Judicial Review” (2005) Texas Law Review Vol. 84 No. 2 257 
(hereinafter Friedman, 2005): 277-278. See also, Tom Lininger, “On Dworkin and Borkin’” (2007) 
Michigan Law Review Vol. 105 1315 (hereinafter Lininger, 2007). 
476 The national and, indeed, international attention of (in)famous cases such as Roe v Wade (1973) 
410 US 113 (hereinafter Roe v Wade), and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) 347 U.S. 
483 (hereinafter Brown v Board of Education) exemplify this. Indeed, Dworkin argues that the public 
scrutiny of these cases enhance the democratic legitimacy of the US Supreme Court because it fosters 
the virtues of public debate and deliberation of political issues within the general public (Dworkin, 
1996: 345).  
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4.2. Understanding Judicial Independence in the EU 
 
The foregoing shows that the Court of Justice of the European Union is, as Stone 
Sweet observed, a powerfully insulated court. It has a large “zone of discretion” 
because of its jurisdiction, and its insulation from ex post and ex ante mechanisms of 
control, to a comparatively high degree. But this is only part of the story here. 
Democratic legitimacy and trusteeship demand more than this.  
 
To be sure, independence is key to instrumental democratic legitimacy; and all the 
more so in the Court of Justice. Unlike its national and transnational counterparts, the 
Court of Justice functions in an atypical socio-political environment. As we saw in 
Chapter Two, the EU is a polity distinctive in its complexity; its divisive existential 
contestation; and its susceptibility to (potentially radical) change – the three C’s of 
EU constitutionalism. Particularly relevant to the discussion of independence is the 
contestation over finalité, which gives rise to a hostile political environment of 
competing political interests – especially (though not exclusively) from the Member 
States – that inevitably exert strategic pressure on the Union’s central institutions, 
including the Court of Justice. Nation-states suffer much less from this sort of 
existential tension. The political legitimacy of the nation-state – and the legitimacy 
of its central political organs – is relatively stable. Furthermore, nation-states have 
the benefit of a collective national identity that underpins the centrality and strength 
of the overarching political system and its political organs i.e. a demos.477 In a 
similar vein, the Council of Europe quite neatly, and relatively uncontroversially, fits 
into the intergovernmental model. There are no questions or debates on deeper 
political, economic and fiscal union (i.e. supranationalist or statist visions of finalité) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
477 Though this is not to suggest that there are not constitutionally significant powerful political 
tensions that emerge in the UK’s or the US’s courts. In the UK, the great constitutional debate of the 
present day, over the devolution settlement and Scottish independence, has pervaded the judicial 
sphere, including especially questions on the UK Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal 
System. See Neil Walker, “Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System”, 2010, available 
at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/01/19154813/0 (hereinafter Walker, 2010a; this 
issue is addressed in greater depth in Chapter Five, on the issue of the representativeness of courts). In 
the US, the aforementioned (oxymoronic) ideological cleavage between free-market, social 
conservatives (Republicans); and (relatively) market-interventionist, social liberals (Democrats) 
pervades the appointments process and general public-political evaluation of the US Supreme Court 
(see Posner, 2005; Friedman, 2005; and Lininger, 2007). This issue is also addressed in Chapter Five.  
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that pervade the ECtHR’s structures and processes. By contrast, the EU and its 
institutions have to contend with competing claims, rife in their complexity, over the 
constitutional nature of the Union – intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, 
infranationalism, experimentalism, statism – which ultimately exert pressure on the 
Court of Justice. And given the demonstrable strength of Member States’ interests 
qua intergovernmentalism within the ordering of the Union generally, it is all the 
more justified that the Court – as a type of institution that requires independence qua 
trusteeship – be powerfully insulated from their strategic influence. In this regard, we 
can say that, on the agency-trustee spectrum, courts like the ECtHR, the UK 
Supreme Court, and the US Supreme Court, are justifiably understood to tend 
towards the agency end of the spectrum, whereas the Court of Justice must be 
understood conversely. 
 
But what of institutional responsiveness and the intrinsic virtues of democratic 
legitimacy i.e. representativeness and participation? We saw in Chapter Three that 
these requirements are important parts of what makes a good trustee-institution. How 
do we reconcile these requirements with independence? This is, again, all the more 
relevant in the Court of Justice because, paradoxically, its democratic legitimacy 
depends on responsiveness to inter alia the interests of Member States. As Barber 
notes: 
 
The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights are 
conspicuously large … Part of the rationale for large courts is undoubtedly political; 
it makes the decision of the court more palatable to those before it. Transnational 
courts are especially sensitive to the need to secure acceptance; their authority 
depends on the voluntary obedience of member states. The same explanation does 
not seem to hold for large national courts.478 
 
Yet the difference between the Court of Justice and the ECtHR is that the former’s 
“authority depends on the voluntary obedience” of more than simply the Member 
States, as noted above. The Court of Justice must also be responsive to the Union’s 
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supranational and civil society organisations, and individuals. This is why the Court 
– in order for it to be a good trustee-institution – must be carefully balanced between 
being responsive to those interests (through representativeness and participation), 
and independence. But does responsiveness to the interests of the public not 
undermine judicial impartiality? This is an important question to address before 
proceeding to consider how the Court of Justice fosters intrinsic virtues of 
democratic legitimacy in the following two Chapters. 
 
The answer here lies in the distinction between responsive decision-making and 
biased decision-making. Biased decision-making is precisely what impartiality and 
insulation seek to suppress. It is about ensuring that institutional decision-makers do 
not prioritise one set of interests over others, pre-decision. Judges should not favour 
Member State party-litigants because they are from that Member State; nor should 
they favour a particular interpretation of EU law because it is in the political or 
economic interests of their parent Member State. The same can be said of financial 
or other personal motivations that might influence a judge. Responsive decision-
making, by contrast, is about ensuring that all affected interests are considered. As 
we saw in Chapter 3, the trustee-court enjoys a “zone of discretion” within which it 
must bring determinacy to the law. Responsiveness ensures that the interests that 
would be positively or negatively affected by the exercise of this discretion have 
been addressed by the Judges, before they make their decision. It does not preclude a 
Judge from making, for example, an interpretation that is favourable to their parent 
Member State. As long as the decision has been made after consideration of all 
affected interests, and without giving priority to one set of interests regardless of the 





This Chapter demonstrated that the structures and processes of the Court of Justice 
support the Court in satisfying the criteria of instrumental democratic legitimacy 
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through fostering the virtue of institutional independence. In Section 2, we saw that 
instrumental democratic legitimacy refers to the role that an institution plays within a 
democratic polity, and how that role contributes to the proper democratic functioning 
of the polity. For the Court of Justice, this is: to resolve legal/constitutional disputes; 
to resolve those disputes according to a faithful interpretation of the meaning of 
established rules of law; to bring determinacy to that law; and to ensure that the law 
is observed by all. The independence of the Court from external influences is central 
to these functions. In Section 3, the structures and processes of the Court were shown 
to meet the criteria of institutional independence, under the rubric of “zone of 
discretion”. That assessment was broken down into first determining the powers and 
discretion given to the Court i.e. its jurisdiction; then balancing these against both ex 
post and ex ante external mechanisms of control that may undermine the exercise of 
that discretion.  
 
We saw that the Court is not only competent to hear a vast number of actions, but 
that it has significant interpretive discretion with which to adjudicate. Ex post 
mechanisms of control relate to the ways in which political principals can respond to 
the discretion of delegate-institutions (these also tend to be direct mechanisms of 
control) such as to invalidate or reverse the decisions of delegate-institutions. In that 
regard, we saw that it is very difficult for the Union’s legislature to reverse or 
invalidate the decisions of the Court. Ex ante mechanisms of control are the ways in 
which political principals can influence the decision-making of delegate-institutions 
such as to make that discretion heteronomous. It is here that the main threat to the 
Court’s independence exists by virtue of the strong role the Member States have in 
the appointments process of the Court’s Judges. Yet in spite of that, we saw that the 
Judges are strongly insulated from extraneous influences by various structural and 
procedural mechanisms in place, such as: the “common accord” requirement; the 
independent appointments panel; the formal duties and protections afforded to the 
Judges, and the internal supervision by the President of the Court; the secrecy of 
deliberations; collegiate judgments; the use of judicial chambers; and the use, and 
potential use, of specialised courts.  
      Chapter Four 







We then considered the Court’s independence from a comparative perspective – 
reviewing the “zones of discretion” of the ECtHR, the UK Supreme Court, and the 
US Supreme Court. There, we saw that the Court of Justice, by comparison, has a 
relatively high “zone of discretion”. Each of the three comparator courts suffered (in 
different ways) from jurisdictional and/or structural weaknesses. Viewed holistically, 
the Court’s independence-enhancing credentials are, indeed, atypically strong.  
 
The final part of the analysis posed the question of balance: how much independence 
is needed in the Court of Justice? As we saw in Chapter Three, intrinsic and 
instrumental criteria cannot be understood or applied in the abstract, and that they 
often conflict. This was shown to be true of independence, whereby the more 
insulated the Court, the less open it is to being responsive, prima facie. Yet we 
considered two responses to this: conceptual and empirical. Conceptually it was 
observed that there is a distinction between responsiveness and impartiality. So long 
as the Judges are dispassionate in their appraisal of all affected interests, then 
structures and processes which allow for such interests to be (re)presented to the 
Court can be both responsive and impartial. Empirically, and related to that point, it 
was observed that given the dominance of Member State power within the EU (e.g. 
strong intergovernmental constitutional structures) it is, in fact, necessary for 
Member States to have a strong role in the appointments process, in order to foster 
the authority and acceptance of the Court. As we shall see in the next Chapter, there 
is a special (intrinsic) virtue of the one-Judge-per-Member State composition of the 
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This Chapter examines the extent to which the structures and processes of the Court 
of Justice exemplify the intrinsic virtue of representativeness. In Section 2, the 
concept of democratic representation is defined, and its applicability to trustee-courts 
explained. Section 3 goes on to demonstrate that there are two categories of interests 
represented in the Court of Justice: national legal traditions, and Union legal culture. 
Section 4 then critically appraises the relative dominance of these categories of 
representation – determining whether or not, and to what extent, alternative 
categories and mechanisms of representation might be justified. The Section 
concludes by demonstrating that, in spite of a few sub-optimal consequences, the 
dual representation of national legal traditions and Union legal culture in the Court of 
Justice is both necessary and a democratically responsive solution to matters relating 
to the polity-conditions of the EU. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Orientations: Symbolic and Substantive Democratic 
Representation in Trustee-Courts 
 
In this Section, the concept of democratic representation is defined, and its 
applicability to trustee-courts explained. Intrinsic virtues, such as representativeness 
and democratic participation (Chapter Six), are capable of being, and, indeed, ought 
to be, exemplified by trustee-courts. Yet this is achieved in different and more 
nuanced ways than the way in which they are exemplified by majoritarian 
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2.1. Representativeness: Symbolic and Substantive Democratic Representation of 
Holistic Public Interests 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, most polities are constituted by millions of individuals, 
so it is simply not feasible (nor necessarily desirable) for institutions to be open to 
everyone for direct participation. Representation is, at its core, a way of resolving 
this problem, by identifying the salient political ambitions of the people and 
implementing them i.e. government for the people. Do the people want progressive 
taxation; the rights of the child to prevail over countervailing interests, such as 
parental autonomy; or to trade freely with other polities? Representation is about 
identifying salient matters of public interest, and incorporating them into institutional 
decision-making processes, without the actual participation of all the people.  
 
There are two ways that institutions can identify these interests: responsiveness to the 
eclectic array of disaggregated interests of the public; and responsiveness to more 
holistic aggregations of public interest. On the former, disaggregated interests are 
generally understood in democratic theory as coming from “civil society”: 
individuals, NGOs, corporations, interest groups – promoting a cause and 
representing some shared political ambition or interest. 479   The most obvious 
example of this in the modern polity is the practice of lobbying in majoritarian 
institutions – where representatives of this sort exert pressure on governments and 
legislatures: for example, an environmental organisation such as Greenpeace 
campaigning for reduced carbon emissions.  
 
Institutions may also take a more holistic approach to representing the public’s 
interests. Public interests are aggregated into some totalising concept – which could 
be a community of identification, or a political ideology – that members of the public 
feel reflects their overarching political values and ambitions. In this way, members of 
the public can trust the institution to make political decisions on their behalf. A 
commonplace example of holistic representation is the party-political system. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
479 On the relationship between civil society and the public sphere, see Habermas, 1989.  
    Chapter Five 






Imperfect as it may be, the party political system presents the public with ideological 
alternatives as a “best fit” for their interests. In contemporary western polities, this 
typically takes the form of a choice between “right wing” and “left wing” ideologies, 
which take ideological approaches to an array of political issues. Members of the 
public who believe in greater individual autonomy, particularly in matters of 
economic policy, as well as social conservativism, will typically vote for right wing 
political parties in general elections, such as the Conservative Party in the UK, or the 
Republican Party in the US. After a general election, the public’s interests across this 
ideological spectrum will be proportionally balanced by representatives according to 
the relative support between party-representatives. In this Chapter, we are concerned 
only with holistic forms of representation. In Chapter Six, we look at the ways in 
which the Court of Justice allows for disaggregated interests to be represented, by 
granting access to legal actors so that they may directly participate in the Court’s 
decision-making through its structures and processes.  
 
Holistic representation has both symbolic and substantive operational logics. 
Symbolically, what is important is the public’s perception of institutions and the 
extent to which the public recognises them as theirs.480 This form of representation 
thus depends on the visible structures of institutions. The public can identify with 
parliaments because of their ideological structuring, which takes into account salient 
political matters of public interest. Furthermore, the public is endowed with the 
power to appoint and remove these representatives. Both of these factors function to 
generate confidence in the public that the parliament is responsive to their interests, 
whether or not this is in fact the case. Substantively, on the other hand, institutional 
decision-makers may rationalise their decision-making according to holistic 
aggregations of public interest. In this way, the ideological preferences of the public 
can exert an influence on various aspects of political administration e.g. legislating.   
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480 On the idea of symbolic representation, see Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government 
and the Constitution: Text and Materials, Cambridge, [England]; New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011: 377. They distinguish between “effective” and “symbolic/representative” 
parts of government, with the latter not being assessed or legitimised on actual decision-making, but 
as a representative symbol. 
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2.2. Symbolic and Substantive Representation in Trustee-Courts 
 
To what extent can trustee-courts exemplify holistic forms of representation? As we 
saw in Chapter Four, there is a danger that institutional responsiveness may offend 
the instrumental requirement of judicial independence – especially judicial 
impartiality. There is a careful balance to be struck between responsiveness and 
independence, which presents itself as a particularly tricky feat in terms of 
substantive representation. We have seen, however, that this is achieved in observing 
the distinction between biased decision-making and responsive decision-making. 
Moreover, as we saw in Chapter Three, a good trustee-court is one that is responsive 
to salient matters of public interest, and is thus representative, insofar as it is 
consistent with its (secondary) fiduciary duties.  
 
How, then, do trustee-courts represent holistically? As we saw above, holistic 
representation operates in relation to aggregations of interests with which the public 
can identify as reflecting their more general political ambitions, which serve to 
generate and foster the confidence and trust of the public in the institution. Those 
interests can be ideological, as we see in the US Supreme Court; or national, as we 
see in the UK Supreme Court. Furthermore, there are both symbolic and substantive 
elements to this form of representation. Symbolically, the necessary condition is that 
there is some visible structure or process of the institution with which the public can 
identify. In a study of the appellate court structure in the Scottish legal system, for 
example, Walker refers to representation as the cultivation of public confidence in 
institutions and a sense of public identification with the institution:  
 
[W]hat is required is a culture of institutional compliance on the one side and a 
culture of public respect for and confidence in these institutions on the other side, 
with each set of dispositions reinforcing the other.481 
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In the UK Supreme Court, the composition of the Justices is a sensitive issue that 
plays a strong role in determining public confidence in the Court. The nationality of 
the Justices – or rather, the national legal system in which they have been trained and 
have practised law – is a particularly salient matter of institutional posturing. The UK 
has three distinct quasi-autonomous legal systems – the Scottish; the English and 
Welsh; and the Northern Irish – over which the UK Supreme Court has final 
appellate jurisdiction.482 It is thus important to ensure a reasonable degree of 
representation of these jurisdictions in the composition and the appointments of the 
Justices. In this way, in order for the UK Supreme Court to foster the support of the 
Scottish people, it is important to have Scottish Justices.483 The present two Scottish 
Justices at the UK Supreme Court can thus be understood, and are often referred to, 
as representatives of the Scottish legal system, because the Scottish public, as a 
constituent part of the British public, has confidence in the UK Supreme Court 
because of its Scottish judicial incumbents. In a similar vein, as we saw in Chapter 
Four, in the US Supreme Court, judges are seemingly appointed on an ideological 
basis – observing the American public’s primary ideological cleavage between 
conservative Republicans and progressive Democrats.484 Symbolically, this helps to 
generate the trust in, and acceptance of, the US Supreme Court’s decisions for the 
American public. For those who oppose the practice of abortion, for example, the 
Court’s decision in Roe v Wade, and the Court as a legitimate institution, is more 
acceptable given the presence of the putatively Republican Justices.485  
 
Substantively, it is also important for these structures and processes to be able 
competently to articulate those preferences within and around institutional decision-
making. The substantive implications of holistic representation in courts are more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
482 There are many qualifications to make here. For a useful overview, see Walker, 2010a: Chapter 
Two; and Himsworth, 2007.  
483 When the UK Supreme Court was established, there was a convention by which two Scottish 
judges were always appointed to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which has survived 
in the composition of the UK Supreme Court. See House of Commons, Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, Judicial appointments and a Supreme Court (court of final appeal), First Report of 
Session 2003–04 Volume I: 17. See also the Court’s website at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/. 
484 See Section 4.1.3 of Chapter Four.  
485 Indeed, the dissenting Opinion in Roe v Wade was delivered by Justice Rehnquist, a Republican 
nominee.  
    Chapter Five 






problematic, however. “Democrat” Justices, for example, being motivated by liberal 
or progressive political preferences, cuts too close to the bone in terms of the 
requirement of impartial adjudication. This concern can be addressed in two ways. 
First, as Posner argues in relation to the US Supreme Court, the Justices of the 
Supreme Court do not argue according to these ideological preferences, and they 
sometimes argue against their own “legislative preferences” in the judicial forum 
because of their duties of impartiality i.e. their primary duties as trustees.486 In other 
words, their position as Republican or Democrat Justices serves only a symbolic, 
confidence-generating, function. Second, the substantive input of the Justices does 
not need to be in the form of strategic negotiations or bias. In order for conservative 
or progressive views to take shape in the judicial forum, they need only be expressed, 
rather than relied on by one or all of the Justices. A Republican Justice may simply 
air the views of the conservative approach, without necessarily being persuaded by 
them; or persuading the other Justices of the Court.  
 
Substantive representation in courts can also be non-ideological. In the UK Supreme 
Court, for example, the Scottish Justices are representatives not because they 
somehow advocate Scottish interests or are motivated to adjudicate according to the 
political preferences of the Scottish public, but because they have been trained in, 
and have practised, Scots law. The UK Supreme Court is thus a more competent 
court because its Scottish Justices are able to advise the Court on the nuances of the 
Scottish legal system for cases that are embroiled in the overlapping jurisdictions of 
the UK. Likewise, as we saw in the last Chapter, in the transnational context of the 
ECtHR, the judges are appointed on a one judge per State basis. The High 
Contracting Parties have entrenched domestic political and legal interests that they 
wish not to be subverted by the ECtHR’s decision-making. Symbolically, then, 
States, and their publics, can be confident in the ECtHR by virtue of the fact that they 
have a legal representative there – their judge. Substantively, each judge is able to 
advise the ECtHR’s judiciary as to the likely effects and problems any decision 
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might pose to each State’s legal and political system, without necessarily being 
personally motivated to decide in the State’s interest. 
 
In Section 3, we consider holistic representation in the Court of Justice. It is argued 
that the Court represents, via its structures and processes, two identifiable categories: 
national legal traditions, and an emerging autonomous Union legal culture. In 
Section 4, it is then argued that representing these categories in the Court of Justice is 
justified, and representative of the public, given the distinctive polity conditions of 
the EU, but that it leads to sub-optimal consequences. 
 
 
3. Democratic Representation in the Court of Justice 
 
The argument in this Section is that the Court of Justice represents the national legal 
traditions of the Member States; and a distinct and autonomous Union legal culture. 
The following presentation will address how it does this by examining the Court’s 
structures and processes.  
 
Before proceeding with this analysis, it is important to clarify what these two 
categories entail. What kind of holistic interests are being represented? And to what 
extent do they differ? The issue here is the nature of the legal system of the EU. The 
back-story is a familiar one: “[t]ucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg” 
the Court has been instrumental in “the making of a transnational constitution.”487 
Furthermore, in this process, law is not simply the object of integration, whereby 
“new common rules emerge, and in which new institutions and structures are 
created”, but is also “perceived as an agent of integration”, whereby legal actors are 
themselves largely in control of the direction of integration.488 As such, as Stone 
Sweet argues, “[l]itigants and their interests are understood to be fuelling a machine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
487 Stein, 1981: 1. 
488 Jo Hunt and Jo Shaw, “Fairy Tale of Luxembourg? Reflections on Law and Legal Scholarship in 
European Integration” in Reflections on European Integration: 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome in D. 
Phinnemore and A. Warleigh-Lack (Eds.), Palgrave: Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009: 93-109; Weiler, 
1991; Timmermans, 2002; Dyevre, 2005; and Stein, 1981: 1-3. 
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operated by judges. In this view, legal integration develops a self-sustaining 
logic.”489 And so, compounded by competing claims to supremacy (examined in 
Section 2.2 of Chapter One)490 and visions of finalité (examined in Section 4 of 
Chapter Two),491 legal actors have different expectations of the EU’s legal system. 
What sort of legal system is it, or what should it be? They also have different 
expectations of how the Court of Justice – as its apex court – fits within the broader 
constitutional architecture of the EU. What sort of court should the Court of Justice 
be? A constitutional court? A supreme court? An appellate court of last instance? 
The represented categories discussed in this Chapter – national legal traditions and 
Union legal culture – depict alternative visions of the legal system of the EU, and the 
proper role of its apex court – finalité in minor key. 
 
 
3.1. National Legal Traditions 
 
The notion of national legal traditions is quite broad, and engenders a variety of 
characteristics to be found in the diverse constituent legal orders of the European 
Union. In light of the conceptual framework identified in Section 2, national legal 
traditions – as an holistic category of democratic representation – can be understood 
in both symbolic and substantive terms. Symbolically, national legal actors are used 
to, and have faith in, the form of their own legal orders. In other words, they are 
familiar with the broader institutional structures and processes within which they 
operate and in which their law is adjudicated. These forms are illustrated in the table 
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489 Stone Sweet, 2004: 21.  
490 The distinction between national legal traditions and Union legal culture is not inherently the same 
as competing claims to constitutional supremacy between national constitutional courts (i.e. the 
Solange jurisprudence) and the Court of Justice (i.e. Costa v ENEL and the reverse-Solange 
jurisprudence), but this competition generates some of the conditions that give rise to the need for the 
Court of Justice to be representative of these categories. 
491 In Section 4, the analytical distinctions between these represented categories will be considered as 
analogous to schools of thought on finalité discussed in Chapter Two: intergovernmentalism (national 
legal traditions); and supranationalism/statism (Union legal culture). Indeed, the represented 
categories exemplify the “contrapunctual” understanding of the three C’s of EU constitutionalism. See 
Section 4.3 of Chapter Three.  
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in Appendix Two.492 The types of legal form are split into four distinctions: civil law 
and common law systems; inquisitorial and adversarial modes of legal enquiry; 
constitutional and majoritarian democracies; and federal, unitary and union divisions 
of state sovereignty. The table demonstrates that, across the 27 Member States, these 
traditions are all present. It also demonstrates that there is no consistent trend or 
pattern by which a model European tradition could be identified. It is difficult to 
identify any more than two Member States that share exactly the same traditions. 
Some Member States, such as France and Luxembourg, are, for historical reasons, 
very similar – they are both civilian systems; they both employ inquisitorial modes 
of legal enquiry; they both have limited forms of administrative review; and they are 
both unitary states. If we look to the UK, on the other hand, there are no other 
Member States that share all of its “asymmetric” common law features.493 Given the 
diversity of the Member States, the Court of Justice – at the apex of the EU’s legal 
order – has been structured, and its processes designed, in such a way that seeks its 
recognition and acceptance by legal actors from the different legal traditions within 
the EU i.e. the symbolic representation of these national legal traditions. It is through 
these structures and processes that legal actors can gain confidence in the Court by 
recognising and identifying with features that reflect their own national legal 
traditions.  
 
Substantively, structuring the Court in this way helps to ensure that, like it is in the 
ECtHR and the UK Supreme Court, the Court’s decision-making process pays due 
regard to the entrenched nuances of the domestic legal systems of the Member States 
that are affected by adjudication. It is about ensuring that there are structures and 
processes in place in the Court of Justice (e.g. Judges from each of the Member 
States, because of their knowledge of the laws of their Member States494) that allow 
for these nuances to be competently articulated to the Court, especially when it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
492 The table illustrates four key distinctions or type of tradition, and marks them against each of the 
27 Member States – pointing out the ways in which each Member State’s legal order reflects these 
types. Below the table, the conceptualisation of each type is given in an explanatory note.  
493 Himsworth, 2007.  
494 See Section 3.1.1. 
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adjudicates at the interface between national and EU jurisdictions e.g. the 
preliminary rulings procedure (Article 267 TFEU, discussed below).  
 
In contrast to Union legal culture, the representation of national legal traditions 
comes out more strongly in the Court’s structures and processes. There are four 
principal ways in which the Court represents national legal traditions: the 
composition and function of the Judges; the composition and function of the 
Advocates-General; the recognition and use of national languages in the Court’s 
proceedings; and the use of the preliminary rulings procedure.495  Each of these will 
now be addressed in turn. 
 
 
3.1.1. The Composition and Functions of the Judges 
 
As observed in Chapter Four, the Judges in the Court of Justice are appointed on a 
one Judge per Member State basis.496 As such, there are 27 Judges at the Court of 
Justice. Prima facie, this means that each Member State has a “representative” in the 
Court’s judiciary. Yet, as we saw in Chapter Four, they are not there to act in the 
interests of the Member State from which they have been appointed – nor should 
they be, given the constitutional and democratic requirements of independence and 
impartiality. In what sense, then, can we regard the composition of the judiciary as 
an example of the representation of national legal traditions?  
 
One short (though very important) answer to this is simply that, at a purely symbolic 
level, this system enhances the “acceptability” of the Court’s decisions by national 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
495 Space precludes a comprehensive analysis here. Consider also the manner in which the Court 
balances the adversarial mode of legal enquiry in its actions with the inquisitorial. Inquisitorial refers 
to the capacity of judges to proactively conduct investigations that will help them adjudicate. In the 
inquisitorial mode, by contrast to the adversarial mode, judges initiate their own investigations 
independently from the parties’ submissions. In the Court of Justice, the judges may conduct these 
sorts of investigations ex proprio mutu (see, for example Les Verts: para. 19); and through the use of 
“measures of enquiry” (see Section 2, Chapter 7, Title II RPCJ). 
496 The same is true for the General Court, but not the CST (see Section 3.3.1 of Chapter Four). The 
issue of representativeness in the CST is addressed in Section 3.2.2 of this Chapter.  
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legal and political actors.497 This is an especially pertinent point in relation to 
national political actors, particularly national governments, who may feel that it is 
their right to have a place, or their say, in the workings of all of the EU’s institutions, 
such is the nature and well-established practice of international, intergovernmental 
associations and institutions.498 As we saw in Section 2, this symbolic representation 
serves to generate confidence in, and identification with, the Court for national 
political and legal actors. 
 
Yet beyond the purely symbolic, the Court also represents national legal traditions 
substantively. Specifically, the Court, through its Judges’ professional training and 
their professional interaction with one another, represents national legal traditions as 
a comparative court: 
 
[E]ach deliberation gives rise to a ‘mixing’ of mentalities, cultures and legal 
constructions. A judgment will thus tend to be the result of ‘cross’ contributions of 
different legal systems and ways of legal reasoning ... the comparative approach 
nevertheless permeates the daily activities of the [Union] judge in many ways. For 
this reason, some commentators have called the Court of Justice and the [General 
Court] a ‘laboratory of comparative law’.499  
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497 Mancini presciently argues that it is likely that the one Judge per Member State system will 
eventually give way to the demands created by the enlargement of the EU, which, he argues, presents 
a “danger ... to the acceptance of the Court's rulings in the States which would no longer be 
represented” (Mancini, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales: para. 2 (1)). Indeed, the 
enlarged Court is now presented with sub-optimal problems (on which see Section 4 infra).  
498 The ECtHR, for example, also works on a one judge per State basis. The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), with their significantly larger memberships, 
gives each signatory State a veto power in the selection of their judges. For the ICJ see 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2. For the ICC, see http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Structure+of+the+Court.htm.  
499 Koen Lenaerts, “Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law” (2003) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 52 873 (hereinafter Lenaerts, 2003): 876. See also 
Koen Lenaerts, “Interpretation and the Court of Justice: A Basis for Comparative Reflection”, The 
International Lawyer (2007) Vol. 41 No. 4 (hereinafter Lenaerts, 2007): 1011-1078; and Thijmen 
Koopmans, “The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions” (1991) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law Vol. 39 493 (hereinafter Koopmans, 1991). Mancini noted that the 
Court’s members can draw on each others’ knowledge of Member States’ legal systems when 
deciding cases, even when that particular Judge is not involved in the case at hand. This is particularly 
relevant in preliminary rulings. See Mancini, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales: para. 
7 (3); and para. 10.  
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In this regard, the Judges are able to represent national legal traditions by bringing 
together their collective wisdom, which draws on the legal traditions of the Member 
States from which they have been selected, as part of both formal and informal 
professional interactions. Former Judge of the Court of Justice, Sir David Edward, 
writing about judicial deliberations in the Court, explains that: 
 
In these discussions, and in the deliberations later, the role of the judge of the 
country from which the case comes (the so-called “national judge”) is not to urge on 
the Court a solution favourable to that Member State. Such advocacy would almost 
certainly be counterproductive. But it is important that the Court should be aware of 
all dimensions of the cases it has to decide. It is therefore expected that the judge of 
the country from which the case comes should draw the Court's attention to any 
special features of the case of which the Rapporteur and Advocate General may have 
been unaware. This may be a significant deciding factor in determining how the case 
should be dealt with.500 
 
This process has both a symbolism – generating the confidence of national legal and 
political actors – and an influence on the substantive output and the working methods 
of the Court i.e. the substance of the law, and the form of the Union legal order. For 
example, French concepts of administrative review, such as misuse of power 
(détournement de pouvour), violations of essential procedural requirements (vice de 
forme substantielle), and the acte clair doctrine501 have become part of Court’s 
jurisprudence in actions for judicial review.502 Similarly, the German concept of 
proportionality (verhältnismässigkeit), and the English concept of estoppel have also 
become part of the Court’s jurisprudence.503 Similar observations can be made in 
relation to matters of form, such as the distinction between civil law and common 
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500 Edward, 1995: 553.  
501 See Advocate General Capotorti in Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 (hereinafter CILFIT): 
3435.  
502 Koopmans, 1991: 500. 
503 Koopmans, 1991: 501; and Mancini, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales: para. 10 
(5). 
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law jurisdictions.504 One former Judge at the Court of Justice, and the Court of First 
Instance, argues that a truly European Union “common law” emerges from “the fact 
that the members and staff of the Court, as well as those who plead before it, have 
been bred in a variety of legal traditions spanning the historic divide between the so-
called Civil Law and Common Law systems” 505  and that it achieves this by 
“[bringing] together in a single working institution representatives of nearly all the 
classical legal systems of Europe.”506 A good example of this is that since the 
accession by the UK, Ireland and Denmark (notably common law jurisdictions) in 
1973, the Court has made consistent reference to its own case-law in its judgments – 
thus reflecting the common law practice of stare decisis. The working methods of the 
Court’s proceedings also reflect the common law tradition through its more 
discursive oral hearings, which were formerly more monological in style.507 
 
A problem with this assessment is that, since then, the Judges, as we saw in Chapter 
Four, are organised into judicial chambers – increasingly so as the Court and the EU 
expand. The result of this is that the substantive representation of national legal 
traditions is diluted. In any given case, there is no way of ensuring the involvement 
of a particular Judge who may be able to advise the other Judges and the Advocate-
General on the salient national legal and political conditions of a Member State that 
might be affected by their decision. There are three ways, however, in which this 
concern might be mitigated. First, each of the Judges will have at least some 
awareness of the national legal traditions of the other Member States, which will 
continue to develop over time as they interact with each other formally and 
informally. Second, Judges considering a case may take advantage of their informal 
interactions – out of chambers – with relevant Judges and the members of their 
cabinets. Third, in spite of the dilution of the substantive representation of national 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
504 David Edward, “The Role and Relevance of the Civil Law Tradition in the Work of the European 
Court of Justice,” in D.L. Carey Miller and R. Zimmerman, (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots 
Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, 1997.  
505 Edward, 1995: 540.  
506 Edward, 1995: 548.  
507 See Koopmans 1991.  
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legal traditions in judicial chambers, the one Judge per Member State appointments 
system still holds its symbolic significance.   
 
Another problem with the current composition of the Judges is that it does not take 
into account the quasi-autonomous legal systems that operate at the sub-state level, 
such as, for example, the Scottish legal system. In a conference held in 1980 on the 
reform of the Court – attended by the Judges and Advocates-General of the Court of 
Justice, and academics – many of the issues outlined above were the main focus of 
the discussions.508 One of the initial observations made by Professor (soon to be 
Advocate-General) Francis Jacobs was: 
 
[I]n some respects I would say that the Court of Justice is, or ought to be, a 
representative court. That does not mean that the Judges ought to represent the 
political views of governments, and of course there is no place in the European 
Court for judges like some in other international courts, spokesmen for the national 
interest; but it does mean that they should represent the legal backgrounds from 
which they come, and that the Court itself should embody the variety of legal and 
political cultures which make up the Community.509 
 
He then went on to propose that the Judges be appointed on a per legal system basis, 
as opposed to a Member State basis. He argued, for example, that there ought to be a 
Scottish Judge, an English Judge and a Northern Irish Judge from the UK, given that 
these are distinct legal systems. 510  Ultimately, however, these proposals were 
rejected on the basis that national legal traditions are satisfactorily represented by the 
prevailing one Judge per Member State system.511 Moreover, again, in today’s 
enlarged Court, representing quasi-autonomous legal systems in this way would be 
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508 See IEE, 1980.  
509 IEE, 1980: 15, emphasis added.  
510 IEE, 1980: 15-17.  
511 Indeed, the reform in the Nice Treaty in 2001 – to make explicit the one Judge per Member State 
requirement – was justified, in part, by the argument that this system satisfactorily represents 
“national legal orders”. See the Due Report: 46. See also an earlier articulation of this logic in 
Edward, 1995.  
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even less feasible. This problem is redressed to a large extent anyway by the 
existence of the preliminary rulings procedure (Section 3.1.4).  
 
 
3.1.2. The Composition and Functions of the Advocates-General 
 
Formally, the role of the Advocate-General is a quasi-judicial one, and they are 
subject to the same constitutional safeguards of independence as the Judges.512 The 
Advocates-General take part in cases by assisting with the procedural administration 
of the cases; making “reasoned submissions” in open court; and, finally, preparing 
and presenting a written legal opinion – very much in the style of a judgment – to the 
Judges before they begin their deliberations.513 Compositionally, according to Article 
252 TFEU, the Court of Justice shall be assisted by eight Advocates-General;514 and 
the Court may request an increase to eleven with the unanimous consent of the 
Council.515 This composition is also sensitive to the Member State from which each 
Advocate-General comes, although it is not explicitly designed as such in the 
Treaties. There are five that are, by convention, always appointed from the five “big” 
Member States: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. The three remaining 
Advocate-General positions are the nominees of three of the remaining 22 Member 
States, each of which will have to wait their turn to fill one of these three 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
512 Article 252 (2) TFEU; and Article 8 SCJ. The Advocates-General are also members of the Court of 
Justice appointed on the basis that they are “persons whose independence is beyond doubt” (Article 
253 TFEU). 
513 Article 252 (2) TFEU. See generally Title III SCJ. See also Edward, 1995: 555. In Chapter Six, we 
consider their roles in more depth. In particular, it is shown that their duty to submit a written opinion 
is analogous to that of “pioneering research” (Kirsten Borgsmidt, “The Advocate General at the 
European Court of Justice: A Study” (1988) European Law Review 106 (hereinafter Borgsmidt, 
1988): 108), and, as such, represents a mechanism of access to democratic participation.  
514 The General Court has a different system in operation. Article 49 (1) SCJ provides that members of 
the General Court’s judiciary may be “called upon to perform the task of an Advocate-General” and 
Article 2 RPGC further provides that any member, except the General Court’s President, may perform 
this role. There are thus no extra members of the General Court that perform the role of Advocate-
General, where the function is performed by the General Court’s Judges on a case-by-case basis in 
accordance with the rules set out in the RPGC (Article 49 (3) SCJ). According to Article 17 RPGC, 
this happens when case is head by the GC in plenary sessions. This happens vary rarely (see GC, 
Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the General Court, Annual report 2011: 200. There are no 
Advocates-General at the CST.  
515 If there is an increase to eleven Advocates-General, then Poland will acquire a permanent 
Advocate-General, leaving five rotational positions. Declaration of Article 222 TFEU on the number 
of Advocates-General in the Court of Justice, (Lisbon, 2007) DS 866/07.!
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positions.516 The majority of Member States (at any one time, as it stands at present, 
19 Member States) have no Advocate-General at all, and will have to wait up to 42 
years for their turn.517 
 
In this respect, prima facie, the composition of the Advocates-General does not 
represent national legal traditions. Yet there are reasons to reject this view, or, at 
least, to be sceptical of it. First, national legal traditions transcend the “per Member 
State” boundary. As we have seen in the table in Appendix Two, there are at least 
four taxonomies of national legal traditions. Looking at the table more closely, the 
five Member States who permanently have an Advocate-General have been 
highlighted. The table shows that each of these Member States is sufficiently 
different from the others and that they represent all of the national legal traditions, at 
least in terms of the form of their legal orders. In fact, even if we were to remove 
Italy and Spain, this would still be the case: France – the archetype civilian, 
inquisitorial system – is a unitary state with relatively weak forms of administrative 
review; Germany is a federal state, with a codified system of law which recognises 
judicial precedent and has a strong system of judicial review; and the UK – with its 
“union” of common law legal orders – employs an adversarial legal process, and has 
relatively weak powers of judicial review in all of its jurisdictions. At a purely 
symbolic level, national legal actors familiar with each form of legal tradition can 
feel confident that the system to which they are used is represented in some 
combination of the Advocates-General. An Austrian lawyer, for example, used to 
dealing with a federal court structure, but one that has inquisitorial processes, may 
feel confident that the French and German Advocates-General understand, and are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
516 At present, those members are the nominees of Finland, Slovenia and (recently appointed) 
Belgium. The current members’ profiles can be viewed on the Court’s website at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7027/. 
517 Article 253 TFEU stipulates that the tenure of the Advocates-General is, like for the Judges, six 
years, and that there will be a partial replacement every three years (except that the Advocates-
General from the “big five” Member States may stay on). Article 9 SCJ stipulates that four 
Advocates-General are to be replaced – or, in the case of the “big five”, potentially renewed – on each 
occasion. For the Member State who is last in line, they will have to wait up to 42 years for their turn. 
With 19 Member States on rotation and only three rotational positions, and with a full replacement of 
those three positions every six years, the calculation is 19/3 = 6.3, rounded down to 6; then 6 x 6 + 6 = 
42 years. 
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sensitive to, the demands of these structures, in spite of the fact that there may be no 
Austrian Advocate-General.  
 
Second, in functional terms, the Advocates-General assist adjudication as expert 
advisors on legal matters pertaining to each case.518 This function is implemented 
primarily through the submission of an opinion, which is very much in the style of a 
judgment. This process simultaneously symbolises both inquisitorial and common 
law systems. On the former, the historical roots of the office was modelled on the 
French commissaires du government for the Conseil d’Etat.519 
 
Yet, at the same time, it was felt by those from the common law tradition that 
collegiate judgments were unsatisfactory, with their lack of discursively framed 
deliberations and dissenting opinions. The invocation of the Advocate-General’s 
opinion was thus a compromise that was reached, and one which continues to this 
day to be a satisfactory consolation for legal actors from the common law tradition 
who find it hard to accept the apparent rigidity of the Court’s judgments.520 
 
Third, in substantive terms, the advisory role of the Advocates-General is, as with the 
Judges, amenable to comparative reasoning and influence. Given that within the 
permanent five, there is a sufficiently broad range of experience of the different 
forms of legal traditions, the Advocates-General may adopt a similarly reliable 
comparative approach to their written opinions. For example, Advocate-General 
Léger compared the laws of 15 Member States (the EU’s full membership at that 
time) in relation to the right of access to information held by public authorities in 
Council v Hautala.521  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
518 For a useful break-down of the various ways the Advocates-General assist with the “legal 
reasoning” of the Court, see Norreen Burrows and Rosa Greaves, The Advocate General and EC Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 (hereinafter Burrows and Greaves, 2007): 29. See also 
Edward, 1995: 555.  
519 Rapport de la délégation Française sur le traité instituant la Communauté Européenne du Charbon 
et de l'Acier; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Octobre 1951: 32.  
520 See, for example, Burrows and Greaves, 2007. See also Edward, 1995: 555.  
521 Case C-353/99 P Council v Hautala [2001] ECR I-9565.  
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Given these observations, the Advocates-General have both strong symbolic and 
substantive representative qualities with respect to national legal traditions. 
Following on from the discussion in Section 3.3.3 of Chapter Four, their role 
compensates for the democratic deficits observed in relation to the Court’s single 
collegiate judgments. Whilst the Advocates-General opinions are not “dissenting 
opinions”, as we saw above, the separate opinion is a compromise between 
competing interests of national legal traditions i.e. common law and civil law 
systems. As we shall see below, their opinions also serve to represent Union legal 
culture. Their capacity to be representative is thus virtuous in its accommodation of a 
complex array of competing intrinsic (representativeness) and instrumental 
requirements. Even within the representation of national legal traditions, the role of 
the Advocates-General manages to pacify the competing interests at stake (as above); 
not to mention the representation of Union legal culture, and the instrumental 
requirement of independence, the latter of which is preserved by the system of 
collegiate judgments that has been accepted by those familiar with the common law 
system by virtue of the Advocates-general opinions.  
 
 
3.1.3. National Languages 
 
The “General Presentation” section of the Court’s Website opens with this statement 
on language in the Court:  
 
As each Member State has its own language and specific legal system, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union is a multilingual institution. Its language 
arrangements have no equivalent in any other court in the world, since each of the 
official languages of the European Union can be the language of a case. The Court is 
required to observe the principle of multilingualism in full, because of the need to 
communicate with the parties in the language of the proceedings and to ensure that 
its case-law is disseminated throughout the Member States.522 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
522 See http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/.  
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There are 23 official languages recognised by the EU, all of which can be used in 
legal proceedings before the Court of Justice. Participants in and members of the 
Court of Justice will naturally be from different linguistic backgrounds. The question 
here is how the legal process of the Court allows for the use of these multiple 
languages. First of all, each case is assigned one of the official languages, as chosen 
by the applicant, or the national court in preliminary rulings procedures; except in 
cases where the defendant is a Member State or a natural or legal person, in which 
case the language of the case will be determined by their choice.523 The language of 
the case determines the operating language of the documents and oral proceedings of 
the case (except for the purposes of Member State intervention).524 The Judges and 
Advocates-General are free to use any one of the official languages in the oral 
proceedings, 525  and they may require that any evidence be submitted with a 
translation in a language of their choice.526 By convention, however, the operating 
language of the Judges and Advocates-General is French.527 Furthermore, the Court 
of Justice has an extensive translation service, as well as having staff who are 
competent in many of the official languages of the EU – especially the Registrar.528  
This service functions to translate supporting documents that have been prepared in 
languages different to the language of a given case; to translate the oral or written 
testimony of witnesses or experts; and to translate the opinions, judgments and 
reports of the Judges and Advocates-General into the language of the case.529 Finally, 
the translation service translates the publications of the Court i.e. the judgments and 
the opinions of the Advocates-General. 
 
The general point to take from this is that much is done to ensure that the various 
actors coming from different Member States and national legal traditions – many of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
523 Chapter 8, Title I RPCJ; and Article 35(2) RPGC. The provisions in the RPGC governing language 
arrangements apply to the CST (Article 29 RPCST). 
524 Article 38 (4) RPCJ; and Article 35 (3) RPGC. 
525 Article 38 (8) RPCJ; and Article 35 (5) RPGC. 
526 Article 38 (2) (3) RPCJ; Article 35 (4) (5) RPGC.  
527 Edward, 1995: 546.  
528 Article 39 RPCJ. The General Court does not have its own translation service, but its Registrar is 
generally responsible for ensuring that translation is provided where necessary, see Article 36 RPGC. 
Indeed, linguistic skill is one of the Registrar’s required qualifications for the post.  
529 Paragraph 5 of Article 29 RPCJ for the Court of Justice and Paragraph 5 Article 35 RPGC for the 
General Court. 
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whom may not be proficient in a language other than one of their national languages 
– are capable of participating and understanding everything they need to understand. 
By adopting an inclusive approach towards the many different languages spoken 
within the Union, the Court fosters public confidence in national legal actors; as well 
as allowing for substantive representation. 
 
There are a few problems to note here, however. First, the official languages that are 
recognised by the Court only account for linguistic communities as they appear in 
their Member State form. In other words, the Court does not represent regional 
languages (e.g. Welsh) or dialects. Once again, the dominance of the Member State-
centric logic appears as a more favourable criterion of national identification. 
Second, there is a more subtle problem in relation to the working language of the 
Judges and Advocates-General. Edward and Mancini both point out, for example, 
that the use of French by the Judges and Advocates-General “is criticised on the 
ground that it gives an unacceptable predominance to French as the language of 
[Union] law, or that it unduly favours francophones or, more generally, that it 
favours French or ‘continental’ legal culture.” 530  Indeed, it may prove to be 
cumbersome to those members of the judiciary whose French skills are 
comparatively weak. However, short of radically altering the deliberations process, 
there does not appear to be a satisfactory solution to this problem. Naturally, with 
one Judge per Member State, there are always going to be, at least, 23 “mother 
tongues” at the table. Finally, given the multiplicity of languages and documents 
involved, this presents significant economic constraints on the working of the Court. 
The translation service must be staffed by numerous individuals proficient in several 
languages; and must function to make the sure the many documents involved in the 
legal proceedings – those published and those that are not – are translated. This 
relates to the discussion in Section 4, where I argue that the polity-conditions of the 
EU (the multiplicity of languages being a strong feature of which) justify sub-
optimal performance issues of the Court (in this case, the costs associated with the 
translation service).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
530 Edward, 1995: 546. See also Mancini, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales: para. 10.  
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3.1.4. The Preliminary Rulings Procedure  
 
Article 267 (1) TFEU (ex Article 234 TEC (pre-Lisbon)) provides that the Court of 
Justice has “jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings” on “(a) the interpretation of the 
Treaties” and “(b) the validity and interpretation of [Union Acts]” when references 
are sent by national courts.531 It is an action through which national courts – and, by 
association, national legal actors – can have matters of national and Union law 
clarified by the Court of Justice. The procedure involves a dialogue between national 
courts and the Court of Justice. In this way, national courts act as representatives of 
their national legal traditions, articulating, clarifying, and negotiating the most salient 
concerns of the beneficiaries of the national legal systems at the interface between 
national and Union law. Moreover, Article 267 (3) TFEU provides that “any court or 
tribunal of a Member State” may make a reference, insofar as it is “necessary to 
enable it to give judgment” (emphasis added). The Court has taken a relatively 
liberal approach in determining the types of institutions that qualify as a “court or 
tribunal”. A referring institution must be acting in a “judicial capacity”, which means 
that it must be addressing questions of law that arise in relation to a dispute, and that 
it must be able to settle the dispute authoritatively.532 It must also establish that it is 
sufficiently independent from the institution(s) that established the laws or rules that 
form the subject-matter of the reference to the Court of Justice.533 These rules thus 
do not exclude judicial forums that are not formally part of national court structure. 
The Court has allowed various administrative tribunals – for example, administrative 
bodies set up to address disputes over taxation – to refer questions of Union law.534 
This means that ad hoc tribunals and “private” dispute resolution bodies can make 
references.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
531 See Appendix One, and Section 3.3.2 of Chapter Six for a more detailed account of the preliminary 
rulings procedure. 
532 Case C-134/97 Victoria Film [1998] ECR I-7023; and Case C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] ECR I-
3361. 
533 Case C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277; Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft v. 
Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1997] ECR I-4961. For a more detailed examination of these rules, see 
Takis Tridimas, “Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the 
Preliminary Reference Procedure” (2003) Common Market Law Review Vol. 40 No. 1 9 (hereinafter 
Tridimas, 2003): 27-34.  
534 Ibid. 
    Chapter Five 







The preliminary rulings procedure is not an appellate system, and neither does it 
engender a hierarchical relationship between national courts and the Court of Justice. 
It is generally regarded as one of the EU’s more successful enterprises.535 Giving 
access to lower-tier national courts is very much a part of that success. It generates a 
greater degree of public confidence in the Court of Justice, and the EU’s legal 
system, inasmuch as the various national legal traditions within the Union are being 
represented, both symbolically and substantively. Indeed, this system addresses the 
concerns to which Francis Jacobs referred in his arguments for reform of the 
composition of the judiciary.536 Lower-tier Scottish courts and Northern Irish courts, 
for example, become part of the overarching legal system of the Union – generating 
confidence in those legal actors in the national context who feel that they are a part 
of the Union’s legal system; as well as providing them with the opportunity to 
articulate the nuances of their legal systems and laws to the Court of Justice.537  
 
 
3.2. Union Legal Culture 
 
In this Section, Union legal culture is examined using the same analytical framework 
as national legal traditions – being understood as an holistic interest in both symbolic 
and substantive terms. The European Union has, since the early 1960s, been 
developing its own autonomous legal order – much of which has been defined by the 
Court of Justice itself.538 In substantive terms, much of this is the result of this is an 
array of general legal principles that have the force of law, such as legal certainty, 
legitimate expectations, non-retroactivity, proportionality, non-discrimination, 
equality and fundamental (human) rights.539 In fact, here there is a synergetic 
relationship between national legal traditions and Union legal culture. The EU’s legal 
order is, to a large extent, a synthesis of the commonalities of the national legal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
535 Tridimas, 2003: 30.  
536 See IEE, 1980: 15-17. 
537 On the strategic use of references by national courts, see Nyikos, 2006. 
538 See Section 2.1 of Chapter One. 
539 See Leczykiewicz, 2008; and Section 2.1.3 of Chapter One. 
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traditions of the Member States as they are applicable in a newly emerging EU legal 
order.540 Koen Lenaerts, the present Belgian Judge and newly elected Vice President 
of the Court of Justice, argues that these jurisprudential developments at the EU level 
have explicitly and implicitly been drawn from the national legal traditions of the 
EU’s Member States by the Court of Justice acting as a “comparative court”.541 He 
argues that in cases such as Internationale, and in Treaty provisions such as Article 6 
(3) TEU and Article 340 TFEU (ex Article 288 TEC), EU jurisprudence has 
explicitly paid due regard to the “general principles common to the laws of the 
Member States” as a guiding hand in the development of general principles of EU 
law. We can thus view the development of Union legal culture as part of a process in 
which the national legal traditions of the Member States play a significant formative 
role. Yet the broader significance of this process of juridification is that there is a 
separate and autonomous Union legal system. For the relevant actors here, there is a 
vested interest in sustaining and developing the EU’s emerging legal system and 
culture as one that is autonomous and distinctive with respect to its constituent 
national legal systems. In this way, the influence of national legal traditions on the 
development of the EU’s legal order is formative, but conditional on the approval of 
central EU legal actors – especially the Court of Justice.542 The preservation and 
development of a Union legal culture, is, then, itself, a represented category within 
the Court’s structures and processes, both symbolically and substantively.  
 
In this sub-section, the structures and processes of the Court of Justice that represent 
these interests will be demonstrated. There are three principal ways that this is 
achieved: the structures and processes of institutional independence (as identified in 
Chapter Four); the composition and functions of the Advocates-General; and the 
procedural mechanisms that ensure a Union-centred singularity of legal voice. 
Although not always mutually exclusive, each of these will now be addressed in turn.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
540 Koopmans, 1991; Lenaerts, 2003; and Lenaerts, 2007.    
541 Ibid. 
542 See, for example, the constitutive developments in cases such as Van Gend en Loos, Costa v 
ENEL, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Omega, and Kadi.  
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One important way that Union legal culture is represented is through the 
independence of the Court itself. In Chapter Four, it was argued that the 
independence of the Court – as a trustee-institution – was vital to secure the impartial 
adjudication (and therefore interpretation) of law, which serves to bolster the Court’s 
instrumental democratic legitimacy. Here, however, there is a subtle distinction to be 
made between the former rationale for independence, and independence as a 
mechanism that fosters the representation of Union legal culture. As we saw in 
Chapter Four, the utility of the mechanisms of independence was largely about 
insulating the Court from the undue influence of national legal and political forces. 
Here it is important to focus on the distinction between national legal traditions and 
Union legal culture a little more closely. There is an apparent tension between the 
two categories. The sustained cultivation of a distinct and autonomous Union legal 
culture exists, to a large extent, in a zero-sum tension with the preservation of 
national legal traditions.543 The extent to which there can be such an autonomous and 
self-standing Union legal system depends, to a large extent, on the partial 
relinquishment of national legal traditions. The insulation of the Court of Justice 
from Member State influence thus plays its part in the cultivation of a distinct and 
autonomous Union legal system by further reducing the reach, and thus the impact 
of, national legal institutions in the constitution of the Union legal system. By having 
an independent Court, with independent members, the Court and its legal actors have 
greater control over the fate of the development of the Union’s legal system. The 
survival and resolute application of EU law depends, to a large extent, on these 
institutional mechanisms of independence and insulation.  
 
All the greater the significance, then, is the use of the CST and the proposals for 
other specialised courts.544 By dividing up judicial labour into institutions composed 
of expert and experienced legal actors, under the remit of the vindication of Union 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
543 In Section 4, it will be shown how this tension manifests negative-sum consequences. 
544 On the independence of the CST, see Section 3.3.5 of Chapter Four.  
    Chapter Five 






law, these fields of professional practice become more insulated from national legal 
and political processes. They become more deeply embedded within the 
infrastructure of the Union legal system. The appointments process for the Court of 
Justice and the General Court can also be regarded as representing Union legal 
culture.545 As we have seen, the Judges in both of these courts are appointed on a one 
judge per Member State basis, exposing them somewhat to the influence of national 
political and legal interests. Yet there are two factors within this process that mitigate 
this control, and exemplify the representation of Union legal culture: the “common 
accord” requirement, and the consultation of the appointments panel.546  These 
requirements are symbolic of a process that counterposes exclusive Member State 
influence in favour of a centralised Union appointments process. Notwithstanding 
the functional limitations of the panel (i.e. its advisory role), it also substantively 
represents Union legal culture insofar as “one of [its members] shall be proposed by 
the European Parliament”.547 Given that the deliberations of the panel are evidence 
based, where “[t]he panel may ask the government making the proposal for 
appointment to send additional information or other material which the panel 
considers necessary for its deliberations”,548 the result here is an objective process of 
expert scrutiny of candidates, which ultimately restricts, or negatively influences, the 
degree of autonomy each Member State has in appointing a Judge – substantively 
representing the (desired) autonomy of the EU’s legal order. For those with a vested 
interest in the cultivation of a Union legal culture, the role of the EP here will be a 
welcome development.  
 
 
3.2.2. The Advocates-General 
 
The second way Union legal culture is represented is through the composition and 
functions of the Advocates-General.549 Symbolically, because their composition is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
545 See Section 3.3.1 of Chapter Four.  
546 See Section 3.3.1.1, and Section 3.3.1.2 of Chapter Four, respectively. 
547 Article 255 (2) TFEU, emphasis added. 
548 Skouris, 2010: 3.  
549 See supra at Section 3.1.2. 
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not on a per Member State basis, it is much less nationalistic; and signifies another 
structural feature within the Union legal system over which Member States have less 
control. Substantively, as we saw above, the key function of the Advocate General is 
to provide an opinion on cases. Whilst there is scope for symbolic and substantive 
representation of national legal traditions within this process (as outlined above), the 
primary remit of the opinion is to assist the Judges with their deliberations with 
respect to EU law, insofar as it is the Court’s duty (and, a priori, the duty of the 
Advocate General) to “ensure that [EU] law is observed” (Article 19 (1) TEU).550 
The submission of opinions exemplifies the Court’s concern for robust legal 
reasoning, which necessarily reflects the interests of those who envisage an effective 
and autonomous system of EU law; as well as to represent EU law in accordance 
with its Treaty enshrined autonomy. Indeed, one of the decisive factors that 
establishes the necessity of an Advocate-General’s opinion is whether or not the case 
at hand “raises a new point of law” 551 or, in the General Court, an Advocate General 
is used where there is “legal difficulty or the factual complexity of the case so 
requires”. 552  Their role thus has quite a close relationship to jurisprudential 
development, and serves as a guiding hand to the ends of establishing an autonomous 
Union legal culture, which, as we saw above, is virtuous in its capacity to 
accommodate competing interests within and between representativeness; as well as 
instrumental democratic legitimacy i.e. institutional independence.   
 
 
3.2.3. The Singularity of Authoritative Legal Voice 
 
The final way that Union legal culture is represented – here, in substantive terms – is 
through procedural mechanisms designed to ensure the singularity (“integrity” qua 
Dworkin, 1996; or “coherence” qua MacCormick, 1994) of voice in the EU legal 
system. To that end, a significant feature of the Court’s jurisprudence, and the 
rationale by which the Court’s designers have ordered the Union’s court structure, is 
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550 See Burrows and Greaves, 2007: 29.  
551 Article 20 (5) SCJ.  
552 Article 49 SCJ; and Article 18 RPGC.  
    Chapter Five 






the requirement of the “uniform” application of EU law across the Member States. 
First, the Court of Justice acts as a court of appeal,553 as well as being able to review 
the decisions of the General Court on the instruction of the First Advocate General 
for the purposes of preserving the “unity and consistency of EU law”. 554 
Additionally, under Article 3 SCJ and Article 8 SCJ, the Court of Justice has the 
responsibility of hearing disciplinary proceedings for the General Court’s members. 
This quasi-hierarchical system is designed to ensure, generally speaking, the 
effective administration of Union law and, in particular, by the “unity and 
consistency of EU law”. Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that the General Court, 
although having a prima facie jurisdiction to hear preliminary rulings under Article 
256 (3) TFEU, has never been enabled to exercise it.555 There has been some debate 
as to whether or not the General Court should be competent to exercise this 
jurisdiction,556 and the most common argument against this is that in order for there 
to be uniform application of EU law across the diverse national legal systems of the 
Member States, and for coherence thereof, the Court of Justice, as a single 
institution, must be responsible for directing EU jurisprudence in light of those 
requirements. The involvement of the General Court would only serve to fragment 
this jurisprudence and thus undermine the coherence and general effectiveness of 
Union law. Placing jurisprudential supremacy within the Court of Justice, for the 
purposes of jurisprudential “unity”, ensures that the substance and form of the 
Union’s legal system is effectively and systematically represented in proceedings 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
553 Article 56 SCJ. 
554 Article 62 SCJ. 
555 Article 256 (3) TFEU: “[t]he General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 267, in specific areas laid down by the Statute.” 
However, Point 3 of Information Note “On References from National Courts for a Preliminary Ruling 
(2009) OJ C 297/01 states: “Since no provisions have been introduced into the Statute in that regard, 
the Court of Justice alone has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings.”  
556 See the opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster [2001] ECR 
I-9445, where he argues that “[t]he uniform interpretation of [Union] law must, without exception, 
remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice for preliminary rulings . . . the [General 
Court] should not be asked to share the task ... The day that two different interpretations are given by 
the two Courts in respect of the same precept of [Union] law, the death knell will sound for the 
preliminary-ruling procedure” (para. 74 of the Opinion). See also Bo Vesterdorf, “A Constitutional 
Court for the EU” (2006) International Journal of Constitutional Law Vol. 4 No. 4; Angus Johnston, 
“Judicial Reform and the Treaty of Nice” (2001) Common Market Law Review Vol. 38 499; and 
Tridimas, 2003: 13. We look at counter-arguments in Section 4 – in particular, see Pescatore, 1983; 
and Komarek, 2007. 
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before the Court, as well as national courts. The internal hierarchy ensures that, 
formally at least, Union law and legal culture has this internally ordered quality. One 
significant manifestation of this is that – in spite of its imperfect realisation – it has 
uniform effects across the Member States. 
 
 
3.3. Interim  Conclusions 
 
Before moving on to discuss the question of balance, it is worth recapping the 
dynamics of representation in the Court of Justice. As we have seen, the Court’s 
structures and processes symbolise and substantiate the national legal traditions of 
the Member States, as well as an emerging autonomous Union legal culture. There 
are aspects of conflict (and, in ways outlined above, synergy) here between these two 
forms of holistic representation. This is because each serves to represent two distinct 
democratic constituencies. First, under the rubric of national legal traditions, there 
are those who favour a Union legal system that simply reflects, and does not trespass 
on, the prevailing systemic and substantive characteristics of national legal systems – 
what we can understand, in contrapunctual terms, as intergovernmentalism in minor 
key. Yet we see that, given the diverse range of national legal traditions across the 27 
Member States, this constituency is itself one of a contested nature, giving rise to 
countervailing forces on the Court’s structural and procedural design even before we 
consider Union legal culture. Second, Union legal culture represents a constituency 
that sees the Union legal system as something that naturally overlaps with Member 
State systems, but which ultimately must be self-standing – supranationalism or 
statism in minor key – imposing on the Court’s designers another set of criteria to be 
responsive to. In the next Section, we evaluate the balance between these two 
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4. Questions of Balance: Understanding Representativeness in the EU 
 
In Section 3, we saw that the two dominant categories of representation in the Court 
of Justice were national legal traditions and Union legal culture. In this Section, we 
are concerned with understanding representativeness in the complex, contested and 
ever-changing context of the EU. Is it justified that these two categories are the focus 
of representation? What about other processes or categories: elections to the 
judiciary; statistical categories, such as diversity on the bench; or ideological 
representation? These arguments will now be addressed in turn.  
 
A good trustee-court could not credibly allow for public elections to the bench. As a 
matter of priority – constitutionally and democratically – courts must be impartial 
adjudicators of the established rules of law of the polity; and independent from the 
arbitrary and ephemeral whims of majoritarian politics. Subjecting potential judges 
to popular elections significantly undermines their capacity to adjudicate on matters 
of law impartially. This is because judges running for office would have to convince 
the public why they are the best candidates, which could have negative repercussions 
should they be successful. In particular, judges would be held accountable by the 
public for the decisions they subsequently make against the promises they made in 
their campaign, or, at the very least, feel obligated to adjudicate according to those 
promises. Judges would become embroiled in matters of politics – adjudicating on 
the basis of a political mandate and motivated to do so by the possibility of being 
punished or rewarded by the public during elections. Such biases are even likely to 
penetrate any potential shielding mechanisms, such as anonymous judgments and 
secret deliberations (both of which are practised in the Court of Justice), because 
judges may feel personally obligated to remain true to their election promises; to 
themselves and in front of the other judges. If this latter hypothesis is correct, then 
judicial impartiality will have been compromised. If it is incorrect, then the elections 
process will have been rendered both toothless and dishonest. In other words, the 
point of having popular elections is to hold the office-bearers to account for their 
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decisions. Accountability, in this form, encroaches too far into the requirements of 
independence in trustee-courts.557 
 
What about representing statistical categories, such as the ethnicity, sex, and 
religious beliefs of the Court’s Judges? Solanke considers the extent to which the 
Court of Justice’s composition of its members does and should conform to the 
requirements of “diversity”.558 She argues that, in the first place, the Court is, and has 
always been, composed of predominately white males,559 and that given the lack of 
“minority representation” in the Court, the appointments process should incorporate 
the requirement of diversity by having sufficient levels of black and female judges 
being appointed by central Union institutional processes, which, she argues, “could 
increase the Court’s legitimacy by providing a second, European Union level, source 
of legitimacy. Diversity of the members would act as a third, Court-level source of 
legitimacy.”560 Her argument is premised on the notion that a diverse judiciary will 
ensure “a more independent court” and that this is down to both the symbolic 
element of representation, as well as the substantive element. In other words, she 
argues that, in addition to there being greater public recognition and acceptance of 
the judiciary, the judges’ deliberations will be better inasmuch as they are more 
independent because of the diversity of views being represented.561 
 
What about ideological representation? As we have seen, the Justices of the US 
Supreme Court are appointed by the Federal Government. 562  It is commonly 
understood that these appointments are made on the basis of the ideological 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
557 In the US, elections to the bench are carried out in 22 of the States. For discussions on this issue, 
see Seth Andersen and Rebecca Kourlis, “How it Works, Judicial Selection in the States, Why it 
Matters” (2008) Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, University of Denver. 
See also “Election vs. Appointment” (2012) Justice at Stake Campaign, available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/issues/state_court_issues/election-vs-appointment/. 
558 Iyiola Solanke, “Diversity and Independence in the European Court of Justice” (2008-9) Columbia 
Journal of European Law 89 (hereinafter Solanke, 2009). At the time of this study, there are five 
female Judges and all 27 judges are white. Three of the eight Advocates-General are female and they 
are all white.!!
559 Solanke, 2009: 91.  
560 Solanke, 2009: 114. See generally Part IV of her paper.  
561 Solanke, 2009: 114.  
562!See!Section!4.1.3!of!Chapter!Four.!!
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preferences of the appointing Government, where a Republican administration will 
appoint a Republican Justice. 563  Consequently, the primary category of 
representation that dominates the appointments process in the US Supreme Court is 
the distinction between the putative “conservatives” and “liberals”,564 leaving the 
public concerned with whether or not these ideologies are evenly represented in the 
Supreme Court.  
 
In light of these views, we might ask whether or not the different categories outlined 
should be represented in the Court of Justice, instead of national legal traditions and 
Union legal culture? Also, how would we go about answering this? What are the 
relevant measures of (democratic) legitimacy for this assessment?  As argued in 
Chapter Three, in answering how the Court can be, for example, representative, it is 
important to consider the broader polity conditions within which the Court functions. 
In order to answer how the Court can be representative – or to appraise critically the 
representation of national legal traditions and Union legal culture within the Court’s 
structures and processes – we must consider the polity-conditions, and, in particular, 
the contested nature, of the EU. By measuring this, we can determine the most 
salient matters of public interest vis-à-vis the EU as a way of gauging the 
representativeness of the Court of Justice. Considering the US ideological context for 
illustration, the ideological cleavage between Republicans and Democrats is the 
dominant force in American political thought.565 As such, there is an understandable 
place for a system of representation and accountability in the US Supreme Court. 
Lininger’s argument is that appointing Justices on the basis of the prevailing 
ideological cleavage in US politics delivers this sort of legitimacy, referring to it as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
563 See Friedman, 2005: 277-278. For a sceptical view of this assessment see Posner, 2005.  
564 Of course, there are other forms of ideology capable of being represented in courts. For example, it 
has been argued that there is a lack of feminist representation in the UK Supreme Court. See 
Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice, 
Hart Publishing, 2010. For a summary of the issues addressed in the book see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/nov/11/feminism-improve-judicial-decision-
making?intcmp=239.!
565 Hix would thus concur that the US’s system of party-political elections to Congress is justifiably 
centred on this cleavage (see Section 2.2.1 of Chapter Two). 
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“the salutary effect of intense public scrutiny” and “a vindication of democratic 
power as expressed in the Senate’s ‘advice and consent’ function.”566  He argues:  
 
Public engagement in the selection of new Supreme Court justices brings a measure of 
accountability and increases awareness of Court’s [sic] important work ... Public 
outcry has been beneficial in keeping unqualified nominees off the Court. Perhaps 
Harriet Miers would be wearing a robe right now if the public and the media had not 
been so vigilant. 567 
 
The question we are concerned with here is whether there is an equivalent in the EU? 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the deep contestation over finalité underpins much, if not 
all, of the political and institutional debates on the future of the EU. This is the 
equivalent contestation for which we are looking. With this in mind, then, the 
distinction between national legal traditions and Union legal culture is both 
symptomatic of this contestation (intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism/statism in minor key, respectively); as well as a measured and 
democratically representative response to it. This is because the representation of 
national legal traditions reflects the interests of national political and legal actors 
who share a view of finalité that accords with the arguments of Moravscik and 
Majone; whereas Union legal culture reflects the interests of the arguments of 
Weatherill and Hix. In other words, for the former, their interests ultimately lie in 
preserving, as much as possible, the Member State as the appropriate location of 
sovereignty (intergovernmentalism). On the other hand, the representation of Union 
legal culture reflects the interests of the political and legal actors who aspire towards 
deeper forms of European integration and the absorption of sovereignty within the 
EU and its institutions (supranationalism or statist).  
 
Prima facie, Solanke’s proposal for a more diverse bench does not conflict with this 
proposition. Yet, her argument is more consistent with institutional independence, 
and is less persuasive with respect to representation. This is not because she is wrong 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
566 Lininger, 2007: 1323. 
567 Ibid. 
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that a diversity of views on the bench would both symbolically and substantively 
represent sectoral interests in relation to statistical categories of the European public. 
It is because the lack of consensus, at both the national and EU level, between the 
intergovernmentalists and supranationalists,  provides the key to answering the 
question of representativeness in the Court of Justice. Yet, as observed in the 
DemDefLit, it is the sheer pervasiveness of this contestation that gives rise to the sort 
of political contestation around which representative structures ought to be 
configured, as argued by Hix,568 and which justifies the dominance of representation 
of national legal traditions and Union legal culture – both of which represent salient 
democratic political principals (Member State centred and Union centred), which is 
ultimately where the contestation emerges.  
 
What we are left with is a complex mélange of legitimising, representative, forces 
that inform the structuring of the Court of Justice. The impact of the 
intergovernmentalist and supranationalist visions pervades the structuring of the 
Court of Justice, some of the consequences of which are delegitimising. In light of 
the observations in Section 3, the structuring of the Court has become a highly 
regulated field. With various legitimacy claims converging on the same structures, it 
becomes somewhat of a sub-optimal relationship, which, ultimately, undermines 
other measures of legitimacy e.g. institutional independence. In some respects, these 
two categories of representation are not in conflict and are mutually reinforcing. The 
preliminary rulings procedure, for example, is virtuous in its capacity simultaneously 
to represent national legal traditions and Union legal culture. As Tridimas argues: 
 
The overriding concern is to make the preliminary reference procedure available as 
widely as possible, thus ensuring the uniform interpretation of [Union] law and the 
availability of a remedy for the protection of [Union] rights. The Court, behaving, in 
effect, as a rational decision-maker, widens the franchise of [Union] law: by making 
the preliminary reference procedure available to as wide a category of bodies as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
568 Hix, 2008.  
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possible, it upholds [Union] rights at the lower level and increases their immediacy 
and resonance.569 
 
The same observation can be made with respect to the recognition of the Union’s 
multi-lingual background. 570  In other respects, it is sub-optimal, whereby an 
unfortunate consequence of contestation negatively impacts on the Court’s structure 
and performance. The requirement of uniformity, for example operates in a sub-
optimal way. As we saw in Section 3.2.3, it has inhibited the Union legal system’s 
designers from permitting the General Court to hear references from national courts 
under the preliminary rulings procedure. It is also demonstrably the case that the 
preliminary rulings procedure accounts for the majority of the workload for the Court 
of Justice; and that, whilst the duration of the cases before the Court is being reduced 
slowly, the number of cases the the Court of Justice has to hear is increasing.571 
Indeed, Komarek has argued that the procedure be reformed to one that is akin to an 
appellate system like those in federal systems – ultimately rejecting the premiss that 
uniformity would be undermined in such a system.572 Similarly, Lavranos extols the 
virtue of the CST, and the proposals for more specialised courts, as being one that 
sufficiently responds to the increasing workload of the Court.573 Nevertheless, as we 
have seen, the designers are sticking to their guns, in spite of rapid enlargement. 
Likewise, the Member States’ strong position in the appointments process, for 
example, is somewhat counter-balanced by the involvement of the EP in the 
selection of one of the members of the appointments panel. Yet there are aspects here 
that have this sub-optimal quality, insofar as the effectiveness of the appointments 
process is undermined by so many competing claims by the two democratic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
569 Tridimas, 2003: 30.  
570 See supra at Section 3.1.4. 
571 In 2011, out of 668 cases before the Court of Justice, 423 were references from national courts 
(63%), with an average duration of 16.4 months; whereas in 2007, it was 265 out of 581 (46%), with 
an average duration of 19.3 months (see Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of 
Justice, 2011, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-
06/ra2011_statistiques_cour_en.pdf). In 1997, it was 301 out of 456 cases, with an average duration 
exceeding 20 months (see Statistical information of the Court of Justice (1997) available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/st97cr_2008-09-30_16-42-
41_25.pdf).!
572 See Komarek, 2007. 
573 See Lavranos, 2005.  
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constituencies. The appointments process, like in the UK, could more effectively and 
simply be performed by the appointments panel.574 
 
It might simply be the case, then, that there are significant legitimation deficits in the 
Court’s structures and processes, because of the need to represent both national legal 
traditions and Union legal culture. This is, however, perhaps properly understood as 
necessary given the ever-changing – specifically, ever-growing – nature of the EU. 
The convergence of competing legitimacy claims and visions of finalité on the 
Court’s structures is not just an unfortunate and inevitable state of affairs, but, 
instead, a necessary way to ensure the continued survival and legitimacy of the 
institution and the polity within which it serves. To put it another way, without 
responding to these competing claims, and without reaching (sub-optimal) 
consequences, it is unlikely that the actors involved would continue to accept the 
legitimacy of the institution, since the democratic national Member States and the 
democratic suprantational Union institutions are representative of two sets of 
democratic constituencies. As Barber notes, like with the ECtHR, without the 
Member States’ role in the appointments process, the legitimacy of the Court and the 
Union legal system may be less “palatable”. 575  Pescatore once described the 
preliminary rulings procedure as an “infant disease”, precisely because of the sorts of 
sub-optimal consequences it creates; but, more importantly, that epithet was 
premised on the notion of the maturity of the Union legal system i.e. a vision of 
finalité.576 It is perhaps necessary to accept these consequences in order for the Court 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
574  There are also negative sum consequences here. In relation to the instrumental virtue of 
independence, the involvement of the EP in the appointments panel undermines the independence of 
the appointments process, where the appointments process becomes affected by political influences of 
the supranationalist elements of EU governance, as opposed to, but in addition to, the governments of 
the Member States. Indeed, this was one of the objections made during the European Convention’s 
discussion circle on the Court of Justice as part of the Constitutional Treaty deliberations: “[h]owever, 
one member was opposed to the idea of the European Parliament’s involvement because he saw in it a 
danger that the appointment process would become politicised.” See the Final Report of the European 
Convention: 2. 
575 See Section 4.2 of Chapter Four.  
576  Pescatore, 1983. Burrows and Greaves also argue that the office of Advocate-General is 
unnecessary now given the “maturity” of the EU legal order  – specifically responding to the 
increasing workload of the Court (Burrows and Greaves, 2007: 293).!
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and the Union legal system to retain its (democratic) legitimacy, especially given the 





The purpose of this Chapter was to demonstrate that the Court of Justice is a 
representative institution – and that it achieves this through its structures and 
processes. The argument was split into three parts. First, it was argued that the Court 
represents holistic categories of public interest both symbolically and substantively. 
Symbolic representation is achieved through structures and processes with which the 
public can identify. Substantive representation is where the interests at stake play a 
part in the decision-making of the Court.  
 
Second, it was shown that the Court of Justice represents both national legal 
traditions and Union legal culture. National legal traditions can be understood in two 
ways: the substance of the laws of the Member States; and the form of the legal 
orders of the Member States. In terms of substance, the legal and political actors of 
the Member States have a vested interest in their own legal rules, and maintaining 
the objectives they serve. Form refers to the broader institutional structures and 
processes within which national legal and political actors operate and on which they 
have their law adjudicated. The types of legal form are: civil law and common law 
systems; inquisitorial and adversarial modes of legal enquiry; constitutional and 
majoritarian democracies; and federal, unitary and union divisions of state 
sovereignty. Union legal culture, by contrast, refers to the sustained cultivation of a 
distinctive and autonomous European (Union) legal order. We saw, for example, that 
the composition and appointment of the Judges represent national legal traditions. By 
operating on a one judge per Member State basis, the appointment of the Judges 
ensures that the interests of national legal actors are represented. In terms of Union 
legal culture, we saw that, for example, the various mechanisms of insulation from 
Member State control represent the autonomy of a distinct Union legal culture. The 
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use of the appointments panel is geared towards making the appointments process 
more insulated, and involves the European Parliament.  
 
The analysis then went on to appraise critically the emphasis on the representation of 
national legal traditions and Union legal culture. The argument here was that the 
pervasiveness of national legal traditions and Union legal culture is a symptom of, 
and a measured democratically representative response to, the underlying 
contestation over visions of finalité. With such a controversy ongoing between legal 
and political actors at the national and Union levels, the structural and procedural 
representation of national legal traditions and Union legal culture of the Court of 
Justice is a justified and representative configuration, in spite of a few sub-optimal 
consequences associated with this. 
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In this Chapter, we turn to the second intrinsic virtue: democratic participation. Thus 
far, we have seen that, in fulfilling its fiduciary duties as a trustee-court, the 
structures and processes of the Court of Justice have been designed in favour of, in 
particular, Member State interests (intergovernmentalism) and Union interests 
(supranationalism or statism). Yet, as we saw in Chapter Two, the categories of 
actors that fall under the rubric of “civil society” are also important beneficiaries of 
the trust – arguably all the more so in the EU given its complex “neo-functionalist”, 
“infranational”, and “deliberative supranationalist” constitutional and political 
structures.577 This Chapter examines the structures and processes of the Court of 
Justice which provide these actors with access to participate in the decision-making 
of the Court, such that their affected interests are also matters to which the trustee-
Court is democratically responsive. This does not mean that Member State and 
Union actors do not or should not enjoy access to democratic participation. As we 
shall see in Section 2, they too have disaggregated affected interests that must be 
taken into account. But given the demonstrable dominance of intergovernmental and 
supranational forces in the Court’s configuration, and the Union more generally, 
special attention will be paid here to the extent of democratic participation available 
to civil society actors. 
 
In Section 2, the concept of democratic participation is defined, and its applicability 
to trustee-courts explained. At a conceptual level, democratic participation can take 
many forms. But the key variables are: disaggregated or special interests; and some 
form of access to decision-making authorities, such that decision-making authorities 
recognise those interests. In Section 3, a case-study is presented on three mechanisms 
of access to the Court of Justice: the researcher role of the Judges and Advocates-
General; third party intervention; and access as litigants. Section 4 then goes on 
critically to appraise these mechanisms of access to democratic participation, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
577 See Section 4 of Chapter Two. 
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assessing the extent to which the degree of access afforded to actors by the Court of 
Justice is sufficient – the question of balance. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Orientations: Democratic Participation in Trustee-Courts 
 
In this Section, the notion of democratic participation is defined (Section 2.1). 
Section 2.2 goes on to specify how and why the Court of Justice can and should be 
analysed in this way – setting up the case-study in Section 3; and the critical 
discussion in Section 4.  
 
 
2.1. Democratic Participation 
 
As we saw in Chapter Three, democratic participation is an intrinsic virtue of 
democratic ordering – it is a mechanism by which discrete decision-making 
authorities can be responsive to the interests of the public. Specifically, democratic 
participation refers to the capacity with which actors can engage directly (i.e. without 
the medium of representation) with decision-making authorities, such that their 
interests can be taken into account. In a sense, this concept is a relatively 
straightforward institutional ordering virtue of democratic legitimacy – most 
intuitively a signifier of collective self-government (government by the people) – as 
it relates to the classic, inaugural notion of democracy.578 Yet, as we have seen, 
contemporary polities – including the EU – simply cannot achieve this given the size 
of their populations. Indeed, this was the rationale underpinning representativeness. 
Irrespective of the contemporary polity context, there is a universal relationship 
between representativeness and democratic participation. Here, we must understand 
this relationship to be compensatory or complementary. 579  This is because 
underpinning theories of democracy is the idea that public interests are most 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
578 See the introduction to Section Three of Chapter Three. See also Schwartzberg, 2004.  
579 The distinction between compensatory and complementary bears a special significance in the EU 
context, discussed in Section 4.  
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optimally defined, articulated and defended by the representatives of a polity’s 
political institutions. The legitimacy of systems such as these is based on the premiss 
that the polity’s political representatives, who are directly accountable to the public, 
cannot escape democratic scrutiny and can guard all salient matters of public interest.  
 
One of the key problems with this is that public interests are reduced to very blunt 
aggregations of interests – typically expressed as abstract political philosophies, such 
as liberalism, conservatism, left wing, right wing, etc. i.e. holistic categories of 
public interests.580 The capacity for non-representatives (the Joan Public) to have 
their particular, disaggregated or special interests taken into consideration by 
decision-making authorities is severely displaced, if not altogether abandoned, by 
purely representative democracy. Nevertheless, democratic participation remains – 
theoretically, if not popularly – a core mechanism for collective self-government. 
And in the contemporary polity, it takes shape in different and more nuanced forms.  
 
To that extent, we must understand that the sorts of interests to which institutions 
must be responsive are, unlike the holistic interests examined in Chapter Five, 
disaggregated and special interests. We must also be aware that participation is a 
broad concept, and can be understood in different ways. Common examples of 
participation include referendums and lobbying by institutions of civil society. 
Habermas, for example, demonstrates, by analysing a discrete period in history, how 
representatives can respond to the particular, disaggregated interests of the public as 
they emerge from civil society.581 The legacy of this discrete period in history is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
580 There is also an epistemological problem with understanding the polity as a genuine manifestation 
of “the public” or “the people”. See, for example, John Dewey, The Public and its Problems, A. 
Swallow: Denver, 1954 (hereinafter Dewey, 1954). Dewey argues that as soon as the public is defined 
by the emergence of the office of state regulation, the latter ceases to be definitive of that public 
(Dewey, 1954: 33-34). This observation is central to Everson and Eisner’s theory of 
Rechtsverfassungsrechts in Everson and Eisner, 2009. Likewise, it resonates with the vision of finalité 
adopted in this thesis, which extols the notion of the EU as a polity with respect to which we “don’t 
know what it is yet”.  
581 Habermas argues that there was a brief period in history where the “public sphere” was populated 
by private individuals bringing to bear their special interests thereon. He argues that this was achieved 
through the publication of letters – written between market actors conveying important market-related 
information – and represented an instance of civil society influencing matters of state; in this case, the 
regulation of the (newly emerging) transnational free market (Habermas, 1989). 
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mass media – especially newspapers – which provides a crucial democratic link 
between political representatives and Joan Publics as forums within which salient 
matters of public interest can be communicated to the former by the latter.582 In this 
view, salient matters of public interest – as expressed by Joan Publics within and 
between their private associations – are an important resource for discrete decision-
making authorities; bridging the gap between the governors (representatives) and the 
governed (non-representatives). Anthony Giddens – an advocate of dialogic 
democracy – argues that self-help groups, for example, present people with more 
attractive forums of political discourse than membership of political parties.583!
 
Participation can also take place within institutions that, whilst being autonomous 
from representative institutions, nevertheless wield regulatory powers (either 
delegated powers, or powers that exist by virtue of broader socio-political structures 
e.g. private market regulation) and are accessible to the public for their participation. 
In this context, Cohen and Sabel have developed a special theory of the polity – 
“directly deliberative polyarchy” – within which decision-making authorities are 
broken up into epistemic units.584 In their analysis, they argue that such institutions 
are best suited to decision-making at the “local” level, e.g. parents and teachers’ 
associations, or community policing, where local problems require local solutions.585 
 
There are thus many ways for actors to engage themselves in political discourse. In 
this Chapter, I do not focus on aspects such as deliberativeness – itself a (related) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
582 One of Habermas’ key points was that contemporary forums of public discourse are poor 
substitutes that lead to unsatisfactory civil society deliberative participation. The emergence of social 
networks via the Internet may represent a re-emergence of Habermas’ notion of the public sphere. 
583 Anthony Giddens, “Brave New World: The New Context of Politics”, in D. Miliband, (Ed.), 
Reinventing the Left, London: Polity Press, 1994. 
584 Cohen and Sabel, 1997.  
585 Cohen and Sabel argue that directly-deliberative institutions can address these difficulties in three 
ways. First, given their autonomy, they are not bound to implement solutions that are commensurate 
with solutions arrived at in other locales. Second, interested members – the parents, the teachers, or 
the residents of the community, for example – familiar with the local circumstances can more 
effectively determine appropriate solutions. And third, deliberative institutions can coordinate and 
interact with one another in a broader discussion on how problems in common can be, and have been, 
addressed by different types of solutions – what Cohen and Sabel call “deliberative coordination” 
(Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 322-327). In other words, they can learn from each other, without being 
restricted by each other. 
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2.2. Access to Democratic Participation in Trustee-Courts 
 
We have seen that a good trustee-court is one that is democratically responsive, 
insofar as this is consistent with its (secondary) fiduciary duties (Chapter Three) and 
does not lead to judicial bias, but, instead, to the dispassionate treatment of all 
affected interests (Chapter Four). Yet there is an added instrumental value to be 
noted here. As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, the Court of Justice, like other 
constitutional courts, can exemplify instrumental democratic legitimacy by, first and 
foremost, giving faithful expression to the established rules of law in its 
interpretation thereof. But its interpretation is also instrumental insofar as it makes 
polity-constitutive, democracy-generative contributions e.g. defining, establishing 
and refining the basic tenets of a democratic polity (such as fundamental rights) 
through its adjudication i.e. its output. The degree to which the EU has been 
constituted in this way by the Court of Justice need not be repeated here. What we 
must understand is that there is some degree of overlap between the intrinsic and the 
instrumental when it comes to democratic participation. In this thesis, we are not 
analysing the Court’s output, but, instead, looking to how the Court’s structures and 
processes exemplify intrinsic virtues such as, in this Chapter, democratic 
participation. As we saw in Chapter Three, the reason that we are interested in this 
aspect of instrumental legitimacy relates to the ways in which the structures and 
processes facilitate legitimising the Court’s adjudication and jurisprudence.586 
 
Trustee-courts can exemplify the virtue of democratic representation in the terms 
outlined above: responsiveness to disaggregated or special interests, through 
mechanisms of access to the decision-making process of the trustee-court (its cases), 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
586 This aspect is addressed in Section 4, where, in evaluating the putative gap in access to democratic 
participation for natural and legal persons (outlined in Section 3), we consider the significance of the 
instrumental role of access in terms of democratic compensation and complementarity.  
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such that it can give dispassionate treatment of all affected interests. As emphasised 
above, this thesis is not exploring the deliberative efficacy of adjudication;587 nor are 
we interested in the “locality” qua Cohen and Sabel of the trustee-court vis-à-vis 
those interests.588 Three questions will be addressed here: what are disaggregated 
interests; what sorts of mechanisms of access are available in trustee-courts; and for 
whom are these mechanisms available? On the first question, disaggregated interests 
are the particular or special interests of actors that are implicated in cases before 
trustee-courts. Some of those issues will be purely doctrinal, requiring specialists in 
particular areas of law. Yet, given the notion of “polycentricity”,589 the range of 
issues pertinent to any given case is expansive – from the mundane to the sublime: 
fishing rights in international waters;590 trade union rights;591 the right to freedom of 
expression;592 feminism;593 environmentalism;594 or human dignity.595  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
587 Dworkin, for example, argues that the deliberative efficacy of constitutional adjudication is a more 
effective way of reaching a legitimate decision in the interests of democracy than its majoritarian 
counterpart, because judges are closer to the facts and are therefore equipped to make more informed 
decisions; they are immune to the cynicism that plagues mainstream politics and politicians, therefore 
enabling more radical decisions of principle to be made; and they are better placed to make decisions 
that protect the interests of minority groups and the “politically impotent” (Dworkin, 1985: 24-28). 
Similarly, Habermas proposes “a proceduralist paradigm of law”, in which the deliberative function of 
communicative action is greatly enhanced by the procedural conditions through which law is 
articulated: “[i]n the proceduralist paradigm of law, the vacant places of the economic man or welfare-
client are occupied by a public of citizens who participate in political communication to articulate 
their wants and needs, to give voice to their violated interests, and, above all, to clarify and settle the 
contested standards and criteria according to which equals are treated equally and unequals unequally” 
(Habermas, 1998: 18). See also Robert Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravscik, 
“Democracy enhancing Multi-Lateralism” (2009) International Organisation Vol. 63 No. 2 309. On 
the deliberative performance of constitutional courts, see Conrado Hübner Mendes, “Political 
Deliberation and Constitutional Review” in Imer Flores and Kenneth Himma (Eds.), Law, Liberty, 
and the Rule of Law, Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice Vol. 18, Springer 
Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013. 
588 See Thomas Horsley, “Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the 
Subsidiarity Jigsaw?” (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 50 No. 2 267. On the 
relationship between subsidiarity (qua locality) and democracy, see Barber, 2005.  
589 Barber, 2001. 
590 Factortame.  
591 Viking; and Laval.  
592 Schmidberger.  
593 Roe v Wade. 
594 Case T-585/93 and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-2205; on appeal to the Court of Justice, 
Case C-321/95 P Greenpeace and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1651 (hereinafter 
Greenpeace). 
595 Omega Spielhallen.  
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On the second question, mechanisms of access relate to the various structural, 
procedural or socio-legal factors that affect the capacity for different types of actors 
to participate in the trustee-court’s cases. These include: locus standi (rules of 
standing) for actors to raise actions that the trustee-court is competent to hear, 
including judicial review;596 the rules of access that allow third parties to intervene in 
cases; financial considerations, e.g. the provision of legal aid; and the linguistic 
dimension of the legal process before the Court. There are also less formal 
mechanisms of access. As discussed in Section 3.1, for example, the role of the Court 
of Justice’s members performing a researcher-role is a proxy for actors to engage, 
albeit informally, with institutional decision-makers.  
 
On the third question, it is inimical to the foundational notion of democracy – as an 
inclusive mode of governance – to prohibit certain categories of actors, or certain 
categories of interest, from institutional decision-making. Yet it is central to the 
argument of this Chapter that, in the context of trustee-courts (specifically, the Court 
of Justice), there is a question of balance to be addressed. To make trustee-courts as 
accessible as possible – a participatory free-for-all – would be deeply impractical. 
Putting it more normatively, it would cause severe negative sum consequences by 
overloading the work of trustee-courts to the extent that they would be unable to 
perform their primary instrumental duties. In short, there has to be a line drawn 
somewhere. As a general rule, the basic principle is that the actor’s interest must be 
one that is reasonably affected by the outcome of the case. How to specify that rule is 
very much dependent on the circumstances not just of each case, but, as we shall see 
in Section 4, the type of court and the type of polity within which that court 
functions. 
 
In Section 3, I present a case-study of some of the Court of Justice’s mechanisms of 
access – demonstrating the extent to which different types of actors and different 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
596 Schwartzberg proposes that “a key insight for contemporary democracy” is derived from the 
“distinctively democratic quality of the capacity to modify law” under the Athenian concept of 
“pragmatic innovation”, which, among other things, emphasised the direct participation of the people 
and incorporated a system of judicial review into its institutional framework (Schwarzberg, 2004: 
321). 
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types of interest are thereby given attention. Section 4 moves on to address the 
question of balance, evaluating the mechanisms of access to determine whether or 




3. Access to Democratic Participation in the Court of Justice: A Case-Study 
 
In this Section, some of the Court’s key mechanisms of access will be outlined.597 In 
Section 3.1, we look at the researcher role of the Court’s Judges and Advocates-
General as a proxy by which actors express their affected interests to the Court’s 
decision-makers. In Section 3.2, we look at third party intervention in cases as a way 
in which actors who are not litigants in cases can nevertheless articulate their 
affected interests to the Court. In Section 3.3, we look at the capacity through which 
actors can express their affected interests to the Court as litigants. We look at the 
rules of access to raise actions for judicial review under Article 263 TFEU (actions 
for annulment of Union acts); and the participatory nature of the preliminary rulings 
procedure (Article 267 TFEU), commenting also on the (well-documented) 
synergetic relationship between these two forms of action.598 In Section 4, I then go 
on critically to appraise the commentary on the putative gap in the “complete system 
of judicial remedies”599 that has been argued to exist in relation to access to the Court 






597 As indicated in Section 2.2, there is a variety of phenomena – formal, informal, legal, socio-legal – 
that are relevant to the discussion of access. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give sufficient 
attention to all of these issues, which is why a case-study approach has been adopted. 
598 Indeed, attesting to the comments made ibid, there is a variety of actions that are worthy of 
attention here (see Appendix One). I have chosen Article 263 TFEU and Article 267 TFEU because of 
their synergetic relationship, and because of the extensive commentary thereon, to which the 
arguments made in Section 4 contribute. 
599 See Greenpeace: para. 70; and the case-law referred to in Section 3.3.1 infra.  
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3.1. The Judges and Advocates-General as Researchers 
 
We have already considered the professional association of the Judges and 
Advocates-General with the academic world, insofar as this strengthens their 
competence and bolsters (the instrumental virtue of) institutional independence in the 
Court of Justice.600 Here, we consider the significance of this association as a 
mechanism of access. Given the eclectic range of interests that may be implicated in 
the Court’s cases, the association of members of the Court with academia – as 
researchers themselves; and through their interaction with other academic 
researchers – provides an important proxy by which potentially salient public 
interests can be expressed to the Court. Stein argued:  
 
[T]he judges and the Advocates General of the Court of Justice often assume the role 
of scholarly writers. Their publications and speeches on issues facing the Court and 
the seminars they offer for members of national judiciaries greatly facilitate the 
propagation and acceptance of the Court's rulings.601 
 
More recently, Burrows and Greaves note: 
 
The Judges read the literature, gauge the reaction to their case-law, interact with 
national judges and academics, meet students in the Court and respond to questions 
... Judges of the European Court of Justice, much more so than judges from the 
courts of the Member States, participate in academic and practitioner conferences 
and events where they are exposed to a wide variety of ideas.602 
 
What is important is that this researcher role makes for an informed Court. We might 
call this epistemic representation through access. Indeed, there is a special 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
600 See Section 3.3.2 of Chapter Four. 
601 Stein, 1981: 2. See, for example, Section 3.3.2 of Chapter Four. See also the extensive list of 
publications of the present Belgian Judge and Vice President of the Court of Justice (and former CFI 
Judge) Koen Lenaerts at 
http://www.law.kuleuven.be/int/europees/English/Publications/Lists%20of%20Publication/publicatio
n_list.htm; and of former UK Judge at the Court of Justice (and former CFI Judge) Sir David Edward 
at http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/judge-david-edward-oral-history/publications. 
602 Burrows and Greaves, 2007: 289, 293.  
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democratic significance here with respect to the individual, and also to associations 
of civil society. The informed Court is also responsive to the affected 
intergovernmental and supranational/statist (disaggregated) interests of the European 
public, including those of, for example, the governments of Member States or the 
Commission. Since civil society does not benefit from the sorts of holistic 
representative structures and processes observed in Chapter Five, the researcher role 
of the Judges and Advocates-General plays both a compensatory and complementary 
role in making the Court a responsive court – achieved by actors’ access to the 
Court’s members, such that their affected (disaggregated) interests are expressed.   
Furthermore, academia is informed by the interests and viewpoints of other spheres 
of civil society. Academic writings on a given issue of EU law invariably dwell on 
broader social structures and interests and thus act as a proxy for civil society 
representation.  
 
The contribution of the Advocates-General presents an even greater significance 
here. The Advocates-General make “reasoned submissions” in open court and 
prepare a written opinion – very much in the style of a judgment – to assist the 
Judges with their deliberations.603 In a comparative review, Borgsmidt observes that, 
given their involvement in the academic world and the nature of their contribution to 
cases (mainly through their written opinions), the role of the Advocates-General 
“approximates most closely to the concept of pioneering research work”.604 A 
significant advantage of the Advocate-General’s opinion is that it is “the product of a 
single mind”, which has “a clarity and directness which judgments of the Court, 
essentially a committee document, may lack.” 605 The Advocates-General do not 
produce their opinions in concert with other Advocates-General, or Judges, and they 
can write them in their own language,606 which enhances their argumentative and 
expressive potential – making them more amenable to academic consumption. 
Furthermore, opinions often include academic citations to support their interpretation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
603 See Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 of Chapter Five. The opinions are published along with the final 
judgment in the case, and published online at the time of delivery. 
604 Borgsmidt, 1988: 108.  
605 Arnull, 2006: 16.  
606 See Section 3.1.3 of Chapter Five. See also Edward, 1995: 555.  
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and consideration of the salient legal issues. The opinion is thus simultaneously a 
reference point for the Judges’ deliberations as well as a focal point for academic 
attention and debate. The Advocate-General is thus able to facilitate a “dialogue” 
between the Court’s Judges and with interested fields of academic practice. Burrows 
and Greaves note:  
 
What is important is the dialogic relationship between the Advocate General and the 
Court. This dialogic relationship does not end with the outcome of any particular 
case but continues as part of the ongoing conversation on the interpretation of 
Community law and it takes place over time ... It can also take place outside the 
Court ... Very often, academics would look to the Opinions of the Advocates 
General as a starting point for a critique of the case-law of the Court.607 
 
This attests to the view that the academic role of the Judges and Advocates-General 
resonates with the interests of civil society: directly, if we consider academic fields 
themselves as spheres of civil society; and indirectly, if we regard the academic 
commentary as a proxy for other spheres of interest that emanate from civil society. 
In both cases, the dialogic process between the Advocates-General and the Judges 
allows for the eclectic range of interests of the European public to access the 
decision-making of the Court.  
 
 
3.2. Third Party Intervention 
 
In general terms, third party intervention is a procedure that grants access to actors 
that have a demonstrable interest in direct actions608 being heard by the Court of 
Justice. It is a mechanism of access that allows actors to participate in cases in which 
they are not – and in some instances could not have been – party-litigants, such that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
607 Burrows and Greaves, 2007: 293.  
608 The legal framework of third party intervention concerns direct actions only (see Chapter 4, Title 
IV RPCJ) and is thus unavailable in indirect actions such as the preliminary rulings procedure (Article 
267 TFEU). 
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they may persuade the Court to consider their affected interests when determining 
the outcome of cases. According to Article 40 SCJ: 
 
Member States and institutions of the Union may intervene in cases before the Court 
of Justice. The same right shall be open to the bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union and to any other person which can establish an interest in the result of a case 
submitted to the Court. Natural or legal persons shall not intervene in cases between 
Member States, between institutions of the Union or between Member States and 
institutions of the Union. 609 
 
As can be seen in Appendix One, and will be illustrated in Section 3.3, Member 
States and Union institutions are “privileged” actors insofar as they have standing to 
raise almost all of the actions that the Court is competent to hear, often irrespective 
of whether or not they have any demonstrable interest at stake.610 As such, the focus 
in this Section will be on the extent to which non-privileged actors can avail 
themselves of this mechanism of access.  
 
There are two stages involved in establishing an “interest” for non-privileged actors: 
the application; and the “statement in intervention”. The application to intervene 
must be made within six weeks of publication of the lodging of the initial application 
with the Registry, and must include: (a) the description of the case; (b) the 
description of the parties; (c) the name and address of the intervener; (d) the 
intervener’s address for service at the place where the Court has its seat; (e) the form 
of order sought, by one or more of the parties, in support of which the intervener is 
applying for leave to intervene; and (f) a statement of the circumstances establishing 
the right to intervene.611 The application only permits the applicant to state which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
609 For the General Court, see Article 53 SCJ, which may derogate from the rules laid down in Article 
40 SCJ “in order to take account of the specific features of litigation in the field of intellectual 
property.” For the Civil Service Tribunal, see Article 7 of Annex I SCJ.   
610 This is reflected in Article 40 SCJ, since, unlike “bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and 
[natural and legal persons]”, Member States and Union institutions do not have to “establish an 
interest in the result of a case”. Furthermore, they may submit “observations” to the Court in cases, 
including in Article 267 TFEU references, which is a distinct process that gives them an extra layer of 
privileged access. See Article 20 SCJ, Article 23 SCJ and Article 53 SCJ.  
611 Article 130 RPCJ; Article 115 RPGC; and Title 3 Chapter 3 RPCST.  
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party the applicant supports.612 Yet, if the application is accepted (i.e. if the rules of 
standing having been met, discussed below613), the intervener is permitted to make a 
“statement in intervention”, which outlines: (a) a statement of the form of order 
sought by the intervener in support of or opposing, in whole or in part, the form of 
order sought by one of the parties; (b) the pleas in law and arguments relied on by 
the intervener; and (c) where appropriate, the nature of any evidence offered.614 It is 
through this document that the interveners can express their arguments and 
viewpoints on the legal and factual details of the case i.e. to express their affected 
interests to the Court.615 
 
The determining factor for a successful application to intervene for non-privileged 
actors is establishing “an interest in the result of a case”. The Court defined 
“interest” in Região autónoma dos Açores v Council:  
 
On this point, it has consistently been held that an interest in the result of the case 
means a direct and present interest in the decision on the claims. In particular, it is 
necessary to ascertain whether the prospective intervener is directly affected by the 
measure in question and that his interest in the result of the case is certain … 
Associations may be admitted to intervene to protect the interests of their members 




612 Article 40 SCJ states that the application to intervene “shall be limited to supporting the form of 
order sought by one of the parties.” 
613 It is only if the President of the Court or Chamber is satisfied that the applicant has met the 
standing criteria for intervention that the applicant will be permitted to make a statement in 
intervention. Article 131 RPCJ; Article 116 (1) RPGC; and Article 109 (6) RPCST.  
614 Article 132 RPCJ; Article 116 (4) RPGC; and Article 110 (3) RPCST.  
615 The interveners are given the opportunity to review documents submitted by the parties. Article 
131 RPCJ; Article 116 RPGC and Article 116 (5) RPGC; and Article 109 RPCST. Additionally, an 
intervener may submit observations at the oral hearing. Article 129 (4) RPCJ; Article 116 (6) RPGC; 
and Article 110 (6) RPCST. 
616 The order in Case T-37/04 R Região autónoma dos Açores v Council [2004] ECR II-02153 
(hereinafter Região autónoma dos Açores v Council): para. 59. See also the orders in Case T‑54/00 R 
Federación de Cofradías de Pescadores de Guipúzcoa and Others v Council [2000] ECR II‑2875: 
para 15; Case T‑138/98 ACAV and Others v Council [1999] ECR II‑1797: para. 14; and Case 
C‑151/98 P Pharos v Commission [1998] ECR I‑5441: para. 6.  
    Chapter Six 






As we shall see in Section 3.3.1, the requirement of “direct concern” is a less 
restrictive a test than that of “direct and individual concern” under Article 263 
TFEU, and presents, for natural and legal persons, an opportunity to participate in 
cases they might otherwise have been unable to raise themselves. Indeed, in Região 
autónoma dos Açores v Council, the Court permitted two associations to intervene, 
where one was, significantly, a non-economic association.617 As I argue below, the 
salient problem of locus standi in relation to Article 263 TFEU is that general 
interests (such as those of environmental associations) are too broad to satisfy the 
requirement of “individual concern” e.g. the judgment in Greenpeace, which 
prevented that association from raising an action for annulment.618 This is somewhat 
counter-intuitive from a democratic point of view, since the more general the 
interest, the greater the need is ostensibly for those actors to have their interests taken 
into account by the Court. In the context of third party intervention, however, the 
Court is willing to regard environmental interests as sufficient: 
 
An order suspending the Contested Regulation would have a direct effect on fishing 
activities within Azorean waters including the use of fishing gear that may have a 
significant impact on the ecosystem of the Azorean waters, an area which forms the 
principal area of activity of GÊ-Questa. It is, therefore, considered that GÊ-Questa 
has a direct and certain interest in the outcome of the present proceedings.619 
 
Nevertheless, the Court refused standing to intervene in this case to two other 
environmental associations on the basis that their interests were not specifically 
concerned with the geographical area or the particular issues in question. 620 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
617 Região autónoma dos Açores v Council: para 63: “GÊ-Questa is a not-for-profit association for the 
defence of the environment, whose principal responsibilities are the defence and marketing of the 
environment as well as the study and the protection of the national and cultural heritage of the 
Azorean archipelago. The Statute of GÊ-Questa specifically directs it to protect the natural heritage of 
the Azorean archipelago which includes the fish population and marine ecosystems of that 
archipelago.” 
618 Greenpeace: para. 28.  
619 Região autónoma dos Açores v Council: para. 64. 
620  Região autónoma dos Açores v Council: para. 70: “[i]ndeed, despite their expertise and 
involvement in environmental issues, both organisations’ aims and activities cover large geographic 
areas and are not focused exclusively or mainly in Azorean waters … The members and supporters of 
Seas at Risk and WWF are located throughout the world and their interests are even more remote, 
consisting in environmental protection in general.” 
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Therefore, even though the test is less restrictive than that under Article 263 TFEU, a 
balancing exercise will still be undertaken. Moreover, non-privileged actors cannot 
intervene in cases where both the applicant and defendant are either a Member State 
or a Union institution i.e. privileged actors. In this sense, many of the cases, in which 
an institution or organisation with a prima facie affected interest that is too general in 
nature to satisfy the standing criteria of Article 263 TFEU, will also be incapable of 
being accessed through Article 40 SCJ.  
 
Before moving on to consider locus standi in more detail in Section 3.3, it is worth 
considering one final point that brings us back to the inquisitorial roots of the Court’s 
structures and processes. In CIRFS,621 the Court refused standing to intervene to an 
applicant, and, as such, refused to respond to an objection of inadmissibility (in 
relation to the main action) that the applicant intervener raised. The Court pointed 
out that Article 40 SCJ limits the applicant to merely supporting one of the parties in 
the initial application, and, as such, “[i]t follows that the interveners were not entitled 
to raise the objection of inadmissibility, and that the Court is therefore not bound to 
consider the pleas on which they rely.”622 Yet, immediately following this in the 
judgment, the Court continued: “[h]owever, since this is an objection of 
inadmissibility involving public policy considerations, the Court should examine it of 
its own motion under Article 92(2) of the Rules of Procedure”.623 This demonstrates 
another potential effect of rules of access. It shows that even unsuccessful applicants 
can (1) make submissions to the Court (whether or not they will be successful); and 
(2) that the Court may act on those submissions. Of course, in these circumstances, 
with no standing, the failed applicant or intervener will not be able to “dialogue” 
with the Court on the relevant issue. Yet it nonetheless exemplifies a responsive 





621 Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others ν Commission [1993] ECR I-1125 (hereinafter CIRFS). 
622 CIRFS: para 22. 
623 CIRFS: para 23, emphasis added.  
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3.3. Democratic Participation as Litigants 
 
In this section, I present a case-study of the rules of standing for Article 263 TFEU 
(the action for annulment of Union Acts) and of the significance of Article 267 
TFEU (the preliminary rulings procedure) as a mechanism of access. Both of these 
actions are concerned with, broadly, the judicial review of established rules of law. 
As such, they implicate the issue of democratic legitimacy in several ways.624 As 
litigants, actors have the opportunity to vindicate the rights with which they are 
provided by democratically established rules of law. In that context, the processes 
through which the rules of law under review have been established and the notion of 
polycentricism exacerbate the democratic implications of judicial review. On the 
former, the trustee-Court becomes part of the legislative process, clearly emphasising 
its responsibility to be a democratically responsive institution; on the latter, given the 
range of interests potentially affected by judicial review, the trustee-Court must 
prima facie have quite open rules of access, to allow for those actors whose interests 
are at stake to have their say. As mentioned above, this does not mean “access for 
all” – there is a line to be drawn somewhere in order that the trustee-Court can 
function effectively.625 This question is addressed in Section 4. In this Section, I 
present the relevant procedural rules of access that govern these actions, with a view 
to setting up the evaluation in Section 4.  
 
At the outset, it is important to point out that the actions provided for by Article 263 
TFEU and 267 TFEU operate synergistically, insofar as the Court can review the 
validity of Union acts under both mechanisms. It is because of this synergy that the 
debates on locus standi under Article 263 TFEU have developed. The prevailing 
critique (notwithstanding the Lisbon Treaty, discussed below) is that natural and 
legal persons are not afforded sufficient access to the Court of Justice. This issue is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
624 Indeed, much of the literature referred to in Chapter Three – especially the debates between 
political and legal constitutionalists – focuses on the democratic legitimacy of the judicial review of 
legislation.  
625 Gormley argued that the drafters of the EC Treaty designed this action so as not to become an 
“actio popularis”. See Laurence Gormley, “Judicial Review in EC and EU Law – Some Architectural 
Malfunctions and Design Improvements?” (2000) Durham European Law Institute, available at 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/deli/annuallecture/2000_DELI_Lecture.pdf: 5-6. 
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central to the discussion in Section 4 and will be given special attention in this 
Section also. Here, it will be demonstrated, first, that “natural and legal persons” is 
not a uniform category, and that, second, whilst the critiques lament the rules of 
access for individuals, the more salient problem, especially from a democratic 




3.3.1. The Annulment of Union Acts 
 
Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 TEC) gives the Court the jurisdiction to review the 
validity of Union acts; and, should they be found to be invalid, Article 264 TFEU 
empowers the Court to annul the act, or the relevant parts thereof.626 The Court has 
defined a Union act as “any act intended to produce legal effects”.627 So, in addition 
to legislation628 and the processes through which it can be adopted,629 the Court has 
interpreted “Union act” more broadly. For example, in Commission v Council,630 
“conclusions” reached by the Council were held by the Court to generate “legal 
effects” amenable to review under this action.631 The legal framework of Article 263 
TFEU apportions different degrees of access primarily on the basis of the type of 
actor involved: Member States and Union institutions (privileged actors); the Court 
of Auditors, the European Central Bank and the Committee of the Regions (semi-
privileged actors); and natural and legal persons (non-privileged actors). In the 
following analysis, we look at the extent to which each of these categories of actors 
is afforded access to this action, and under what conditions. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
626 The General Court hears these actions at first instance (Article 256 (1) TFEU), except in cases 
brought between Member States and Union institutions (Article 51 SCJ). 
627 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263 (hereinafter ERTA). 
628 According to Article 288 TFEU, these are Regulations, Directives, and Decisions. 
629 These are: the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (Article 289 TFEU); “Delegated Acts” (Article 290 
TFEU); and “Implementing Powers” (Article 291 TFEU).  
630 Case C-27/04 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-06649. 
631 Decisions by the Union’s institutions to initiate legal proceedings are not subject to review in this 
sense. See Joined Cases T-377/00, T-379/00, T-380/00, T-260/01 and T-272/01 Philip Morris 
International and Others v Commission [2003] ECR II-1. Neither are framework decisions that may 
encroach on the competences associated with the former “Community Pillar” (See Case C-170/96 
Commission v Council [1998] ECR I-2763). 
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3.3.1.1. Privileged Actors 
 
In stark contrast to what we see in relation to non-privileged actors, the governments 
or representatives of Member States and the Union’s institutions – namely, the 
Council, the Commission and the European Parliament – have virtually unfettered 
access to this action. Article 263(2) TFEU simply provides that “[the Court] shall for 
this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission”. Critically, in order to raise proceedings 
before the Court, the privileged actors do not need to satisfy any restrictive standing 
criteria.632 They are free to challenge any Union act, regardless of the nature and the 
objective of administrative and legislative acts of the Union. The UK Government 
could feasibly raise an action for annulment against a decision issued to the 
Bulgarian Government. As such, the interest the former has in the case will be 
capable of being expressed to the Court, affected or not. The desirability of this 
privileged degree of access is discussed in Section 4.2. 
 
 
3.3.1.2. Semi-Privileged Actors 
 
There are three actors that enjoy semi-privileged status. They are identified in Article 
263(3) TFEU as the Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank, and the 
Committee of the Regions. These institutions may raise an action for annulment 
under the same conditions as the privileged actors, except that they may only do so 
“for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives.”633 This qualification restricts 
access for these actors depending on the nature of their interest in the case. In other 
words, protecting their prerogatives is virtually synonymous with “affected interests” 
and, as such, presents a relatively uncontroversial test by which this mechanism of 
access can be optimally utilised. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
632 The only relevant restriction that these actors (along with semi-privileged and non-privileged 
actors) face is the two month time-limit (Article 263 (6) TFEU).  
633 Article 8 of Protocol 2 provides that “the Committee of the Regions may also bring such actions 
against legislative acts for the adoption of which the [TFEU] provides that it be consulted.” 
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3.3.1.3. Non-Privileged Actors: Natural and Legal Persons  
 
Historically, the issue of access to annulment proceedings for natural and legal 
persons (the non-privileged actors) has been one of the most significant controversies 
amongst European public lawyers. There is a vast literature and a considerable 
degree of judicial pronouncement on the subject. It is beyond the scope of this 
Chapter to present a comprehensive overview of the debates and jurisprudence; 
instead the key points of contention and law will be highlighted in Section 4.634 They 
key question is, how easily can natural and legal persons participate in the judicial 
review of Union acts? This phrasing also reflects the discussion in Section 3.3.3, in 
which the question is addressed more fully in light of the availability of the 
preliminary rulings procedure to review Union Acts. In this Section, we look at the 
rules of access to Article 263 TFEU for natural and legal persons. Article 263 (4) 
provides three ways for natural and legal persons to raise this action: 
 
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and 
second paragraphs, [1] institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person 
or [2] which is of direct and individual concern to them, and [3] against a regulatory 
act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures 
[emphasis added].635 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
634 For a comprehensive historical overview of these jurisprudential developments and debates see 
Arnull, 2006: Chapter Three and Chapter Four. For a more recent account – discussing the (potential) 
implications of the Lisbon Treaty reforms – see Stephan Balthasar, “Locus Standi Rules For 
Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The New Art.263(4) TFEU” (2010) European 
Law Review Vol. 35 No. 4 542 (hereinafter Balthasar, 2010); and Koen Lenaerts and Nathan 
Cambien, “Regions and the European Court: Giving Shape to the Regional Dimension of the Member 
States” (2010) European Law Review Vol. 35 No. 5 609 (hereinafter Lenaerts and Cambien, 2010). 
635 Latent requirements of standing include natural and legal persons having “legal personality”; and 
“establishing a legal interest”. On legal personality, according to settled case law, there are two tests: 
first, if the legal person has been recognised as such under national legal rules (Case T-161/94 
Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council [1996] ECR II-695 (hereinafter Sinochem): para 31); and, second, if 
a Union institution has treated an organisation as an independent “negotiating body” for the purposes 
of the former’s administration. In Case 175/73 Union Syndicale, Massa and Kortner v Council [1974] 
ECR 917, the Court recognised an ad hoc representative group of employees as an officially 
recognised “trade union”, legitimately acting in the collective interest of its employee members (at 
para. 12). It should also be noted that legal personality does not exclude third country nationals. See 
Sinochem; and Metock. See also Koen Lenaerts and Dirk Arts, Procedural Law of the European 
Union, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1999: 157. On the requirement to establish a legal interest, 
applicants must establish that the annulment of the contested Union act will significantly affect their 
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The first is relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. It is easy to understand, 
for example, a business entity’s right to challenge a fine imposed on it by the 
Commission on the basis of anti-competitive commercial practice e.g. Microsoft in 
Microsoft v Commission.636 Like access for semi-privileged actors, there is a sense of 
evenness and optimality regarding this rule of standing – the natural or legal person’s 
affected interest is palpable, and analogous to the prerogatives of semi-privileged 
actors.  
 
It is the second rule of access that has given rise to controversy and debate. Given the 
broad scope of “Union act”, there are many species of Union law that fall within the 
requirement for the natural or legal person to demonstrate that they are “directly” 
and, most problematically, “individually” concerned therewith. The requirement of 
“direct concern” was clarified by the Court in Les Verts: 
 
It must first be pointed out that the contested measures are of direct concern to the 
applicant association. They constitute a complete set of rules which are sufficient in 
themselves and which require no implementing provisions, since [its application] is 
automatic and leaves no room for any discretion.637 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
interests. This test overlaps with the tests of direct and individual concern: “[w]here the contested act 
exhibits those characteristics, it is rare that that condition of a legal interest will not be satisfied. In 
any event, the existence of a legal interest is one of the elements of admissibility of the action 
examined by the [Union] judicature.” Opinion of Advocate-General Cosmas in Greenpeace: para. 49. 
Moreover, the applicant is not precluded from establishing a legal interest based on the type of interest 
– i.e. whether it is environmental, economic, social, etc. (Greenpeace: Para 50. The type of interest 
can, however, be relevant in the determination of individual concern (discussed below). In Antillean 
Rice Mills and Others v Commission, the CFI decided that the decisive test for the existence of a legal 
interest is whether the annulment of the contested act was “of itself capable of having legal 
consequences” (Joined Cases T-480/93 and T-483/93 Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission 
[1995] ECR II-2305: para 59). See also Case 77/77 BP v Commission [1978] ECR 1513; Case 207/86 
Apesco v Commission [1988] ECR 2151; and Case T-183/97 Micheli and Others v Commission 
[2000] ECR II-28. Indeed, this is what differentiates this test from the test for direct concern. Whereas 
the latter test requires the applicant to demonstrate that the contested measure brings about legal 
consequences on the applicant, the test for legal interest requires the applicant to show that the 
annulment of the contested measure will alter the applicant’s legal situation (by itself, logically 
connected to, and practically the same as, the test of direct concern; though not the same, strictly 
speaking) in such a way that is commensurate with an identifiable interest of the applicant, whatever 
that may be e.g. economic, social or environmental.  
636 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-1491 (hereinafter Microsoft). 
637 Les Verts: para 31, emphasis added.  
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The requirement is that legal effects flow directly from the contested measure, and 
are not subject to any further administrative discretion i.e. no implementing 
provisions. In Greenpeace, for example, the Court held that the applicants were not 
directly concerned by financial aid given by the Commission to the Spanish 
authorities because there was a level of discretion with which the Spanish authorities 
could use that financial assistance – leaving only an “indirect” link between the 
Commission’s act (providing financial assistance) and the issue with which the 
applicants were ultimately concerned (the building of power stations by Spanish 
authorities). This requirement all but excludes EU directives from being reviewed by 
non-privileged actors, since directives “shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods.”638 However, the Court decided in Piraiki-Patraiki that 
even when an act leaves open the possibility of further administrative discretion, if 
that discretion is “entirely theoretical” and if there is “no doubt” as to the intended 
use of that discretion, then that would be sufficient to satisfy the test of direct 
concern. 639  Even though that judgment concerned an applicant challenging a 
decision, and not a directive, this rationale has opened up the possibility of natural 
and legal persons being able to establish that they are directly concerned by 
directives.640 A useful summary of these rules is provided by Lenaerts and Cambien:  
 
The requirement that an act not addressed to the applicant must be of direct concern 
to it expresses the rule that an applicant may bring an action for annulment only 
against acts which, as such, have legal effects on it. The legal consequences for the 
applicant must flow directly from the act, which implies that it should not leave any 
margin of discretion with regard to its implementation. The act’s implementation 




638 Article 288(3) TFEU. 
639 Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki v Commission [1985] ECR 207: para. 9. 
640 See Joined Cases T-172/98 and T-175/98 to 177/98 Salamander AG and Others v Parliament and 
Council [2000] ECR II-2487.  
641 Lenaerts and Cambien, 2010: 611-612.!!
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The requirement of “individual concern” was seminally defined by the Court in 
Plaumann: 
 
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be 
individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes 
which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them 
individually just as in the case of the person addressed.642  
 
That ratio survives to this day as the foundation on which the jurisprudence on 
“individual concern” has been constructed.643 Yet, it is must be observed that this 
foundation is shaky at best. Syntactically, it makes for, and has resulted in, a 
remarkably incoherent jurisprudence – opening its application to all sorts of hostages 
to fortune. In 1962, in Plaumann, the Court rejected the application as inadmissible 
on the basis that the applicant – an importer of clementines – was indistinguishable 
from other importers of clementines in relation to the legal effects of the contested 
measure, holding that “by reason of a commercial activity which may at any time be 
practised by any person”.644 This would tend to suggest that any legislative act would 
be beyond the scope of this requirement, especially regulations, which “shall have 
general application”.645 Yet, in later years, the test has been construed in such a way 
as to grant natural and legal persons standing to challenge the validity of legislative 
acts of the Union, including regulations.646 In Codorniu, the Court considered that 
the applicants were individually concerned by a regulation because it prohibited the 
applicant from using one of its registered trade-marks. The incoherence of the 
Plaumann ratio makes its application to any given applicant legally uncertain. 
Historically, this requirement has been especially contentious because it has proven 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
642 Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95 (hereinafter Plaumann): 107. 
643 See Balthasar, 2010: 544-549. 
644 Supra at note 642. 
645 Article 288(2) TFEU.  
646 See Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853 (hereinafter Codorniu); and Case C-
358/89 Extramet Industrie v Council [1991] ECR I-2501 (hereinafter Extramet). In both of these cases 
the Court gave standing to business entities seeking to annul regulations. 
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to be so restrictive.647 When the Union legislature enacts a rule of law of general 
application, such as a regulation adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, it 
is intuitively difficult to see how a natural or legal person could be individually 
concerned. Indeed, this is referred to as the “closed class” test, where access will 
only be granted to a categorically finite group.648 The demonstrable concern of the 
action’s interlocutors has been that individuals, in particular, are deprived of their 
constitutional right to “a complete system of judicial protection”.649 However, the 
argument here is that the real problem is access for non-economic associations whose 
interests are “general” in nature.  
 
Economic legal persons, such as business entities, are typically the recipients of 
Union decisions, and often their interests are more clearly implicated by other 
species of Union acts. Arnull has identified two ways in which the Court has applied 
the Plaumann formula in this way.650 First, applicants are individually concerned by 
a Union act if it relates to a property right (including an intellectual property right) 
that is peculiar to the applicant e.g. Codorniu. Second, applicants are individually 
concerned by a Union act if “the relevant [Union] legislation has laid down specific 
procedural guarantees for such a person”.651 Furthermore, in Federolio, the General 
Court interpreted individual concern to include: 
 
(a) where a legal provision expressly grants trade associations a series of procedural 
rights; (b) where the association represents the interests of undertakings which 
would be entitled to bring proceedings in their own right; [and] (c) where the 
association is differentiated because its own interests as an association are affected, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
647 See Balthasar, 2010: 542-543. 
648 Arnull, 2006: 78-80. 
649 See especially the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677 (hereinafter UPA): para 62. See also Albertina Albors-
Lorens, “The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the European Court 
of Justice Missed the Boat?” (2003) Cambridge Law Journal Vol. 62 72 (hereinafter, Albors-Lorens, 
2003).  
650 Arnull, 2006: 78-80.  
651 See Case T-60/96 Merck and Others v Commission [1997] ECR II-849: para. 73. 
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and especially where its position as negotiator is affected by the measure which it 
seeks to have annulled.652 
 
By contrast, in Greenpeace, the Court of Justice emphasised that, although the 
standing requirements, and, in particular, the sorts of “interests” applicants are 
required to demonstrate, do not, in principle, exclude non-economic interests: 
 
It has consistently been held that an association formed for the protection of the 
collective interests of a category of persons cannot be considered to be directly and 
individually concerned for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the 
Treaty by a measure affecting the general interests of that category, and is therefore 
not entitled to bring an action for annulment where its members may not do so 
individually.653 
 
The exclusion of “collective interests” that are of “general interest” severely limits 
the extent to which civil society associations can raise actions for annulment of 
Union acts addressed to third parties. In Greenpeace, the applicants were inter alia 
environmental associations, specifically concerned in this case with the damage that 
two power stations would cause to the environment if they were built by the Spanish 
authorities. As well as not being directly concerned by the Commission’s financial 
support given to the Spanish authorities (the contested act, discussed above), the 
Court held that the “general” nature of environmental interests is incompatible with 
the requirements of individual concern and thus refused them standing. Economic 
actors, especially business entities, stand a much better chance of satisfying this 
requirement given that, typically, their purview is confined to the particular interests 
of their stakeholders.654 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
652 Case T-122/96 Federolio v Commission [1997] ECR II-1559 (hereinafter Federolio): paras. 60-61. 
653 Greenpeace: para 59. See also Gormley, 2000.  
654 See Takis Tridimas and Gabriel Gari, “Winners and Losers in Luxembourg: A Statistical Analysis 
of Judicial Review Before the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2001-2005)” 
(2010) European Law Review Vol. 35 No. 2 131 (hereinafter Tridimas and Gari, 2010). Their findings 
show that between 2001 and 2005, “[o]ut of a total of 340 [actions for annulment] … the percentage 
of actions dismissed as inadmissible was considerably higher amongst those lodged by natural persons 
(50 per cent) than those lodged by legal persons (30 per cent)” Tridimas and Gari, 2010: 159-160).  
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The Court has frequently had the opportunity to reform these rules in light of these 
criticisms, especially in light of the forceful Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in 
UPA, in which he argued that: 
 
The only satisfactory solution is therefore to recognise that an applicant is 
individually concerned by a Community measure where the measure has, or is liable 
to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests.655 
 
The Court rejected this argument, however, on the basis that the drafters of the 
Treaty had not meant for this rule of law to be part of the jurisprudence, otherwise 
they would not have explicitly included the requirement of “individual concern” in 
the Treaty – and reasoning, therefore, that the solution must be reform of the 
Treaty.656 
 
The question we must now address is whether or not the advent of the third category 
of access for natural legal persons – the “regulatory act” – introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty compensates for the restrictiveness of the locus standi case law; and the same 
question must also be asked given the availability of the preliminary rulings 
procedure (Section 3.3.2). In Section 4, we go on to address the boundary question in 
view of complete picture presented here in light of the polity-conditions of the EU. 
 
If the contested Union act is a “regulatory act” that is of direct concern and entails no 
implementing measures, natural and legal persons do not have to satisfy the 
requirement of individual concern. What we need to know is the scope of “regulatory 
act”. To what extent does it overlap with the three forms of legislation in Article 288 
TFEU; furthermore, does it relate to the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 289 
TFEU), delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU), and/or implementing acts (Article 291 
TFEU), the latter two being forms of secondary legislation? The advent of this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
655 UPA Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs: para. 102 (4), emphasis not added. 
656 UPA: para 45. This ratio is discussed in Section 3.3.3. See also the interestingly timed and 
competing decisions of the CFI in Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v Commission [2002] ECR II-
2365; and the ECJ in Case C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425, the former 
accepting Advocate General Jacob’s Opinion in UPA, only for it to be overturned by the ECJ in the 
latter.  
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mechanism of access was brought about because of the controversy and 
consternation over the restrictive requirement of individual concern in Article 230 
TEC (pre-Lisbon), as reflected in the reform deliberations.657 In the wake of the 
Lisbon Treaty solution, there were disagreements as to whether or not the term 
“regulatory act” would cover Union acts adopted under the ordinary legislative 
procedure: 
 
[T]he central question is which kinds of Regulations fall under the term “regulatory 
act”. It is common ground that it covers non-legislative acts of general application 
and thus implementing and delegated Regulations adopted under arts 290 and 291(2) 
TFEU; arguably, it also includes Decisions of general application. It is unclear, 
however, whether “regulatory acts” also include Regulations that are adopted 
through a legislative procedure and that are therefore legislative acts under art.289 
(3) TFEU.658 
 
In 2011, the General Court twice confirmed the suspicions of Balthasar by excluding 
acts adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure from the scope of regulatory 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
657 Since the Laeken Declaration (European Council, Laeken Declaration, 14-15 December 2001, 
available at European Council website at: http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm. (hereinafter 
the Laeken Declaration)), there has been a deliberate movement towards a more “democratic” EU; 
attempted, first, by the European Convention and concluded, finally, in 2009 with the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty. Within these protracted deliberations, was a consistent emphasis on reform of the 
standing requirements under the then Article 230(4), specifically in relation to the requirement of 
individual concern, with a view to expanding individuals’ involvement in EU law-making. Indeed, the 
pre-legislative discussion papers and related literature – for both the proposed Constitution and the 
Lisbon Treaty – show that removing this requirement was important for giving individuals a greater 
role in the law-making process and was generally regarded as part of the EU’s move towards greater 
democratic legitimacy. See,generally, the meeting minutes of the Discussion Circle on the Court of 
Justice, available at http://european-
convention.eu.int/doc_register.asp?lang=EN&Content=CERCLEI. See also “A Summary Guide to the 
Treaty of Lisbon”, National Forum on Europe, January 2008: 18. For an overview, see Balthasar, 
2010: 544-547. 
658 Balthasar, 2010: 543-544. See Dougan, 2008: 675-680. Dougan argues that the Convention 
deliberately excluded legislative measures from the meaning of “regulatory acts”. For a contrary view, 
see Lenaerts and Cambien, 2010: 616-619. Lenaerts and Cambien argue that the interpretation given 
to “regulatory acts” with respect to the Lisbon Treaty should not necessarily be drawn from the 
deliberations by the European Convention, given their essentially different purviews. They argue that 
the form and substance of the Lisbon Treaty are sufficiently different from the proposed Constitution 
and support a broader interpretation of “regulatory acts”. 
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act. In Inuit,659 the applicant sought to annul a regulation adopted under the ordinary 
legislative procedure.660 The General Court dismissed the action as inadmissible 
insofar as the term “regulatory act”, whilst applying to acts of general application, 
does not cover legislative acts.661 The Court relied inter alia on the deliberations in 
the run-up to the Constitutional Treaty.662 Subsequently, in Microban663 the General 
Court decided that the term “regulatory act” covered an implementing act of the 
Commission in the form of a decision adopted under Article 291 TFEU.664  
 
This situation relaxes the requirements of standing somewhat, but not in a way that 
would sufficiently enhance access for associations with affected interests of a general 
nature, primarily because the exclusion of legislative acts precludes precisely matters 
of general interest. Of course, much depends on how the Court of Justice interprets 
this new provision on appeal.665 Given the Court’s discretion here, it certainly would 
not be unreasonable for the Court to interpret “regulatory acts” as inclusive of 
legislative measures. Indeed, it is conceivable that the Court might do so, since the 
decisive reason on the basis of which the Court rejected Advocate General Jacobs’ 
recommendation in UPA was because the Treaty explicitly included the requirement 
of individual concern. The legislative history, and its end product (being the removal 
of the requirement of individual concern for regulatory acts), presents the Court with 
another, less “activist”, opportunity to grant private individuals standing to challenge 
legislative acts of the Union. On the contrary, the Court might be minded to uphold 
the reasoning of the GC. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
659 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami EA v Parliament and Council Order of the General Court of 
6 September 2011 (hereinafter Inuit). 
660 Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 on trade in seal products (2009) OJ L 286 36. 
661 Inuit: para. 56. 
662 Inuit: para. 49. 
663 Case T-262/10 Microban v Commission Judgment of 25 October 2011 (hereinafter Microban). 
664 Microban: para 22.  
665 C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami EA v Parliament and Council (pending). For further analysis 
of this emerging jurisprudence, see Steve Peers and Marios Costa, Case Report on Case T-18/10 Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami EA v Parliament and Council (2012) European Constitutional Law Review Vol. 8 
82; and Jürgen Bast, “New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of 
Parliamentarisation in EU Law” (2012) Common Market Law Review Vol. 49 885: 898-907. 
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3.3.2. The Preliminary Rulings Procedure 
 
As we saw in Section 3.1.4 and Section 3.2 of Chapter Five, the preliminary rulings 
procedure under Article 267 TFEU (ex Article 234 TEC) is a key component in 
integrating the legal systems of the Member States with the Union’s legal system. 
This is especially the case because, as we saw, its procedural rules allow any court or 
tribunal of a Member State to make a reference to the Court of Justice. In this 
Section, we consider this procedure as a mechanism of access. In particular, to what 
extent can actors have their affected interests expressed in matters relating to Union 
law? Given the nature of this action, and the overlap of jurisdictions it entails, 
national courts are themselves part of the legal system within which matters of 
Union law are adjudicated. Thinking especially of the twin doctrines of direct effect 
(Van Gend en Loos) and supremacy (Costa v ENEL), national courts, at all levels, 
present actors with forums within which their affected interests vis-à-vis Union law 
can be expressed. As we shall see below, the role of the Court of Justice, and access 
thereto, is relevant also – as a constitutional court with supervisory jurisdiction – and 
entails procedural criteria to be satisfied in order for it to deliver authoritative and 
binding decisions. 
 
Direct effect is a principle that requires national courts to apply EU law where 
relevant in their determination of cases. Broadly speaking, this principle covers all 
species of Union law, including primary (i.e. Treaty provisions) and secondary (see 
Section 3.1, above) legislation, and the decisions of the Court of Justice.666 Of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
666 It is unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis to present a comprehensive overview of the various 
qualifications here. See Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies, and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law 
(2nd Edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011 (hereinafter Chalmers et al, 2011): 268-
300. Of particular note, however, is that directives only enjoy direct effect under very specific 
conditions. Private individuals are able to enforce unimplemented directives that are unconditional 
and sufficiently precise (see Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337) against 
“organisations or bodies which [are] subject to the authority or control of the [Member] State” (Case 
C-188/89 Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313) after the period of transposition of the directive 
into national law has expired (Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1978] ECR 1629) – vertical 
direct effect. Private individuals are, generally speaking, unable to invoke unimplemented directives 
in national courts against other private individuals – horizontal direct effect – (Case 152/84 Marshall 
v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723), except in the 
case of “incidental direct effect”, whereby an organ of the state is implicated in the case as a third 
party (Case C-194/94 CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA and Securitel Sprl [1996] ECR I- 
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particular note here is that direct effect establishes not only that Union law can be 
enforced against Member States that have defaulted on their Union obligations 
(vertical direct effect), but also that private individuals may rely on Union law in 
cases inter se (horizontal direct effect).667 Moreover, rules of national procedural law 
are prohibited from preventing litigants from vindicating rights established by Union 
law in national courts, subject to the requirements of “effectiveness” (that rules of 
national procedural law must not render directly effective species of Union law 
ineffective) and “equivalence” (that restrictive rules of national law are only 
permissible if they are applied consistently in substantive areas of law that are not 
germane to Union law i.e. that they are “no less favourable than the rules governing 
actions for safeguarding an individuals rights under national provisions”).668 In the 
situation where a national court cannot, or does not, apply Union law, the Member 
State may be liable to a claim in damages, which is actionable in national courts i.e. 
state liability.669 The principle of supremacy complements these rules,670 whereby 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2201; and Joined Cases C-152/07 and C-154/07 Arcor v Bundesrepublic Deutschland [2008] ECR I-
5959); and in the case of “indirect effect” where the national court is required to interpret national law 
insofar as is possible in light of unimplemented directives (Von Colson; and Case C-106/89 
Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA  [1990] ECR I-4135). 
667 Van Gend en Loos; and Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (No. 2) [1976] ECR 455. On regulations, 
see Case 93/71 Leonesio v Italian Ministry of Agriculture [1972] ECR 293. On directives, see ibid. 
668  The seminal judgment in Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz v Landwirtschaftskammr für das 
Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 established these rules. On effectiveness, see Factortame (the ECJ 
prescribing that national courts must allow interim protection vis-à-vis Union law, in order that the 
rules of Union law are not deprived of their effectiveness). See also C-465/93 Atlanta [1995] ECR I-
3761: para 42; and Case C-432/05 Unibet v Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271 (hereinafter Unibet): 
para 64 (where the lack of available national procedures gave rise to a prima facie obligation on the 
Swedish legal system to allow for an action with a view to permitting the litigant to raise a reference 
to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, discussed infra). On equivalence, see Unibet: para 52. 
See also Case C-326/96 Levez v Jennings [1998] ECR I-7835: paras 41-53 (on time limits imposed by 
national procedural rules). Moreover, these requirements also apply in horizontal cases (see Case C-
453/99 Courage Ltd. v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297). 
669 See Joined Cases C-6/90 and Case C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357: para 
33. These rules also apply in areas of law that are not directly effective in national courts (see Joined 
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany [1996] ECR I-1029). As we shall see 
below, the principle of state liability can also be activated where national courts of last instance do not 
make a reference to the Court of Justice when, according to the Union’s procedural rules under Article 
267 TFEU, they are required to (see Case C-224/01 Köbler v Austria [2003] ECR I-10239 (hereinafter 
Köbler): para. 55).  
670 Indeed, in its inception (Costa v ENEL) it was justified on the basis that direct effect and the 
effectiveness of Union law would be deprived in the absence of this principle.  
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rules of national law that conflict with Union law are to be “disapplied” by national 
courts.671 
 
The democratic significance of this, in terms of the intrinsic virtue of participation, is 
highly significant. From a socio-legal perspective (and, as we shall see in Section 4, 
also from a comparative perspective), the complementary doctrines of direct effect 
and supremacy provide actors with an (atypical) exceptional opportunity to express 
their views within the overarching architecture of the Union legal system. The fact 
that any court (or tribunal) is bound by these rules, and, by association, can make 
references to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, avoids the economic 
pitfalls associated with appellate jurisdictions. Moreover, national courts of first 
instance will not generally exclude categories of actors from their rules of standing – 
allowing privileged, semi-privileged, and natural and legal persons to access the 
Union legal system in order to express their affected interests.672 We must also 
consider national courts themselves as relevant actors, since they too have vested 
interests (holistic, as we saw in Chapter Five, but which may be disaggregated into 
particular interests, perhaps systemic or doctrinal) that are implicated by the 
overlapping jurisdiction of the Union legal system.673 In democratic terms, as we saw 
in Section 2.2, access to democratic participation overlaps with instrumental virtues 
of democratic legitimacy – in particular, the polity-constitutive, democracy-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
671 Case 106/77 Simmenthal (Italian Finance Administration) v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. See also 
Factortame I, Factortame, and Factortame II. See CJEU, Information Note on References from 
National Courts for a Preliminary Ruling (2009) OJ C 297/01 (hereinafter CJEU, Information Note on 
267 TFEU): Point 8. See also Case 28-30/62 Da Costa en Schakke NV v Nederlandse 
Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 31 (hereinafter Da Costa). The issue of supremacy is a complex 
area of legal and political analysis, especially in terms of the competing claims to kompetenz-
kompetenz and constitutional supremacy. For a fuller discussion, see Section 2.2 of Chapter One, 
especially the discussion on the Solange and reverse-Solange jurisprudence; and Section 2.1 of 
Chapter Two, on the existential debate.   
672 Indeed, the Court recently decided that it was not contrary to the Charter for the Commission to 
raise an action, subsequently referred to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, before a 
national court. See Case C‑199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and others Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) 6 November 2012.!
673  Nyikos argues that, given their discretion, national judiciaries use the preliminary rulings 
procedure as a means of directing the meaning and application of Union law according to their own 
juridical preferences. In particular, she demonstrates empirically how national courts have used the 
provision of  “pre-emptive opinions” (in their summary of the legal and factual circumstances, 
discussed above) as effective “rhetorical weapons” designed to secure their desired interpretation of 
Union law (Nyikos, 2006: 527-530). 
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generative aspects. The system created through the preliminary rulings procedure is 
of great significance here too. As Stone Sweet puts it: 
 
Litigants and their interests are understood to be fuelling a machine operated by 
judges. In this view, legal integration develops a self-sustaining logic. In announcing 
the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, the ECJ opened up the European legal 
system to private parties, undermined certain constitutional orthodoxies in place in 
Continental legal systems, and radically enhanced the potential effectiveness of EC 
law within the Member States. Private actors, motivated by their own interests, 
provided a steady supply of litigation capable of provoking [Article 267 TFEU] 
activity.674 
 
The questions we are now concerned with relate to the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice within this system. The actors/litigants before national courts – 
expressing and negotiating their affected interests vis-à-vis Union law – are 
ultimately subject to the constitutional authority of the Court’s interpretation of 
Union law. As well as this mandate being expressed in Article 19(1) TEU, the 
national courts, when making a reference, are bound to adopt the interpretation of 
Union law provided by the Court of Justice.675  
 
In Section 3.3.2.1, we consider the access of actors to the supervisory jurisdiction of 
the Court in relation to questions of interpretation of Union law. In Section 3.3.2.2, 
we consider two issues. First, the accessibility question in relation to references made 
by national courts on the validity of Union law; and, second, the extent to which this 
access compensates for the difficulties associated with locus standi for natural and 





674 Stone Sweet, 2004: 21. 
675 See Case C-306/99 BIAO v Finanzamt für Grossunternehmen in Hamburg [2003] ECR I-1: para. 
92 (although this was doubted by Advocate General Jacobs in paragraph 50 of his Opinion). See 
Article 91 RPCJ and Article 104(1) RPCJ, which provide that the judgments and orders in preliminary 
rulings are binding.  
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3.3.2.1. Accessibility and References on the Interpretation of Union Law 
 
In references on the interpretation of Union law, the Court interprets Union law on 
behalf of national courts seeking to determine its applicability in cases before the 
national court. The Court can give interpretations of any species of Union law, 
including legislation, and binding and non-binding administrative acts of the Union’s 
institutions,676 which can have the result of national courts disapplying rules of 
national law.677 The Court cannot, however, give rulings on matters of fact before the 
national court,678 nor can it interpret provisions of national law.679  
 
There are two main procedural hurdles for litigants within the Article 267 procedure: 
the discretion of national courts to make a reference; and the Court’s rules on when 
national courts may, must and cannot make a reference. On the discretion of national 
courts to make a reference, the general position under Article 267(2) TFEU is that a 
national court can make a reference “if it considers that a decision on the question is 
necessary to enable it to give judgment” (emphasis added). The Court has 
consistently held that: 
 
[N]ational courts have the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court of 
Justice if they consider that a case pending before them raises questions involving 
interpretation, or consideration of the validity, of provisions of [Union] law, 
necessitating a decision [emphasis added].680 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
676 See Case C-322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles [1989] ECR 4407. 
677 Factortame, Factortame I, and Factortame II. 
678 Case C-435/97 WWF and Others [1999] ECR I-5613. 
679 Case C-295/97 Piaggio [1999] ECR I-3735. There is some confusion on this point, however. In 
Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi v Belgium [1990] ECR I-3763, the Court of Justice ruled 
that it had jurisdiction to interpret national law when “the national law of a Member State refers to the 
content of [provisions of Union law] in order to determine rules applicable to a situation which is 
purely internal to that State” (at para. 36). See also Article 104(2) RPCJ, which allows national courts 
to re-refer rulings that they deem not to have sufficiently enabled it to deliver a judgment. For a full 
discussion on the blurring of this boundary – conceptually and empirically – see Arnull, 2006: 107-
114; and Silvere Lefevre, “The Interpretation of Community Law by the Court of Justice in Areas of 
National Competence” (2004) European Law Review Vol. 29 No. 4 501: 508.!
680 Case 166/73 Rheinmüllen v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1974] ECR 33: para. 4. It was 
decided in Da Costa that Article 177 TEEC (now Article 267 TFEU) always allows a national court to 
make a reference if it feels it is desirable, and even if materially similar references have already been 
made. See CJEU, Information Note on 267 TFEU: Points 20-24. A referring courts is invited to, “if it 
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Litigants must therefore convince the national court to make a reference if it is their 
intention to deliberate with the Court of Justice. Access here is, therefore, dependent 
on rules of national procedural law, which may differ across the legal systems within 
each of the 27 Member States.681 In terms of Union law, the position is that the 
national court has sole discretion in situations where the national court is not 
compelled to make a reference by the Treaty; national courts are not obliged to make 
a reference simply because a party raises a question of Union law.682 Indeed, the 
Court of Justice makes this point explicit in its directions to national courts on how 
to make references: 
 
It is for the national court alone to decide whether to refer a question to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling, whether or not the parties to the main proceedings 
have requested it to do so.683 
!
This means that the case presented to the Court of Justice does not necessarily reflect 
the interests of the litigants themselves. For example, even though litigants are 
invited to make written submissions and take part in oral proceedings, 684 they do not 
choose the questions that form the principal subject-matter of the preliminary ruling 
– in contrast to the position of party-litigants in annulment proceedings, whose legal 
and factual submissions in their initial application form the principal parameters of 
the case.!
 
This basic framework has been further developed by the Court’s rules on when 
national courts may, must, and cannot make references. On the latter, the Court has 
established criteria on the accessibility of a reference, based on the questions that 
have been drafted by the national court, and the nature of the proceedings therein. It 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
considers itself able, briefly state its view on the answer to be given to the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling.” (Point 23). 
681 It is beyond the scope of this research to determine empirically and illustrate these national rules.  
682 CILFIT: para. 9.  
683 CJEU, Information Note on 267 TFEU: Point 10. 
684 See Article 23 SCJ, and Article 97 RPCJ. Note, however, Article 97 (3) RPCJ, which provides: 
“[a]s regards the representation and attendance of the parties to the main proceedings in the 
preliminary ruling procedure the Court shall take account of the rules of procedure of the national 
court or tribunal which made the reference.” 
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is for the referring court to choose the questions, and to ensure that the request for a 
preliminary ruling satisfies the procedural criteria. These criteria emphasise the 
discretion conferred on referring courts by laying down precise instructions to enable 
referring courts to articulate effectively the questions that they deem to be “necessary 
to enable [them] to give judgment”.685 Indeed, the Court of Justice will refuse to hear 
a preliminary ruling from a national court if the latter’s reference is not sufficiently 
explained.686 Furthermore, the Court of Justice has taken a very dim view of litigants 
before national courts that have ostensibly contrived cases in order to access the 
Court of Justice. In Foglia v Novello,687 for example, the Italian national court 
referred questions on the interpretation of Union law with respect to French law – the 
result of which (for the Court of Justice to rule that French law was incompatible 
with Union law) was shared by both parties pleading before the Italian court. The 
Court of Justice refused to answer the questions referred on the basis that the Court’s 
remit, with respect to its jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings, is to assist national 
courts to resolve genuine disputes and not to be used for strategic purposes: 
 
It must in fact be emphasized that the duty assigned to the Court by [Article 267 
TFEU] is not that of delivering advisory opinions on general or hypothetical 
questions but of assisting in the administration of justice in the Member States. It 
accordingly does not have jurisdiction to reply to questions of interpretation which 
are submitted to it within the framework of procedural devices arranged by the 
parties in order to induce the Court to give its views on certain problems of [Union] 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
685 See CJEU, Information Note on 267 TFEU: Points 20 – 24. Referring courts are invited to, “if it 
considers itself able, briefly state its view on the answer to be given to the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling.” (Point 23). 
686 Joined Cases C-320/90, C-321/90 and C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo v Circostel [1993] ECR I-393. 
In this decision, the Court of Justice refused to give a preliminary ruling on the questions referred by 
the Italian national court on the grounds that the Italian court had not adequately explained the factual 
and legislative background to the case that necessitated a reference to the Court of Justice. Exceptions 
to this rule include: when a ruling by the Court is very important (Case C-316/93 Vaneetveld [1994] 
ECR I-763); or if the deficiencies are remedied at a later stage in the proceedings (Case C-35/99 
Arduino [2002] ECR I-1529). See also Article 101 RPCJ, which allows the Court of Justice to request 
that the national court clarifies its reference. 
687 Case 104/79 Foglia v Novello [1980] ECR 745; and Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] ECR 
3045 (hereinafter Foglia II).  
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law which do not correspond to an objective requirement inherent in the resolution 
of a dispute.688 
 
There are also procedural rules that determine when national courts may and must 
refer questions on the interpretation of Union law. Article 267(2) TFEU provides that 
national courts “may” make a reference, whereas Article 267(3) TFEU goes on to 
state that “[w]here any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or 
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court [emphasis 
added].” Prima facie, this means that courts of last instance, when faced with 
questions on the interpretation of Union law, are under a duty to refer, which, if not 
carried out, may give rise to Member State liability (Köbler).689 Any other national 
court has the discretion to make that determination for itself, which will not render 
the Member State liable.690  
 
Yet, in CILFIT, the Court of Justice provided national courts – including courts of 
last instance – with a set of criteria that permit them not to refer in certain 
circumstances. This is referred to as the acte clair doctrine, and it relates to the 
complexity of proposed questions. In Da Costa, the Court of Justice held that 
national courts may refer questions that are materially identical to questions referred 
in previous preliminary rulings proceedings, but that, in that event, the Court of 
Justice will simply refer the national court to the original judgment. This rationale 
was developed in CILFIT, in which the Court concluded that, in those circumstances, 
national courts – including national courts of last instance – are permitted to make 
the interpretation of Union law themselves, where: 
 
... the correct application of [Union] law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
688 Foglia II: para 18, emphasis added. In Case C-83/91 Meilicke v ADV/ORGA [1992] ECR I-4871, 
the Court refused a reference from a German court in which a German jurist posed a hypothetical 
legal problem. See, however, Tridimas, 2003: 23-24. 
689 The duty is not affected by the discontinuance of infringement proceedings by the Commission on 
the same issue. See Case C-393/98 Gomes Valente [2001] ECR I-1327.   
690 Case C-99/00 Lyckeskog [2002] ECR I-4839. 
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specific characteristics of [Union] law, the particular difficulties to which its 
interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the 
[Union].691 
 
This can be extended to questions in which the points of law have been clearly 
established, but the facts and/or questions at issue are not strictly identical. National 
courts are thus empowered to provide their own interpretation of Union law, 
foregoing jurisprudential dialogue with the Court of Justice. The acte clair doctrine 
thus potentially undermines access, as it provides national courts with a legal basis 
on which to refrain from making a reference, even when there are legitimate 
questions on the interpretation of Union law raised in national proceedings – 
precluding access to the Court of Justice’s supervisory jurisdiction.692 
 
 
3.3.2.2. Accessibility and References on the Validity of Union Acts 
 
Much the same rules of access outlined in Section 3.3.2.1 apply to references on the 
validity of Union acts.693 Where any national court or tribunal of a Member State 
entertains doubts as to the validity of a Union act in a relevant case, it must refer the 
matter to the Court of Justice. In terms of the discretion of the national court, 
especially from the perspective of strategically motivated litigants, the procedural 
rules are the same. The Court will only hear references that are germane to genuine 
disputes; and it is for the national court – not the litigants – to determine whether or 
not a reference is needed for adjudication. There are, however, some qualifications 
that differentiate this type of reference from the former. In particular, should the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
691 CILFIT: Para 16.  
692 The acte clair doctrine has been criticised on different grounds. Tridimas demonstrates its abuse 
with an example of a Greek national court, in which, he argues, the Greek national court’s 
interpretation of Union law was “not supported by the Court’s case law on mutual recognition and 
appears to be incorrect. In any event, given that a substantial number of the Conseil d’Etat members 
dissented, it must be accepted, at the very least, that the issue was not acte clair. The Conseil d’Etat 
clearly exceeded its CILFIT mandate.” See Tridimas, 2003: 43. See also Arnull, 2002. Tridimas does 
argue, however, that “[a]cte clair is an indication of maturity in the development of the Community 
legal order.” See Tridimas, 2003: 12.  
693 Unlike references on interpretation, the Court of Justice cannot review the validity of Treaty 
provisions, only Union acts as under Article 263 TFEU. 
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national court decide that the validity of a Union act is relevant in order for it to give 
judgment, it must refer to the Court – regardless of whether or not it is a court of last 
instance.694 This is so even when a similar reference has been made by another 
national court.695 The doctrine of acte clair does not apply in these instances.696 The 
other qualification to note is that litigants who would otherwise have had standing to 
challenge the validity of the impugned Union Act under Article 263 TFEU, but have 
missed the two month deadline, are unable to have the national court make this type 
of reference.697  
 
The question that we must now address is, given this procedure, and these 
qualifications, are the restrictive rules of standing for natural and legal persons under 
Article 263 TFEU redressed? This question is all the more pertinent since the Court’s 
insistence on retaining the requirement of individual concern was, in part, premised 
on the argument that Article 267 TFEU provides “a complete system of judicial 
remedies” – thus redressing the concerns of the critics of standing under Article 
230(4) TEC.698 The starting point is to consider the detailed and systematic Opinion 
of Advocate General Jacobs in UPA, who addresses precisely this question. AG 
Jacobs’ argument is that the availability of Article 267 TFEU does not address the 
deficits in Article 263 TFEU (Lisbon reforms notwithstanding, which came after his 
Opinion). His argument is essentially two-fold: that the procedural rules discussed 
above do not provide a complete system of judicial remedies; and that it should be 
the CFI (now the General Court) that hears these actions, not the Court of Justice.699 
On the former, he argued that the requirement in Foto-Frost – that all national courts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
694 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199 (hereinafter Foto-Frost). 
Arnull argues that it would be anathema to the Union system – especially the objective of uniformity 
– for national courts unilaterally to invalidate Union law. See Arnul, 2006: 125. 
695 R v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, ex parte ED and F Man Sugar Ltd. [1986] 2 ALL 
ER 126 (Queens Bench Division).  
696 The only exception to this rule is that national courts may suspend the application of Union acts in 
the interim, so long as there are ongoing proceedings challenging the validity of the same Union act. 
See Factortame: para 22, in light of the judgments in Factortame I and II. See also Joined Cases C-
143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1991] ECR I-415: para 
18. Moreover, the national court must use the same test under Union law for enforcing interim 
measures (Article 279 TFEU) – see Foto-Frost: para. 33.  
697 Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf v Germany [1994] ECR I-833 (hereinafter TWD). 
698 UPA: 6734. 
699 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs: paras 36-49. See also Arnull, 2006: 131. 
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must refer – means that litigants cannot vindicate their rights at the national level;700 
related to that, the wide discretion given to national courts as to whether or not to 
make a reference results in procedural gaps that might encourage litigants to break 
the rules in order to make a reference, 701  time-delays (given the protracted 
proceedings of the preliminary rulings procedure),702 and, thus, legal uncertainty. On 
his preference for the General Court to hear these actions, AG Jacobs argued that 
litigants would have direct access to the Court and thus be able to express their 
viewpoints more effectively;703 that raising these actions would be published in the 
OJ, and thus also allow for third party intervention;704 and, finally, that the two 
month time-limit would apply and lead to greater legal certainty.705 He also rejected 
the argument that there would be a “deluge” of cases if the standing requirements 
were relaxed; arguing that there is no comparative evidence to support that claim; 
that similar applications could be dealt with together; and that the rules of procedure 
could be reformed in such a way as to accommodate a greater volume of 
applications.706 In light of these observations, he concluded: 
 
[A]n individual should be regarded as individually concerned within the meaning of 
the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC by a Community measure where, by reason 
of his particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial 
adverse effect on his interests [emphasis added].707 
 
This Opinion received great support from the scholarly community, and was surely 
one of the forces that lead to subsequent legal developments. In Unibet, for example, 
the Court held that: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
700 Ibid, para. 41. 
701 Ibid, para 43. See also Laurence Gormley, “Judicial Review: Advice for the Deaf?” (2006) 
Fordham International Law Journal  Vol. 29 655 (hereinafter Gormley, 2006): 661, 681. 
702 Ibid, para 42. 
703 Ibid, para. 46. 
704 Ibid, para. 47. 
705 Ibid, para.48. This was one of the key rationales supporting Albors-Llorens’ evaluation of these 
rules (Albors-Llorens, 2003: 85). 
706 Ibid, paras. 79-81. See also Albors-Llorens, 2003: 89-90; and Gormley, 2006: 676. 
707 Ibid, para. 103. 
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[I]t is clear from paragraphs 56 to 61 above that Unibet must be regarded as having 
available to it legal remedies which ensure effective judicial protection of its rights 
under [Union] law. If, on the contrary, as mentioned at paragraph 62 above, it was 
forced to be subject to administrative or criminal proceedings and to any penalties 
that may result as the sole form of legal remedy for disputing the compatibility of 
the national provision at issue with Community law, that would not be sufficient to 
secure for it such effective judicial protection [emphasis added].708 
 
The Court thus concluded that, in such a situation, the Swedish authorities ought to 
ensure that there are procedural means available for litigants to access national courts 
such that they can activate a reference, subject to the discretion of the national court. 
There is a prima facie argument to be made that the same ratio ought to apply to 
references on the validity of Union acts – responding to the concerns of AG Jacobs 
and others that, in order to vindicate rights established by Union law, litigants would 
have to break the law. The feasibility of this argument is less convincing, since it 
does not require Member States to establish new and open-ended legal procedures. 
More persuasively, the reforms in the Lisbon Treaty go some way towards 
addressing these concerns (discussed in Section 3.3.1.3). Indeed, Balthasar 
optimistically argued that “regulatory act” be adopted in line with AG Jacobs’ 
Opinion, pointing out that it was part of the history of reform.709 Yet, as we saw 
above, the General Court has (tentatively) only relaxed this requirement in relation to 
non-legislative acts.  
 
As compelling as AG Jacobs’ analysis was, it must be noted, contrary to prevailing 
support, that he was wrong, on two counts. First, the Court in UPA did what any 
good trustee-court ought to do, which is dutifully to apply the established rules of 
law, irrespective of convincing arguments to the contrary. It is anathema to the 
trustee-Court’s primary fiduciary duties – and, thus, its instrumental democratic 
legitimacy –so flagrantly to dispense with the terms of the trust (in this case, a Treaty 
provision, no less). Indeed, as we have seen, this was one of the Court’s primary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
708 Unibet: para. 62. 
709 Balthasar, 2010: 543-544. 
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justifications for not adopting AG Jacobs’ radical legal transformation.710 Second, 
AG Jacobs’ account of access to the Court is somewhat myopic. It omits from the 
analysis various other standards of legitimacy, a comparative perspective, and, 
relatedly, the distinctive polity-conditions of the EU. In Section 4, we go on to 
consider this question of boundary, assessing the extent to which access to 
democratic participation in the Court of Justice strikes the right balance. 
 
 
4. Questions of Balance: Understanding Access to Democratic Participation in 
the EU 
 
In this Section, we turn to consider the appropriateness of the current distribution of 
access between different actors’ interests. Is there too much access for privileged 
actors? Is there not enough for civil society actors? We thus consider the criteria by 
which appropriate boundaries can be set for apportioning levels of access for these 
actors. In Section 4.1, we look at the prevailing approaches in the literature to this 
question, and determine the shortfalls and gaps therein. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 then 




4.1. Diagnostic Problems and Solutions 
 
In the literature on access to judicial review in the Court of Justice, there are four 
shortcomings that, as indicated above in relation to AG Jacobs’ analysis in UPA, 
present an unfair account of the issue of access. These are: a myopic preoccupation 
with particular values of good governance; a general neglect of the salient problem 
of access as being one that affects associations of (non-economic) “general interests” 
(as observed in Section 3.3.1.1); a non-comparative approach; and the neglect of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
710 Albors-Llorens disagrees with this position, arguing that the Court has historically adopted radical 
“teleological” interpretations of Union law; providing the invocation of State liability in Francovich 
as an example. See Albors-Llorens, 2003: 90. For a similar argument, see Gormley, 2006: 674.  
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distinctive polity-conditions of the EU (recalling the three C’s of EU 
Constitutionalism), especially the pervasive debate on finalité. In this Section, these 
shortfalls will be addressed with a view to setting up the arguments presented in 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
In the literature (and in the jurisprudence of the Court), there are certain key values 
that emerge which guide a normative assessment of the apportionment of access (i.e. 
the question of balance). These values are: adherence to the rule of law; ensuring an 
effective or complete system of judicial remedies; legal certainty; the requirement of 
uniformity; and the control of the increasing workload of the Union’s courts. Arnull, 
for example, argues: 
 
It is submitted that the annulment action strikes a better balance than the reference 
procedure between the competing interests at stake when the validity of a [Union] 
act is challenged. The principle of legality requires unlawful acts to be quashed after 
a thorough review of their validity. This implies adversarial proceedings in which 
the institution which adopted the act plays a full part and all the relevant issues are 
examined. The principle of legal certainty requires the question of an act’s validity 
to be resolved within a reasonable period of its adoption so that those affected by the 
act can have confidence in the legal context within which they conduct their affairs. 
The right to an effective remedy entitles those who are adversely affected by an act 
to bring proceedings before a court with jurisdiction to rule on its legality. Although 
the preliminary rulings procedure may sometimes seem to safeguard one or other of 
those principles more effectively than the annulment action, only the latter action is 
able to protect all of them simultaneously. 711 
 
Arnull, like AG Jacobs in UPA, stresses that the preliminary rulings procedure does 
not present an effective alternative for natural and legal persons who fail to establish 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
711 Arnull, 2006: 131, emphasis added. On legal certainty and jurisprudential complexity, see Albors-
Llorens, 2003: 85, 92. On judicial protection of the individual, see Gormley, 2006: 688. See also 
Balthasar, 2010; Lenaerts and Cambien, 2010; Koen Lenaerts and Tim Corthaut, “Judicial Review 
and a Contribution to the Development of European Constitutionalism” (2003) Yearbook of European 
Law 1; and Stefan Enchelmaier, “No-One Slips Through the Net? Latest Developments, and Non-
Developments, in the European Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence on Art. 230 (4) EC” (2005) Yearbook 
of European Law Vol. 24 173. 
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the standing criteria under the annulment procedure, which, consequently, cannot be 
justified as it offends higher order values that must take precedence i.e. the principle 
of legality, legal certainty and the right to an effective remedy. The debate on this 
issue is thus derived from a disagreement over the implementation of these values, 
rather than over the normative weight of the values themselves. The Court and the 
commentators are in agreement that, for example, rule of law requirements of 
“legality” or “the right to a judicial remedy” take precedence. Where the analytical 
confusion emerges is the failure, by both the Court and the commentators, adequately 
to frame these higher order values in a relational way. Rather than discuss the 
synergies and tensions between these values – and a broader normative rationale 
within which to reconcile and implement them coherently – discussion and debate 
over the organisation of the Court’s procedures and processes tends to frame 
analyses in a narrow way, incongruously generating a plethora of values with which 
to justify very particular institutional claims.  
 
The literature tends to give the greatest attention to the “private individual”, or 
sometimes, “trade associations”, as the categories of actors that are most severely 
affected by the problems associated with access. 712 Yet, as we saw in Section 
3.3.1.1, the counter-intuitive requirement of applicants demonstrating affected 
interests peculiar to them as a “closed-class” of actor (qua Plaumann) most severely 
disenfranchises the association whose interests are general in nature e.g. the 
environmental association; and that these rules are relatively relaxed for the interests 
of economic associations. Moreover, the interpretation of “regulatory act” by the 
General Court to date only partially redresses these concerns, given the exclusion of 
legislative acts. Albors-Llorens curtly addresses the concerns of “pressure groups” in 
a somewhat dismissive way, given the strength with which she supports AG Jacobs’ 
Opinion in UPA more generally: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
712 See generally Llorens, 2003; Gormley, 2006; and Balthasar, 2010. Indeed, this was the focus of 
AG Jacobs’ Opinion in UPA. 
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[A]lthough the standing of pressure groups such as environmental associations 
would be difficult to establish under either test, the Jacobs test seemed more suitable 
for assessing the locus standi of trade associations.713 
 
For her, like others, it is the “private party” that we should be most concerned about 
– her contribution stressing “the unsatisfactory position of private parties who might 
wish to challenge [Union] acts”.714  
 
Yet the individual is not quite so severely disenfranchised by these rules of access, 
and the position of (non-economic) associations with “general interests” should be a 
greater focus of concern. First, most individuals are relatively unconcerned with the 
sorts of policy initiatives that give rise to the adoption of Union acts.715 Yet, even 
when they have a demonstrable interest in a Union act’s substance, the extent to 
which they can access proceedings for judicial review thereof is, as we shall see 
below, actually comparatively stronger than the typical position in national and 
transnational courts. More pertinently, however, there are strong reasons to support 
the proposition that (non-economic) associations with general interests deserve 
greater attention in the literature; and, more importantly, greater access to judicial 
review of Union acts. As we saw in Section 2.1, the intrinsic virtue of democratic 
participation (and thus the associated issue of access) overlaps with the intrinsic 
virtue of representation – democratic participation as epistemic representation. As 
such, (non-economic) associations with general interests (hereinafter epistemic 
associations) fulfil a core democratic function in a democratic society – that of 
representing disaggregated interests as they emanate from civil society. Given that 
epistemic associations’ interests are of a general nature, they will represent the 
affected interests of large groups of individuals via the association itself. As such, 
these associations should be granted access to judicial review of Union acts, because 
such general interests will often be implicated in Union legislation. Moreover, 
because they represent, greater access would prevent a plethora of individual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
713 Albors-Llorens, 2003: 85-86.  
714 Albors-Llorens, 2003: 92. 
715 Indeed, this is empirically verified by Moravscik (see Moravscik 2002: 615-617).  
    Chapter Six 






applicants from raising actions on these bases – their affected interests converging 
through the representation of the epistemic association. The extent to which the 
correct balance has been struck, vis-à-vis the boundary question, with respect to 
epistemic associations (qua natural and legal persons) is addressed in Section 4.3 
below. The other neglected category of actor in the debates is the privileged actors. 
This is perhaps because they have virtually unfettered access to judicial review of 
Union acts directly via Article 263 TFEU. Nevertheless, the boundary question 
should still be addressed here – do they enjoy too much access? This issue is 
addressed in Section 4.2. 
 
The third weakness of the debates on access is the neglect of the comparative 
context. In spite of the limitations observed in Section 3.3, the fact that natural and 
legal persons can challenge the validity of legislation in an apex court should be 
recognised to be quite special protection of their rights, and atypical when compared 
to national and transnational courts. Given the appellate structure in the UK and the 
US, for example, individuals cannot raise direct actions at first instance before the 
UK Supreme Court or the US Supreme Court respectively. Nor, for the same reason, 
can they do so indirectly by making references thereto. As we saw in Section 4.1.1 of 
Chapter Four, individuals can raise direct actions before the ECtHR. Yet there are 
two problems with this. First is that “[the ECtHR] may only deal with the matter 
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally 
recognised rules of international law”.716 This qualification reduces the direct nature 
of the action to one of an especially burdensome appellate system. Moreover, 
applicants cannot make references to the ECtHR. Second, as we saw in Section 4.1.1 
of Chapter Four, there are only two actions available to raise in the ECtHR, both of 
which have the principal effect of awarding damages to aggrieved applicants. They 
are thus not actions for judicial review in the orthodox functional sense, whereby the 
reviewing court can authoritatively strike down impugned legislation. Indeed, this is 
a problem we observed in relation to the UK Supreme Court, in Section 4.1.2 of 
Chapter Four, which also lacks the jurisdiction to strike down primary legislation, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
716 Article 35(1) ECHR, emphasis added. 
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and, where it can strike down secondary legislation, or interpret legislation in a novel 
way, it is subject to the strong ex post mechanism of control through the doctrine of 
parliamentary legislative supremacy, which means that Parliament can overturn or 
reverse those decisions. The fact that natural and legal persons can challenge the 
validity of Union acts both directly and indirectly in the Union’s apex Court at all 
must be recognised as being atypical and exceptional, and this must be factored into 
the appraisals of access to judicial review in the Court of Justice. 
 
The fourth, and final, criticism of the literature is that the debates give only a very 
sparse consideration, if at all, to the distinctive polity context of the EU and to the 
relevance of the deep controversy over finalité. The claims famously propounded by 
the Court in Les Verts, that the EU is a polity “based on the rule of law” and that the 
Treaty is a “basic constitutional charter”, prima facie present quite compelling 
organisational logics for the design of the Court’s procedures. Indeed, as we have 
seen, commentators will often justify particular institutional claims on these 
premises. Yet, viewed in abstract terms, the notion of the “rule of law”, for example, 
presents more of a rhetorical means by which to justify these claims. Notions like 
the rule of law, a complete system of judicial remedies and legal certainty are 
concepts that have been borrowed from the constitutional orthodoxies that underpin 
the modern nation-state, which we know the EU is not. How does the rule of law 
apply in the sui generic EU, for example? To put this into context, consider, for 
example, a claim made by the Court when considering the issue of standing under 
Article 263(4) TFEU for (trade) associations:  
 
The very nature of the process of preparing legislative acts and of such acts 
themselves, as measures of general application, is such that the participation, by 
virtue of those principles, of the persons and/or associations affected is not required, 
their interests being deemed to be represented by the political authorities called upon 
under the Treaty to adopt those acts.717 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
717 See Federolio: para. 75. The General Court also advanced the same point of view in Case T-109/97 
Molkerei Grossbraunshain and Bene Nahrungsmittel v Commission [1998] ECR II-3533, also arguing 
that, for the purposes of interest representation in the legislative process, associations are “deemed to 
be represented by the political bodies called upon to adopt those measures”: para. 60.  
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In the nation-state context, this argument would hold much more weight. Yet, as we 
saw in Chapter 2, the EU’s political institutions do not enjoy the same degree of 
democratic legitimacy as their national counterparts. The legislative process of the 
EU does not offer the same degree of representation and accountability as can be 
observed in national parliaments. This is not to suggest that borrowing constitutional 
orthodoxies from the nation-state context is entirely implausible. On the contrary, 
they present useful analytical yardsticks. But they must be approached, first, in the 
abstract and then, second, re-specified with a careful appreciation of the 
distinctiveness of the EU polity.  
 
In light of these diagnostic problems, the proposed solution here is to reframe the 
debates in light of the notion of institutional trusteeship, and to use that conceptual 
frame to address the boundary question – how much access? Above all, here, 
trusteeship factors in a sensitivity to the EU’s conditions. In terms of resolving the 
boundary question, as we saw in Section 2, the intrinsic virtue of access to 
democratic participation has an important relationship to (output) instrumental 
legitimacy. Given the centrality of Union law within the terms of the Court’s 
trusteeship, the Treaties – and the norms that inhere implicitly within them – present 
a necessary and primary source for determining legitimate institutional functioning 
and ordering. The Treaty, as an instrument that is constitutive of the EU polity, does 
not operate in a vacuum, and must always be interpreted and reinterpreted in light of 
the very political conditions that gave rise to its formulation. The institutional 
configuration of the Court of Justice is inexorably tied to the social and political 
realities that define the EU as a polity. Given this relationship, the extent to which 
institutional access can and should be apportioned between actors must be assessed 
in light of the broader context that defines the EU polity. All of the juristic and 
academic discussions on the nature of the EU and finalité (outlined in Chapter 2) are 
informative for this purpose. If, for example, the EU’s legislative processes were 
commensurate, democratically speaking, with those of national legislative processes, 
and they offered the same degree of responsiveness to public interest, then the Court 
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of Justice would have been right in making the observation given in Federolio. Not 
only is it the case that the Union’s legislative processes are insufficiently responsive 
to public interests (Chapter 2), but it is also plain that neither the Court nor 
commentators pay sufficient regard to the complex nature of the EU polity when 
justifying arguments on legitimate institutional ordering. 
 
In the remaining sections of this Chapter, the boundary issue will be (re)examined in 
light of these methodological propositions, emphasising how our (contested) 
understanding of the EU polity and finalité informs that analysis. It is argued, first, 
that the Union’s commitment to an intergovernmental organisational logic, and its 
countervailing supranationalist posturing, justify the privileged degree of 
institutional access apportioned to the governments of the Member States and the 
Union’s institutions. We then go on to consider the weaker position of civil society 
actors, and consider whether or not this is justified. It is argued that civil society 
actors are entitled to greater access, because of the democratic deficits that exist 
within the Union’s legislative and administrative infrastructure, and also because in 
the Union, as a sui generic polity, the domains of “politics” and “law” are 




4.2. Understanding Privileged Access 
 
Given the deliberate use of the term “privileged actor” within the debates on access, 
it is perhaps surprising that there are few, if any, objections to this institutional 
configuration. Indeed, it is anathema to the very idea of democracy to think of 
political democratic rights as something qualified by status; underpinning the notion 
of collective self-government is the idea that all actors share those rights equally.718 
Of course, as we are addressing these rights in the context of trustee-courts, and 
given the specific instrumental roles of such institutions, something like institutional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
718 Rawls, 1996: 6. 
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access comes at a premium – it cannot be a deliberative “free-for-all”. Nevertheless, 
giving the governments of the Member States and the Union’s institutions unfettered 
(for the most part) access to deliberative participation in the Court begs the question, 
especially when civil society actors are given comparatively little: how can these 
privileges be justified? 
 
It is here that an appreciation of polity-complexity and polity-contestation are 
particularly informative. On the former, it is important to recall the complex 
jurisdictional asymmetries that are divided between intergovernmental and 
supranational ordering logics (Section 4 of Chapter Two). Given this complexity, it 
is quite natural and proper that the governments of the Member States and the 
Union’s institutions are afforded privileged judicial access. For example, for those 
areas that fall under purely intergovernmental jurisdiction, the Court acts as “umpire” 
in the event that these actors disagree over the form or methods of intergovernmental 
action e.g. the CFSP. This is why, as can be seen in Appendix One, there is a range 
of actions before the Court that concern only these institutions. It is relevant to note, 
for example, that the Commission – as the Union’s strongest supranationalist symbol 
– has less access within these “intergovernmental” actions. Actions of this type are 
generally reserved for the governments of Member States and the Council of 
Ministers, both of which assume the Union’s intergovernmental responsibilities. 
With respect to the supranational jurisdiction of the Union, privileged access for 
these actors can be understood in two ways. First, in the same vein as the 
intergovernmental jurisdiction, the governments of the Member States and the 
Union’s institutions are the primary actors involved in the administration and 
delivery of the Union’s (supranational) objectives. The Court thus acts, again, as an 
“umpire” in the event that these institutions have disagreements over the proper 
implementation of those objectives e.g. the single market.   
 
On polity-contestation, we saw in Chapter Five that the dominance of the 
representation of national legal traditions and Union legal culture within the Court’s 
structural configuration is counter-poised from the inherent tension that exists 
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between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. This same phenomenon is also 
relevant when addressing the issue of institutional access. Because of the political 
controversy over finalité, representatives (broadly speaking) from either school of 
thought, and, importantly, the de jure political representatives of the relevant 
institutions (e.g. the governments of Member States and the Council of Ministers, 
representing the intergovernmentalist vision; and the institutional actors of the 
Union’s institutions, representing the supranationalist vision) have vested interests to 
protect as those interests emerge and are exposed in the Court’s constitutional 
deliberations. These vested interests thus go beyond the ordinary and immediate 
subject-matter of any given legal dispute, but, in addition to that, they relate to the 
consequences of the Court’s constitutional adjudication with respect to 
intergovernmentalist and supranationalist sentiments. For example, will the decision 
by the Court in any given case bring the Union closer to the supranationalist vision 
of finalité? In order to ensure that these quasi-ideological interests can be sufficiently 
protected, their adherents must be given the means to articulate them to the Court on 
any given matter of constitutional adjudication that might affect them, which, given 
the constitutional nature of the vast majority of the Court’s cases, will be often.  
 
 
4.3. Understanding Access for Civil Society Actors 
 
Can the reduced capacity of civil society actors to access the Court of Justice be 
justified?719 Should they be afforded more access? The argument here is that the 
procedural rules of access are too restrictive given the legitimacy deficits that exist in 
the EU’s political domain. This argument can be given from two perspectives: the 
view that greater access for civil society actors compensates for those deficits; and 
the view that, given the inseparability of the “political” and “legal” domains in the 
EU polity, greater access for civil society actors is complementary to the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy. Both of these perspectives are grounded in the same 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
719 Here we understand “civil society actors” to relate to natural and legal persons. Yet, given the 
observations made in Section 4.1 on the special virtue of epistemic associations (qua non-economic 
associations with general interests), the focus here is on their access. 
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empirical observations in relation to the EU’s political credentials i.e. that, according 
to an orthodox conception of politics and its commensurate institutional 
infrastructure, the EU suffers from a political deficit (as seen in the DemDefLit). 
Where these perspectives differ are the ways in which they respond to this deficit: 
the former re-affirms the hypothesis that the EU’s political deficit is, indeed, a 
problem that has to be resolved; whereas the latter perspective rejects the 
applicability of institutional orthodoxies that give rise to these perceived deficits, 
and, instead, postulates that the de facto political infrastructure that operates in the 
EU is sui generic and overlaps with the EU’s legal system to a large extent. As such, 
the legal system must be infused with measures of democratic legitimacy, 
irrespective of the failure of the EU’s “political” infrastructure to foster legitimacy.   
 
 
4.3.1. Compensating for Political Democratic Deficits 
 
The argument here is that greater access for civil society actors compensates for the 
fact that those actors are poorly represented by the Union’s political institutions. By 
allowing private individuals and associations to participate in various mechanisms of 
judicial review at the Court of Justice, their democratic rights of interest-
representation are re-established, even if this solution is not ideal. Here, the argument 
is that, because of democratic deficits (detailed in Chapter Two), the Court of Justice 
should allow for greater involvement of civil society actors within its actions for 
judicial review. But the problem with these deficits is that they are inadequately 
responsive to the European public. The epistemic association cannot support or exert 
pressure on a political party that may be voted into office and consequently 
implement favourable policies. Likewise, the individual voter cannot reward or 
punish European administrations because the latter have insufficiently represented 
their interests. Indeed, this is exemplified by the General Court’s interpretation of 
“regulatory act”. Given that it excludes “legislative acts”, and, thus, acts adopted 
under the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 289 TFEU), epistemic associations 
may only enjoy this relaxed standing requirement with respect to “delegated” 
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(Article 290 TFEU) or “implementing acts” (Article 291 TFEU). Furthermore, 
according to Article 2 of Protocol 2 TEU, national parliaments may only participate 
in the adoption of “legislative acts”, and are thus excluded from raising objections 
with respect to delegated and implementing acts.  
 
Given that national parliaments do not suffer from the same representation deficits as 
the EP, we can say that the General Court’s interpretation of “regulatory act” is 
somewhat commensurate with responding to political deficits. Nevertheless, the role 
that national parliaments have in the adoption of legislative acts is limited, 720 and 
they do not necessarily represent epistemic associations at the EU level. As such, it is 
still insufficient that epistemic associations do not have direct access to the judicial 
review of legislative acts under Article 267 TFEU. From the perspective of 
legitimate democratic ordering at the EU level, civil society needs to be given the 
means to articulate and defend its interests. This is not to suggest that the framework 
of locus standi (for both raising actions and intervening as interested third parties) is 
improvident – owing to the specificities of the judicial forum (i.e. its primary trustee-
duties), it would be both unnecessary and counterproductive to turn the Court into a 
deliberative “free-for-all”. There has to be some mechanism by which relevant and 
salient affected interests are optimally determined. Allowing greater civil society 
participation will ultimately make the Court a more responsive and informed court 
for when it has to deliberate over the meaning and application of indeterminate 
Union law. In this way, the interests of civil society actors are re-integrated into the 
Union’s legislative and administrative decision-making.  
 
 
4.3.2. Complementing the Union’s Sui Generic Political System 
 
The compensatory view implicitly assumes a modernistic orientation to the issue of 
political and democratic legitimacy. It affirms that the observations of “democratic 
deficits” are problems that have to be solved – in one way or another – in order to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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make the Union a more democratic polity. This view is therefore dependant on 
orthodox political structures – as derived from the nation-state tradition – as the 
appropriate benchmark of democratic ordering. In particular, democratic legitimacy 
is dependant on a particular vision of the appropriate location of “political” action 
i.e. in the axiomatic sense of the word. In this view, the political domain of the polity 
– as distinct from the social or the legal domains, for example – is presupposed to be 
identifiable by, and only by, a particular institutional infrastructure. So, because the 
EP is a “parliament” with “elected officials”, it must be where political action takes 
place, and, therefore, where measures of democratic legitimacy ought to be 
implemented. But that approach tends to place the cart before the horse. Rather than 
determine, first, where political action does take place, and, thereafter, assess 
democratic legitimacy accordingly, it pre-supposes that democratically relevant 
political action only takes place in institutions that are ostensibly the same as 
national democratic political institutions i.e. because the Council of Ministers, the 
Commission and the European Parliament are ostensibly “executive” and 
“legislative” institutions, then why are they not structured democratically? No 
wonder, then, that so much attention is paid to perceived deficits vis-à-vis the 
European Parliament, which fails in several ways to imitate the democratic ordering 
of national parliaments.  
 
This is not to say that the Union’s institutions do not have significant political 
powers. Nor is it to suggest that they should have fewer powers. The foregoing 
observations merely emphasise that such an analysis is methodologically misplaced 
because it anticipates the Union’s institutions to be as politically active – both 
quantitatively and qualitatively – as national executives and legislatures, which, as a 
matter of empirical verifiability, they are not. Furthermore, and significantly for the 
present argument, it overlooks the role of law within the political ordering of the 
Union. Historically, it has been through the administration of law, within and around 
the Union legal system, that the political objectives of the Union have been most 
significantly implemented i.e. integration through law (for the familiar backstory 
here, see Section 3 of Chapter Five). It is therefore the case that meaningful and 
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democratically relevant political action within the Union is inseparably intertwined 
with the Union’s legal system and its legal institutions. It is in this sense that the 
Union’s political system is sui generic, because it, unusually, operates through legal 
processes. In this view, instilling the Union’s legal institutions with measures of 
democratic ordering serves to complement the Union’s democratic legitimacy, as 
opposed to merely compensating for perceived deficits in the Union’s putatively 
executive and legislative institutions.721 This presents an alternative rationale for 
affording civil society actors (as well as, indeed, the Union’s institutions) greater 
degrees of institutional access to democratic participation than presently exists. 
Given my vision of finalité – namely, that “we don’t know what it is yet” – this 





In this Chapter, I examined the Court’s structures and processes in light of the 
intrinsic virtue of democratic participation. In Section 2, democratic participation 
was defined as the expression by actors of their affected interests in institutional 
decision-making. It was shown that the sorts of interests that are relevant here were 
special or disaggregated interests, in contrast to the holistic forms of interests 
observed in Chapter Five. Disaggregated interests, moreover, entail any kind of 
interest – from the mundane to the sublime – that an actor feels is affected by a 
discrete authority’s decision-making. We also saw that democratic participation as an 
intrinsic virtue overlaps significantly with representation, as well as instrumental 
indices of democratic legitimacy; in this case, the polity-constitutive output from the 
decision-making authority. We then saw how these concepts applied in the context of 
trustee-courts: supplementing the representation of holistic interests with avenues for 
disaggregated interests to be expressed; and facilitating the legitimate exercise of the 
trustee-court’s polity-constitutive jurisprudential output (given rise to by secondary 
fiduciary duties).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
721 On the suitability of “democratic experimentalism” in the EU, see Gerstenberg, 1997: 346 – 349.   
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Section 3 then went on to present a case-study on the Court’s structures and 
processes that act as mechanisms of access for different types of actors to express 
their arguments and viewpoints on how their affected interests should be dealt with 
by the Court of Justice in its constitutional adjudication. We saw that democratic 
participation in the Court is achieved through the researcher role of the Judges and 
Advocates-General, which enhances the Court’s awareness of affected interests 
through giving access, albeit informally, to actors via involvement in academic and 
practitioner colloquia; and because the Judges and Advocates-General conduct 
research, read the literature, and publish their research. We then looked at various 
mechanisms of access to judicial review – such as third party intervention; the rules 
of standing under the Court’s annulment procedure (Article 263 TFEU); and the 
significance of Article 267 TFEU’s preliminary rulings procedure for national 
litigants, and the availability thereof for access to the Court of Justice – examining 
the extent to which these formal mechanisms of access allowed for different 
categories of actors and interests to be expressed to the Court of Justice. We saw that 
there are three categories of actors: privileged  (Member States and the Union’s 
institutions); semi-privileged (the offices bodies and agencies of the Union); and 
non-privileged (natural and legal persons). It was further observed that access is 
especially limited for the latter category and that the salient problem that emerges 
from these rules is for epistemic associations (non-economic associations with 
general interests) – alternatively referred to under the rubric of “civil society”.  
 
The discussion then normatively appraised the relative degrees of access afforded to 
these actors, emphasising how our complex and contested understanding of the EU 
informs that analysis. It was argued, first, that the Union’s commitment to an 
intergovernmental organisational logic, and its countervailing supranationalist 
posturing, justifies the privileged degree of institutional access apportioned to the 
governments of the Member States and the Union’s institutions. We then went on to 
consider the weaker position of civil society actors, and considered whether or not 
this is justified. It was argued, first, from a comparative perspective, that civil society 
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actors have an unusually high degree of access to the Court of Justice when 
compared to the likes of national supreme or constitutional courts, as well as other 
transnational courts. Yet the truly problematic group is not individuals, but epistemic 
organisations. It was then argued that these actors are entitled to greater access 
because of the democratic deficits that exist within the Union’s legislative and 
administrative infrastructure; and also because, in the Union, as a sui generic polity, 
the domains of “politics” and “law” are functionally intertwined in such a way that 
requires its legal institutions to be more democratic. 
 







The purpose of this thesis was to examine the procedural democratic legitimacy of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. The subject-matter of this analysis was 
the Court’s structures and processes, including the composition and appointments 
processes for members of the Court; the mechanisms that give access to various 
kinds of participants (such as locus standi and third-party intervention); and the use 
of judicial chambers. Procedural democratic legitimacy, moreover, has two 
dimensions: intrinsic and instrumental. The intrinsic refers to  the democratic 
credentials of the Court as a discrete decision-making authority (measured by 
indicators such as representativeness and participation); whereas the instrumental is 
concerned with the ways in which the Court contributes to the overall democratic 
legitimacy of the EU. 
 
This analysis was set against the backdrop of a court that has famously been a key 
player in constituting a polity that is distinctive in kind – the sui generic European 
Union. In so doing, the Court of Justice is implicated – actually and potentially – in a 
range of discourses on the legitimacy of judicial governance. The argument of this 
thesis contributes to three principal discourses of this kind. First, in Chapter One, I 
examined the literature that critically evaluates the Court of Justice’s methods of 
legal reasoning, and its constitutional functions. I observed that very little attention 
has been given to evaluating the Court through the lens of democratic legitimacy. 
Second, in Chapter Two, I examined the expansive (conceptually and empirically) 
debates on the democratic deficit in the EU – debates within which an examination 
of the instrumental democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice play an essential 
part. Yet we saw that, whilst there have been some modest contributions in that 
regard, there remains much more to be said about the Court’s role in contributing to 
the overall democratic legitimacy of the EU. Third, in contrast to the prevailing 
approaches of many constitutional theorists – who tend to treat intrinsic and 
instrumental democratic criteria as functions that are quite discrete, and their 
performance as mutually exclusive – an important theoretical contribution of this 
thesis was to develop an analytical framework that allows for the inherent synergies 






and tensions that exist between intrinsic and instrumental criteria to be factored into 
analyses of the democratic legitimacy of constitutional courts.   
 
In Chapter Three, I developed an analytical framework within which the procedural 
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice was examined. As stated above, 
procedural democratic legitimacy embraces both intrinsic and instrumental 
dimensions. In terms of intrinsic democratic legitimacy, I argued that discrete 
decision-making authorities must use their discretion in a manner that is responsive 
to the interests of the public. This is because contemporary polities are constituted by 
such large populations that it is simply impractical for institutions to accommodate 
the direct participation of all. Responsiveness to public interests is, then, an 
underlying principle that facilitates democratic decision-making in decision-making 
institutions that possess final and exclusive authority. To that end, I argued that there 
are four intrinsic virtues that achieve this: participation (making institutional 
decision-making accessible to the public for their involvement); representativeness 
(ensuring that the public’s interests are, in various ways, part of institutional 
decision-making); accountability (ensuring that the officials of political institutions 
are supervised by the public, whereby the public can punish improvident political 
action and reward political officials for acting in good faith); and institutional 
transparency (providing the means for public audit of the political institution’s 
exercise of political power). Instrumental democratic legitimacy, by contrast, is a 
way of understanding the functional relationship between the particular political 
institution and the broader democratic polity within which, and for which, it 
functions.  
 
The reason we examine a political institution in this way is because each political 
institution within a democratic polity has been allocated certain functions in order to 
enhance the democratic qualities of the polity, taken holistically. In order to 
understand the democratic legitimacy of a political institution, we must also pay 
attention to how it functions – paying close attention to the scope of its political 
powers and the limits that places on institutional functioning. There are two aspects 
of the polity-institution connection to be aware of here. First, there are the formally 






established institutional roles and objectives that have been handed over (or 
delegated) to the institution by virtue of the separation of powers doctrine – thus 
enabling one to deduce the expected output and appropriate limits to institutional 
functioning. Second, because political institutions will have, to varying degrees, a 
certain amount of discretion in enacting their formally established roles and 
implementing their objectives, they will inevitably and iteratively function in such a 
way as to help (re)define and (re)constitute the polities within which they function. 
 
As noted above, an examination of the procedural democratic legitimacy of any 
discrete decision-making institution must pay due regard to both intrinsic and 
instrumental criteria, carefully addressing the inherent synergies and tensions that 
exist therein. Moreover, because the instrumental dimension is sensitive to the nature 
of the wider polity, the salient characteristics of that polity (the polity-conditions) 
must be factored into the analysis of both the intrinsic and instrumental dimensions 
of procedural democratic legitimacy. The complexity here is compounded by the 
peculiar character of the EU. In that regard, in Chapter Two – having observed the 
various ways in which the EU’s polity-conditions informed empirical analyses of the 
instrumental democratic legitimacy of the its political institutions – the salient polity-
conditions of the EU were identified under the heading of the three C’s of EU 
constitutionalism: complexity, contestation, and change. Polity-complexity refers to 
the multi-faceted nature of the Union in terms of its jurisdiction and its multi-level, 
inter-institutional relations – in particular, the tangled relationship between  
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Polity-contestation refers to the deeply 
contested nature of the EU in existential terms i.e. what is the EU, and what is it for? 
We saw that, given the demonstrable conflict over this question, this conflict must 
itself be factored into the structures and processes of the Union’s institutions. Finally, 
polity-change refers to the ever expanding, widening, and deepening of the EU – 
territorially and jurisdictionally. Given this state of flux, not only must we 
understand the structures and processes of the Union’s institutions to be contingent 
upon future reform, we must also be careful to understand debates on institutional 
reform in light of this historical trend. 
 






The foregoing thus presents a complicated array of conceptual conditions by which 
the procedural democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice ought to be examined. 
In light of these complexities, the notion of trusteeship was presented in Chapter 
Three as an analytical basis from which to address them. The idea of the trustee-
institution explains – in terms of constitutional and political theory – the legitimate 
vesting of delegated regulatory decision-making in non-majoritarian institutions, 
such as constitutional courts. Owing to the virtuous fiduciary relationship between 
trustee-institutions and their beneficiaries (the public) – as laid down in rules agreed  
by the settlors of the trust – trustee-institutions are endowed with significant 
discretion with which to exercise regulatory decision-making. In constitutional courts 
such as the Court of Justice, this discretion relates to the following duties: to resolve 
constitutional disputes; to do so according to a faithful interpretation of the meaning 
of the norms set out (explicitly and implicitly) in constitutional settlements i.e. 
constitutional law; to make reasonable interpretations and clarifications of 
indeterminate constitutional law; and to ensure that no-one is above the law i.e. that 
the law is observed by all (especially political institutions). The fiduciary relationship 
that inheres in this arrangement was shown to involve primary and secondary 
fiduciary duties. The former simply denotes dutiful compliance in accordance  with 
the four listed criteria e.g. judges faithfully applying rules of law. Secondary 
fiduciary duties, however, account for the inevitability that the terms of the trust are 
not exhaustive (which neatly overlaps with the idea of indeterminate law), given 
unforeseen, or unforeseeable, contingencies and contractual incompleteness. These 
duties require the institutional decision-makers (i.e. the judges) to “fill in the blanks” 
in ways that are responsive to the interests of the public-beneficiaries. Trusteeship 
thus provides a firm basis on which (1) both the intrinsic and the instrumental  
democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice can be understood and measured; (2) 
the inherent tensions and synergies within and between the intrinsic  and the 
instrumental dimensions can be optimally evaluated; and (3) the salient polity-
conditions of the EU can be factored into the analysis. 
 
With trusteeship operating as an umbrella concept, in Chapter Four I then proceeded 
to examine the structures and processes of the Court that foster the requirement of 






institutional independence. This feature relates to the Court’s primary instrumental 
democratic role of giving faithful interpretation to and application of democratically 
established rules of law. The structures and processes of the Court were shown to 
meet the criteria of institutional independence, and to quite a significant degree in 
comparison to other apex courts (the ECtHR, the UK Supreme Court, and the US 
Supreme Court). That assessment was broken down into, first, determining the 
powers and discretion given to the Court i.e. its jurisdiction; and, second, balancing 
these against both ex post (the ways in which the Union legislature can nullify or 
reverse the decisions of the Court) and ex ante external mechanisms of control that 
may qualify or undermine the exercise of that discretion. We saw that the Court is 
not only competent to hear a vast number of actions, but that it has significant 
interpretive discretion with which to adjudicate, given comparatively weak ex post 
and ex ante mechanisms of control. It was thus concluded that the Court fulfils its 
primary instrumental democratic duties.  
 
Chapters Five and Six went on to consider the intrinsic virtues of democratic 
legitimacy, namely: representativeness (Chapter Five) and participation (Chapter 
Six). What we were concerned with here were the structural and procedural 
mechanisms by which relevant public constituencies and interests are identified with 
or articulated by the Court of Justice, which is the province of representativeness and 
participation. 
 
In Chapter Five, I argued that the Court represents key holistic categories of public 
interest both symbolically and substantively. Symbolic representation is achieved 
through structures and processes with which the public can identify. Substantive 
representation is where the relevant public interests are factored into the decision-
making of the Court. In that regard, it was shown that the Court of Justice represents 
both national legal traditions and Union legal culture. The concept of national legal 
traditions was understood in two ways: the substance of the laws of the Member 
States; and the form of the legal orders of the Member States. In terms of substance, 
the legal and political actors of the Member States have a vested interest in their own 
legal rules, and maintaining the objectives they serve. Form refers to the broader 






institutional categories and processes within which national legal and political actors 
operate and in terms of which they have their law adjudicated, such as: civil law and 
common law systems; inquisitorial and adversarial modes of legal enquiry; 
constitutional and majoritarian democracies; and federal, unitary and union models 
of state sovereignty. Union legal culture, by contrast, refers to the sustained 
cultivation of a distinctive and autonomous European (Union) legal order. We saw, 
for example, that the basic framework of composition and appointment of the 
Court’s Judges strongly represents national legal traditions. By operating on a one 
judge per Member State basis, the appointment of the judges ensures that the 
interests of national legal actors are represented. In terms of Union legal culture we 
saw, however, that there are also various mechanisms of insulation from Member 
State control which represent the autonomy of a distinct Union legal culture. The use 
of the appointments panel is geared towards making the appointments process more 
insulated, and involves the European Parliament as a strong supranational 
counterpoint to the Member States.  
 
In Chapter Six, I examined the Court’s structures and processes in light of the 
intrinsic virtue of democratic participation. Democratic participation was defined as 
the expression of an actor’s affected interests in institutional decision-making in the 
particular or disaggregated sense, by contrast to the holistic forms of interests 
observed in Chapter Five. To that end, I presented a case-study on the Court’s 
structures and processes that act as mechanisms of access for different types of actors 
to express their arguments and viewpoints on how their affected interests should be 
dealt with by the Court of Justice in its constitutional adjudication. We saw that 
democratic participation in the Court is achieved through the researcher role of the 
Judges and Advocates-General, and mechanisms of access to judicial review – such 
as third party intervention; the rules of standing under the Court’s annulment 
procedure (Article 263 TFEU); and the significance of Article 267 TFEU’s 
preliminary rulings procedure for national litigants (and the availability thereof for 
access to the Court of Justice). We examined the extent to which these formal 
mechanisms of access allowed for different categories of actors and interests to be 
expressed to the Court of Justice. There are three categories of actors: privileged 






(Member States and the Union’s institutions); semi-privileged (the offices, bodies 
and agencies of the Union); and non-privileged (natural and legal persons). It was 
observed that access is somewhat limited for the last category, and that the key 
difficulty that emerges from these rules concerns the role of epistemic associations 
(non-economic associations with general interests) – alternatively referred to under 
the rubric of “civil society”.  
 
The foregoing observations simply, but systematically, addressed the procedural 
democratic legitimacy of the Court’s structures. Yet the leitmotif throughout all of 
these analyses was the “question of balance” – addressing the synergies and tensions 
between the different democratic roles of the Court, especially in light of the EU’s 
salient polity-conditions (the three C’s of EU constitutionalism). In Chapter Four, the 
key tension that emerged was, prima facie, that the more independent the Court, the 
less open it is to being a responsive institution i.e. the instrumental conflicting with 
the intrinsic. Yet I argued that there is a distinction between responsiveness and 
partiality: so long as the Judges are dispassionate in their appraisal of all affected 
interests, then structures and processes which allow for such interests to be 
(re)presented to the Court can be both responsive and impartial. It was also observed 
that independence in the Court is most acutely threatened by the powerful position of 
the Member States in the appointments process i.e. they can, to a significant extent, 
choose their Judge. I argued, however, looking to the EU’s polity conditions, that 
this was a necessary sacrifice. Given the dominance of Member State power within 
the EU (e.g. strong intergovernmental processes and institutions) it is, in fact, 
necessary for them to have a strong role in the appointments process, in order to 
foster the authority and acceptance of the Court.  
 
In Chapter Five, I observed that the pervasiveness of the representation of national 
legal traditions, as opposed to Union legal culture, gave rise to an internal conflict 
within the intrinsic virtue of representation, generating zero-sum or sub-optimal 
consequences. For example, the insistence of the Court’s designers on denying the 
General Court jurisdiction in the preliminary rulings procedure, because of the 
(Union legal culture-centred) preoccupation with system integrity or “uniformity”, 






exacerbates the already problematic case-load of the Court of Justice, with references 
from national courts constituting the majority of its cases. The appointments process 
also displayed sub-optimal qualities by becoming such an over-regulated field – the 
dominance of the Member States being offset by the creation of an appointments 
panel, for which the EP can recommend one of its incumbents. Yet there is also a 
negative sum aspect to consider here in the relationship between representation and 
independence. The involvement of the EP in the appointments panel, in seeking to 
create a representative counterbalance, also threatens to undermine the independence 
of the appointments process, for the appointments process becomes affected by 
political influences of the supranationalist elements of EU governance in addition to 
the governments of the Member States. Yet these tensions, I argued, might well be 
necessary given the EU’s polity-conditions. They are symptoms of, and measured 
democratically representative responses to, the underlying contestation over visions 
of finalité. With such a sustained division of interests between legal and political 
actors at the national and Union levels, and the need for its continuous negotiation 
and accommodation, the structural and procedural representation of national legal 
traditions and Union legal culture of the Court of Justice is a justified and 
representative configuration, in spite of certain sub-optimal, zero-sum and negative 
sum consequences. 
 
In Chapter Six, we saw that democratic participation – as an intrinsic virtue – 
overlaps significantly with representation, as well as with instrumental indices of 
democratic legitimacy (in this case, the polity-constitutive output from the decision-
making authority) in a synergetic way. This was seen in the discussion that appraised 
the relative degrees of access afforded to privileged, semi-privileged and non-
privileged actors, emphasising how our complex and contested understanding of the 
EU informs that analysis. I argued, first, that the Union’s commitment to aspects of 
an intergovernmental organisational logic, together with its countervailing 
supranationalist commitments, justifies the privileged degree of institutional access 
allocated to both the governments of the Member States and the Union’s institutions. 
I then considered the weaker position of civil society actors (as non-privileged 
actors), and examined whether or not this is justified. It was argued, first, from a 






comparative perspective, that civil society actors have an unusually high degree of 
access to the Court of Justice when compared to national supreme or constitutional 
courts, as well as other transnational courts. The problematic group is not, as already 
noted, individuals, but epistemic associations. The synergy with representation in 
this regard is due to the fact that epistemic associations may bring to bear their 
disaggregated or special interests on behalf of those with whom their views are 
shared. The synergy with instrumental indices of democratic legitimacy is borne out 
of the need for responsiveness to all affected interests when the Court’s juridical 
output can have (and has had) significant effects on Union law. In that light, I made 
two arguments: (1) that epistemic associations are entitled to greater access because 
of the Union’s democratic deficits as manifest in its legislative processes (the 
“compensation” thesis); and (2) that in the Union, as a sui generic polity, the 
domains of “politics” and “law” are functionally intertwined in such a way that 
requires its legal institutions to be more democratic (the “complementary” thesis). 
 
At the beginning of this thesis, I remarked that the findings of this research could not 
be expressed in quantitative terms – that we could not conclude, for example, that 
“the Court of Justice is 72% democratic.” As an overall estimation, however, 72% – 
its mathematical crudity apart – might be a fair assessment. The findings of this 
research have been expressed in terms of the ways in which the Court meets, or fails 
to meet, the precepts of procedural democratic legitimacy. And the conclusions 
reached show that the structures and processes of the Court are more democratic than 
might have been expected, and tend to outweigh the ways in which they are 
undemocratic. This is not to suggest that the Court of Justice – or courts in general – 
ought to be the focus of democratic functioning. That was not part of my argument. 
It is to say, though, that given the Court’s essential function within the EU – as a 
trustee-Court – here are the ways that it fulfils those functions in a democratic way; it 












The Court of 
Justice 
Description of Action The 
General 
Court722 
Article 218 TFEU. Review of the constitutionality of agreements reached 
by the Union and third parties, actionable by the 
Commission, the European Parliament or the Council.  
None. 
Article 259 TFEU.  Enforcement proceedings for Member State failure to 
fulfill an obligation under the Treaties raised by a 
Member State. 
None. 
Article 260 TFEU. Enforcement proceedings for Member State failure to 
fulfill an obligation under the Treaties raised by the 
Commission (Article 258 TFEU) 723  – including the 
power to impose fines on defaulting Member States. 
None. 
Article 263 TFEU. Action for annulment of Union Acts raised by Member 




722 According to Article 257 (1) TFEU, the General Court is primarily a first instance court (subject to 
the appeals process from the CST (see infra)). Article 51 SCJ: By way of derogation from the rule laid 
down in Article 256 (1) TFEU, jurisdiction shall be reserved to the Court of Justice in the actions 
referred to in Articles 263 and 265 TFEU when they are brought by a Member State against: (a) an act 
of or failure to act by the European Parliament or the Council, or by those institutions acting jointly  
(except for: decisions taken by the Council under Article 108 (2) (3) TFEU; acts of the Council 
adopted pursuant to a Council regulation concerning measures to protect trade within the meaning of 
Article 207 TFEU; acts of the Council by which the Council exercises implementing powers in 
accordance with Article 291 (2) TFEU); and (b) against an act of or failure to act by the Commission 
under Article 331 (1) TFEU. Jurisdiction shall also be reserved to the Court of Justice in the actions 
referred to in the same Articles when they are brought by an institution of the Union against an act of 
or failure to act by the European Parliament, the Council, both those institutions acting jointly, or the 
Commission, or brought by an institution of the Union against an act of or failure to act by the 
European Central Bank. 
 
723 Article 258 TFEU provides that the Commission has the responsibility to deliver a “reasoned 
opinion” to Member States when it considers that they have failed to meet their Treaty obligations. 
The reasoned opinion outlines the legal and factual basis of the Commission’s complaint; an 
indication of the appropriate remedial action to be taken by the allegedly recalcitrant Member State; 
and a deadline for this action to be taken. Private individuals and associations do not have direct 
access to the infringement procedure. They can, however, take action indirectly via the complaints 
process set up by the Commission. This process allows private individuals and associations to bring to 
the attention of the Commission any perceived infringements by the Member States of their Union 
obligations, which may consequently lead to Article 258 TFEU and Article 260 TFEU action. The 
process is clearly explained and can be viewed by the public on the Commission’s webpage at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/your_rights/your_rights_en.htm. See also (2002) OJ 2002 C 244/5. Article 
260 TFEU then gives the Court of Justice jurisdiction to review potential infractions and impose 
sanctions if applicable. 
724 The scope of “Union Act” and the extent to which this action can be raised by different classes of 
actor is addressed in depth in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter Six. 
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Article 265 TFEU. Failure to act of a Union Institution Yes. 
Article 267 
TFEU.725 
Preliminary rulings on the interpretation or the validity 
of Union law with respect to national law, referred by 

















Article 268 TFEU. To settle disputes on the non-contractual liability of the 
Union. 
Yes. 
Article 269 TFEU. 
 
 
Review the constitutionality of disciplinary measures 
adopted by the Council or the European Council under 




To settle disputes between the Union and its servants. Yes. 
Article 272 TFEU. To settle disputes on the contractual liability of the 
Union. 
Yes. 
Article 273 TFEU. To settle disputes between Member States on matters 
pertaining to the subject-matter of the Treaties. 
None. 
Article 275 TFEU. To monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU; and to rule 
on proceedings, brought in accordance with Article 263 
(4) TFEU, reviewing the legality of decisions providing 
for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons 
adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title 
V of the Treaty on European Union. 
None. 
Article 10 (2) 




Title VI TEU (pre-
Lisbon) on 
1. Article 35 (1) TEU (pre-Lisbon): To give preliminary 
rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework 
decisions and decisions, on the interpretation of 
conventions established under this title and on the 





725 For a detailed overview of this action, see Section 3.3.2 of Chapter Six.  
726 See Section 3.2.3 of Chapter Five.  
727 The CST ordinarily hears these actions at first instance, which is the sole competence of the CST. 
See Article 1 Annex I SCJ. These decisions can be appealed to the General Court and the Court of 
Justice (see infra).  
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Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in 
Judicial Matters.728 
2. Article 35 (6) TEU (pre-Lisbon): To review the 
legality of framework decisions and decisions in actions 
brought by a Member State or the Commission on 
grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of this 
Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or 
misuse of powers. 
 
3. Article 35 (7) TEU (pre-Lisbon): To rule on any 
dispute between Member States regarding the 
interpretation or the application of acts adopted under 
Article 34 (2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) 729  whenever such 
dispute cannot be settled by the Council within six 
months of its being referred to the Council by one of its 
members; to rule on any dispute between Member States 
and the Commission regarding the interpretation or the 
application of conventions established under Article 
34(2)(d) TEU (pre-Lisbon).730 
 
Article 56 SCJ.  Appeals may be brought before the Court of Justice, 
within two months of the notification of the decision 
appealed against, against final decisions of the General 
Court and decisions of that Court disposing of the 
substantive issues in part only or disposing of a 
procedural issue concerning a plea of lack of 
competence or inadmissibility. 
NA731 
Article 57 SCJ.  Any person whose application to intervene has been 
dismissed by the General Court may appeal to the Court 
of Justice within two weeks from the notification of the 
NA 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
728 The Treaty of Lisbon, having repealed Article 35 TEU (pre-Lisbon), incorporates Article 35 TEU 
(pre-Lisbon) into the legal framework here under Protocol 36 TEU’s “transitional provisions. As such, 
it must be referred to to determine the nature and scope of this action.  
729 Article 34 (2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) provides: “The Council shall take measures and promote 
cooperation, using the appropriate form and procedures as set out in this title, contributing to the 
pursuit of the objectives of the Union. To that end, acting unanimously on the initiative of any 
Member State or of the Commission, the Council may: (a)  adopt common positions defining the 
approach of the Union to a particular matter; (b)  adopt framework decisions for the purpose of 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. Framework decisions shall be 
binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not entail direct effect; (c)  adopt decisions for 
any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this title, excluding any approximation of the laws 
and regulations of the Member States. These decisions shall be binding and shall not entail direct 
effect; the Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt measures necessary to implement those 
decisions at the level of the Union; (d)  establish conventions which it shall recommend to the 
Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Member 
States shall begin the procedures applicable within a time limit to be set by the Council. 
730 Ibid. 
731 The General Court may hear appeals against decisions of the CST (Article 256 (2) TFEU). 
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decision dismissing the application. 
Article 62 SCJ. To review the decisions of the General Court on the 
instruction of the First Advocate General for the 
purposes of preserving the “unity and consistency of EU 
law”. 
NA 
Article 6 SCJ. Disciplinary proceedings against Judges of the Court of 
Justice, the General Court, and the CST, who have 































              
Austria x    x    x  x   
Belgium x    x   x   x   
Bulgaria x    x   x    x  
Cyprus   x   x  x     x 
Czech 
Republic x    x   x     x 
Denmark  x   x    x    x 
Estonia x    x   x    x  
France x    x    x   x  
Finland   x   x   x   x  
Germany  x    x  x   x   
Greece x    x   x    x  
Hungary  x   x   x    x  
Ireland   x   x  x    x  
Italy x    x   x    x  
Latvia  x   x    x   x  
Lithuania  x   x   x    x  
Luxembourg x    x    x   x  
Malta  x   x   x    x  
Netherlands  x   x    x    x 
Poland x    x    x   x  
Portugal  x   x   x     x 
Romania x    x    x   x  
Slovakia x    x   x    x  
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Slovenia  x   x   x    x  
Spain x    x   x     x 
Sweden  x   x    x   x  






Member States highlighted indicate a Member State which has a permanent Advocate-General.  
 
Civil law: This conceptualisation does not consider civil law from a substantive perspective, but on matters of legal form and legal system. 
Civil law refers to a codified corpus of law within the legal system; and a legal system that does not systematically recognise case-law and 
judicial pronouncements as a source of law. 
 
Civil law 2: This refers to a largely codified corpus of law, but one that recognises case-law and judicial pronouncements as a source of 
law. 
 
Common law: This refers to a legal system that recognises case-law as a source of law, and has areas of law in which case-law, or non-
codified sources of law, are the only or major source e.g. Scots criminal law. 
 
 
Inquisitorial732: This refers to a mode of legal enquiry by which the factual veracity of a given legal matter is determined by the judges or 
judicial bodies conducting proactive investigative methods e.g. the Court of Justice’s “measures of enquiry”.733 This tradition is also 
generally regarded as part of the civil law tradition.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
732 For a distinction between inquisitorial and adversarial modes of legal enquiry, see Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, András Sajó and Susanne Baer, “Criminal 
Procedure (Due Process)” Comparative Constitutionalism St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2003 (hereinafter Dorsen et al., 2003). 
733 See Section 3.1 of Chapter Five.  
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Adversarial: This refers to a mode of legal enquiry in which legal problems arrive out of a dispute between parties, and the factual veracity 
of the claims are dependent on the parties’ submissions, giving the judiciary or judicial bodies a more reactionary role. This tradition is 
generally regarded as part of the common law tradition.  
 
 
Constitutional democracy: This refers to a legal and political system where governments and legislatures are held to account by courts 
deciding on the legality of their legislation and administrative acts according to a higher source of law i.e. a constitution. Additionally, 
courts in this set-up may invalidate legislation by way of judicial review. 
 
Majoritarian democracy: This refers to a legal and political system where governmental power, and especially legislative processes, are 
controlled by majoritarian, parliamentary processes, and the courts have either no powers, or very limited declaratory powers, such as the 
UK’s courts under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The courts may have, however, powers of administrative review. 
 
 
Federal state: This refers to a political and legal system in which sovereignty is divided evenly between central and local political and legal 
institutions on a territorial basis.  
 
Unitary: This refers to a political and legal system in which sovereignty is undivided, and rests within central political and legal 
institutions. 
 
Union: This is essentially the same as a unitary system, except that there is an uneven distribution of legislative and administrative 
competences between central and local political and legal institutions, organised on a national or ethnic basis. Sovereignty ultimately, 
however, still rests with the central institutions e.g. Scotland – with devolution and its Scottish legal system – in the UK.734 
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
734 See Walker, 2010a: Chapter Two. See also Himsworth, 2007; and Neil MacCormick “Is There a Constitutional Path to Scottish Independence?” (2000) 
Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 53 721 (hereinafter MacCormick, 2000).  
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Publication of the Court of Justice, Les Juridictions des États membres de l’Union 
européenne: Structure et Organisation, available at 





Austria: See the Commission’s webpage on the Austrian legal order at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_aus_en.htm; see also 
Johannes Oehlboeck and Immanuel Gerstnerhttp, The Austrian Legal System and 
Laws: a Brief Overview, available at 
://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/austria1.htm, April 2009.   
 
Belgium: See the Commission’s webpage on the Belgian legal order at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_bel_en.htm; see also 
Christoph Malliet, Research Guide to Belgian Law, available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/belgium.htm, August 2005.   
 
Bulgaria: The Commission has yet to create a webpage on the Bulgarian legal order; 
see Angel Panayotov, Lora Kapelovska, and Nikolay Bebov, The Bulgarian Legal 
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System and Legal Research available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Bulgaria.htm, August 2006.   
 
Cyprus: The Commission has yet to create a webpage on the legal order of Cyprus; 
see Andrew Grossman, Finding the Law: the Micro-States and Small Jurisdictions of 
Europe, available at, http://www.llrx.com/features/microstates.htm, September, 




Czech Republic: See the Commission’s webpage on the Czech Republic’s legal 
order at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_cze_en.htm. See also 
Michal Bobek, An Introduction to the Czech Legal System and Legal Resources 
Online available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/czech_republic.htm, 
August, 2006.  
 
Denmark: Rasmus H. Wandall, Researching Danish Law, 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/denmark.htm, August, 2009. 
 
Estonia: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_est_en.htm; see also Jannu 
Kuusik and Kart Miil, Guide to Estonian Legal System and Legal Research available 
at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/estonia.htm, 2008. 
 
France: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_fra_en.htm. See also 
Borgsmidt, 1988; Burrows, 2007; Lenaerts, 2003; and Koopmans, 1991.  
 
Finland: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_fin_en.htm. See also Sami 
Sarvilinna (Update by Erika Bergström), Finnish Law on the Internet available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Finland1.htm, 2008. 
 
Germany: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_ger_en.htm. See also the 
Brunner and Lisbon Treaty judgments of das Bundesverfassungsgericht; Borgsmidt, 
1988; Burrows and Greaves, 2007; Lenaerts, 2003; and Koopmans, 1991.  
 
Greece: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_gre_en.htm. See also Maria 
Panezi, A Description of the Structure of the Hellenic Republic, the Greek Legal 
System, and Legal Research, available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Greece1.htm, 2008.  
 
Hungary: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_hun_en.htm. See also 
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Zsuzsanna Antal, Features - Introduction to Hungarian Law Research, available at 
http://www.llrx.com/features/hungarian.htm, 2001. 
 
Ireland: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_ire_en.htm. See also 
Koopmans, 1991; Lenaerts, 2003; and Mancini, Law and Justice Foundation of New 
South Wales. 
 
Italy: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_ita_en.htm. See also Elio 
Fameli and Fiorenza Socci, Guide to Italian Legal Research and Resources on the 
Web, available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Italy2.htm#_1.2.1._Regions, 2007. See also 
Koopmans, 1991; Lenaerts, 2003; and Mancini, Law and Justice Foundation of New 
South Wales. 
 
Latvia:  See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_lat_en.htm. See also Ilona 
Ceica, Baiba Bebre and Ligita Gjortlere, Guide to Latvian Law and Legal Resources 
available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Latvia.htm, 2007. 
 
Lithuania: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_lit_en.htm. See also Elona 
Norvaisaite, A GUIDE TO THE LITHUANIAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND RESEARCH, 
available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Lithuania1.htm, 2008; and the 
Constitutional Court’s website at http://www.lrkt.lt/Information1_e.html 
 
Luxembourg: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_lux_en.htm.See also Nicolas 
Henckes, Luxembourg – Description of the Legal System and Legal Research, 
available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/LUXEMBOURG1.htm, 2009; 
Koopmans, 1991; and Lenaerts, 2003. 
 
Malta: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_mlt_en.htm.  
 
The Netherlands: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_net_en.htm. See also Oswald 
Jansen and George Middeldorp(update by Dorien Snoek and Henk Zonneveld), 
Researching Dutch Law, available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Netherlands1.htm, 2007; and the 
Constitutional Court’s website at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/information+in+english.  
 
Poland: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_pol_en.htm. See also Piotr 
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Rakowski and Robert Rybicki (Update by Piotr Rakowski), An Overview of Polish 
Law available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Poland1.htm, 2010. 
  
Portugal: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_por_en.htm. See also Tiago 
Fidalgo de Freitas, Legal Research in Portugal, available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/portugal1.htm, 2009.  
  
Romania: No Commission page as yet: 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_rom_en.htm. See Dana 
Neacşu (update by Anamaria Corbescu), Doing Legal Research in Romania, 
available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Romania1.htm, 2009. See also 
the Constitutional Court’s website at http://www.ccr.ro/default.aspx?page=activity 
 
Slovakia: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_svk_en.htm. See also Juraj 
Alexander and Juraj Gyárfáš Legal Research in Slovakia (Including a Brief 
Description of Slovak Political and Legal System), available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Slovakia.htm, 2010.    
 
Slovenia: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_sln_en.htm. See also Maja 
Čarni and Špela Košak, A Guide to the Republic of Slovenia Legal System and Legal 
Research, available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/slovenia.htm, 2006; 
and the Constitutional Court’s website at http://www.us-rs.si/en/about-the-
court/jurisdiction/.  
 
Spain: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_spa_en.htm. See also Olga 
Cabrero, Guide to Legal Research in Spain, available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/spain.htm, 2005.  
 
Sweden: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_swe_en.htm. See also Ingrid 
Kabir and Sofia Sternberg Swedish Law and Legal Materials, available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Sweden1.htm, 2009 
 
UK: See the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_order/legal_order_uni_en.htm. See also Walker, 
2010a; and Himsworth, 2007. 
 





1. Academic Publications 
 
 
Abromeit, H., “How to Democratise a Multi-Level, Multi-Dimensional Polity” in A. 
Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: 
Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, London: Routledge, 1998. 
 
Albors-Lorens, A., “The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Community 
Measures: Has the European Court of Justice Missed the Boat?” (2003) Cambridge 




! “The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A Reply to Professor 
Hartley” (1996)  Law Quarterly Review Vol. 112  411; 
!  “The Past and Future of the Preliminary Rulings Procedure”, (2002) 
European Business Law Review Vol. 13 No. 3 183; 
! The European Union and its Court of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006. 
 
Balthasar, S., “Locus Standi Rules For Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private 
Applicants: The New Art.263(4) TFEU” (2010) European Law Review Vol. 35 No. 4 
542. 
Barber, N.: 
! “Prelude to the Separation of Powers” (2001) Cambridge Law Journal 
Vol. 60 No. 1 59;  
! “Must Legalistic Conceptions of the Rule of Law Have a Social 
Dimension?” (2004) Ratio Juris Vol. 17 No. 4 474; 
! “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity” (2005) European Law Journal 
Vol. 11 308. 
Barendt, E., “Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government” (1995) Public 
Law Winter 599. 
 
Bast, J., “New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of 
Parliamentarisation in EU Law” (2012) Common Market Law Review Vol. 49 885. 
 
Bebr, G., “Joined Cases C-6/90 and 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, Bonifaci v. Italy” 




! Political Constitutionalism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007; 





! “Democracy Without Democracy? Can the EU’s Democratic ‘Outputs’ be 
Separated from the Democratic ‘Inputs’ Provided by Competitive Parties 
and Majority Rule?” (2010) Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 17 
No.1 2. 
 
Bellamy, R. and Castiglione, D., “The Uses of Democracy: Reflection on the 
European Democratic Deficit” in Eriksen and Fossum (Eds.), Democracy in the 
European Union: Integration Through Deliberation?, London; New York: 
Routledge, 2000. 
 
Bengoetxea, J.:  
 
! The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993; 
! “The Scope For Discretion, Coherence and Citizenship”, in O. Wiklund 
(ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective, Stockhom: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003. 
 
Bergstrom, C., Comitology. Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the 
Committee System, Open University Press, 2005. 
 
Blok, P., Patentrettens Konsumtionsprincip, Kobenhaven, 1974. 
 
Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, People and Parliament in the European Union, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 
Bogdanor, V., “The Future of the European Community: Two Models of 
Democracy” (1986) Government and Opposition Vol. 21 No. 2 161. 
 
Bonnor, P., “Institutional Attitudes in Context: A Comment on Rawlings’ Engaged 
Elites” (2001) European Law Journal  vol. 7 No. 1 114. 
 
Borgsmidt, K. “The Advocate General at the European Court of Justice: A 
Comparative Study” (1988) European Law Review 106. 
 
Bovens, M., “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework” 
(2007) European Law Journal Vol. 13 No. 4 447. 
 
Bradley, A. and Ewing, K., Constitutional and Administrative Law (15th Ed) Pearson, 
2010. 
 
Brandsma, G.J., Curtin, D. and Meijer, A., “How Transparent are EU ‘Comitology’ 
Committees in Practice?” (2008) European Law Journal Vol. 14 No. 6 819.  
Bredimas, A., Methods of Interpretation and Community Law, Amsterdam; New 
York; Oxford: North-Holland, 1978. 
 





Burrows, N. and Greaves, R., The Advocate General and EC Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
 
Cabral, P., “Access to Member State Documents in EC Law” (2006) European Law 




! “The Law-making Power of the Judge and Its Limits” (1981) Monash 
University Law Review Vol. 8 15; 
! “Is the European Court of Justice ‘running wild’?”, (1987) 12 European Law 
Review Vol. 12  3. 
 
Cappelletti, M., and Golay D., “The Judicial Branch in the Federal and Transnational 
Union: Its Impact on Integration” in Cappelletti, M., Seccombe, M. and Weiler J., 
gen. eds., Integration Through Law: Vol. I: Methods, Tools and Institutions Book 2, 
Berlin and New York: de Gruyterm, 1986. 
 
Cardwell, P., French D., and White, N., “Case Comment Kadi v Council of the 
European Union (C-402/05 P)” (2009) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly Vol. 58 No. 1 229. 
 
Carolan, E., The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Carrick, R., Review of The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Law 
Beyond Constitutive Power by Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2009), (2011) European Law Journal Vol. 17 No.1 138. 
 
Chalmers, D., “Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Treaty” (2005) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law Vol. 3 No.2/3 448. 
 
Chalmers, D., Davies, G. and Monti, G., European Union Law (2nd Edition), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
 
Cohen, J. and Sabel, C., “Directly Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) European Law 




! “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework” (1997) Public Law Aut 467; 
! “The Jurisdiction of the Community Courts Reconsidered”, in de Búrca and 
Weiler (Eds.), The European Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, 2001.  
 
Craig, P. and de Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th Ed.) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 





Crombez, C., “The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about 
Nothing?” (2003) European Union Politics Vol. 4 No. 1 101. 
Curtin, D.: 
 
! “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces” 
(1993) Common Market Law Review Vol. 30 17; 
! Postnational Democracy: the European Union in Search of a Political 
Philosophy, The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 1997; 
! “Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account” 
(2007) European Law Journal Vol. 13 No. 4 523; 
! “Top Secret Europe” Inaugural Lecture 415 (delivered upon appointment to 
the chair of Professor of European Law at the University of Amsterdam on 20 
October 2011), Universiteit vvan Amsterdam, 2011. 
 
Curtin, D. and Meijer, A., “Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?” (2006) 
Information Polity Vol. 11 No. 2 109. 
 
Davies, G., “Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’ 
(2006) Common Market Law Review Vol. 43 63. 
Decker, F., “Governance Beyond the Nation-State. Reflections on the Democratic 
Deficit of the European Union” (2002) 9(2) Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 
9 No. 2 256. 
 
Dehousse, R., The European Court of Justice: the Politics of Judicial Integration, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998. 
 
Dewey, J., The Public and its Problems, A. Swallow: Denver, 1954. 
 
Dicey, A.V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan: 
London; New York, 1897. 
 
Dorsen, N., Rosenfeld, M., Sajó, A. and Baer, S., “Criminal Procedure (Due Process) 
“Comparative Constitutionalism St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2003. 
 
Dougan, M., “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts” (2008) 
Common Market Law Review Vol. 45 617. 
 
Due, O., “A Constitutional Court for the European Communities?” in D. Curtin and 
D. O’Keeffe, Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National 




! A Matter of Principle; Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 
1985; 





! Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Dyèvre, A., “The Constitutionalisation of the European Union: Discourse, Present, 
Future and Facts” (2005)  European Law Review Vol. 30 165. 
 
Enchelmaier, S., “No-One Slips Through the Net? Latest Developments, and Non-
Developments, in the European Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence on Art. 230 (4) EC” 




! “How the Court of Justice Works” (1995) European Law Review 539; 
! “The Role and Relevance of the Civil Law Tradition in the Work of the 
European Court of Justice,” in D.L. Carey Miller and R. Zimmerman, (eds.), 
The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays, 
Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, 1997. 
 
Ely, J.H., Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. 
 
Eriksen, E. and Fossum, J., “Conclusion: Legitimation Through Deliberation” in 
Eriksen and Fossum (Eds.), Democracy in the European Union: Integration Through 
Deliberation?, London; New York: Routledge, 2000. 
 
Everson, M. and Eisner, J., The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Law 
Beyond Constitutive Power, London and New York: Routledge, 2009.  
 
Fichera, M., “The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of 
Convenience?” (2009) European Law Journal Vol.15 No.1 70.  
 
Fletcher, M., “Extending ‘Indirect Effect’ to the Third Pillar: The Significance of 
Pupino?”, (2005) European Law Review Vol. 30 862. 
 
Føllesdal, A., “Democracy, Legitimacy and Majority Rule in the European Union” in 
A. Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: 
Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, London: Routledge, 1998. 
 
Føllesdal A. and Hix, S., “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response 
to Majone and Moravcsik” (2006) Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 44 No. 3 
533. 
 
Friedman, B., “The Politics of Judicial Review” (2005) Texas Law Review Vol. 84 
No. 2 257.  
 
Fuller, L., “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) Harvard Law Review 
Vol. 92 353. 
 





Gerstenberg, O., “Law’s Polyarchy: A Comment on Cohen and Sabel” (1997) 
European Law Journal Vol. 3 No. 4 343. 
 
Giddens, A., “Brave New World: The New Context of Politics”, in D. Miliband, 
(Ed.), Reinventing the Left, London: Polity Press, 1994. 
 
Giorgi, F., and Triart, N., “National Judges, Community Judges: Invitation to a 
Journey through the Looking-Glass — On the Need for Jurisdictions to Rethink the 
Inter-Systemic Relations beyond the Hierarchical Principle” (2008) European Law 
Journal Vol. 14 No. 6 693. 
 
Gormley, L.:  
 
! “Judicial Review in EC and EU Law – Some Architectural Malfunctions and 
Design Improvements?” (2000) Durham European Law Institute, available at 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/deli/annuallecture/2000_DELI_Lecture.pdf; 
! “Judicial Review: Advice for the Deaf?” (2006) Fordham International Law 
Journal  Vol. 29 655. 
 
Grande, E., “Post-National Democracy in Europe” in Greven and Pauly, Democracy 
Beyond the State? The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000. 
 
Green, A.W., Political Integration by Jurisprudence, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1969. 
 
Greven, M. “Can the European Union Finally Become a Democracy?” in Greven and 
Pauly (Eds.), Democracy Beyond the State?: The European Dilemma and the 
Emerging Global Order, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. 
 
Gulmann, C., “Methods of Interpretation of the Court of Justice” (1980) Stockholm 
Institute for Scandianvian Law 1957-2009, available at 
http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/24-8.pdf. 
 
Gustavsson, S., “Defending the Democratic Deficit” in A. Weale and M. Nentwich 
(Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice 
and Citizenship, London: Routledge, 1998. 
 
Habermas, J.:  
 
! The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989; 
! “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of 
Europe” (1992) Praxis International Vol. 12 1; 
! Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995; 
! “Paradigms of Law” in Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical 
Exchanges, edited by Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato, Berkeley, 
California; London: University of California Press, 1998: Chapter One; 





! The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (2nd Edition) The MIT 
Press, 1999; 
! “Why Europe Needs a Constitution” (2001) New Left Review Vol. 11 5. 
 
Halberstam, D., “The Bride of Messina: Constitutionalism and Democracy in 
Europe” (2005) European Law Review Vol. 30 No. 6 775. 
 
Hamson, C.J., “Methods of Interpretation – A Critical Assessment of the Results” 
(September, 1976) Judicial Academic and Conference; Luxembourg; Court of 
Justice of the European Communities Vol. II 1. 
 
Hart, H., The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
 
Hartley, T., “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the 
European Union” (1996) Law Quarterly Review Vol. 112 95.  
 
Hay, P., Federalism and International Organization, University of Illinois Press, 
1966. 
 
Held, D., Models of Democracy (2nd Edition), Oxford: Polity Press; Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996. 
 
Helliskoski, J. and Leino, P., “Darkness at the Break of Noon: The Case Law on 
Regulation No. 1049/2001 on Access to Documents” (2006) Common Market Law 
Review Vol. 43 735. 
 
Heywood, A., “Models of Democracy” in Politics (2nd Edition), Palgrave, 2002. 
 
Himsworth, C., “Devolution and its Jurisdictional Asymmetries” (2007) Modern Law 




! “Elections, Parties and Institutional Design. A Comparative Perspective on 
European Union democracy” (1998) 2(3) West European Politics  Vol. 2 No. 
3 19; 
! The Political System of the European Union (2nd ed.), Palgrave, 2005; 
! What’s Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It, Polity Press, 
2008. 
 
Horsley, T., “Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the 
Subsidiarity Jigsaw?” (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 50 No. 2 267. 
 
Hunt, J. and Shaw, J., “Fairy Tale of Luxembourg? Reflections on Law and Legal 
Scholarship in European Integration” in Reflections on European Integration: 50 
Years of the Treaty of Rome (Editors D. Phinnemore and A. Warleigh-Lack), 
Palgrave: Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009. 
 





Hunter, R., McGlynn, C. and Rackley, E., Feminist Judgments: From Theory to 
Practice, Hart Publishing, 2010. 
 
Jacobs, F.:  
 
! “The Member States, the Judges and the Procedure” in La Cour de Justice 
des Communautés Européennes et les États Membres, Institut D’Eudes 
Europénnes, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1980; 
! “Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitutional 
Court?” in D. Curtin and D. O’keeffe, Constitutional Adjudication in 
European Community and National Law, Essays for the Hon. Mr Justice TF 
O’Higgins, Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd., 1992. 
 
Joerges, C., “‘Deliberative Political Processes’ Revisited: What Have we Learnt 
about the Legitimacy of Supranational Decision-Making” (2006) Journal of 
Common Market Studies Vol. 44 779. 
 
Joerges, C. and Neyer, J., “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative 
Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology” (1997) European Law 
Journal Vol. 3 No. 3 273. 
 
Joerges, C. and Rödl, F., “Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ 
of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and 
Laval” (2009) European Law Journal Vol. 1 1.  
 
Johnston, A., “Judicial Reform and the Treaty of Nice” (2001) Common Market Law 
Review Vol. 38 499. 
 
Joutsamo, K., The role of Preliminary Rulings in the European Communities, Turku: 




! “The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation Under the 
Human Rights Act 1998” (2004) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 24 No. 
2 259; 
! Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
 
Kelsen, H., Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. 
 
Kennedy, T., “Thirteen Russians! The Composition of the European Court of 
Justice”, in AIL Campbell and M. Voyatzee, Legal Reasoning and Judicial 
Interpretation of European Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Mackenzie Stuart, 
London: Trenton Publishing, 1996. 
 
Keohane, R., Macedo, S. and Moravscik, A., “Democracy enhancing Multi-
Lateralism” (2009) International Organisation Vol. 63 No. 2 309. 





Kiiver, P., “The Early-Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: the National 
Parliament as a Conseil d’Etat for Europe” (2011) European Law Review Vol. 36 98. 
Koopmans, T.: 
 
! “The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integration” (1986) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 35 925; 
! “The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions” (1991) 




! “European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In Search of 
the Limits of Contrapunctual Principles” (2007) Vol. 44 Common Market 
Law Review 9; 
! “In the Court(s) we Trust? On the Need for Hierarchy and Differentiation in 
the Preliminary Ruling Procedure” (2007) European Law Review Vol. 32 No. 
4 467. 
 
Kuper, R., “The Many Democratic Deficits of the European Union” in A. Weale and 
M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, 
Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, London: Routledge, 1998. 
 
Kutscher, H., “Methods of Interpretation: As Seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice” 
(September, 1976) Judicial Academic and Conference; Luxembourg; Court of 
Justice of the European Communities Vol. I 1. 
 
Lavranos, N., “The New Specialised Courts within the European Judicial System” 
(2005) European Law Review Vol. 30 No. 2 261. 
 
Leczykiewicz, D., “Why Do the European Court of Justice Judges Need Legal 
Concepts?” (2008) European Law Journal Vol. 14 No. 6 773. 
 
Lefevre, S., “The Interpretation of Community Law by the Court of Justice in Areas 
of National Competence” (2004) European Law Review Vol. 29 No. 4 501. 
 
Lenaerts, K.:  
 
! “Some Thoughts about the Interactions between Judges and Politicians in the 
European Community” (1992) Yearbook of European Law Vol 12 1; 
! “Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law” 
(2003) International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 52 873; 
! “Interpretation and the Court of Justice: A Basis for Comparative 
Reflection”, The International Lawyer (2007) Vol. 41 No. 4 1011. 
 
 
Lenaerts, K. and Arts, D., Procedural Law of the European Union, London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1999. 






Lenaerts, K. and Cambien, N., “Regions and the European Court: Giving Shape to 
the Regional Dimension of the Member States” (2010) European Law Review Vol. 
35 No. 5 609. 
 
Lenaerts, K. and Corthaut, T.: 
 
! “Judicial Review and a Contribution to the Development of European 
Constitutionalism” (2003) Yearbook of European Law 1; 
! “Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law” 
(2006) European Law Review Vol. 31 287. 
 
Lever, A., “Democracy and Judicial Review: Are They Really Incompatible?” 
(2009) Perspectives on Politics Vol. 7 No. 4 805. 
Lininger, T., “On Dworkin and Borkin’” (2007) Michigan Law Review Vol. 105 
1315. 
 
Loc Hong, Q., “Constitutional Review in the Mega-Leviathan: A Democratic 
Foundation for the European Court of Justice” (2010) European Law Journal Vol. 
16 No. 6 695. 
Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge: University Press, 1960. 
Lord Howe of Aberavon, PC, QC, “Euro-Justice: Yes or No?” (1996) European Law 
Review Vol. 21 187. 
MacCormick, N.: 
! Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994; 
! “Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the ‘European 
Commonwealth’” (1997) Law and Philosophy Vol. 16 No. 4 331; 
! “Is There a Constitutional Path to Scottish Independence?” (2000) 




! “Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as Good as it Gets?” (2000) 
Constitutionalism Web-Papers ConWEB No. 5/2000, available at:  
http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb/. 
! “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action” in N. 
Walker (Ed.), Sovereignty in Transition, Hart Publishing, 2003: 501-537. 
 










Majone, G.:  
 
! “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards” (1998) 
European Law Journal Vol. 4 No. 1 5–28; 
! “Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU 
Governance” (2001) European Union Politics Vol. 2 103. 
 
Mance, J., “The Composition of the European Court of Justice” (2011) Presented to 
the United Kingdom Association for European Law, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_111019.pdf. 
 
Mancini, G.F., “Europe: The Case for Statehood” (1998) European Law Journal 
Vol. 4 No. 1 29. 
 
Mancini, G.F. and Keeling, D.T., “Democracy and the European Court of Justice”, 
(1994) Modern Law Review Vol. 57 No. 2 175. 
 
Martinico, G. and Pollicino, O., “Between Constitutional Tolerance and Judicial 
Activism: the ‘Specificity’ of European Judicial Law” (2008) European Journal of 
Law Reform Vol. 10 No. 1 125. 
 
Mendes, C.H., “Political Deliberation and Constitutional Review” in Imer Flores and 
Kenneth Himma (Eds.), Law, Liberty, and the Rule of Law, Ius Gentium: 
Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice Vol. 18, Springer Science+Business 
Media Dordrecht, 2013.  
 
Menon, A., and Weatherill, S., “Democratic Politics in a Globalising World: 
Supranationalism and Legitimacy in the European Union” (2007) LSE Law, Society 
and Economy Working Papers No. 13/2007, available at 
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm. 
 
Meyring, B., “Intergovernmentalism and Supranationality: Two Stereotypes for a 
Complex Reality” (1997) European Law Review Vol. 22 No. 3 221. 
 
Mitchell, J.D.B., “Why European Institutions?” (Nov, 1986) University of Edinburgh 
Inaugural Lecture No. 39.  
 
Moe, T., “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story” (1990) Journal of 
Law and Economic Organization Vol. 6 213. 
 
Moravscik, A.:  
 
! “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union” (2002) Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 40 No. 4 
603; 
! “The Myth of Europe’s Democratic Deficit” (2008) Intereconomics: Journal 
of European Public Policy 331. 
 





Neill, P., “The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism”, 
published in the Minutes of Evidence, House of Lords Sub-Committee on the IGC 
(Session 1994-95, 18th Report, HL Paper 88, pp 218-52); and published in London: 
European Policy Forum Frankfurt: Frankfurter Institut, 1995. 
 
Nentwich, M., “Opportunity Structures For Citizens’ Participation: The Case of the 
European Union” in A. Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the 
European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship, London: 
Routledge, 1998. 
 
Nic Shuibhne, N.:  
! “The Free Movement of Goods and Article 28 EC: An Evolving Framework” 
(2002) European Law Review  Vol. 27 No. 4 408; 
! “The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship” (2010) Common Market Law 
Review Vol. 47 1597. 
Nicol, D., “Democracy, Supremacy and the ‘Intergovernmental’ Pillars of the 
European Union”, (2009) Public Law Apr 218. 
 
Nyikos, S., “Strategic Interaction Among Courts Within the Preliminary Reference 
Process – Stage 1: National Court Preemptive Opinions” (2006) European Journal of 
Political Research Vol. 45 527. 
 
Papadopoulos, Y., “Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and 
Multilevel Governance” (2007) European Law Journal Vol. 13 No. 4 469. 
Peers, S. and Costa, M., Case Report on Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami EA v 




! “La Carence du Législateur Communautaire et le Devoir du Juge”, 
Rechtsvergleihung, Europarecht, Staatsintegration – Gedächtnisschrift für 
L.J.Constantinesco (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag), 1983; 
!  “The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of Community Law”, 
(1983) European Law Review Vol. 8 155. 
 
Petersmann, E., “Judging Judges: from ‘Principal-agent Theory’ to ‘Constitutional 
Justice’ in Multilevel ‘Judicial Governance’ of Economic Cooperation Among 
Citizens” (2008) Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 11 No. 4 827. 
 
Petkova, B. “Structural Changes and Decision-Making at the European Court of 
Justice after the Eastern Enlargement” (2010) Dublin, ECPR Conference on EU 
Politics. 
 
Plato, Republic (Translation by Robin Waterfield), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 






Posner, R., “The Supreme Court 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political Court” (2005) 




! On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study 
on Judicial Policymaking, Dordrecht; Lancaster: Nijhoff, 1986; 
! “Between Self-restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European 
Court” (1988) 13 European Law Review Vol. 13 28;  
! ‘Towards a Normative Theory of Interpretation of Community Law’ in Europe and 
America In 1992 and Beyond: Common Problems … Common Solutions? The 
University of Chicago Legal Forum, Vol., 1992: 135- 178. 
 
 
Rawlings, R., “Engaged Elites: Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in 
Commission Enforcement” (2000) European Law Journal Vol. 6 4. 
 
Rawls, J., Political Liberalism, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
1996. 
 
Raz, J., “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979: 210–29. 
 
Rosenfeld, M., “Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice 
and the US Supreme Court” (2006) International Journal of Constitutional Law Vol. 
4 No. 4 618. 
 
Sabel, C. and Gerstenberg, O., “Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: the 
ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order” (2010) European Law 
Journal Vol. 16 511. 
Schlesinger P. and Kevin, D., “Can the European Union Become a Sphere of 
Publics?” in Eriksen and Fossum (Eds.), Democracy in the European Union: 
Integration Through Deliberation?, London; New York: Routledge, 2000. 
 
Schmidt, V., Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Polities, Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Schütze, R., “Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism” 
(2009) Cambridge Law Journal  Vol. 68 525. 
Schwartzberg, M., “Athenian Democracy and Legal Change” (2004) The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 98 (2) 311. 
 
Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996. 
 





Shapiro, M., “The US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice Compared”, 
in Anand Menon, Martin Schai eds., Comparative Federalism: The European Union 
and the United States in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Siedentop, L., Democracy In Europe, London: Allen Lane, 2000.  
 
Smith, M., “Enforcement, Monitoring, Verification, Outsourcing: The Decline and 
Decline of the Infringement Process” (2008) European Law Review Vol. 33 No. 6  
777. 
 
Snell, J., “‘European Constitutional Settlement’, an Ever Closer Union, and the 
Treaty of Lisbon: Democracy or Relevance?” (2008) European Law Review Vol. 33 
No. 5 619. 
 
Solanke, I., “Diversity and Independence in the European Court of Justice” (2008-9) 
Columbia Journal of European Law 89. 
 
Spiermann, O., “The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of 
the European Community Legal Order” (1999) European Journal of International 
Law Vol. 10 No. 4 763. 
 
Stein, E., “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution” (1981) 
American Journal of International Law Vol. 75 1. 
 
Stone Sweet, A.: 
 
! “Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy” (2002) West European 
Politics Vol. 25 77; 
! The Judicial Construction of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A., “Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-
Majoritarian Institutions” (2002) West European Politics Vol. 25 1. 
 
Thym, D., “In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the 
Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court” (2009) Common Market Law 
Review Vol. 46 1795. 
 
Timmermans, C., “The Constitutionalization of the European Union” (2002) 21 
Yearbook of European Law Vol. 21 1. 
 
Tomkins, A., Our Republican Constitution, Oxford: Hart, 2005. 
 
Tomuschat, C., “Note on Kadi v Council and Commission (CFI)” (2006) Common 
Market Law Review Vol. 43 537. 
 
Toth, A., “Review of On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice by H. 
Rasmussen. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1986” (1987) Yearbook of 
European Law Vol. 7 No. 1 411. 








! “The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism” (1996) European Law Review 
Vol. 21 199; 
! “Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the 
Preliminary Reference Procedure” (2003) Common Market Law Review Vol. 40 No. 
1 9; 
! “Terrorism and the ECJ: Empowerment and Democracy in the EC Legal 
Order”, (2009) European Law Review Vol. 34 No. 1 103. 
 
 
Tridimas, T. and Gari, G., “Winners and Losers in Luxembourg: A Statistical 
Analysis of Judicial Review Before the European Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance (2001-2005)” (2010) European Law Review Vol. 35 No. 2 131. 
 
Turpin, C. and Tomkins, A., British Government and the Constitution: Text and 
Materials, Cambridge, [England]; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2011. 
 
Van Gerven, W.: 
 
! “The Role and Structure of the European Judiciary Now and in the Future” 
(1996) European Law Review Vol. 21 211; 
! The European Union: A Polity of States and Peoples Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2005. 
 
Vaubel, R. The Centralisation of Western Europe: The Common Market, Political 
Integration and Democracy, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1995. 
 
Vesterdorf, B., “A Constitutional Court for the EU” (2006) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law Vol. 4 No. 4. 
 
Waldron, J., Law and Disagreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Walker, N., “Surface and Depth: The EU’s Resilient Sovereignty Question” in J, 
Neyer and A. Wiener (Eds.), Political Theory of the European Union, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Waluchow, W., A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Weale, A., “Between Representation and Constitutionalism in the European Union” 
in A. Weale and M. Nentwich (Eds.) Political Theory and the European Union: 











!  Law and Integration in the European Union, Clarendon Press, 1995; 
! “Law and the Economic Objectives of the Union” (Chapter Nine) in Stephen 
Weatherill, Cases & Materials on EU Law (9th Edition), Oxford: Oxford 




! “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism” (1981) 
Yearbook of European Law Vol 1 267; 
! “The Court of Justice on Trial” (1987) Common Market Law Review Vol. 24 
555; 
! “The Transformation of Europe” (1991) The Yale Law Journal Vol. 100 
2403; 
! “European Democracy and its Critics: Polity and System” in The Constitution 
of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other Essays on 
European Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; 
! “Epilogue: Comitology as Revolution Infranationalism, Constitutionalism 
and Democracy” in C. Joerges and E. Vos (Eds.) EU Committees. Social 
Regulation, Law and Politics, Hart Publishing, 1999; 
! “Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg” (2000) Harvard 




Weiler, J., Haltern, U. and Mayer, F., “European Democracy and its Critique” (1995) 
West European Politics 18. 
 
White, R., “Separation of Powers and Legislative Supremacy” (2011) Law Quarterly 
Review Vol. 127 July 456. 
 
White, S., “Harmonisation of Criminal Law Under the First Pillar” (2006) European 
Law Review Vol. 31 No. 1 81.  
 
Zürn, M., “Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State” in Greven and Pauly 
(Eds.), Democracy Beyond the State?: The European Dilemma and the Emerging 
Global Order, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. 
 
Zweifel, T.:  
 
! Democratic Deficit? Institutions and Regulation in the European Union, 
Switzerland and the United States in Comparative Perspective, Lanham MD, 
2002; 









2. Institutional Publications 
 
Andersen, S. and Kourlis, R., “How it Works, Judicial Selection in the States, Why it 
Matters” (2008) Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, 
University of Denver.  




CJEU, “The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union (Proposals and 
Reflections)” (May, 1999), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/2458996/THE-
FUTURE-OF-THE-JUDICIAL-SYSTEM-OF-THE-EUROPEAN-UNION. 
 
CJEU, Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice, 2002, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_11035/rapports-annuels. 
 
CJEU, Les Juridictions des États membres de l’Union européenne: Structure et 
Organisation, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7231/, 2007.   
 
CJEU, Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice, 2009, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7032/.  
 




CJEU, Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the General Court, Annual report 
2011, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-
06/ra2011_statistiques_tribunal_en.pdf. 
 
CJEU, “Partial replacement of the Court of Justice and entry into office of a new 
Member of the General Court” ((8/10/2012) Press Release 126/12. 
 
CJEU, “Mr Vassilios Skouris is re-elected President of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union” (9/10/2012) 127/12.  
 
CJEU, “Mr Koen Lenaerts is elected as Vice-President of the Court of Justice” 
(9/10/2012) Press Release 128/12. 
 
CJEU, “Election of the Presidents of the Chambers of five Judges of the Court of 
Justice” (9/10/2012) Press Release 129/12. 
 
Council of the European Union, “IGC 2007 Mandate” (Brussels, 2007) POLGEN 74 
11218/07, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st11/st11218.en07.pdf. 
 





Council of the European Union and of the Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States, (Brussels, 2010) sse/SE/ms 5195/10. 
 
Donnelly, B. and Wagner, M., “Voting for Europe: Citizens, Elections and 
Referendums” Federal Trust, Policy Brief Number 27, 2006. 
 
European Convention on the Future of Europe, “Final Report of the Discussion 
Circle on the Court of Justice” (Brussels, 2003) CONV 636/03 CERCLE I 13. 
European Commission, Report by the Working Party on the Future of the European 
Communities’ Court System, May 2000, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/pdf/due_en.pdf. 
 
European Commission, “The Internal Market: Ten Years Without Frontiers” (2002) , 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/10years/docs/workingdoc/ 
workingdoc_en.pdf. 
 
European Commission, Green Paper, Public Access to Documents held by the 
Institutions of the European Community A Review, COM (2007) 185 Final (18 May 
2007). 
Interights, Report on “Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of 
Human Rights”, May 2003, available at http://www.interights.org/jud-ind-
en/index.html.  
 
Mancini, F., “The Practice, Procedure and Working Methods of the European Court 
of Justice”, (last updated, 2006) Lecture to the Law and Justice Foundation of New 
South Wales, available at 
http://ljf.itechne.com/ljf/app/&id=/EB1B6BA8391FA0C1CA2571960024FC2B. 
 
Skouris, V., Note on “Recommendation Relating to the Operating Rules of the Panel 
Provided for in Article 255 TFEU” to Mr. Miguel Angel Moratinos, President of the  
UK Parliament, “A Partnership of Nations” March 1996 (Cm 3181). 
 
UK Parliament, Constitutional Affairs Committee, Judicial Appointments and a 
Supreme Court (court of final appeal), First Report of Session 2003–04 Volume I: 
17.  
 
United Kingdom Independence Party Manifesto 2005, Available at 
http://www.stuartagnewmep.co.uk/stuartagnew/pdf/UKIPa4manifesto2005.pdf. 
 
Walker, N., “Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System”, 2010, The 
Scottish Government, available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/01/19154813/0. 
 





White, I., “Prisoners’ voting rights” (26 September 2012) Library of the House of 
Commons SN/PC/01764. 
 
(Unknown Author), Rapport de la délégation française sur le traité instituant la 
Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier; Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères, Paris, Octobre 1951. 
 
(Unknown Author), “A Summary Guide to the Treaty of Lisbon”, National Forum on 
Europe, January 2008. 
 














CJEU: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7045/.  
 
Edward, D.’s Publications:  http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/judge-david-edward-
oral-history/publications. 
 




European Convention on the Future of Europe: http://european-
convention.eu.int/EN/bienvenue/bienvenue2352.html?lang=EN. 
 
European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/your_rights/your_rights_en.htm.  
 





International Court of Justice: http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2.  
 











Justice at Stake Campaign: 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/issues/state_court_issues/election-vs-appointment/. 
 
Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales: 
http://ljf.itechne.com/ljf/app/&id=/EB1B6BA8391FA0C1CA2571960024FC2B. 
 








UK Parliament: http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/sub-judice/. 
 
UK Supreme Court: http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/. 
 
 
